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FOREWORD
We welcome the publication of Mine Action Review’s Clearing
the Mines 2019 in this important year of the Oslo Review
Conference, where the mine action community is taking stock
of progress made and setting the agenda for the next ﬁve
years. In positive developments, since last year’s report Jordan
has completed clearance of the remaining mined areas that
required veriﬁcation and Palau has determined that it does
not have any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. It is
always preferable to report good news, but the reason we came
together as Advisory Board members to support this project
was to ask the difﬁcult questions, even when we don’t like the
answers. This is how we improve programme performance.
We believe that Mine Action Review has changed the mine
action narrative since it was launched at the Third Review
Conference in 2014. Many states have shown great maturity
by engaging positively with the project and continue to do so,
even when this means openly discussing the challenges and
not just the progress. The Mine Action Review works best
where it has provoked debate and discussion. In-country
coalitions which bring together the national authority,
implementing partners, and donors, can use the annual
report to pull together towards completion, despite operators
working in a sector in which competition is hardwired in
national and international frameworks. Impressively, some of
the closest intra and inter-sector cooperation has happened in
the most challenging environments, where recent conﬂict has
led to new contamination – and new victims.
In around 20 of the total 34 affected states parties, there has
been progress in Article 5 implementation and we congratulate
them. But this progress is fragile and should not be taken for
granted, especially where long-standing programmes dealing
with legacy contamination risk being at the mercy of changing
political priorities of governments. States and mine action
programmes that do the right things in the right way need to
be supported and rewarded. This also means that national
governments need to allocate more of their own resources to
mine action, even if they’re not able to meet the donors half way.
More has happened in some of the most highly complex
environments, such as South Sudan and Afghanistan, than
in a number of wealthier and more stable states parties.
States with huge resources at their disposal have absolutely
no excuse for inaction. But as the report illustrates, in

some countries there is an unwillingness to apply good
practice in land release or worse still, inaction in survey and
clearance. Sadly, in a minority of countries and contexts even
the good faith application of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention that international law demands is being called
into question. The time has come for such inaction in Article 5
implementation to be addressed as a compliance issue.
Completion of clearance is of course of fundamental
importance, but how we get there is also a measure of success.
This year, for the ﬁrst time, the Mine Action Review asked basic
questions of mine action programmes on how they address
gender and diversity. There was not just a paucity of data but
an absence of understanding in far too many. Now that we know
how bad the problem is, we need to act to address it.
Looking ahead, the new landmine emergency in states such
as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has shown the value of our
work as a key protection issue. As NGOs, we are there to save
lives and safeguard livelihoods. We need to build on this and
ensure our work is ﬁrmly embedded in the wider humanitarian
response in the face of increasingly complex conﬂict. Where
mine contamination is less of a humanitarian imperative and
more of a disarmament and developmental endeavour, we need
to be relevant to development agendas and the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), and to help address the impact on
mine action of the environmental crisis facing our planet.
All of us in the mine action sector need to commit to not
repeat errors of years ago, as we have no time to waste. It is
utterly unacceptable to be wasting time and money clearing
uncontaminated land. In addition, it does not matter under
the Treaty how anti-personnel mines were produced: all
improvised, as well as more conventionally manufactured
mines designed to be detonated by a person are covered and
banned. All must be cleared, destroyed, and reported on.
We also need to plan for completion and the management
of residual risk, link our work to assistance to victims,
meaningfully mainstream gender and diversity, coordinate
our efforts, and actively engage in the transparent and open
discussions which need to be had.
So in Oslo, let us look forward to the next ﬁve years and
accelerate the pace of change in our sector as we push on
towards 2025. If we are not being bold, we are not doing
enough, and that is simply not an option.

JANE COCKING

PER HÅKON BREIVIK

JAMES COWAN CBE DSO

Chief Executive
Mines Advisory Group

Director | Department for Mine Action
and Disarmament | Norwegian People’s Aid

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer
The HALO Trust
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■

In the 20 years since the entry into force of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on
1 March 1999, a total of at least 2,880 square
kilometres of mined area has been cleared. This
equates to an area greater than the size of Nairobi,
New York City, and Rome combined. Operations have
destroyed more than 4.6 million anti-personnel mines.

■

In 2018 alone, a global total of more than 155 square
kilometres was cleared of anti-personnel mines; with
more than 96% of recorded clearance in states parties
to the APMBC. This represents a 16% increase on the
2017 total (almost 134 square kilometres). The true
total area of clearance is probably considerably greater,
but data recording and reporting problems, especially
in Iraq, prevent accurate reporting of a higher ﬁgure,
in addition to a lack of transparency by several states
not party.

■

■

Clearance operations in 2018 destroyed more than
146,200 anti-personnel mines while “spot tasks”
destroyed a further 7,600. In total, more than 153,800
emplaced anti-personnel mines were destroyed during
clearance and explosive ordnance disposal operations
(EOD), compared to 181,600 in 2017. In addition, over
38,500 anti-vehicle mines were also destroyed during
clearance of mined areas in 2018, signiﬁcantly higher
than the 7,500 destroyed in 2017.
Two states fulﬁlled their APMBC Article 5 obligations
to survey and clear all mined areas containing
anti-personnel mines in 2018: Jordan and Palau.
Jordan completed veriﬁcation of mined area that
had not been cleared to humanitarian standards,
while Palau conﬁrmed that survey of potentially
contaminated areas was complete and that no mined
areas had been identiﬁed.

■

As at 1 October 2019, 56 states and 3 other areas were
conﬁrmed or suspected to have anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control.1
Of the 56 states, 34 are party to the APMBC. These
include Cameroon and Nigeria, both of which have mined
area under their jurisdiction or control as a result of the
use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature by
Boko Haram, but which have yet to request an extension
to their respective Article 5 deadline.

■

In the last 20 years, 33 states (all states parties to the
APMBC, except for Nepal) and 1 other area (Taiwan),
have completed mine clearance.2

■

Although all estimates should be treated with caution
– and the picture is complicated by the addition
of signiﬁcant amounts of new contamination from
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature in a
relatively small number of countries – Mine Action
Review estimates that global contamination from
anti-personnel mines covers no more than 2,000
square kilometres in total.

■

Based on Mine Action Review’s assessment of the
extent of contamination in affected states parties,
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq are massively
contaminated (deﬁned as covering more than 100km2
of land), while heavy contamination (covering more
than 20km2) exists in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. In other affected states,
the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is
medium or light.

■

For operations in 2018, six states parties had demining
programmes Mine Action Review rated as good:
Afghanistan, Jordan (which has now fulﬁlled its Article
5 obligations), Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom,
and Zimbabwe. A further 11 states parties had
demining programmes rated as average: Angola, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Oman,
Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey.
Colombia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru,
Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen attained only a rating of
“poor”, while Chad, Eritrea, Niger, and Senegal all rated
“very poor”.

■

However, several affected states parties to the APMBC,
including Eritrea, Niger, and Senegal, seemingly
released no mined area in areas under their jurisdiction
or control in 2018, putting their compliance with the
duty in Article 5 to complete clearance “as soon as
possible” into very serious question.

1

Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo,
Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States parties to the APMBC are in bold. Other areas are
in italics.

2

States Parties: Albania, Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, France, The Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala,
Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Republic of North Macedonia, Palau, Rwanda, Suriname,
Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zambia; State not Party: Nepal; and “other area” Taiwan. States parties in italics are those that reported mined
areas under the APMBC, and which have subsequently reported completion under the APMBC.
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KEY FINDINGS

KEY FINDINGS

OVERVIEW
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC) entered into force as binding
international law on 1 March 1999. Its implementation has
encompassed sustained action to rid the world of millions
upon millions of emplaced anti-personnel mines. Demining
programmes over the past 20 years in some 90 countries
worldwide have cleared a total of at least 2,880 square
kilometres of mined area, with the destruction of more than
4.6 million anti-personnel mines. Tens of thousands of lives
have undoubtedly been saved as a direct result of mine
action, and demining’s broader contribution to development
has been huge. This herculean effort been supported by
more than US$10 billion of combined national funding and
international aid.
From the ﬁrst 40 states that ratiﬁed the Convention,
triggering its entry into force, the APMBC has grown to boast
a membership of 164 parties. It is the most widely ratiﬁed
conventional disarmament treaty in history, with only 33
states still to adhere, one of which is a treaty signatory.
Traditionally, disarmament treaties were preventive
instruments of international law, seeking to remove weapons
from the hands of states before they could be used, or used
widely. The APMBC differs in that it also addresses the harm
that has been inﬂicted by use of the weapons it prohibits. Its
provisions do sustain a preventive approach, requiring its
states parties to destroy all but a handful of anti-personnel
mines that can be lawfully retained for training in mine
clearance. But, signiﬁcantly, a duty is also imposed to clear
all anti-personnel mines on the territory of a state party
(irrespective of whoever laid them) as well as on any areas
its forces occupy abroad. It also sets a time-bound deadline
for this clearance. Under Article 5 of the Convention, each
state is obligated to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than ten years after becoming a
state party to the Convention. This duty of clearance is a
remarkable innovation in international law.
And where gaps in the legal framework for this clearance
have become clear, states parties have acted to ﬁll them.
The APMBC did not address the legal ramiﬁcations of a
state party ﬁnding anti-personnel mine contamination after
its ten-year deadline had expired. But this occurred during
implementation of the Convention.1 Accordingly, in 2012
the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties agreed that such a
state should either clear and report (if the contamination

2 Clearing the Mines 2019

was minimal) or seek a new deadline for clearance. Niger,
which discovered colonial-era mineﬁelds laid by France
on its north-eastern border in 2012, submitted an Article 5
deadline extension request in June 2013. This procedure is
also relevant for both Cameroon and Nigeria, part of whose
territory has been contaminated with anti-personnel mines
of an improvised nature laid by Boko Haram, and whose
original 10-year clearance deadlines have already expired.
However, as at 1 October 2019, neither Cameroon nor Nigeria
had sought a new Article 5 deadline for clearance, which they
must both do as soon as possible to ensure compliance with
the Convention.
During the negotiation of the APMBC, the issue arose of what
would happen to those states whose contamination was so
signiﬁcant that ten years would not be sufﬁcient to complete
clearance. The suggestion was made to adapt and apply
the approach from the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention,
which allowed states parties that were unable to complete
stockpile destruction within the allotted period to seek a
(single) extension to the deadline. States negotiating the
APMBC agreed to allow heavily affected states parties to
seek multiple extensions, but each may be for no more than
ten years. Subsequently, states parties have also shown
ﬂexibility in allowing extensions purely for survey, to enable
an affected state party to better understand the extent of
contamination. As discussed below, high-quality survey is
integral to an effective and efﬁcient mine action programme.
Unfortunately, the extension process has also allowed states
to drag their feet on clearance. Currently, almost every
state party, whether their contamination is great or small, is
subject to an extended deadline. Only recent adherents Oman,
Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka are facing
their initial Article 5 deadline, and of these only Sri Lanka is
currently on course to meet it. Worse, a number of states
have failed to request extensions to their deadlines, putting
them in serious violation of the Convention. Eritrea was, as
of writing, the latest state to ﬁnd itself in such a position,
having failed to submit an Article 5 deadline extension
request as at 1 October 2019. It joins Ethiopia, Jordan, and
Ukraine on the list of those who have been in violation for
lack of an extended deadline, but each subsequently returned
to compliance: Ethiopia and Ukraine through requesting and
gaining approval of new Article 5 deadlines, and Jordan by
completing clearance of remaining mined areas.

AFFECTED COUNTRIES
In 1999, when the APMBC entered into force, it was suspected
that as many as 91 states and 4 “other areas” were mine- or
UXO-affected. Over time, ﬁve further states were found to
have conﬁrmed or suspected mined area, three as a result
of new information, 2 and two as a result of existing states
allowing part of the sovereign territory to secede and become
a new state,3 while seven states were found to be affected
only by UXO. Since 1999 and through 1 October 2019, a total

of 33 states have completed mine clearance; all but one of
these states (Nepal) are party to the APMBC (see Table 1).
In 2018, two states parties fulﬁlled their Article 5 demining
obligations: Jordan and Palau.
Taiwan completed mine clearance several years ago,
leaving Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara
as mine-affected “other areas”.

Table 1: Completion of Demining of Anti-Personnel Mined Area Since 1997*
State
Albania**
Algeria**
Bhutan**
Bulgaria**
Burundi**
Rep. of Congo**
Costa Rica**

France**
The Gambia**
Germany**
Greece**
Guatemala**
Guinea-Bissau**
Honduras**

Malawi**
Mauritania**
Montenegro
Mozambique** & ***
Nepal
Nicaragua**
North Macedonia**

Rwanda**
Suriname**
Swaziland**
Tunisia**
Uganda**
Venezuela**
Zambia**

(previously known as the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

Denmark**
Djibouti**
Total

Hungary**
Jordan**

Palau

Other area
Taiwan
33 states and 1 other area

* States parties to the APMBC are in bold. The sole other area (Taiwan) is in italics.
** States parties which reported mined areas under the APMBC and subsequently reported completion.
*** Mozambique has four very small suspected mined areas that remain underwater. These areas, which were declared by Mozambique to the other APMBC states parties,
must be released as soon as possible.

Table 2: Global Anti-Personnel Mine Contamination (at 1 October 2019)
States parties
Afghanistan
Angola
Argentina*
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Nigeria**
Oman
Palestine
Peru

Cambodia
Cameroon**
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Croatia
Cyprus
DR Congo
Ecuador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Iraq
Niger

Senegal
Serbia
Somalia
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Yemen
Zimbabwe

34 states parties

States not party
Armenia
Azerbaijan
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
22 states not party

Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Myanmar
North Korea
Pakistan
Russia
South Korea
Syria
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Other areas
Kosovo
Nagorno-Karabakh
Western Sahara
3 other areas

* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.
The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.
** Have not yet submitted a request to extend their Article 5 deadline.
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MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Table 3 below summarises what is known or reasonably
believed about the extent of contamination in affected states
parties. It is therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review
of the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination based on
available evidence, as opposed to the claims of governments
or mine action programmes, some of which do not stand up
to scrutiny.
In nearly three quarters of affected states parties, the extent
of anti-personnel mine contamination is believed to be
medium or light. In these states, the necessary survey and
clearance could be completed within a few years with the
necessary approach and commitment.
Over the coming 18 months, both Chile and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DR Congo) are expected to complete mine
clearance on their respective territory. Chile has an Article
5 deadline of 1 March 2020 while DR Congo is obligated to
complete mine clearance by 1 January 2021. If, however, by
November 2019, Chile is not ﬁrmly on course to complete
clearance in time, at the Fourth Review Conference it should

request a short extension period (of no more than one year)
in order to fulﬁl its Article 5 obligations in a treaty-compliant
manner. Sri Lanka may complete mine clearance in the
course of 2021, which would make it one of the most heavily
affected states yet to do so.
Other welcome news has come from Cyprus and Angola.
A series of conﬁdence-building measures agreed upon
in February 2019 by the President of Cyprus, Nicos
Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci,
included survey and clearance of 18 suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs), nine on each side of the buffer zone. It is
expected that this work will be completed by February 2020.
Cyprus could be made a mine-free island in short order if all
the parties agreed to facilitate the United Nations and their
contractors in this endeavour, something they have not thus
far agreed to do. In Angola, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
reported completing clearance of all known and registered
tasks in Malanje province in 2018, putting the province on
track to become Angola’s ﬁrst to be declared free of the
threat of mines.

Table 3: Extent of Anti-Personnel Mined Areas in Affected States Parties (at 1 October 2019)
Massive (>100km2)

Heavy (>20km2)

Medium (2–20km2)

Afghanistan
Cambodia
Iraq

Angola
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Thailand
Turkey
Yemen

Argentina*
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Croatia
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Palestine
Somalia
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tajikistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Zimbabwe

Light (<2km2) or extent
of contamination unclear
Cameroon**
Cyprus
DR Congo
Ecuador
Niger
Nigeria**
Oman
Peru
Senegal
Serbia

* Argentina is considered mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.
The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.
** Has not yet submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline.

NEW CONTAMINATION AND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES OF AN IMPROVISED NATURE
But new contamination is still being added to the global
problem, largely at the hands of non-state armed groups.
Use of mines of an improvised nature, predominantly by
Islamic State, has added huge swathes of new contamination
to an already huge problem in Iraq and created one in
Syria. Anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature pose
the biggest humanitarian threat in Afghanistan (despite a
signiﬁcant threat coming also from anti-vehicle mines), with
contamination continuing to expand as a result of persistent
conﬂict. In Yemen, huge quantities of anti-personnel mines of
an improvised nature have been laid by Houthi forces over
the past three years. In Colombia, new mines have been laid
in recent times, often to protect coca production, but also as a
result of a rise in the resurgence of non-state armed groups.

4 Clearing the Mines 2019

These improvised munitions are both captured by and
prohibited under the APMBC whenever they are designed
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person. It does not matter under the APMBC how these
weapons were produced or employed, nor by whom they
were laid; if they fall within the jurisdiction or control of a
state party, all of the Convention’s provisions apply, including
obligations to clear and report under Article 5 and Article 7,
respectively, just as they do to more conventionally
manufactured anti-personnel mines.

Accordingly, in states parties affected by victim-activated
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the deﬁnition
of an anti-personnel mine, all relevant stakeholders should
support the national authorities to correctly record and
report this type of mine contamination under the APMBC,
along with the requisite efforts to survey and clear it. This
requires the use of reporting forms and establishment
of information management systems that are able to

disaggregate victim-activated IEDs that meet the treaty
deﬁnition of an anti-personnel mine, from time delay-,
command detonated-, or suicide borne-IEDs, all of which do
not. Recording and reporting by APMBC states parties of
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature only under
the catch-all term “IED” is legally incorrect and should be
treated as a compliance issue.
Unfortunately, to date, the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) has, in a number of key countries, impeded
compliance with the APMBC in this regard. It has done so
by declining to require that demining actors report victimactivated devices of an improvised nature as anti-personnel
mines, which would help ensure that states parties recognise
and comply with the full extent of their APMBC obligations
under international law. In Iraq, for instance, where UNMAS
is the main channel for international mine action funding, it
does not disaggregate results of clearance by operators it
contracts to report anti-personnel mines of an improvised
nature even though this is required by the APMBC. In
Afghanistan, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA), acting on advice from UNMAS, reports on the
protection of civilians describing all anti-personnel mines
using the term IED.

CLEARANCE IN 2018
Globally, clearance in 2018 covered more than 155 square kilometres of mined area. This was a 16% increase on clearance in
2017, but still amounted to the third lowest output in more than a decade, in part a reﬂection of continuing economic pressures
on the mine action sector. The number of anti-personnel mines destroyed in demining programmes dropped signiﬁcantly in
2018, down to just over 153,800 from more than 181,000 the previous year, raising concerns about the targeting of clearance.
However, the number of emplaced anti-vehicle mines destroyed in 2018 was over 38,500, a marked increase from the 7,500
in 2017. Table 4 summarises clearance output in major mine action programmes globally in 2018 and describes changes in
recorded clearance compared to 2017.
Table 4: Major Recorded Anti-Personnel Mine Clearance in 2018*

State/area*

Area cleared
in 2018 (km2)

AP mines
destroyed
(excluding spot tasks)

Comparison to
2017 clearance
(+/- km2)

Croatia

48.8

984

+ 18.4

The huge increase in clearance output for 2018
over the previous year is in part because of a
change in the recording of clearance output
(now only upon ofﬁcial certiﬁcation). In addition,
realisation of major funds for demining in forests
was delayed to 2018.

Cambodia

41.0

11,718

+ 13.3

Overall land release output in Cambodia fell
slightly in 2018 compared to the previous year
even though clearance increased signiﬁcantly. To
reach its ambitious targets tor 2025, Cambodia
will need to secure additional funding and extra
capacity and gain access to the non-demarcated
border areas with Thailand.

Afghanistan

30.9

8,818

+ 2.7

The mine action programme has maintained
anti-personnel mine clearance at a consistent level
in the face of funding and insecurity constraints,
but in 2018 was still elaborating its strategy for
dealing with mines of an improvised nature.

Iraq

8.4**

9,112

- 14.9

Iraq achieved very signiﬁcant destruction of
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature
in 2018, but the inability or unwillingness of the
authorities to disaggregate the destruction of
mines from that of remotely detonated IEDs has
prevented accurate reporting.

Sri Lanka

3.5

31,323

0.3

Sri Lanka has set a highly ambitious goal of
completing clearance of all mines and by end
2020. It did not, however, meet its national mine
action strategy target for land release in 2018 and
the 2020 goal is entirely dependent on increasing
clearance resources.

Comment
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The APMBC text and the travaux préparatoires of the
Convention make that clear. This has also been highlighted
by the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation in
its “Reﬂections and understandings on the implementation
and completion of Article 5 mine clearance obligations”;4
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in its non-paper, “Views and Recommendations on
Improvised Explosive Devices Falling Within the Scope of
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention”; in the UN General
Assembly 73/67 Resolution of December 2018; and in the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) glossary. Mine
Action Review hopes that the issue of whether anti-personnel
mines of an improvised nature fall under the APMBC – which
should not have been open to debate in the ﬁrst instance – is
ﬁnally put to bed at the Fourth Review Conference.

Area cleared
in 2018 (km2)

(excluding spot tasks)

Comparison to
2017 clearance
(+/- km2)

Western
Sahara

2.4

37

+ 2.1

In 2018, according to UNMAS, a total of just over
2.38km2 of mined area was cleared, but with the
destruction of only 37 anti-personnel mines.

Zimbabwe

2.1

22,013

+ 0.4

A total of nearly 9.4km2 of land was released in
2018, surpassing Zimbabwe’s 2018 target for land
release under its national mine action strategy.

South Sudan

2.1

1,163

+ 0.4

While South Sudan will not meet its current Article
5 deadline of 2021, its remarkable progress in
land release output and obtaining a more realistic
picture of remaining contamination in 2018 place it
in a much better situation as it prepares its second
Article 5 deadline extension request, with a much
more achievable problem to tackle.

Somalia

1.6

220

+ 0.7

Of the total clearance in 2018, 0.03km2 was cleared
in Somalia (no AP mines destroyed), 1.49km2 in
Somaliland (219 AP mines destroyed), and 0.08km2
in disputed area (1 AP mine destroyed). Land
release outputs remained limited in 2018, primarily
due to ongoing armed conﬂict, new security threats,
and a lack of resources and operational capacity.

United
Kingdom

1.5

588

+ 0.4

The United Kingdom released nearly 1.5km2
of mined area in 2018 and conducted technical
survey of the eight mined areas which will remain
as at the end of the current phase of demining in
March 2020.

Turkey

1.2

22,220

+ 0.4

Turkey increased its clearance output in 2018, and
also cancelled a signiﬁcant amount of mined area
on the Syrian border.

Ethiopia

1.1

582

+0.7

With a poor track record for clearance in recent
years, it is encouraging that Ethiopia reported
clearing 1.1km2 in 2018, with the destruction of
582 anti-personnel mines. In addition, there was
also signiﬁcant cancellation through non-technical
survey.

Angola

1.0

1,646

- 0.2

Funding constraints are impeding progress
in Angola, especially since the US decision to
withdraw its support for mine action there.
Collectively, the resources of the three largest
operators in Angola, HALO Trust, Mines Advisory
Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid, have declined
by nearly 90% over the past decade.

Sudan

1.0

31

+ 0.3

Despite increased clearance in 2018, only 31
anti-personnel mines were destroyed, raising
questions about the targeting of demining efforts.

Chile

1.0

3,908

+ 0.1

It is unclear whether Chile is on track to meet its
impending Article 5 deadline as the small increase
in clearance output in 2018 may not be enough to
enable it to meet its legal target.

Colombia

1.0

322

+0.5

Colombia is not on track to meet its current Article
5 deadline and has already stated it will request a
second extension in 2020.

Jordan

1.0

6

- 0.4

Jordan completed clearance/veriﬁcation in 2018,
which explains the drop in area cleared and the
small number of anti-personnel mines destroyed.

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

0.9

2,101

+ 0.2

The amount of land released through clearance
and cancelled through non-technical survey in
2018 was a slight increase on 2017, while technical
survey output decreased slightly. Efforts in the
latter half of 2018 were put into the “country
assessment” project, to set a new baseline for
realistic Article 5 implementation planning.

State/area*
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AP mines
destroyed

Comment

(excluding spot tasks)

Comparison to
2017 clearance
(+/- km2)

Tajikistan

0.6

4,998

+ 0.0

Tajikistan cleared nearly 0.6km2 of mined area
in 2018, less than it had planned to clear and
substantially less than the amount foreseen in its
deadline extension request.

Thailand

0.5

7,392

+ 0.1

Land release output in 2018 was on a par with
2017. Its land release targets are ambitious and
require sustained funding, extra capacity, and a
resolution of border demarcation issues that affect
responsibility for mined areas.

North Korea

0.3

636

+0.3

In 2018, clearance took place of a Joint Security
Area by North and South Korea, in which North
Korea cleared 636 mines. North Korea also
reportedly cleared a 1.3km2-long mine belt in the
Arrowhead Hill region.

Other
programmes

3.5

16,443

Spot task
clearance
Totals

AP mines
destroyed

Comment

7,613
155.4

153,874

* APMBC states parties are in bold. Other areas are in italics. Clearance ﬁgures are rounded to the nearest decimal point.
** As compared to 2017 estimate. 2018 data excludes items recorded only as IEDs and not disaggregated.

The disparity in density of contamination is obvious from Table 4. But while some contaminated areas will certainly be very
much more heavily mined than others, ﬁgures of 37 anti-personnel mines cleared from 2.4km2 of mined area in Western
Sahara and 31 anti-personnel mines cleared from 1km2 of mined area in Sudan raise serious questions about the quality
of survey.

CLEARANCE SINCE 1999
In the past 20 years of clearance through the end of 2018, a
total of more than 2,880 square kilometres of mined area has
been cleared. This equates to an area greater than the size
of Nairobi, New York City, and Rome combined. Operations
have destroyed more than 4.6 million anti-personnel mines.
Of the total global clearance since the entry into force of the
APMBC, 1,780 square kilometres were cleared in the last
decade, as Figure 1 illustrates.
This suggests that at current rates of clearance, most
countries would be cleared of mine contamination by
2030, the deadline for the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), leaving just a small number of
conﬂict-affected regions to be addressed in the 2030s. SDG
16.1 seeks a signiﬁcant reduction in all forms of violence
and related death rates everywhere.5

Figure 1: Clearance in 2009-2018
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State/area*

Area cleared
in 2018 (km2)

COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
The impressive overall progress achieved under the auspices
of the APMBC has, however, not been either smooth or
consistent across states parties. Many have been too slow
to initiate and conduct mine clearance; a few, notably the
United Kingdom, failed to clear a single mined area during
the 10 years originally allotted under the Convention for
clearance to be completed (it is, however, now making solid
progress towards completion). In more recent times, Chad,
Ecuador, Eritrea, Niger, Peru, and Senegal have carried out
little or no clearance of mined areas over the past ﬁve years,
putting their compliance with the duty in Article 5 to complete
clearance “as soon as possible” into very serious question. In
Ecuador, as of writing, due to the lack of budget for demining,
only two days of clearance operations were planned for
the whole of 2019. This simply does not comply with the
requirements of the APMBC. Other states parties have
resisted clearing mines laid in sensitive areas, such as along
national borders or around military facilities. Such inaction is
not permitted by the Convention.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND COMPLIANCE
Two states parties, Jordan and Palau, fulﬁlled their Article
5 obligations in 2018. That leaves 34 states parties with
outstanding Article 5 obligations of survey and clearance.
Table 5 summarises the situation in these 34 states parties
and identiﬁes key implementation priorities. Of these 34
states parties, only 5 – DR Congo, Serbia, Sri Lanka, the
United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe – were on track to meet
their respective Article 5 deadlines as at 1 October 2019.
The position in Chile was unclear, even though its Article 5
deadline expires on 1 March 2020.

Table 5: Progress by Affected States Parties in Implementing Article 5 of the APMBC
State
Party

Article 5
deadline

Status of
progress

Implementation
priorities

Argentina

1 January
2020

Three-year
extension requested

Renew earlier offer to the United Kingdom to support demining of the
Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

Cambodia

1 January
2020

Five-year extension
requested

Accelerate clearance of dense anti-personnel mined areas and
only clear land with ﬁrm evidence of contamination. Conclude early
agreements with Thailand on border demining and commence
pilot-project clearance without delay.

Chad

1 January
2020

Five-year extension
requested

Complete national non-technical survey as soon as possible and
restart clearance operations.

Eritrea

1 February
2020

Not on track and no
extension requested
as of writing

An extension must be requested and granted by the Fourth Review
Conference if Eritrea is not to be in serious violation of the APMBC.
Eritrea should report on progress in demining as required by the
Convention and respect its international legal duty to clear mined
areas as soon as possible.

Chile

1 March
2020

Unclear whether
on track and no
extension requested
as of writing

Accelerate clearance in order to meet the Article 5 deadline (or
request a one-year extension to ﬁnish the job, for consideration
and approval at the Fourth Review Conference).

Yemen

1 March
2020

Three-year interim
extension requested

Conduct a nationwide survey to generate a baseline of mine
contamination, and strengthen coordination, national standards,
and information management.

Tajikistan

1 April 2020

Five-year,
nine-month
extension requested

Complete survey of all mined areas and secure the additional funding
needed to expand capacity in line with its Article 5 extension request
projections.

Ethiopia

1 June 2020

Five-year, sevenmonth extension
requested

Seek additional capacity and resources needed to implement its
Article 5 deadline extension request projections and cooperate in
cross-border mine action activities with Eritrea.

Niger

31 December
2020

Not on track

Submit a detailed workplan and accelerate demining to complete
clearance within no more than two years.

DR Congo

1 January
2021

On track

Submit a detailed workplan and complete clearance as soon as
possible, but no later than 1 January 2021.

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

1 March 2021

Interim extension
granted in 2018 for
new national survey

Complete its “country assessment” project on schedule and prepare
its upcoming Article 5 deadline extension request based on realistic
planning and concrete milestones.

Colombia

1 March 2021

Not on track

Conduct national baseline survey of contamination and signiﬁcantly
strengthen the effectiveness of its management and coordination of
mine action.

Senegal

1 March 2021

Not on track

Complete non-technical survey and clear all mined areas with firm
evidence of contamination as soon as possible.
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Article 5
deadline

Status of
progress

Implementation
priorities

Ukraine

1 June 2021

Not on track

Ensure no use of anti-personnel mines by its forces and formally
establish a national mine action centre to facilitate better coordination,
elaboration of a national strategy, and reporting under the APMBC.

South
Sudan

9 July 2021

Not on track

Set concrete and realistic annual targets for completing survey and
clearance in its forthcoming Article 5 deadline extension request.

Turkey

1 March
2022

Not on track

Approve and publish its national strategic mine action plan for 2019-21
as soon as possible and move forward, without delay, to expand
large-scale survey and clearance of border and non-border areas.

Cyprus

1 July 2022

Not on track

Cyprus and Turkey to facilitate clearance of all mined areas inside and
outside the Buffer Zone.

Somalia

1 October
2022

Not on track

Conduct a national survey to elaborate a baseline of mine
contamination.

Ecuador

31 December
2022

Not on track

Accelerate demining to complete clearance as soon as possible, but no
later than the end of 2022.

Afghanistan

1 March
2023

Not on track

Incorporate in reporting data on contamination and clearance of all antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature to comply with the APMBC.
Present revised milestones for clearance that reﬂect reduced funding
and clarify the implications for meeting its Article 5 deadline.

Serbia

1 March
2023

On track (just) to
meet extended
deadline granted
in 2018

Fully apply land release methodologies including non-technical and
technical survey, to improve operational efﬁciency.

Sudan

1 April
2023

Not on track

Clarify plans for demining in Western Kordofan state and Abyei.

Thailand

31 October
2023

Unclear whether
on track

Accelerate non-technical survey and clearance to achieve its extension
request land release milestones and conclude early agreements with
Cambodia on border demining and commence pilot-project clearance
without delay.

United
Kingdom

1 March
2024

On track to meet
extended deadline
granted in 2018

Provide an update on the results of technical survey of the remaining
eight mined areas in Yorke Bay and on the planned timeline for
contracting and completing clearance of this ﬁnal phase of demining.

Peru

31 December
2024

Unclear whether
on track

Consider using mine detection dogs or other technical survey methods
to speed up land release in the Condor mountain range.

Oman

1 February
2025

Unclear whether
on track

Continue to release mined areas with a view to completion as
soon as possible and no later than 1 February 2015. Seek to apply
non-technical and technical survey, to conﬁrm contamination prior
to clearance, whenever possible.

Angola

31 December
2025

Not on track

Strengthen coordination, improve its national mine action database,
and complete a comprehensive review of its national mine action
standards.

Zimbabwe

31 December
2025

On track

Continue to accelerate clearance with a view to completion as soon as
possible, but no later than the end of 2025.

Croatia

1 March
2026

Unclear whether
on track to meet
extended deadline
granted in 2018

Enhance use of non-technical and technical survey to improve land
release efﬁciency.

Iraq

1 February
2028

Not on track

Incorporate in its reporting data on contamination and clearance of
all anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature (instead of reporting
them within the catch-all category of IEDs) to comply with the APMBC.

Palestine

1 June 2028

Not on track

Report accurately and consistently on the extent of mined area and
annual clearance output.

Sri Lanka

1 June 2028

On track

Complete clearance as soon as possible, with the aim to fulﬁl Article 5
obligations by 2021.

States parties without a future deadline
Cameroon

1 March 2013

Needs extension

Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey
in Extrême-Nord (Far North) region.

Nigeria

1 March 2012

Needs extension

Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey
in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.
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State
Party

Demining security continues to be a challenge in certain
conﬂict-affected states parties, including Afghanistan,
Cameroon, Chad, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, DR Congo, Colombia,
Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen, further impeding
Article 5 compliance. Afghanistan’s increasingly volatile
security environment poses a major challenge to operators.
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) recorded
29 security incidents in 2018 in which 6 deminers were killed
and a further 18 injured. In Senegal in 2019, ﬁve deminers were
kidnapped for a day by a non-state armed group in Casamance.
In 2019, Afghanistan became the ﬁrst country programme
to release a national standard for tackling mines of an
improvised nature. AMAS 06.10: Abandoned Improvised Mine
Clearance was released in March 2019. As its title makes clear,
and to protect the neutrality of humanitarian mine action,
the Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) in the
Afghan government permits clearance only of items that are
not subject to areas of active hostilities. Under international
humanitarian law, direct participation in hostilities (which
includes mine clearance in contested areas without the
consent of all the parties to the conﬂict) makes a person a
lawful target of lethal force by a party to an armed conﬂict.

THE 2025 ASPIRATION
In 2014, at the Third Review Conference of APMBC, states
parties afﬁrmed that they would intensify efforts to complete
their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency
that the completion work requires and aspired to meet
these goals to the fullest extent possible by 2025. After a
decade of repeated Article 5 extension requests being the
norm, this marked a commitment to draw a line in the sand
and set an end date for completion of clearance by affected
states parties. While some states parties, such as Sri Lanka,
United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe, are rising to the challenge,
implementing requisite action plans, applying an efﬁcient
land release methodology, and securing funding to ensure
sufﬁcient capacity to ﬁnish clearance as soon as possible and
before 2025; others are not.
Mine Action Review has provided a rough assessment of the
likelihood of each of the 34 affected states parties fulﬁlling
their Article 5 obligations by end of 2025, based on current
progress, and which can be found in each country-speciﬁc
report. Worryingly, more than half of affected states parties
are currently not on track to meet the 2025 aspiration.
It is, however, not too late to improve this trajectory. With the
exception of the most contaminated countries, or those with
ongoing conﬂict or access issues, most states parties could
still complete by 2025 if national authorities, operators, and
donors were to employ the right resources in the right way.
But this is a big ‘if’, which will require stronger leadership
and commitment from all, sustained funding, and adoption
of the most efﬁcient and effective land release possible.

TWENTY YEARS OF THE APMBC:
KEY LESSONS FOR MINE ACTION
LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION
It is self-evident that clearing areas that actually contain
mines is the basis of an effective mine action programme.
Understanding and localising the mine threat at an early stage
is therefore the launching pad for success. Indeed, one of the
largest impediments to achieving Article 5 compliance quickly
and cheaply, once demining programmes are underway,
has been the widespread poor quality of survey. Even today,
surveyors without technical expertise continue to hamper the
elaboration of a robust baseline of contamination, reporting
vast mined areas where they do not exist, and ﬁlling the
national database with incorrect or inﬂated polygons.
Historically, perhaps the greatest culprit has been the
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), now defunct as a survey
methodology, but once the darling of the donors. The
LIS was conceived in the late 1990s with the very best of
intentions: to identify all the mined areas and explosive
remnants of war (ERW)-affected areas in a country, as well
as to determine their impact on nearby communities. But
instead of generating a robust baseline of contamination for
the purpose of Article 5 implementation, the LIS led to many
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) being entered in the
national mine action database that would prove to contain
no contamination at all, while the size of those SHAs that
actually contained contamination was often vastly inﬂated.
Its fundamental ﬂaw was its perception-based methodology:
using surveyors without technical expertise to ask members
of local communities whether and where they thought mines
were present. Community participation in mine action is
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of critical importance, but what was actually needed for
such methods to work was also supporting evidence and
validation. As the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) make clear, a suspicion of the presence of mines
must be “reasonable”.
Globally mine action has paid the price of these early
mistakes in survey, with greatly exaggerated estimates of the
problem, and ultimately demands for re-survey to remedy the
misdemeanours wrought on the sector by the LIS and other
like surveys. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, one of
those countries in which a LIS was conducted (in 2003), still
does not have an accurate picture of baseline contamination
more than 20 years after becoming a state party to the
APMBC. A nationwide survey, termed a “country assessment”
is now underway with a view to enabling a far more accurate
baseline to be established. Efforts to gain greater clarity on
the extent of mine contamination are welcome, but in truth
are long overdue. In total, in Angola more than 90% of SHAs
recorded as a result of inﬂated estimates from a 2004–07 LIS
were cancelled during re-survey, now almost complete. In
Thailand, precious time is similarly being used up correcting
problems from the LIS conducted there in 2001. The Thailand
Mine Action Centre (TMAC) has forecasted that up to 80% of
existing SHAs can be cancelled or reduced through survey
so will be focusing their efforts in 2019–20 on cancelling land
through non-technical survey before moving on to technical
survey and full clearance in 2021–23.

According to analysis by Mine Action Review, only 12 states
parties have established their national baseline of antipersonnel mine contamination to a reasonable degree of
accuracy.6 The remaining affected states parties still need
to conduct further survey to more accurately identify the
location and extent of mined area, conﬁrming contamination
where direct evidence exists and releasing SHAs found not
to be contaminated.

LAND RELEASE METHODOLOGY
Hand in hand with high-quality non-technical and technical
survey goes an efﬁcient land release methodology based on
the planned assessment of risk. No mine action is risk free,
but wasting resources clearing SHAs also has signiﬁcant
implications for truly affected communities.
The notion of land release did not exist when the APMBC was
being drafted and it remains subject to differing application,
but is now the backbone – and mainstream – of demining
methodology. It is based on a risk management approach
that is implemented through evidence-based survey rather
than a mere fear of the presence of mines. Unfortunately,
some states parties continue to fully clear too many mined
areas in which no anti-personnel mines are found, typically
at considerable time and cost. Better targeting of clearance,
enabled by high-quality evidence-based survey, would help
avoid clearance of areas with no contamination and must
be implemented routinely by all stakeholders in all affected
states parties, without exception.
Astonishingly, Colombia, which has had a mine action
programme for more than 15 years, does not yet have a
national standard for land release that has been approved
and implemented by the national authority, Descontamina
Colombia. Operators are not allowed to call for cancellation
of an area being cleared before at least 50% of it has been
cleared, even if all the indications are that no explosive
items will be found. This is an unforgivable waste of precious
clearance resources. In Serbia, where the national mine
action centre continues to express a preference for full
clearance of SHAs over technical survey, it did reduce some
mined area through technical survey in 2017 and 2018,
demonstrating a greater willingness to adopt more efﬁcient
land release practices.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
The Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) has become the de facto standard database for mine
action programmes. Of 34 affected states parties with Article
5 obligations, 24 use IMSMA. Zimbabwe fully transitioned to
IMSMA in 2018. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia do not
yet use IMSMA (though Bosnia is in the process of switching
to IMSMA Core and Serbia has previously discussed
the possibility of IMSMA installation with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD).7
Other states parties not using IMSMA are Cameroon, Croatia,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, and the United Kingdom. The situation
in Eritrea is unclear. Argentina claims sovereignty over the
Malvinas/Falklands but does not have control of territory
that would enable it to conduct mine action.
A sophisticated database does not, though, mean that data is
accurate and up to date. “Rubbish in, rubbish out” may be a
cliché, but it holds true for national mine action databases. In
Chad, for example, the national mine action centre does use
IMSMA, but many records of past survey have been “lost”
from the database. Colombia continues to collect and report
on “events” (including media reports) related to anti-personnel
mines and other ordnance, with this data serving as the main
indicator of contamination and the basis of demining planning
and prioritisation. Operators, though, report that these IMSMA
“events” are beset with errors, including duplications and
inaccuracies. For example, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) found
that more than three quarters of the anti-personnel mines
found in each assigned task in 2018 did not correspond to the
respective IMSMA events.
Reporting under the APMBC continues to disappoint. Only a
handful of states parties reported accurately on progress in
demining in 2018 in their respective Article 7 transparency
reports, and the reporting of the vast majority of states
parties contained inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Either this
was due to different ﬁgures to those included in the report
being submitted to Mine Action Review, or as a result of
errors and inconsistencies within the Article 7 report itself.
Some states parties simply do not report at all, even though
this is a legal requirement under the APMBC. Eritrea’s failure
to submit any Article 7 report over the past ﬁve years is a
persistent and ongoing violation of the Convention.
As previously mentioned, anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature must be recorded and reported under the
APMBC. Unfortunately, for some affected states parties, three
years of discussion to conﬁrm what was already agreed and
clear (i.e. that victim-activated IEDs that meet the deﬁnition
of an anti-personnel mine must be reported as such under
the APMBC), has led to three years of data which now must
to be cleaned. This must not continue. Correct reporting
on anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature must be
applied by all affected states parties and implementing
partners, without exception.
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It is essential that as a sector we learn from lessons and
apply best practice as standard across the board, ensuring
high-quality evidence-based survey to identify tightly
delineated SHAs and CHAs. These principles must also be
applied to all mined areas, including new contamination
from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, whether
in rural or urban areas, in order to avoid unnecessary
complications and costs further down the line caused by
hugely inaccurate sizes and locations of hazardous areas.

INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS (IMAS)

GENDER AND DIVERSITY IN DEMINING

The International Mine Action Standards have ensured that
demining programmes can attain an acceptable standard of
competence, efﬁciency, and safety. These standards, which
have been developed collaboratively, continue to evolve, and
promote minimum good practice – most recently in Minimum
Data Requirements – which will become an appendix to the
IMAS on Information Management. An increasing number
of states parties have incorporated latest developments
and best practice from IMAS into their national mine action
standards and standing operating procedures. We encourage
all states to make use of this valuable resource.

It is not only important that states parties duly fulfil
their Article 5 obligations, it is also important how they
achieve completion. The mine action community has been
increasingly seeking to strengthen performance in areas not
adequately covered in the Convention drafted twenty years
ago, in particular the importance of ensuring gender- and
diversity-sensitive mine action. Thus, states parties agreed
in the 2014 Maputo Action Plan that they would implement
the commitments in a “gender-sensitive manner”, building on
the Cartagena Action Plan and the Nairobi Action Plan. This
represented a step forward towards integration of gender
perspectives in mine action, but there is still signiﬁcant room
for improvement in practice.

RESIDUAL RISK
Article 5 obligations are fulﬁlled when an affected state party
has completed clearance of all conﬁrmed and suspected
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. However, this
does not mean that every mine (much less every items of
unexploded or abandoned explosive ordnance) will have
been found and destroyed. In states which were once heavily
contaminated, munitions will be found post-completion.
Affected states must plan for this and establish sustainable
national capacity to address contamination discovered post
completion, and this must be commenced well in advance
of completion. The majority of states parties with Article 5
obligations should already be taking measures to plan for
capacity to address residual risk, assessing where such
capacity is best placed (be it with the armed forces, police,
or civil protection, or other appropriate entity) and where
the all-important information management system will be
housed. Failure to do so could result in signiﬁcant cost, such
as unnecessarily requiring international clearance operators
to address what should be dealt with nationally and creating
a problem which is both predictable and avoidable.

As mentioned below, Mine Action Review has introduced
a new criteria on gender (see Table 7 overleaf), as part of
the assessment of mine action programme performance
by states parties. Findings from the new criterion have
shown that, despite progress, the mine action community
has signiﬁcant work still to do to improve its understanding
of and approach to gender along with properly integrating
gender and diversity considerations in mine action. This
demands the removal of barriers to the full, equal, and
meaningful participation of women.
For a sector that in some countries is the largest private
employer, mine action has had a pretty dreadful record in
promoting gender equality. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the
national mine action centre’s 171 employees, only 42 were
women (less than a quarter). Moreover, of its 107 operations
staff in the ﬁeld, only 10 were women (less than one in ten).
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that, as at April 2019,
the overall gender split of its own mine action staff in Bosnia
was 98 men (91%) and 10 women (9%), which also leaves
signiﬁcant room for improvement.
The promotion of gender equality in mine action has, though,
been improving in recent years in a number of countries.
In Afghanistan, for example, the national mine action
programme (MAPA) drafted a policy on gender in 2016 after
consultation with the GICHD and the Gender and Mine Action
Programme (GMAP, now part of the GICHD). The MAPA
included mainstreaming gender as one of the four goals of
its 2016−20 strategic plan though it is still in the process of
developing steps and capacity for implementing it within
the constraints of Afghan society. In 2018, Danish Demining
Group (DDG) deployed the ﬁrst all-women mine clearance
team in Bamyan province. Further clearance by an expanded
all-woman team followed in 2019.
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COUNTRY-FOCUSED APPROACHES

If gender remains work in progress, diversity is work yet
to start. Mine Action Review postponed plans to assess
diversity in mine action given the paucity of practice in
mine action programmes. The problem – and lack of action
– is particularly disappointing in countries in which ethnic
minorities have suffered during earlier conﬂicts. A few
programmes have, though, made a start. As at July 2019,
NPA Colombia was in the process of developing a gender
and diversity policy and has made diversity the focus of
one of its key performance indicators. Women and people
from indigenous communities were targeted during a recent
recruitment drive where of 32 new staff, 11 were female
(34%), 2 were persons with disability (6%), and 4 were from
indigenous communities (13%).

Initiatives, such as the “Individualised Approach” and
the European Union-funded National Stakeholder
Dialogue workshops, have provided useful platforms for
country-focused approaches. However, to yield meaningful
results and sustained outcomes, such initiatives must
be translated into regular in-country workshops that
bring together relevant stakeholders, present progress
reports and updates on Article 5 implementation, improve
coordination, and demonstrate strong national ownership
and political commitment to completion. There is a common
misconception that such forums already exist in most
affected states parties; they do not. Whether called “National
Mine Action Platforms” (NMAPs), as most recently proposed
under the APMBC, or Country Coalitions, as promoted under
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, such forums should be
established in all affected states parties.

Since the Third APMBC Review Conference in 2014, there has
been a growing appreciation of the importance of adopting
a country-focused approach to Article 5 implementation.
Country-focused initiatives enable national authorities
and implementing partners in-country to collectively and
constructively discuss local progress and challenges to
Article 5 implementation. Only through open and transparent
dialogue can obstacles to efﬁcient and effective land release
be identiﬁed and overcome and improvements and greater
progress made.

DEMINING PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN STATES PARTIES
To help affected states parties and their partners focus their
capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of
weakness, and to improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of
survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring
system is used by Mine Action Review. As part of a ﬁve-year
review of the Mine Action Review project and in view of the
Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2019, Mine Action
Review overhauled its programme performance criteria and
scoring system this year.
The seven new criteria were developed in consultation with
the Mine Action Review’s Advisory Board Members (The
HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA), and with input from the GICHD,

including GMAP. The new and improved set of criteria have
been used to assess 2018 performance in all affected states
parties (with the exception of those not assessed due to issues
relating to jurisdiction or control of mined areas or insufﬁcient
information), resulting in a re-ranking. Comparisons with
previous years’ assessments by Mine Action Review of
programme performance are not meaningful.
Table 7 overleaf explains the new programme performance
criteria and key factors in detail. Comments are welcome
from states, international mine action organisations, and
other stakeholders on both the criteria and the factors.

mineactionreview.org 13

OVERVIEW

Where survey and community liaison teams are inclusive and
gender balanced, this facilitates access and participation by
all groups, including women and children. Consulting women
as well as girls and boys during non-technical survey can
lead to a more accurate picture of mine contamination and,
therefore, more efﬁcient and effective land release. Mine action
NGOs have started to include gender-focused objectives in
organizational strategies, and are increasingly conducting
gender analysis and disaggregating data by sex and age. But
despite the increased collection of disaggregated data in the
sector, weaknesses remain around the operationalisation of
such data in prioritization and programming.

Table 7: Programme Performance Criteria and Factors
Criterion

Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF ANTIPERSONNEL
MINE
CONTAMINATION

■

Has a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination been established and is it up to date
and accurate?

■

If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey
being conducted or is it planned?

(20% of overall score)

■

Are anti-personnel mined areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance
(e.g. anti-vehicle mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW))?

■

Is contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature included in the national
baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination?

■

Is anti-personnel mine contamination classiﬁed into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and
conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of
emplaced anti-personnel mines respectively?

■

Is there a high ratio of CHAs to SHAs?

■

Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action?

■

Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations?

■

Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme?

■

Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled?

■

Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?

■

Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine
action programme?

■

Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action?

■

Has the government facilitated the receipt and efﬁcient use of international assistance?

■

Is there political will for timely and efﬁcient implementation of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC)?

■

Does the affected state contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre
and/or survey and clearance of anti-personnel mined areas?

■

Does the affected state have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 5 implementation?

■

Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan?
Do the main mine action operators have one?

■

Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards?

■

Are all groups affected by anti-personnel mine contamination, including women and children,
consulted during survey and community liaison activities?

■

Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and
participation by all groups, including women and children?

■

Are relevant mine action data disaggregated by sex and age?

■

Is gender taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance
activities?

■

Is there equal access to employment for qualiﬁed women and men in survey and clearance teams,
including for managerial/supervisory positions?

■

Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data
accurate and reliable?

■

Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data?

■

Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and
method of land release?

■

Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?

■

Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database?

■

Does the affected state party to the CCM submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on
Article 5 progress?

■

Are Article 5 extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner?

■

Is the reported survey and clearance data accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination
(i.e. anti-personnel mines from other mines or explosive ordnance) and method of land release?

■

Does the affected state party report on progress in Article 5 implementation at the intersessional
meetings and meetings of states parties, and is reporting accurate and consistent between
reporting periods?

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

14 Clearing the Mines 2019

Performance Commentary

PLANNING
AND TASKING

■

Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for
land release?

(10% of overall score)

■

Is there a realistic annual workplan in place for land release?

■

Are there agreed and speciﬁed criteria for prioritisation of tasks?

■

Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?

■

Is clearance of anti-personnel mines tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation?

■

Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?

■

Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability? Is it realistic
and sustainable?

■

Does the affected state have national mine action standards in place for land release?

■

Do the standards enable or impede efﬁcient evidence-based survey and clearance?

■

Are national standards reﬂected in standing operating procedures (SoPs)?

■

Are standards and SoPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice,
in consultation with clearance operators?

■

Is there an effective and efﬁcient: i) non-technical survey capacity, ii) technical survey capacity,
iii) clearance capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity?

■

Are areas being cleared that prove to have no anti-personnel mines?

■

Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address
anti-personnel mines discovered after the release of anti-personnel mine-contaminated
areas or post completion?

■

Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection
systems) integrated into land release operations?

■

Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations?

■

Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme was there an effective
investigation? Were lessons learned shared between operators?

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE

■

Is the affected state seeking to clear all anti-personnel mine contamination from territory
under its jurisdiction or control, including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature,
border mineﬁelds, anti-personnel mine contamination in and around military installations,
hard to access mineﬁelds etc.?

(20% of overall score)

■

Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of anti-personnel mine
clearance and is this within the state party’s Article 5 deadline?

■

Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity?

■

Is the target date sufﬁciently ambitious?

■

What were the outputs of survey and clearance of anti-personnel mine-contaminated area
in 2018, and were they greater or lesser than the previous year and why?

■

Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 5 obligations?

■

Is the affected state on track to meet its Article 5 deadline (or its target completion date,
if earlier)?

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

The country-speciﬁc assessments of the seven criteria, which
should be viewed alongside the Recommendations for Action,
are intended as an implementation tool, offered in the spirit of
openness and constructive dialogue, to assist states parties
to identify and overcome challenges and fulﬁl their Article 5
obligations as efﬁciently and effectively as possible. A score
of between 0 and 10 is accorded for each of the seven criteria
(three of which carry a higher weighting) and an average
performance score calculated. Average scores of 8.0 or
above are considered “very good”, 7.0–7.9 is ranked “good”,
5.0–6.9 is ranked “average”, 4.0–4.9 is ranked “poor”, while
0–3.9 ranks as “very poor”. The obligations under Article 5
apply equally to all states parties and the same set of criteria
are applied by Mine Action Review to assess the performance
of all affected states parties with Article 5 obligations,
irrespective of the extent of mined area or factors such as
national gross domestic product (GDP). That said, there is a
big disparity in wealth between the affected states parties
and their national ﬁnancial capacity for land release varies.

More detail is provided to explain the scoring for each state
and the criteria are reﬂected directly in the subsections
used in each country proﬁle. Table 8 below summarises the
scoring for 2018 for all affected states parties with an Article
5 obligation, with the exception of Argentina, Cyprus, and
Palestine (not assessed due to issues relating to jurisdiction
or control of mined areas), and Cameroon and Nigeria (not
assessed due to insufﬁcient information available to assess
performance in 2018).
Six states parties had demining programmes rated as
good: Afghanistan, Jordan (which has fulﬁlled its Article
5 obligations), Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom,
and Zimbabwe. A further 11 states parties had demining
programmes rated as average: Angola, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Oman, Serbia, South
Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. Colombia, DR Congo,
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen
attained only a rating of “poor”, while Chad, Eritrea, Niger,
and Senegal all rated “very poor”.
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Criterion

Table 8: Mine Action Programme Performance in States Parties to the APMBC
State party
Zimbabwe
Jordan
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Afghanistan
Thailand
Cambodia
Croatia
Sudan
South Sudan
Chile
Angola
Tajikistan
Turkey
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Oman
DR Congo
Ecuador
Ethiopia
Iraq
Somalia
Colombia
Peru
Ukraine
Yemen
Chad
Senegal
Niger
Eritrea

Average performance score for 2018
7.8
7.7
7.4
7.1
7.0
7.0
6.8
6.8
6.8
6.5
6.4
6.3
6.3
6.2
6.0
6.0
5.0
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.9
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.7
2.7

Classiﬁcation of national programme
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Very Poor
Very Poor
Very Poor
Very Poor

CONCLUDING REMARKS
As the APMBC enters its third decade of operation it is in
strong health. While some major military powers remain
outside its purview (most notably China, India, Pakistan,
Russia, and the United States), use of this inhumane weapon
is largely restricted to groups that use terror as a method
of warfare. In less than 25 years, a once indispensable and
ubiquitous weapon of war has come to be perceived as a
cold-blooded killer of civilians.

But amid the self-congratulation that should legitimately
form part of the Convention’s Fourth Review Conference in
Oslo, delegates should spare a thought for the words and
wisdom of Paulo Coelho. “The challenge will not wait. Life
does not look back. A week is more than enough time for us
to decide whether or not to accept our destiny.” Decisions
taken and implemented in Oslo will shape the destiny of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

1

In 2011, Germany reported that a former Soviet military training facility in the former East Germany might contain anti-personnel mines. It submitted an Article 5
deadline extension request in April 2013, but later discounted the presence of anti-personnel mines following survey.

2

Bhutan, Cameroon, and Palau.

3

Montenegro and South Sudan.

4

APLC/MSP.17/2018/10 https://www.apminebanconvention.org/ﬁleadmin/APMBC/MSP/17MSP/Reﬂections-Art.5-en.pdf.

5

See: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16.

6

Angola, Chile, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.

7

Ethiopia continues to report problems with IMSMA installation. Although a version of the IMSMA database software was installed and customised before 2015,
the mine action authority said it was still using an “alternative data processing package” alongside IMSMA, due to a “gap” in the IMSMA system’s installation.
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AFGHANISTAN

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

35

30.9

MASSIVE,
AT LEAST

200KM

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2

(ESTIMATED)

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

30.90KM 8,865
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

30

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

2017
2018

28.18

25

20

15

10

5

2.46

(including 47 destroyed
during spot tasks)

0.0

Clearance

0.95

Technical
Survey

1.9

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Improved donor funding enabled the Mine Action Programme
of Afghanistan (MAPA) to increase annual clearance of antipersonnel mined area to 30.9km2 in 2018. The Department
of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) introduced a national
standard for clearing mines of an improvised nature (called
“Abandoned Improvised Mines” (AIMs) nationally) in March
2019, the ﬁrst national programme to do so. Clearance capacity

operating to the national standard had been deployed by
The HALO Trust already in November 2018. DMAC also
established a technical working group to address survey
and clearance of these improvised mines. Danish Demining
Group (DDG) deployed the ﬁrst all-woman demining team in
Bamyan province in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Afghanistan should revise and update its Article 5 deadline extension request to provide a timeline to take
account of lower levels of donor funding and the additional challenge of AIMs.

■

The Afghan government should provide funding to mine action, particularly in areas where survey and
clearance facilitate priority national development projects.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

The MAPA has an advanced understanding of its anti-personnel mine problem but is still
getting to grips with the extent of contamination by improvised mines, which now account
for the vast majority of casualties.

8

DMAC manages and coordinates mine action and completed its transition to full national
ownership in June 2018 but the government does not provide signiﬁcant funding, leaving
it dependent on international donors.

6

Gender policies are in the process of development and subject to regional cultural
practices. DDG pioneered deployment of an all-women demining team in Bamyan
province, but the extent to which national organisations pursue gender issues is
unclear. Casualty and risk education data are disaggregated by gender.

8

DMAC has an experienced information management team working with an Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database that provides
extensive, disaggregated data although operators say data entry sometimes lags.
Afghanistan submits Article 7 transparency reports annually but sometimes late.
Most national operators did not respond to requests for information.

8

Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request was among the most comprehensive
and DMAC produces annual workplans. Implementation has been hampered by funding
shortfalls and insecurity.

6

The MAPA has updated national standards compliant with the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). It introduced new standards for clearance of mines of an
improvised nature in March 2019 and has also set out an environmental policy and set
of standing operating procedures (SoPs). DMAC and the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) were reviewing land release standards with a view to
increasing operational efﬁciency.

7

The MAPA has maintained anti-personnel mine clearance at a consistent level in the
face of funding and insecurity constraints, but in 2018 was still developing a strategy
for dealing with mines of an improvised nature.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

7

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

7.0

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Afghan National Disaster Management Authority
Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
The HALO Trust (HALO)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation
in Afghanistan (AREA)
Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
Mine Detection Centre (MDC)
Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation
(OMAR)
15 commercial companies accredited, one reported active
in anti-personnel mine clearance in 2018

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
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AFGHANISTAN

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION
Afghanistan estimated that 177.8km2 of conﬁrmed and suspected anti-personnel mined area remained at the end of 2018
(see Table 1). Added to this is massive contamination from mines of an improvised nature (anti-personnel and anti-vehicle)
that is still being deﬁned, but which signiﬁcantly exceeds the 32km2 reported so far (see Table 2).1
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018) 2
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Central

467

25,563,554

49

5,871,852

31,435,406

East

100

7,033,558

7

2,535,350

9,568,908

North

234

10,371,079

10

2,446,660

12,817,739

North-East

654

43,652,720

27

11,898,665

55,551,385

62

10,178,628

64

12,315,425

22,494,053

South
South-East

137

10,763,889

50

7,498,419

18,262,308

West

15

2,362,615

45

25,319,308

27,681,923

Total

1,669

109,926,043

252

67,885,679

177,811,722

Afghanistan’s mine contamination resulted from the
decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet
invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conﬂict, and the
1996−2001 ﬁghting between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance. The intervention of the United States (US)-led
coalition in late 2001 added considerable quantities of
unexploded ordnance (UXO). Continuing conﬂict between
the government, the Taliban and other armed groups is still
adding contamination, particularly by mines of an improvised
nature, which have overtaken legacy mined areas as the
biggest humanitarian threat. 3
Estimated anti-personnel mine contamination fell for the third
successive year in 2018 to 178km2 despite the continuing
addition of previously unrecorded hazards to the database as

a result of survey. By contrast, the threat from anti-vehicle
mines has risen every year for the last ﬁve years and now
exceeds anti-personnel mined area (see Table 2). DMAC
recorded 98km2 of additional mine and explosive remnants
of war (ERW) contamination in 2018, of which just short of
17km2 were anti-personnel mine and mixed anti-personnel
mine/anti-vehicle mined areas. 4
In addition to the challenge from landmines, Afghanistan
contends with huge areas of ERW. DMAC reported total mine
and ERW contamination of 1,762km2 at the end of March 2019.
Estimates of anti-vehicle mined area are still rising and pose
a challenge to current land release methods. Afghanistan
also has North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ﬁring
ranges covering 630km2 remaining to be cleared. 5

Table 2: Mined areas (at end 2018) 6
Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Anti-personnel mines

1,669

109,926,043

252

67,885,679

Anti-vehicle mines

783

129,114,092

382

190,510,163

Improvised mines*

61

11,705,330

21

20,730,871

2,513

250,745,465

655

279,126,713

Total

CHAs = Conﬁrmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
* It is not known what percentage is of anti-personnel mines and what percentage is of anti-vehicle mines.

NEW CONTAMINATION
Mines of an improvised nature pose the biggest humanitarian
threat in Afghanistan and contamination continues to expand
as a result of persistent conﬂict.7 The 32km2 presented
in ofﬁcial statistics for 2018 represent only a fraction
of suspected hazards. At the end of March 2018, DMAC
estimated that pressure-plate mines of an improvised nature
affected an area of 248km2. 8 Little more than a year later,
DMAC said an area of 465km2 may be affected by AIMs.9
Clearance of abandoned improvised mines by The HALO Trust
in Helmand province found stacked devices triggered by
pressure plates with a high metal signal and main charges of
between 0.5kg and 16kg. The devices were placed in routes
and locations that were expected to be used by security forces
when moving towards armed opposition group positions.10
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A rapid assessment of 22 provinces conducted by DMAC’s
implementing partners (IPs) at the end of 2016 reported
ﬁve as inaccessible for security reasons (Baghdis, Ghor,
Laghman, Sar e Pul, and Zabul) and in the other seventeen,
they identiﬁed a total of 270 areas affected by post-2001
mine and ERW contamination covering an estimated 421km2.
Anti-personnel mines accounted for 5.3km2 while improvised
devices, including pressure-plate mines of an improvised
nature, affected 228km2. This included almost 55km2
classiﬁed as high risk, mostly in Helmand, Kandahar, and
Uruzgan provinces, as well as 3.5km2 of medium risk and
170km2 as low risk. Anti-vehicle mines affected 90,000m2
and ERW nearly 188km2.11

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan’s mine action programme, originally established
in 1989, is led by DMAC, which comes under the Afghan
National Disaster Management Authority. DMAC fulﬁls the
role of a national mine action centre. From its headquarters
in Kabul and seven regional ofﬁces, DMAC manages
and coordinates the work of national and international
implementing partners. DMAC provides strategic planning
and annual workplans, sets priorities and standards,
accredits operators, conducts quality assurance (QA) and
quality control (QC), manages the mine action database, and
conducts resource mobilisation. It coordinates closely with
operators through a technical working group and in 2018 set
up a separate technical working group to deal with AIMs.12

for Mine Action (VTF), which handled approximately onethird of total donor funding for the MAPA in 2018. UNMAS
also focused on promoting humanitarian access for IPs to
areas outside effective government control, working through
established UN channels for engagement with the Taliban
representative ofﬁce in Doha, Qatar. UNMAS supported
DMAC organising an emergency response by IPs to clearance
and risk education needs in Ghazni in August 2018 after
heavy ﬁghting between government forces and the Taliban.
Additionally, UNMAS was active in advocacy with local
authorities in Bamyan province for the ﬁrst ever deployment of
women deminers in 2018 and was preparing in 2019 to explore
the possible use of women deminers in northern provinces.14

Since 2012, the MAPA has transitioned from being a
project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to national
management, a process formally completed with the transfer
of the last positions from UNMAS to DMAC in June 2018.
However, the Afghan government does not provide a budget
for mine action, which continues to depend on international
donor funding channelled bilaterally through UNMAS and the
ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF). Although management
now rests entirely with DMAC, 91 of DMAC’s 143 staff are paid
through UNMAS funding, 35 are paid through the ITF, and
17 are on Afghan civil servant salaries. The MAPA’s 2016–20
strategic plan sets out the intention to gain recognition
that “its services are demanded, and paid for, by national
government agencies, internationally supported development
projects and other programmes.”13

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) operates with a staff of
18, including 6 internationals, who provide third-party
monitoring and oversight of all US Department of
State-funded conventional weapons disposal projects.15

UNMAS, with ﬁve international and thirty-ﬁve national staff,
has continued to support the MAPA and DMAC, providing a
channel for donor funding through the Voluntary Trust Fund

International donor contracts awarded for a ﬁxed term
primarily on the basis of square metre costs have become
increasingly challenging for IPs facing increasingly volatile
security conditions. Deminer safety requires close contact
with local communities, with access to conﬂicted districts
sometimes taking weeks to negotiate. Threats to security
forced demining teams to stand down 18 times in the year
to mid-2019, sometimes for a period of days, and on some
occasions causing IPs to move work sites or redeploy
deminers to different districts and tasks, causing delays,
raising costs, and making it difﬁcult to achieve targets.16
Armed opposition groups in some areas demand IPs pay
a “tax”.

GENDER
The MAPA drafted a policy on gender in 2016 after
consultation with the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Gender and Mine
Action Programme (GMAP, now part of the GICHD). The MAPA
included mainstreaming gender as one of the four goals
of its 2016−20 strategic plan but it is still in the process of
developing steps and capacity for implementing it within the
constraints of Afghanistan’s deeply conservative society. The
Strategic Plan observes that “achievable targets, reﬂecting
prevailing circumstances and conditions, will be adopted to
support and encourage progress wherever possible”.17
The gender strategy called for participation of women and girls
as well as boys and men in non-technical survey, community
liaison, and pre- and post-clearance impact assessments and
for equal access to employment. It called for IPs to recruit
more gender-balanced risk education teams, identify forums
in which to access under-represented groups, including
women and girls, for direct risk education (RE), and to ensure
data collection and reporting was disaggregated for gender
and age.18

In 2018, DDG deployed the ﬁrst all-women mine clearance
team with eight deminers in Bamyan province. Further
clearance by an expanded all-women team followed in 2019.
DDG employed 53 women out of a total staff of 550, of whom
41 were working in the ﬁeld, conducting demining, risk
education, or armed violence reduction.19 The HALO Trust
employed women in the ﬁeld (for livelihoods surveys and risk
education) and in the ofﬁce (information, donor support, and
ﬁnance). Survey teams included at least one woman to ensure
access to women and children. 20
Among national IPs, performance appears to be uneven,
partly reﬂective of varying social norms in different regions.
The conditions that permit all-female demining teams to
work in Bamyan would not apply in the south. MCPA hired 13
couples for a 2017 risk education project to provide 13 male
and 13 female trainers. Community liaison projects undertake
detailed interviews with all sections of the community and
focal points are appointed to ensure project results reach
women and the impact of their inclusion is communicated to
community elders. 21
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
DMAC operates an IMSMA NG database but in 2018 started
preparations for an upgrade to IMSMA Core. DMAC was still
in the process of migrating legacy data to IMSMA; as part
of a continuous effort to increase efﬁciency the database
eliminated some duplicates of historical data.22 Operators
endorse the accessibility and accuracy of data but reported
signiﬁcant delays in DMAC uploading completion reports into
the database. 23
DMAC worked with the GICHD in 2018 to improve data quality,
removing duplicate records from IMSMA and updating the
IMSMA template. 24 In 2019, it planned to develop a mobile
application to monitor ﬁeld activity using geotag photos and

geolocation data. It was also developing a cloud-based data
warehouse to back up information. 25
Afghanistan submits comprehensive Article 7 reports, and
provides regular updates on the progress of survey and
clearance at intersessional meetings and meetings of states
parties. Afghanistan’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request in 2012,
prepared in consultation with, and endorsed by, Afghan
implementing partners, was regarded as a model providing a
comprehensive overview of all aspects of the country’s threat
from explosive devices.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request set out
a timeline for completing clearance of all known mine and
ERW contamination by 2023 but as a result of reduced
funding it soon fell behind those targets. The request also
did not take account of heavy contamination from mines
of an improvised nature.

DMAC’s annual workplans set more speciﬁc targets. For
Afghan year 1398 (1 April 2019 – 30 March 2020), targets
included calling for release of 44.7km2 of pre-2001 mine and
ERW contamination, non-technical survey of 29 districts,
post-demining impact assessments in 85 contaminated areas,
along with 12 livelihood surveys. 27

The national strategic plan for 2016−20 reafﬁrms
Afghanistan’s broad commitment to the APMBC and its
Article 5 obligations, but concentrates on four broad goals:
facilitating development; engaging with other sectors and
government departments to have them include mine action
in their development plans; preventive action to reduce the
impact of mines and ERW, including by enhanced resource
mobilisation, completing survey of all communities and
keeping its extension request workplan on track; and gender
and diversity mainstreaming. 26

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, MAPA split
hazards into projects to facilitate resource mobilisation and
monitoring. 28 IPs are tasked for survey and clearance through
a process of competitive bidding for projects. Non-technical
survey tasks are also assigned by DMAC on the basis of
requests received from its regional ofﬁces, government
departments, or local communities. 29

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The MAPA has comprehensive national mine action standards
that DMAC reviews annually and amends in consultation
with IPs. DMAC and GICHD started to review land release
standards in 2019 and were expected to undertake revisions
to strengthen non-technical survey and increase operational
efﬁciency. In 2018, DMAC introduced a new policy and
standing operating procedures (SoPs) for environmental
protection in mine action. Afghanistan became the ﬁrst
country programme to release a standard for tackling mines
of an improvised nature. AMAS 06.10, Abandoned Improvised
Mine Clearance, was released in March 2019. As its title

makes clear, and to protect the neutrality of humanitarian
mine action, DMAC permits clearance only of items that are
not part of active hostilities.
The standard requires operators to get prior written consent
from local authorities and other “key local stakeholders”,
including armed opposition groups, and conﬁrmation by the
party that laid devices that they are abandoned and that
clearance may proceed. It stipulates clearance should take place
only in a rural or semi-rural setting. All action to neutralise AIMs
should be conducted remotely or semi-remotely, and where
possible devices should be destroyed in situ.30

OPERATORS
DMAC reported a total of 44 organisations accredited for
mine action at the end of 2018 of which 23 humanitarian
IPs had total personnel of 6,873. It expected the number of
their employees to increase in 2019. DMAC mine clearance
data, however, shows only nine organisations conducted
anti-personnel mine clearance in 2018, including ﬁve national
humanitarian IPs, one national commercial company, and
three international NGOs. 31
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Afghanistan’s ﬁve longstanding national IPs collectively
accounted for about 40% of mined area clearance in 2018
(see Table 4). ATC (550 staff), MCPA (489 personnel), and
OMAR (650 staff) conducted clearance mainly in central
and north-eastern provinces. 32 MCPA, whose staff included
384 deminers, added mechanical capacity in the form of a
cultivator and ripper to boost clearance productivity and
increasingly sought to link mine clearance work to wider
development initiatives. 33 MDC (750 staff), the biggest of the
ﬁve, has conducted little mine clearance in the last two years.

STATES PARTIES

contamination by mines of an improvised nature. It also set up
an AIM operations room, where staff monitor all AIM-related
activities in real time. From July 2019, HALO Trust expected to
expand its improvised mine capacity to two manual clearance
teams and two dedicated non-technical survey teams.
HALO was also worked closely with and tasked eight teams
combining DAFA and HALO Trust personnel and trained by
HALO Trust for improvised mine non-technical survey.35

The HALO Trust remained much the biggest operator with
2,519 deminers in a total staff of 3,497 at the end of 2018,
more than all of the national humanitarian IPs combined.
HALO started working in the southern province of Kandahar
in 2017 and increased capacity there in 2018 as well as
resuming operations in Logar province. The award of several
new contracts and the extension of others saw HALO Trust’s
capacity increase around 20% in 2018 but the likely reduction
in bilateral United Kingdom funding and delays in the start
of other projects in 2019 was expected to result in lower
stafﬁng levels.

DDG, beneﬁtting from improved funding, added 28 clearance
teams in 2018 and tripled the number of deminers from 90
at the end of 2017 to 270 deminers, a total staff of 552 at the
end of 2018. A US Department of State/WRA contract that
supported signiﬁcant additional capacity was due to expire
in mid 2019, leaving the possibility that DDG would reduce
capacity in the course of the year. DDG deployed a team of 10
women deminers in Bamyan province in 2018, who cleared
one task releasing 51,520m2. The team was expanded to 16
women deminers in 2019. 36

The HALO Trust took a lead in developing the response to
mines of an improvised nature. It established an improvised
mine training area open to use by other IPs to develop
survey and clearance techniques and developed courses in
AIM-focused non-technical survey (three weeks), explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) (four weeks), and manual clearance
(six weeks). It also provided two-day AIM awareness training
for all teams working in areas affected by these devices. The
HALO Trust deployed two ﬁve-person manual clearance teams
and a non-technical survey team as a pilot project to address

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) continued
to operate in Kunduz province working with four
demining teams with 66 deminers in 2018 in areas heavily
contaminated with Soviet-era “butterﬂy” PFM-1 mines.
Stafﬁng levels in 2019 were dependent on the outcome of
discussions with donors. The project’s remote operating
area is accessible through Tajikistan and to circumvent the
complications of obtaining visas for DMAC QA/QC staff, FSD’s
activities are quality assured by the Tajikistan National Mine
Action Centre. 37

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Manual clearance continues to account for most
anti-personnel mine clearance but to boost productivity
most demining IPs employed a range of tools, including
increased use of mechanical assets, with capacity varying
from MCPA deploying four mechanical teams, to HALO Trust
with 22 teams at the start of 2019 and around 60 armoured
machines. 38 The annual workplan for 1398 (2019–20) intended
to “search for the proper utilisation of mine detection dogs”
but there was no report of IPs using dogs in mine action
in 2018.

DMAC and IPs were still in the process of developing their
response to improvised mines in 2018. HALO Trust was
trialling a range of specialist detectors capable of ﬁnding
hard-to-detect switches such as carbon rod and bare wire
switches. From mid 2019, HALO Trust planned to deploy
armoured mechanical assets designed speciﬁcally to address
the different threat posed by improvised mines compared
with other ordnance and was also testing a range of different
personal protection equipment for comfort, mobility and
protection. The HALO Trust had one excavator armoured in
the UK in 2019 according to a design tailored to the speciﬁc
threat of improvised mines it expected to encounter and
was buying a second excavator in Afghanistan and having it
armoured to a similar design. 39

DEMINER SAFETY
Three demining incidents occurred in 2018 resulting in
injuries to three deminers, 40 a signiﬁcant downturn in
demining casualties from previous years when the MAPA
sustained numerous fatalities. In one 2018 incident, a
HALO deminer injured his hand, losing two ﬁngers. HALO’s
investigation suggested it was not an accident but an act of
self-harm intended to obtain an insurance pay-out. 41

Afghanistan’s increasingly volatile security environment
posed a major challenge to operators. The MAPA recorded 29
security incidents in 2018 in which six deminers were killed
and eighteen injured. IPs also suffered loss of equipment,
including 23 Minelab detectors, digital cameras, and personal
protection equipment. 42 IPs depend on contact with local
communities to facilitate survey and clearance but still faced
interruptions and delays from insecurity that required teams
to stop work for a period of time or completely withdraw from
tasks and move to different locations.
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DAFA (350 staff), was the main operator engaged in cluster
munition clearance in 2018 (see Clearing Cluster Munitions
Remnants 2019) but has strong links to the south and has
previously conducted clearance of abandoned improvised
mines around Kajaki in Helmand province. In 2019, DAFA
had eight teams trained by The HALO Trust in non-technical
survey of areas containing mines of an improvised nature. 34

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Afghanistan reported to Mine Action Review that it released a total of 35.05km2 of anti-personnel mined area in 2018 through
survey and clearance. Clearance accounted for 30.9km2 while 2.2km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey and 0.95km2
was reduced through technical survey. 43 Afghanistan’s Article 7 Report for 2018 recorded total land release of 32.89km2, of
which 30.05km2 was through full clearance, 1.9km2 was cancelled and 0.95km2 was reduced. 44

SURVEY IN 2018
Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request foresaw
a nationwide Mine/ERW Impact Free Community Survey
(MEIFCS). Six years later, the survey has completed 290 of
400 districts and it remains a MAPA aspiration but no further
survey was conducted under this programme in 2018 due to
lack of funding. 45
Additional survey conducted by IPs in 2018 added 185
previously unrecorded anti-personnel mined areas
covering a total of 16.57km2 and three areas containing
mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and affecting
421,643m2. At the same time, non-technical survey, mainly
by The HALO Trust and MCPA, led to cancellation of
1,895,176m2 (see Table 3). DMAC reported that no IPs
conducted stand-alone technical survey in 2018 but reduced
some area (0.95km2) in the course of technical survey
conducted as part of mine clearance operations. 46

Survey in 2018 also produced some preliminary ﬁndings
on improvised mine tasks. The HALO Trust deployed an
improvised mine survey team to central Helmand province
which worked on 30 areas containing mines of an improvised
nature in Lashkar Gah, Nad Ali, and Nawa-I Barakzai
districts. The teams deployed in November and as of the
start of February 2019 had lifted four devices. The tasks
were in semi-rural areas, deﬁned by smaller agricultural
plots mixed with compounds and small villages. Tasks are
considerably smaller than conventional mine clearance
tasks, with a mean size of about 27,000m² and a median size
of 6,000–12,000m² and were expected to contain about four
items per hazardous area (~1 improvised mine per 2,000m²),
reﬂecting the different use of improvised mines compared
with conventional mines. 47

Table 3: Cancellation of anti-personnel mined area through non-technical survey48
Area cancelled (m2)

Operator

Region

HALO Trust

Central, South, South East, West

MCPA

Central, North East, South, South East

MDC

East

Total

1,029,990
865,086
100
1,895,176

CLEARANCE IN 2018
The amount of anti-personnel mined area cleared in 2018, as
reported to Mine Action Review, amounted to 30.9km2 in 2018,
almost 10% more than the area of clearance DMAC recorded
in 2017. The six Afghan IPs accounted for 12.82km2 of the
total, an increase of about one third in terms of area cleared
compared with the previous year made possible by increased
donor funding, which also pushed their share of total
anti-personnel mine clearance from 35% in 2017 to 41% in
2018. 49 HALO Trust cleared 7% less anti-personnel mined area
and 25% fewer anti-personnel mines than the previous year,
but it also cleared close to 10km2 of anti-vehicle mined area
in 2018, which pushed its total mine clearance for the year
above the previous year’s level. 50
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With the progress of clearance in recent years, IPs have
deployed on more remote and less densely contaminated
mineﬁelds, a factor reﬂected in a signiﬁcant drop in the
number of mines destroyed from 14,492 in 2017 to 8,818 in
2018. A further 47 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in
the course of spot tasks. 51
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Areas cleared

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Area

12

788,958

270

0

60

ATC

Operator

60

4,084,228

989

11

2,582

DAFA

2

524,360

76

0

1

DDG

26

1,507,947

154

0

295

0

182,831

1,948

0

848

FSD

153

16,321,433

4,457

17

2,690

MCPA

34

3,934,542

339

0

634

MDC

1

31,252

5

0

236

45

3,458,673

580

0

2,779

3

67,499

0

0

0

336

30,901,723

8,818

28

10,125

HALO Trust

OMAR
TDC
Totals

53

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
10-year extension granted by states parties in 2013),
Afghanistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Afghanistan will
not meet this deadline.
The MAPA has cleared more than 120km2 of anti-personnel
mined area since the Maputo conference (see Table 5) and
continuously looked for ways to improve performance
quality and productivity with a view to fulﬁlling its Article
5 commitments. These included the goal of completing
clearance of all known mine and ERW contamination by
2023, subject to the availability of funds.
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

30.90

2017

28.12

2016

27.12

2015

13.44

2014

22.28

Total

121.86

Three main factors have combined to put that objective
beyond the MAPA’s reach:
Funding shortfalls: donor funding increased from $40
million in Year 1396 (2016–17) to $51.4 million in 1397 but
that represented little more than half the funding needed to
achieve clearance targets set out in the extension request. 54
The Afghan government has not yet committed funding to
the sector.
Insecurity: more areas appear to be inaccessible as a result
of conﬂict but even in areas where operators continue to
work access is becoming more challenging requiring lengthy
negotiation with local communities and armed opposition
groups active in those areas and slowing progress.
New contamination: the MAPA has continued to identify
signiﬁcant amounts of suspected anti-personnel mined area
– close to 200km2 in the past ﬁve years – slowing progress
towards completion. The rate of new discoveries of mined
areas appears, though, to be slowing and the net level of
new contamination has fallen every year for the last three
years. Afghanistan’s Article 7 report for 2018 estimates its
remaining Article 5 obligation as 210.25km2 but this includes
only 32.48km2 of contamination by mines of an improvised
nature. 55 However, the MAPA has also pointed to areas
suspected to contain mines of an improvised nature in excess
of 465km2 much of which will need to be addressed as part of
its Article 5 obligation. 56
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Table 4: Mine clearance in 2018 52
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 DECEMBER 2025
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Funding for mine action operations carried out by international
NGO operators remained critically low for much of 2018, with
serious gaps in funding resulting in the reduction of capacity
and threatening the closure of international mine action
operations altogether in Angola. The situation improved
signiﬁcantly with the securing of the United Kingdom (UK)
Department for International Development (DFID) funding
in September 2018 through a partnership grant to Angola’s
three largest international operators, The HALO Trust, Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
A nationwide re-survey of contamination was nearly complete
by the end of the year, with only one province remaining
in 2019. As a result, Angola has a far better estimate of its

remaining mine contamination and a much more realistic
picture of the resources needed to meet it. With support
from a dedicated capacity development advisor, the National
Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian
Assistance (CNIDAH) was able to realign the national database
with operators’ records, resulting in a shared and accurate
understanding remaining contamination.1
NPA completed clearance of all known and registered tasks
in Malanje province in May 2018, putting the province on track
to become Angola’s ﬁrst to be declared free of the threat
of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). An ofﬁcial
declaration was awaited from CNIDAH as of writing. 2

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Angola should continue to work closely with operators to improve the national mine action database and to
reconcile data held by CNIDAH with that of other national mine action entities. Particular efforts should be
made to ensure demining data is disaggregated from veriﬁcation data. Dedicated and sustained assistance for
information management capacity to these ends should be provided to CNIDAH.

■

Angola should complete a comprehensive review of its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).

■

Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national programme, including the roles
and responsibilities and funding of the two mine action entities. The future of CNIDAH and its responsibility for
mine action should be clearly established and resourced from the national budget.

■

Angola should increase its national funding to mine action in order to accelerate clearance and demonstrate
national commitment to respect its Article 5 obligations. It should implement its resource mobilisation
strategy, increasing its international advocacy to attract new and former donors.
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■

Angola should ensure that no taxes are imposed on equipment imported by international operators to carry
out mine action operations.

■

Angola should ensure that an adequate quality control (QC) capacity exists for timely handover and reporting
on released land as soon as possible after clearance is completed.

■

As soon as possible, Angola should develop a plan at the national and provincial level for tackling any
contamination that is found once clearance of mined areas has been completed.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

For the ﬁrst time since mine action began decades ago, Angola was able to present a
reasonable estimate of its remaining mine contamination problem, largely in part to the
near completion of a nationwide re-survey, which resulted in cancellation of almost 90%
of suspected hazardous area (SHA) in the national database.

4

The outlook for the National Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian
Assistance (CNIDAH) was uncertain in 2018 after the expiration of its mandate and a
delayed, and as yet, unresolved government decision as to its future. Government austerity
cuts saw a signiﬁcant reduction in its funding and ability to carry out core functions.
Angola’s national mine action programme has since its outset struggled with competing
tensions between government entities responsible for mine action and a lack of clarity in
responsibility. The government has allocated signiﬁcant funding for mine action, but only
for infrastructure development channelled through private commercial operators.

5

Gender is not referenced in Angola’s 2019–25 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) mine action workplan, nor in Angola’s national mine action standards in place
in 2018. CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review in 2019 that gender mainstreaming will be
included in its forthcoming National Mine Action Strategy to be developed in August 2019.

6

The mine action programme has been plagued with difﬁculties in information management for
more than a decade. Operators have persistently raised concerns about inaccurate data and
lengthy delays in updating the database. However, a dedicated capacity development advisor
embedded with CNIDAH throughout 2018 was able to make signiﬁcant progress in reconciling
the database with operators’ records and improving the accuracy of the database.

6

In November 2018, Angola submitted a detailed annual workplan for 2019–25 with a view
to meeting its extended APMBC Article 5 deadline. CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review
in June 2019 that its annual projections are not achievable with the existing demining
capacity and that planning is signiﬁcantly hampered by ongoing ﬁnancial uncertainty and
reduction in operational capacity.

6

National Mine Action Standards exist but do not cover all key areas necessary for a wellfunctioning national mine action programme. Efforts to review the standards are ongoing,
with standards on quality and information management reviewed and updated in 2018.

7

Angola was not on track to meet its 2025 deadline as at 2019. Meeting the deadline will not be
possible without a substantial and sustained increase in funding. Collectively, the resources of
the three largest operators, HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid
declined by nearly 90% in the past decade, making Article 5 implementation signiﬁcantly more
difﬁcult. At the same time, despite many serious challenges, Angola was able to meet its land
release target for 2019, of nearly 17.5km2 released through survey and clearance.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
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(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Performance Commentary

8

6.3

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de
Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária)
Executive Commission for Demining
(Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED)

■
■
■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

National Demining Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD)
Angolan Armed Forces,
Military Ofﬁce of the President
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Police Border Guard (under the CED)
The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS) (NGO)
Various commercial operators

■
■
■

APOPO
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)

STATES PARTIES

As at December 2018, according to CNIDAH, a total of 1,260
mined areas with a size of just over 122km2 remained to be
addressed. This included 1,120 areas with a size of just over
108km2 of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and 140 areas
with a size of close to 14km2 of conﬁrmed hazardous area
(CHA). 3 A major step forward was achieved at the end of the
year, with every province, with the exception of Cabinda,
having been fully re-surveyed. Following this nationwide
re-survey, and as a result of the considerable efforts to
improve the quality of the national mine action database,
Angola has a much clearer assessment of the remaining
challenge to be completed.
As at May 2019, CNIDAH reported that the remaining estimate
of contamination had decreased to 1,216 hazardous areas with
a total size of just over 104km2. 4 This was down from ﬁgures
reported by CNIDAH in Angola’s latest Article 7 transparency
report, which indicated that as at April 2019, a total of 1,220
areas with a size of just over 105km2 remained.5 This is a
sizeable decrease of more than 43km2 from ﬁgures reported
by CNIDAH the previous year, in April 2018, when it stated that
a total of 1,220 mined areas remained covering 147.6km2.6 This,
however, is not consistent with the approx. 17.5km2 of mined
area reported as released by CNIDAH during 2018.7 CNIDAH
also reported that a total of approx. 6km2 of mined area was
added to the national database in 2018. 8

In November 2018, MAG completed re-survey of Lunda
Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, while The HALO Trust was
scheduled to completed re-survey of Cabinda province by the
end of August 2019, which would complete the re-survey of
all of Angola’s 18 provinces.9 In total, more than 90% of SHAs
recorded as a result of inﬂated estimates from a 2004–07
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) were cancelled during the
re-survey. NPA also reported completing clearance of all
known and registered tasks in Malanje province as at
end-May 2018, the ﬁrst and only province in Angola no longer
reported to contain mined areas.10
Overall, Angola’s progress in land cancelled and reduced
through the re-survey has resulted in huge land release, with
close to 274km2 of land released in just two years.
Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years
of internal armed conﬂict that ended in 2002, during which a
range of national and foreign armed movements and groups
laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most
affected provinces have been those with the ﬁercest and
most prolonged ﬁghting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango,
and Moxico.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2018)11
Province
Bengo
Benguela

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

55

3,440,820

4

0

59

3,440,820

67

3,442,333

0

0

67

3,442,333

122

5,683,552

0

0

122

5,683,552

Cabinda

2

49,500

34

7,643,567

36

7,693,067

Huambo

1

12,890

0

0

1

12,890

Bié

Huila
Kuando Kubango
Kunene
Kwanza Norte
Kwanza Sul
Luanda

36

3,219,680

0

0

36

3,219,680

282

34,440,313

0

0

282

34,440,313

35

2,575,367

9

0

44

2,575,367

44

9,814,101

0

0

44

9,814,101

136

9,407,241

1

35,000

137

9,442,241

9

1,121,211

0

0

9

1,121,211

Lunda Norte

18

903,558

22

2,022,089

40

2,925,647

Lunda Sul

46

7,569,410

22

1,138,474

68

8,707,884

0

0

0

0

0

0

Moxico

202

12,143,087

44

1,269,359

246

13,412,446

Namibe

3

253,750

1

0

4

253,750

41

4,158,551

3

1,860,000

44

6,018,551

Malanje

Uige
Zaire
Totals

21

9,828,847

0

0

21

9,828,847

1,120

108,064,211

140

13,968,489

1,260

122,032,700

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Angola also has a signiﬁcant problem of ERW, especially unexploded ordnance (UXO), and very limited contamination
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Angola
for further information).12
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by
two mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national
mine action authority. It reports to the Council of Ministers
or, in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. The other
coordination body, the Executive Commission for Demining
(CED), reports to the Ministry of Social Action, Family, and
Women’s Promotion (MASFAMU, formerly the Ministry
of Social Assistance and Reintegration, or MINARS). In
2002, in order to separate coordination and operational
responsibilities, Angola established the National Demining
Institute (INAD), which is responsible, under the auspices of
the CED and MASFAMU for demining operations and training.
Tensions between these entities and a lack of clarity in
responsibilities has negatively affected Angola’s mine action
programme for decades, with a lack of coordination and
information sharing between the national demining entities,
the CED, INAD, and CNIDAH. A primary fall-out has been the
quality of the national database, held by CNIDAH, which does
not contain data from the CED and commercial companies,
making it difﬁcult for Angola to describe in detail and with
any degree of accuracy the extent of land released over
the years.
In 2018, NPA initiated a capacity development project to assist
CNIDAH to better manage the national mine action programme,
including in key areas such as information and quality
management. The project, which is scheduled to run through
March 2020, was initiated with funding from UK DFID, as part
of a contract with The HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA.

In 2019, CNIDAH reported that the ﬁnancial challenges
affecting Angola continued to negatively affect the national
mine action programme. Government austerity measures
resulted in reduced funding, which CNIDAH said seriously
impeded its ability to monitor and coordinate mine action.13
Operators conﬁrmed that CNIDAH’s severe shortage of
resources in 2018, including a lack of vehicles or resources
for fuel and expenses greatly limited its ability to conduct
mine action activities, most importantly in relation to quality
management and processing of mineﬁeld completion reports
from operators. As a result, there were lengthy delays in
the sign-off of completed tasks, preventing them from being
handed over to local communities.14
Positively, a draft resource mobilisation strategy had
been developed and was waiting for formal approval from
CNIDAH’s management. It was hoped that the ﬁnal draft
would be ready for distribution in June 2019 at a planned
donor coordination meeting in Luanda.15 However, as at
August 2019, it was reported that the draft was undergoing
further review.16
International mine action operators also continued to
report lengthy bureaucratic obstacles in securing visas
for expatriate personnel, compounded by a new tax law
that entered into force in August 2018 and which added
further tariffs to those already applied to the importation
of equipment.17 A joint meeting was held at the end of the
year with IPROCAC, the government entity responsible for
coordination of humanitarian activities, in which NPA, MAG,
and The HALO Trust expressed their concerns in relation
to the implementation of the new law and its impact on
humanitarian activities.18

GENDER
Gender and diversity are not referenced in Angola’s 2019–25
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) mine action
workplan, nor are they included in Angola’s national mine
action standards in place in 2018.
CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review in 2019 that while it
did not have a gender and diversity policy, provisions on
gender mainstreaming will be incorporated into its new
National Mine Action Strategy to be developed with support
from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) and NPA’s capacity development project
in August 2019. Sex- and age-disaggregated data collection
requirements had been integrated into all relevant standing
operating procedures, data collection forms, and other
tools. All operators ensure that survey and community
liaison teams are gender-balanced, and CNIDAH reported
that, in 2018, a total of 23% of all deminers across the
national programme were women. While men continued to
dominate the sector, all operators were endeavouring to
provide opportunities for fair female representation in their
respective teams, CNIDAH said. Two of nine heads of
department within CNIDAH were also held by women
in 2018.19
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International NGO operators conﬁrmed that gender, age, and
diversity-related concerns are taken into account during
survey and clearance to ensure that the views and needs of
different age and gender groups are reﬂected in the conduct
of demining operations. They further reported taking into
consideration gender balance in the hiring of staff in mine
action operations, ensuring that a mix of male and female
staff were employed in operational roles in the ﬁeld, as well
as in managerial positions. 20
The HALO Trust was continuing its “100 Women in Demining
in Angola” project introduced in 2017, with the aim of
empowering 100 women through recruitment, training, and
employment across a range of mine action roles. It reported
that the number of female staff had increased dramatically in
two years, and the project would be an ongoing focus for its
operations in Benguela province, while seeking its expansion
in 2019 and beyond. 21

STATES PARTIES

Angola’s mine action programme has long suffered from
signiﬁcant problems with information management, including
the poor quality of the CNIDAH national database. This is
exacerbated by the lack of integration of mine action data
held by the CED. As noted above, during the year, an NPA
Capacity Development Adviser was embedded in the CNIDAH
team and focused on establishing an up-to-date and more
accurate database, with assistance from operators. NPA
reported that, as a result, discrepancies between operator
reports from the ﬁeld and the records contained in the

national database were being addressed and consequently,
the accuracy of the data recorded in the database and
reporting began to improve as well. 22
A monthly data-sharing mechanism was established between
CNIDAH and all operators in-country in 2018 as part of mine
action and information management coordination meetings.
CNIDAH reported that progress in integrating data held by the
CED was hampered by ﬁnancial constraints that prevented the
CED from being fully operational during the year.23

PLANNING AND TASKING
In November 2018, Angola submitted a detailed annual
workplan for 2019–25 to meet its extended APMBC Article
5 deadline. According to the plan, in 2019, operations in the
provinces of Kuando Kubango, Uige, Moxico, Kwanza Sul,
Huambo, and Cabinda would be prioritised. 24 It foresaw a
total of close to 17.2km2 of land release per year. 25 In June
2019, however, CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review that the
annual projections are not achievable with existing demining
capacity. Almost all operators were working at a reduced
capacity due to limited funding. 26

In June 2019, CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review that it
was already in the process of considering the formalisation
of plans for residual contamination management capacity.
Discussions, however, were in their infancy and no concrete
decisions had yet been made. 27

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no speciﬁc national mine action legislation in
Angola. 28
National mine action standards were in place in Angola in
2018. However, CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review that
they did not cover all key areas considered necessary for
a well-functioning national mine action programme. This
resulted in a lack of standardisation for activities, and
consequently, operators were relying on their own standing
operating procedures. 29
Positively, CNIDAH reported that national standards on
quality and information management were reviewed and
updated with support from NPA’s capacity development
project in 2018. It stated that implementation of the revised
standards had begun following internal training in 2019. 30
Further signiﬁcant revisions were expected to be made with
assistance from the GICHD in 2019. 31

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality
assurance (QA) and QC of mine action activities, including
QC of all completed tasks prior to handover of land to
beneﬁciaries. Under the NPA capacity development project’s
support for quality management (QM), CNIDAH reported that
QM trainings had been initiated in 2018 and were continuing
in 2019. As of June 2019, CNIDAH reported that ﬁve of its
QA ofﬁcers had received explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) Level 1 training, and 10 QA ofﬁcers had completed a
comprehensive quality management course. 32
Despite these much needed improvements, operators
continue to report that CNIDAH lacked the resources and
logistics to carry out QA/QC properly and continued to
rely on operators to fund their transport and, if necessary,
accommodation and per diem. This allowed CNIDAH to
produce completion reports and remove completed tasks
from the IMSMA database. 33 CNIDAH also acknowledged in its
Article 5 deadline extension request that while improvements
in its own and the CED’s QC teams had been made in previous
years, more remained to be done requiring “special measures
in relation to this challenge”. 34
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

OPERATORS
Four international NGOs conducted demining for
humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2018: APOPO, The HALO
Trust, MAG, and NPA. 35
The CED’s four operators – the Armed Forces, the Military
Ofﬁce of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard
– were operational across Angola. They are tasked by the
government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national
infrastructure development plans. 36 A number of national
commercial companies have been accredited by CNIDAH
and previously were mostly employed by the state or
other private companies. However, CNIDAH reported that
no commercial operators were conducting mine action in
2018–19. Only one national operator, APACOMINAS, was
operational in 2018, which was tasked to complete ongoing
tasks in Kwanza Sul province. 37
At its peak, NPA deployed seven manual demining teams,
and one mine detection rat team, in a partnership with
APOPO, which reduced to three manual teams and the
mine detection rat team, as a result of the completion of a
donor-funded project and subsequent termination of funding.
However, the deployment of two additional manual teams in
September 2018 was made possible by new funding under
the DFID grant. 38 APOPO reported deploying one six-person
manual demining team and one mine detection rat team of
six handlers and 15 mine detection rats during the year. 39
APOPO’s partnership with NPA ended in 2018, however, and

in 2019, it reported directly to CNIDAH as an independent
operator. 40 MAG deployed three manual demining teams,
one rapid response team with an EOD capacity, and three
mechanical assets in 2018, a slight increase resulting from
additional funding. The HALO Trust reported deploying a
total of 19 manual teams, 2 survey/community liaison teams,
and 2 weapons and ammunition disposal teams. 41
The impact of the severe decline in funding for mine action
in Angola in recent years cannot be overstated. This trend
continued in 2018, reaching a nadir in April when the United
States (US), one of Angola’s biggest and long-term mine
action donors, decided not to continue funding for future
mine action operations.
As reported above, in September 2018, DFID pledged to fund
mine action in Angola over a two-year period from July 2018
as part of £46 million of support for mine action programmes
globally. This injected critically needed funding to sustain
mine action operations in Angola, with a joint grant to the
three largest operators. However, the continuing decline
and gap in funding experienced by all operators negatively
affected operations in 2018.

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Operational tools in use in demining activities in Angola
in 2018 included one MineWolf machine, two mechanical
excavators (MAG), one brush cutter (NPA), 16 mine detection
rats (APOPO), and one mechanical digger (HALO Trust). 42

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
2

A total of more than 17.5km of mine contamination was
released in 2018, including just over 1km2 through clearance,
close to 2.7km2 through technical survey, and over 13.8km2
through non-technical survey. 43

Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 201847
Province

Operator

Benguela

HALO Trust

356,964

Kuando Kubango

HALO Trust

1,340,072

SURVEY IN 2018

Kwanza Sul

HALO Trust

111,000

CNIDAH reported that international operators released a
total of nearly 16.52km2 through survey in 2018: cancelling
13.85km2 through non-technical survey in 2018, and reducing
a further 2.67km2 through technical survey. 44

Lunda Norte

MAG

5,458,008

Lunda Sul

MAG

5,924,008

Malange

NPA

65,829

Uíge

NPA

591,385

This is a signiﬁcant decrease from 2017, when international
operators reported cancelling more than 138km2 of SHA
through non-technical survey and reducing a further 2.4km2
through technical survey. 45 This was due to the fact that the
nationwide re-survey, which accounted for huge cancellation,
was largely concluded by the end of 2018. 46

Total

13,847,266

Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 201848
Area reduced (m2)

Province

Operator

Moxico

MAG

485,624

Malanje

NPA

1,068,840

Uíge

NPA

1,119,485

Total
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Area cancelled (m²)

2,673,949

STATES PARTIES

ANGOLA

CLEARANCE IN 2018
According to CNIDAH, international NGO operators cleared a total of 1.04km2 of mined area in 2018, destroying in the
process 1,646 anti-personnel mines, 25 anti-vehicle mines, and 517 ERW. 49 In 2017, NGO operators reported clearing
a total of over 1.18km2 of mined area, destroying 3,480 anti-personnel mines, 114 anti-vehicle mines, and 2,201 ERW. 50
While the amount of area cleared remained fairly consistent, the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed
in 2018 fell by over 1,800, compared with 2017.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 2018 51
Areas
cleared

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

HALO Trust

10

241,703

176

3

84

HALO Trust

10

111,518

56

9

153

Kuando Kubango

HALO Trust

5

225,693

370

0

80

Kwanza Sul

HALO Trust

3

5,833

18

0

0

Malanje

NPA

4

16,998

692

0

15

Moxico

MAG

13

370,348

333

11

29

Uíge

NPA

Province

Operator

Benguela
Huambo

Totals

UXO
destroyed

10

71,319

1

2

156

55

1,043,412

1,646

25

517

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

The HALO Trust also reported destroying an additional 59
anti-personnel mines, MAG 27 anti-personnel mines, and NPA
4 anti-personnel mines as a result of EOD spot tasks. 52
The HALO Trust said its decrease in clearance output in 2018
was due to a reduction of funding and subsequent reduction
in the number of teams deployed in Huambo province. 53 In
contrast, MAG reported increased clearance in 2018, owing
to its mechanical clearance teams and ground preparation
team working in combination with manual teams. 54 NPA stated
that despite the numbers of anti-personnel mines destroyed
during the year, its completed tasks in Uíge province proved
to be more heavily contaminated with ERW than mines. 55

Following completion of re-survey in 2017, NPA reported
completing clearance of all known and registered tasks
in Malanje province as at end-May 2018, marking a highly
signiﬁcant milestone of the ﬁrst province to be declared free
of the threat of mines in Angola, following ofﬁcial declaration
by CNIDAH.56 As at August 2019, however, CNIDAH had yet to
make any such declaration and discussions as to when and
how Malanje will be declared mine free were ongoing. The
HALO Trust was also close to completing clearance of Huambo
province, which will be another milestone achievement for
mine action in Angola. It is hoped that with these two provinces
declared completed, renewed momentum and additional
resources can be secured to enable further progress in a
province-by-province approach to completion.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ANGOLA: 1 JANUARY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
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Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

1.0

2017

1.2

2016

4.1

2015

2.2

2014

3.8

Total

12.3

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2017),
Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is not on
track to meet this deadline.
Operators and CNIDAH maintain that with the requisite
funding, Angola could still meet its 2025 Article 5 deadline.
However, there was consensus that in 2018–19, the level of
funding outlined as necessary to complete clearance by this
time was simply not in place. 57 Collectively in the past decade,
the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust,
MAG, and NPA declined by nearly 90%. 58

On the margins of the 16th Meeting of States Parties to the
APMBC in November 2018, Angola, with assistance from the
APMBC’s Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation
and Assistance, convened a joint meeting for relevant
stakeholders and potential donors, under the Committee’s
“individualised approach” framework. At that meeting,
CNIDAH stated that $374 million would be needed to complete
clearance by 2025. However, CNIDAH and operators have
previously set the estimate of funding required signiﬁcantly
lower, at US$275 million. 59
CNIDAH reported in June 2019 that it would be ambitious to
think that Angola will achieve its 2025 Article 5 deadline. 60
Nonetheless, Angola managed to meet its Article 5 workplan
target for land release in 2018, with nearly 17.5km2 of
contaminated area released through survey and clearance.
News that clearance of two provinces, Malanje and Huambo,
were being reported complete is also highly encouraging.
Completion of clearance in these provinces will be major
steps forward for Angola’s mine action.
With a nationwide re-survey of all contamination nearly
complete, Angola is on the verge of having a comprehensive
estimate of remaining contamination. But without substantial
new funding, Angola will not complete clearance by its Article
5 deadline and Maputo political declaration goal of end 2025.
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020
THREE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 MARCH 2023

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Argentina should work with the United Kingdom to reach an agreement on the joint clearance of the
Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION
Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.1 On ratifying
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Argentina submitted a declaration reafﬁrming “its rights of sovereignty
over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the
territory.”2 It reiterated this declaration most recently at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties and the May 2019 APMBC
Intersessional Meetings. 3
The islands were mined, mostly by Argentinian forces, during its armed conﬂict with the United Kingdom in 1982. Argentina
has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected. 4

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo Desminado Humanitario) established by a Ministry
of Defence Resolution, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is invited, and a Humanitarian Demining Training Centre
(Centro de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario). 5

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Argentina has stated that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the Malvinas due to
the “illegal occupation” by the United Kingdom. It did, however, make an offer more than a decade ago to support demining of
the islands. In November 2018, Argentina reiterated its claim of sovereignty over the islands and declared that if the United
Kingdom entered into negotiations over sovereignty an agreement on demining could be reached between the two states. 6
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009 by the Second Review Conference,
Argentina is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but
not later than 1 January 2020. In March 2019, Argentina formally submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline until 1 March
2023. In the request, Argentina has indicated its predisposition to elaborate a new provisional agreement on the basis of a form of
joint sovereignty that would permit the clearance of anti-personnel mines with the United Kingdom.7
In 2018, the United Kingdom submitted and was granted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by an additional ﬁve years
until 1 March 2024, which includes a plan to complete the demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. 8

1

Article 7 Report (for 2009), Form A.

2

Article 7 Report (for 1999), Form A.

3

Statement of Argentina, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018; and Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.

4

Statement of Argentina, 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.

5

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form A.

6

Statement of Argentina, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018.

7

Argentina 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2JBbkAM.

8

United Kingdom 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
INTERIM TWO-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED FOR SURVEY

KEY DATA
ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

HEAVY,
(ESTIMATED)

50KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

0.92KM 2,101
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

25

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

2017
2018
22.84

20

20.75

15

10

6.68

5

5.03
0.69

0.92

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ﬁnalised a new national mine
action strategy for 2018–25 in 2018, which was adopted by
the Council of Ministers in January 2019. In 2018, BiH began
a European Union (EU)-funded country assessment project
to help determine a more accurate baseline of anti-personnel

mine contamination for realistic planning and to support the
preparation of what is hoped will be its last Article 5 deadline
extension request, due to be submitted before the end of
March 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

BiH should adopt, without further delay, the amended demining law drafted in 2017.

■

BiH should implement the recommendations of both the 2015 United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment, and the 2016 performance audit report of
the Audit Ofﬁce of the Institutions of BiH.1 In particular, BiH should continue reforming and strengthening
the governance and management of the mine action programme.

■

BHMAC should strive to ensure that all implementing partners are conducting evidence-based survey and
clearance, to more accurately identify and delineate areas of contamination, in line with the National Mine
Action Standards (NMAS) and Standing Operating Procedures (SoPs).

■

BHMAC should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination,
including using the classiﬁcation of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and conﬁrmed hazardous area (CHA)
in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

■

BHMAC should strive to improve gender balance in the sector, at the least by meeting the target of 40% female
staff set by the 2003 Law on Gender Equality.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

BiH’s current baseline of mined area is not accurate, with inﬂated SHAs. The “country
assessment” project, currently underway, should help to determine a more accurate
baseline and inform planning.

5

National ownership of mine action in BiH falls under the responsibility of the Demining
Commission and BHMAC, and the BiH mine action strategy for 2018–25 has been
adopted. Governance and management of the mine action programme could be
strengthened and reformed. As at June 2019, the amended demining law was still
awaiting parliamentary adoption.

5

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 supports the 2003 Law on Gender Equality.
BHMAC has stated that, under its leadership, relevant actors will include gender in all
phases of all mine action activities. However, of BHMAC’s own 107 operations staff in the
ﬁeld, only 10 were women.

6

There is considerable scope to improve the accuracy and consistency of BHMAC’s mine
action data and information management system, which should also be made consistent
with the IMAS. BHMAC is in the process of developing a new database, which will fulﬁl
IMAS requirements.

6

BiH adopted its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 in January 2019. It is hoped that
the results of the EU-funded “country assessment” project, expected to be completed at
the end of 2019, will assist planning and the realisation of the new National Strategy.

8

BiH has NMAS and SoPs in place for the efﬁcient release of mined areas through
evidence-based survey (including technical survey with targeted investigation) and
clearance. BHMAC must ensure that all implementing partners adhere to the methodology.

6

The amount of land released through clearance and cancelled through non-technical
survey in 2018 was a slight increase on 2017, while technical survey output decreased
slightly. Efforts in the latter half of 2018 were put into the “country assessment” project,
to set a new baseline for realistic Article 5 implementation planning.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE

Performance Commentary

5

(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.0

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

The Demining Commission (representatives from three
ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected
to represent BiH’s three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks,
Croats, and Serbs))
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)

■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■

Armed Forces of BiH
BHMAC
Civil Protection Administration of Republic of Srpska
Federal Administration of Civil Protection
Non-governmental organisations:
■ Association UEM
■ DEMIRA
■ Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)
■ Pro Vita
■ Stop Mines
■ Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez”
■ WBE

Commercial demining companies:
■ Detektor
■ N&N Ivsa
■ In Demining N.H.O

■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
BiH is heavily contaminated with mines, primarily as a
result of the 1992–95 conﬂict related to the break-up of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All warring
factions in BiH laid mines, primarily between confrontation
lines. 2 Nearly twenty-four years after the end of the conﬂict,
BiH is still the most heavily mined country in Europe. BIH is
also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW),
including cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report
on BiH for further information).

In its latest Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 7 transparency report, BiH claimed a total of
1,018km2 of mined area, across 8,525 locations, but did not
disaggregate SHA and CHA. 3 This represents a decrease of
43km2 compared to the 1,061km2 of mined area as at the end
of 2017. 4 The difference in ﬁgures between mined area as at
the end of 2017 and 2018 cannot be satisfactorily reconciled
based on the land released through survey and clearance
in 2018.
Mined area reported to Mine Action Review (see Table 1)
also totalled 1,018km2 (as per BiH’s Article 7 report), but
was reported to be across a total of 8,948 mined areas
(8,141 SHAs and 807 CHAs). 5

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by canton (at end 2018) 6
“Known” mined areas

Area (km2)

Suspected mined areas

Area (km2)

132

3.00

640

98.70

6

0.37

174

17.39

Tuzlanski

57

1.39

704

78.43

Zanicko-Dobojski

52

1.79

665

115.83

Bosansko-Podrinjski

19

1.14

222

44.18

100

3.23

761

119.52

68

3.00

1,225

147.00

3

0.23

10

0.08

Sarajevo

29

1.02

285

67.84

Canton 10

36

1.07

475

74.20

Subtotal BiH Federation

502

16.24

5,161

763.17

Republika Srpska

303

5.79

2,834

218.12

2

0.05

146

14.64

807

22.08

8,141

995.93

Canton
Unsko-Sanki
Posavski

Srednje-Bosanski
Hercegovacko-Neret
Zapadno-Hercegovacki

Brčko district
Totals

A 2016 national audit ofﬁce report on the efﬁciency of the
demining system in BiH concluded that: “Twenty years
after the war ended, the Mine Action Centre still does not
have complete information on the locations of landmines
in BiH, which is to say it does not know the total suspected
hazardous area.”7 Similarly, a 2015 UNDP evaluation reported
that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)
is aware that not all of the SHA is actually mined, but
“without more efﬁcient non-technical survey and technical
survey procedures the exact extent of the problem cannot
be quantiﬁed.”8
During 2017, plans were formalised between BHMAC,
clearance operators, and the EU for a country assessment to
establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and
improve the efﬁciency of clearance operations.9 The resultant
18-month project, “Country assessment of mine-suspected
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018–2019” (hereafter,
the “country assessment” project), was signed in August
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and was planned to be completed by February 2020 (see
the Land Release System section of this report for further
information).10 If this leads to very signiﬁcant reduction of SHA
and identiﬁcation of truly mined area, this will make a major
contribution to improving programme performance.
Mineﬁelds in BiH generally contain relatively small numbers
of mines, which are typically either “in groups or randomly
laid”. The quality of approximately 30% of mineﬁeld
records was not sufﬁciently accurate for the identiﬁcation
of the precise mineﬁeld location and shape. Furthermore,
approximately 40% of mineﬁeld records were reportedly
never made or handed over, and records were often
destroyed or lost for several reasons, such as the death
or emigration of the persons who created the mineﬁeld
records.11 Physical changes to mined areas (such as in
vegetation), and a lack of witnesses to the laying of the
mines, pose additional challenges.12

STATES PARTIES

The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil
Affairs, supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents
BiH in its relations with the international community on
mine-related issues.13 The Demining Commission is composed
of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs,
Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH’s three main
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the
Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for
mine action, the Demining Commission is the strategic body
responsible for setting mine action policy, and it proposes
the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for approval by the
Council of Ministers.14 The existing Demining Commission
representatives were re-elected for a further two years
(October 2017 to October 2019).15
One problem posed by the structure of the Demining
Commission is that each of the three represented ministries
has separate portfolios in their respective ministries; and
their work on the Demining Commission is only part-time
in addition to their other responsibilities.16 Furthermore,
according to the 2016 audit ofﬁce report, “The Commission
has not developed a methodology on how to monitor the work
of the BHMAC”.17
BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of
Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and
implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation
of all mine action organisations.18 BHMAC operates from its
headquarters in Sarajevo, and two main ofﬁces in Sarajevo
and Banja Luka, and eight regional ofﬁces (Banja Luka, Bihac,
Brčko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla).19
Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine
action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable
platform for mine action funding by the government and local
authorities. BiH demining authorities are following the 2015
recommendation of the Council of Ministers to amend the
existing law, instead of adopting a new law, 20 and a working
group which consisted of representatives from the Ministry
of Civil Affairs, the Demining Commission, BHMAC, the Armed
Forces, and the entity Civil Protections, created a ﬁrst draft
of the amended demining law.21 However, as at June 2019 the
amended text from 2017 was still awaiting parliamentary
adoption. Clearer legislation on liabilities related to mine
action activities would be beneﬁcial to all mine action
stakeholders in BiH.

After a 10-year hiatus, Board of Donor meetings resumed in
September 2015. 22 As at April 2019, however, the last Board
of Donor meeting had taken place in Sarajevo in November
2017. 23 BiH’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025
speciﬁes that at least two such meetings should be organised
every year. 24 In October 2016, expert working groups (EWGs),
which used to meet until 2009, were reinitiated and continue
to meet. 25
BiH’s second goal, in its National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2025, is that the “Mine action programme in BH is
promoted on both national and international level to increase
its visibility and improve liability, commitment and support
of the state”, and the strategy includes operational goals
linked to this strategic goal. 26 As committed to in its national
mine action strategy, BiH published a separate ﬁnancial
plan for implementation of the BiH mine action strategy for
2018–25. The plan sees BiH commit a national budget of 4.5
million BAM (over US$2.5 million) per annum for the Armed
Forces and 5.945 million BAM (US$3.4 million) per annum for
BHMAC, for 2019 and 2020; which is forecast to increase to
a total of 21.55 million BAM (over US$12.3 million, at current
exchange rates) per annum in 2021–25. 27 This national funding
is in additional to forecast international funding, which is also
budgeted in BiH’s ﬁnancial plan.28
BHMAC is funded by the common institutions of BiH and
other institutions at state level. 29 BiH has calculated that
the required cost to fulﬁl BiH’s plans during its two-year
interim extension period is almost 80 million BAM (US$46
million), of which 50% will be national funding and 50%
donor funding. Funds for non‐technical survey activities
by BHMAC will be ensured from the budgets of BiH
institutions and implemented through operational activities
of BHMAC. Budgets of BiH institutions will also ensure funds
for technical survey and mine clearance activities to be
implemented by Armed Forces. Entity governments’ budgets
will ensure funds for technical survey and mine clearance
operations, to be implemented by entity civilian protections.
Other funding resources from BiH include: Brčko District
budget, budgets of cantons and municipalities, and budgets
of public and private companies. 30

GENDER
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 speciﬁes
that “Under the leadership of BHMAC, relevant actors will
include gender and diversity into all phases of planning,
realisation and follow-up of all mine activities”. 31 The mine
action strategy considered and supported the 2003 Law on
Gender Equality in BiH, which includes equal treatment of the
genders and equality of opportunity, and prohibits direct and
indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Law
on Gender Equality determines that equal representation
of men and women exists when the percentage of either
gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (state, entity, cantonal,
and municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH’s national mine
action strategy also considered the 2017 Gender Equality
Action Plan. 32 However, as at April 2019, out of BHMAC’s 171
employees, only 42 were women (25%). Of BHMAC’s 107
operations staff in the ﬁeld, 10 were women (9%). 33

BHMAC reported that it has a gender and diversity policy
and that BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender Equality
and routinely includes it in the development of strategies
and standards. 34
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has a gender policy and equal
employment opportunities for suitably qualiﬁed females and
males. However, as at August 2019 MAG’s programme in
BiH had never received applications from women for vacant
operational roles, and of its 62 operational staff in BiH, only
two medic positions were held by women, in addition to a
female operations assistant. MAG does not have dedicated
community liaison in BiH, but it reported that its survey and
clearance teams seek to talk to all women and men living
near the survey area to obtain as much data as possible. Of
MAG’s management team, the country director was female
in 2018, along with a support services ofﬁcer. 35
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Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that it promotes
gender equality in all aspects of its programme activities in
BiH. Mixed gender representation is an obligation for NPA
teams conducting community liaison and risk education. 36
NPA reported that the overall gender split of its staff as at
April 2019 was 98 male employees and 10 female (9%). 37 NPA
reported that it is driving to achieve a gender balance, and
that the programme encourages the employment of women,
including into managerial and operational staff positions.

Four managerial positions in the NPA BiH programme are
held by women. 38
All groups affected by mines, including women and children,
are reported to be consulted during survey and community
liaison activities by both BHMAC and NPA, and survey
and community liaison teams are inclusive with a view to
facilitating this. BHMAC and NPA also reported that relevant
mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age. 39

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at April 2019, BHMAC was using its own information
management system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine
Action Information System (BHMAIS). 40 However, BHMAC does
not report accurately or consistently on mine contamination
by SHAs and CHAs, in a manner consistent with IMAS. In
addition, there are frequent inaccuracies in BHMAC reporting
on land release.
Information in BHMAC’s information management system
is made available to clearance operators, 41 but at present
this is restricted to data for the speciﬁc tasks on which the
operators are engaged. 42

BHMAC, with the support of UNDP and ﬁnancing from the
EU, plans to create a new web-based database to replace the
existing system and increase accessibility and transparency
of mine action data. The project aims “to inﬂuence policy and
build the capacity to instil greater organisational openness
and adaptability to new methodologies”. 43 According to the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), the UNDP-supported project to improve information
management through the development of a web-based
database will improve the accessibility and transparency
of data. 44 The joint development of the database (IMSMA
Core) began in 2019 and was ongoing as at June 2019; it was
expected to be completed by 2020. 45

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2017, BiH developed a new national mine action strategy
for 2018–25, with support from the GICHD, which addresses
all mine and cluster munition remnant contamination. The
strategy was formally adopted in January 2019. 46
The BiH previous Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19, adopted
by the Council of Ministers in 2008, 47 set the target of the
country becoming free of mines by 2019. BHMAC conducted
the ﬁrst of three planned revisions of the strategy in 2012–1348
(the other two were due in 2015 and 2017, respectively). 49
In 2016, BHMAC, in consultation with the GICHD, started the
third revision process. This time, BiH, with support from
the GICHD, and participation from government ministries,
clearance operators, and other stakeholders, produced an
entirely new national mine action strategy for the period
through to projected completion of mine and cluster munition
remnant clearance (2018–25).
The new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025, which
was only adopted in January 2019, contains a general plan
and timeframe for the completion of mine clearance, as well
as for cluster munition remnants. It is due to be revised
in 2020 and 2023, to consider progress and adjust for any
changes in context. 50 The strategy also includes a section on
management of residual contamination, which speciﬁes that
BiH is obliged to create a strategy for the management of
residual contamination by 2022. 51
BiH’s annual operational mine action plan for 2019, in
accordance with Article 16 of the Demining Law, has been
adopted by the Demining Commission. 52
The EU-funded “country assessment” of the size and impact
of mine and ERW contamination, was signed on 15 August
2018, with an implementation period of 18 months. 53 The
assessment aims to determine a more accurate baseline
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of mine contamination and provide a new foundation for
meaningful planning. Results of the assessment will enable
BiH to plan for the implementation of its new National
Strategy and prepare its ﬁnal Article 5 extension through to
completion. 54 Under the project, non-technical survey will be
conducted by BHMAC (nine non-technical survey teams), the
BiH Armed Forces (two non-technical survey teams), and NPA
(three non-technical survey teams), with €1.1 million (approx.
US$1.25 million) of EU funding.
As part of the “country assessment” project, 1,030km2 of
remaining mined area is expected to be subdivided into about
500 MSAs (mine-suspected areas) requiring further survey
and clearance, while 30km2 is expected to be cancelled. 55
The MSA polygons will be made up of SHAs and CHAs that
encompass one or more impacted communities and which,
due to economic, cultural, geographical or other reasons,
form a logical geographical area on which comprehensive
survey and clearance will be undertaken. 56 It is envisaged
that the creation of MSAs will enable mine action operations
to better respond to the needs of the community through
strengthening community liaison and ensuring that the
community needs are prioritised and addressed. It is also
intended to simplify the tasking procedure by assigning
speciﬁc organisations a larger geographical area in which
to carry out operations. 57 Local administrations and BHMAC
will together agree on the size and priority of MSAs in
accordance with humanitarian, developmental, and safety
needs of municipality and local communities. 58 The MSAs
will be categorised into three categories: high, medium, and
low risk, based on available general assessment data. MSAs
with a higher probability of containing PROM mines, large
conﬁrmed mineﬁelds, and high-/medium-impact MSAs based
on general assessment, will be categorised as high- and
medium-risk MSAs within one municipality. All other MSAs
will be categorised as low risk. 59
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Results of mine action in BiH show that the applied land
release model was efﬁcient in the period 2005–09, and
prior to 2009, BHMAC cancelled signiﬁcant amounts of land
annually through non-technical survey.60 Since then, however,
non-technical survey output has declined, but there remains
signiﬁcant potential for further reduction in the size of the SHA.
In December 2012, having recognised the need for more
efﬁcient land release in BiH, the EU, with pre-accession
funding, started a pilot “land release” project with BHMAC. 61
The resulting “IPA 2011 Land Release” was implemented from
2013 to 2016, with EU funding. 62 The project enabled efﬁcient
tasking of systematic technical survey and technical survey
with targeted investigation, helping ensure clearance assets
were only directed into CHAs. 63 Results from six completed
tasks in the EU pilot project revealed that 91% of the total
land released was cancelled through non-technical survey,
8.5% was reduced through technical survey, and 0.5% was
cleared. 64 Assuming the six tasks are representative of much
of BiH’s remaining SHAs, BHMAC predicts that only a minor
proportion of the remaining SHAs contain contamination
and deployment of clearance assets will therefore only be
required for relatively small areas. 65 This has been factored
into the new National Mine Action Strategy, and it is hoped
that the new land release concept will greatly speed up
release of suspected mined area. 66
The application of technical survey with targeted
investigation was also piloted by NPA in 2015, and has
subsequently been expanded and implemented by other
operators and state bodies, including the BiH Armed Forces
and civil protection entities. As part of the process, BHMAC
and NPA identiﬁed new sources of information, including
former soldiers and commanders. Several methodologies
can then be applied as part of technical survey to locate
contamination, including manual clearance lane(s) towards

a speciﬁc target, MDDs to search for a speciﬁc target, or to
help identify a speciﬁc target. Selection of techniques for
each target is guided by several factors, including analysis
of the characteristics of indirect evidence examined and
environmental conditions (including the type of terrain
and density of vegetation). 67 Further promotion of national
ownership by BHMAC and the Demining Commission,
including the adoption of a clear deﬁnition of “all reasonable
effort” and an appropriate division of liabilities would
enhance efﬁcient and effective land release process in BiH.
In 2016, in collaboration with the GICHD and UNDP, BHMAC
held a workshop on “standards and SOP revisions”. 68 Efforts
focused on ensuring the standards and SoPs allow for the
optimal release of land through evidence-based survey,
including through technical survey. 69 The BiH Demining
Commission has adopted three chapters of the standards so
far: one on non-technical survey, one on technical survey, and
one on the opening and monitoring of tasks.70 In addition, a
speciﬁc SoP was approved by the Demining Commission for
the new 18-month “country assessment” project.71
There is broad agreement among operators and experts
that technical survey with targeted investigation could
signiﬁcantly improve the efﬁciency of land release in BiH. This
could more accurately deﬁne CHAs, potentially reducing the
area released through clearance to between 1% and 3% of the
original SHA.72
The Federal Administration of Civil Protection, however,
reported that it had suggested a number of suggested
proposals for the improvement of current standards on mine
clearance and UXO removal, non-technical survey, technical
survey, and land release, but without signiﬁcant results,
which it attributed to a lack of readiness for dialogue from
BHMAC leadership.73

OPERATORS
As at September 2018, 26 organisations were accredited for
mine action in BiH: four government organisations (Armed
Forces of BiH, Federal Administration of Civil Protection,
Civil Protection Administration of Republic of Srpska, and
Brčko District Civil Protection), the Red Cross Society of BiH;
seven commercial organizations (all national); 7 commercial
organizations, and 14 non‐government organizations
(NGOs) (11 national and 3 international).74 Overall demining
capacity totalled 1,200 persons in accredited organisations,
comprising 900 deminers and 300 others (including team
leaders, site leader, operational ofﬁcers, QA ofﬁcers, and dog
trainers). The accredited organisations also have at their
disposal a total of 37 accredited machines (for vegetation
removal, ground disturbance, and removal of debris), 1,257
metal detectors, and 63 accredited explosive detection dogs.
In addition, BHMAC has at its disposal 44 surveyors (i.e.
22 survey teams for non‐technical survey and emergency
marking), 8 ofﬁcers for planning non‐technical survey
operations, 12 inspectors and 28 senior clerks for QC/
technical supervision/inspection.75

During 2018, technical survey and/or clearance of antipersonnel mines was conducted by the BiH Armed Forces,
the Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the Civil
Protection Administration of Republic of Srpska, and twelve
other clearance organisations, comprising nine NGOs
(Association UEM, DEMIRA, Mine Detection Dog Centre
(MDDC), MAG, NPA, Pro Vita, Stop Mines, Udruga “Pazi
Mine Vitez”, and WBE) and three commercial organisations
(Detektor, N&N Ivsa, and In Demining N.H.O).76 BHMAC did not
expect any major changes to demining capacity in 2019.77
The BiH Armed Forces’ survey and clearance operations,
which include use of machinery and explosive detection dogs,
are fully engaged from March to November, and with reduced
activity, predominantly in southern BiH, from December
to February.78 Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused
on building the capacity of the Army’s Demining Battalion.
This involves transfer of knowledge through operational
planning of clearance and technical survey operations; direct
operational support; and provision of mine detection dogs
(MDDs) and equipment, among other things.79 The BiH Armed
Forces require ongoing support to secure personal protective
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equipment, batteries for detectors, and fuel for demining
machinery, since the Army’s own complex procurement
system often cannot deliver such items in sufﬁcient time. 80
The Demining Battalion also receives support from Austria,
France, Italy, and the United States, as well as EUFOR, which
alone provides 90% of support. 81
The state operators, the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining
Battalion and Civil Protection, are both good partners and
have effective capacities, but have suffered from logistical
challenges and equipment deﬁcits, which can prevent them
from working at full capacity. 82 Deminers in the BiH Armed
Forces, however, are forced to stop demining at the age of 38
(this upper limit, until recently, had been 35). This results in
experienced deminers being forced to retire at a very early
age and results in a high turnover of personnel. 83
In the opinion of a UNDP expert, the BiH Armed Forces have
sufﬁcient demining equipment, but could beneﬁt from stronger
management and better oversight of demining operations.84
Federal administration of civil protection teams are spatially
distributed to cover the entire territory of the Federation
of BiH and are located in Bihac, Busovaca, Gorazde, Livno,
Mostar, Orasje, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla, and Zepce. Capacity
includes 11 demining teams with 95 employees, 8 UXO teams
with a total of 27 employees (solely responsible for removing
UXOs in the Federation of BiH following reports from citizens
and institutions), 4 MDD handlers with 4 dogs, a mechanical
debris removal team that has one armoured excavator and two
armoured trucks to remove UXO contaminated debris, and a
demining team with two demining machines and 4 operators.85
The teams of the Federal administration of civil protection
are trained in fast response to remove injured persons (both
civilians and deminers) from mine-contaminated areas. The
Federal administration of civil protection believes that accident
and incident investigation, which is currently only conducted by
BHMAC staff, should be expanded to include representatives
from the wider demining community, such as the entities civil
protection authorities, the Armed Forces, and EUFOR, to help
improve the safety and quality of operations. 86

The Civil Protection of Brčko District only conducts removal
and destruction of ERW, and not demining.
NPA is, according to the 2015 UNDP evaluation, well
respected in BiH and is treated almost like a national asset,
even though it is international and independently donor
funded. 87 Both machines and dogs are integrated into NPA
demining operations in BiH. NPA uses MDD and special
detection dogs (SDDs) for clearance and technical survey
tasks, including targeted technical survey. 88 In 2018, NPA
had 8 manual clearance/technical survey teams with a
total of 53 deminers, 6 MDD handlers and 9 dogs, and 4
machine operators and machines. In addition, NPA had one
three-strong non-technical survey team in 2018. In 2019, this
increased to three non-technical survey teams, as part of
the EU-funded “country assessment” project. 89 As mentioned
above, since 2010, NPA has also focused on building the
capacity of the Armed Forces Demining Battalion.
MAG received operational accreditation in April 2017, and
began technical survey and clearance operations in mid-May
2017.90 In 2018, MAG deployed 61 staff to conduct technical
survey and clearance, an increase of four teams (36 staff,
plus 2 medics and 1 site surveyor), compared to MAG’s
capacity in the previous year. MAG expected capacity in 2019
to remain constant.91
With the exception of MAG and NPA, clearance operators
in BiH typically compete for international tenders in order
to secure their funding. The UNDP evaluation suggested
that this resulted in considerable capacity being underused
and recommended alternative contracting models more
appropriate for land release (either by having longer term
contracts or being contracted for the clearance of larger
areas), which could be more attractive to the demining
organisations in terms of security and could also make best
use of capacity in the long run.92 National demining NGOs,
such as STOP Mines or PROVITA, which are registered in a
similar way to companies, potentially have capacity to quickly
mobilise additional resources and up-scale operations.93
Quality control and quality assurance (QA) is conducted
by BHMAC.94

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Clearance and technical survey operations in BiH include mechanical preparation of land, manual clearance, and the use of
MDDs and SDDs depending on the geographical conditions.95 Much of the remaining mined area is in hilly or mountainous
terrain, which restricts the use of machinery.
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 28.79km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which almost 0.92km2 was cleared, over 5.03km2 was reduced
through technical survey, and 22.84km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, over 5.03km2 was reduced through technical survey,
conducted by various government organisations, NGOs,
and commercial organisations (see Table 2).96 This is a
decrease on the 6.68km2 reduced through technical survey in
2017.97 In addition, a further 22.84km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey in 2018,98 compared to 20.75km2
in 2017.99

Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
by canton in 2018100
Area reduced (m2)

Canton
Unsko-Sanki

553,587

Posavski

515,654

Tuzlanski

602,633

Zanicko-Dobojski

130,153

Bosansko-Podrinjski

74,001

Srednje-Bosanski

472,011

Hercegovacko-Neret

193,600

Sarajevo

263,910

Canton 10

215,716

Total Federation BiH

3,021,265

Total Republika Srpska

1,684,002

Total Brčko district

330,015

Sum total

5,035,282

CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of almost 0.92km2 was cleared in 2018, during which 2,101 anti-personnel mines, 57 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,974
ERW were destroyed (see Table 3).101 This is an increase on the 0.69km2 of mined area cleared and 1,749 anti-personnel mines
destroyed, in 2017. Of 0.92km2 2018 clearance total, 431,808m2 of mined area was cleared (and 1,497 anti-personnel mines and
942 items of ERW destroyed), through tasks created through the EU country assessment project and cleared by the federal
administration of civil protection, MDDC, NPA, MAG and Provita.102
Mine clearance operations were conducted by the BiH Armed Forces, the Civil Protection of FBIH, the Civil Protection of RS,
nine non-governmental organisations, and three commercial demining companies (see Tables 4).103
Table 3: Mine clearance by canton in 2018104
Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

ERW destroyed

Unsko-Sanki

96,454

111

0

186

Posavski

75,137

33

0

20

Tuzlanski

93,765

100

10

88

Canton

Zanicko-Dobojski

19,774

9

0

14

Bosansko-Podrinjski

55,064

212

18

38

744

1

0

6

375,864

1,061

0

858

74,481

383

0

363

Total Federation BiH

791,283

1,910

28

1,573

Total Republic Srpska

106,169

174

29

235

Srednje-Bosanski
Hercegovacko-Neret
Sarajevo

Total Brčko district
Sum totals

22,080

17

0

166

919,532

2,101

57

1,974

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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Table 4: Mine clearance by operator in 2018105
No. of
tasks

Area
cleared (m2)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

ERW
destroyed

Federal Administration
of Civil Protection

6

41,041

59

10

355

BiH Armed Forces

5

92,403

220

10

264

Operator
Government

Local NGOs

International
NGOs

Commercial
demining
organisations

Civil Protection Administration of RS

4

17,874

44

11

26

Association UEM

2

33,833

22

0

7

DEMIRA

2

3,158

2

0

0

Pro Vita

4

357,528

884

0

888

Stop Mines

1

1,735

1

0

0

Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez”

2

19,101

60

12

142

WBE

1

615

0

0

0

Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)

3

28,112

235

0

77

NPA

3

33,213

322

0

16

MAG

1

13,958

62

0

6

Detektor

5

27,857

72

5

10

N&N Ivsa

16

229,728

115

5

182

4

19,376

3

4

1

59

919,532

2,101

57

1,974

In Demining N.H.O
Totals

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENSION REQUESTED (2-YEAR INTERIM REQUEST): 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, BiH was granted a second
extension request in 2018, for an interim two-year extension
to 1 March 2021. Within this interim extension period, BiH
plans to conduct a “country assessment”, to set a new
baseline for realistic planning. Following completion of the
“country assessment”, BiH believes it will be in a better
position to calculate the time required to complete its Article 5
obligations. It has pledged to submit a ﬁnal extension request,
based on a more precise understanding of the challenge, by
31 March 2020.106
Efforts to gain greater clarity on the extent of actual mine
contamination are welcome but long overdue, considering
that BiH still does not have an accurate picture of baseline
contamination more than 20 years after becoming a state
party to the APMBC.
According to its 2018 interim Article 5 extension request, the
next two years will see a transition of working methodologies
throughout BiH, with land release being intensively conducted
through the application of new standards and SoPs to
improve efﬁciency and cost‐effectiveness.107 Results gained
so far through application of more efﬁcient evidence-based
land release methodology to more accurately determine the
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location and extent of actual contamination, and cancel areas
not contaminated, indicate the potential for large areas of
uncontaminated SHA to be released through survey.108 BiH has
expressed its commitment to complete its Article 5 obligations
by 2025, as detailed in the National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2025.109
The “country assessment” project, currently being undertaken,
is expected to result in the cancellation of 30km2 through highquality non-technical survey and should enable more accurate
tasking of technical survey and clearance going forward.
However, this represents less than 3% of BiH’s total suspected
mined area and it remains to be seen what the actual results of
the assessment will be and how it will impact BHMAC’s Article 5
completion planning. The possibility of new areas being recorded
as contaminated through the “country assessment” is considered
to be low, but is a possibility. Over the last ﬁve years, BiH has
released less than 6.5km2 thorough clearance (see Table 5). Since
the ten-year extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, granted
in 2008, BiH has continuously fallen far short of its annual land
release targets. The painfully slow pace of clearance has resulted
in lack of conﬁdence in the national mine action programme from
donors but also from people living in mine-affected communities,
who felt disillusioned that the mines have not been cleared.110
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BHMAC expected land release operations for 2018 and 2019
to continue in line with annual workplans, and predicted
that a total of 237km2 would be released: 179km2 cancelled
through non-technical survey by BHMAC (82km2 in 2018
and 97km2 in 2019); an additional 30km2 cancelled though
non-technical survey by BMHAC, BiH Armed Forces, and NPA
as part of the “country assessment” project; 26km2 reduced
through technical survey by accredited organisations (13km2
in 2018 and 13km2 in 2019); and 2km2 cleared (1km2 in 2018
and 1km2 in 2019). In addition, through non-technical survey
BHMAC expected to prepare a total of approximately 120
MSAs, covering approximately 263km2.115
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Based on 2018 land release outputs of almost 0.92km2
cleared, over 5.03km2 reduced, and 28.79km2 cancelled, BiH
has already fallen behind on its new target, especially with
regards to clearance output.
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km²)

2018

0.92

2017

0.69

2016

1.34

2015

1.64

2014

1.85

Total

6.44

The new National Mine Action Strategy presents an
opportunity for BiH to communicate and outline the mine
action programme’s goals and objectives, both to national and
international stakeholders. To implement the new strategy,
in particular high-quality survey to allow for the release of
what is expected to be substantial area found without direct
evidence of contamination, will, however, require strong
oversight and commitment from BHMAC, and the Demining
Commission and their superiors in the government. It will also
require continued funding of the operational activities in order
to realise the goals within the envisaged timeframe.
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Analysis by both NPA and UNDP shows that in the ﬁrst ﬁve
years of the 2009–19 strategy, while international donors
maintained their planned funding commitments, anticipated
BiH government funding level were not met, especially with
regard to planned “additional government” sources and
consequently, by 2013, progress was way off target.111 In the
period 2006–17, only 50% of planned funds were available.
The local and donor sources ensured the funds as planned,
but unfortunately BiH did not provide additional funding to
mine action, owing to its economic situation.112 The Ministry
of Civil Affairs, the Demining Commission, and BHMAC have
highlighted the limited funds for demining and have requested
funds from the national budget.113 BiH has calculated that the
required cost to fulﬁl its planned two-year interim extension
request is almost 80 million BAM (US$46 million), of which
50% will be national funding and 50% donor funding.114
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodia is working towards completing its baseline survey
with 23 districts surveyed in 2018 and the remainder to be
surveyed by 2020. This, along with the planned classiﬁcation
of mined areas into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
and conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs), should improve
Cambodia’s understanding of the extent of remaining mine
contamination. However, signiﬁcant amounts of previously
unrecorded contamination continue to be added to the
database reducing the overall progress in land release.

In 2018, Cambodia launched its National Mine Action Strategy,
Three-Year Implementation Plan, and Gender Mainstreaming
in Mine Action Plan (GMAP 2018–22). The Cambodia Mine
Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) continued
to strengthen after a management shake-up in 2017.
Cambodia submitted what is hoped to be its last Article 5
deadline extension request in March 2019. While progress
is being made in planning, prioritisation, and land release,
the target of completing anti-personnel mine clearance by
2025 is ambitious and will only be achieved with signiﬁcantly
increased funding and capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Cambodia should report outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination classiﬁed into SHAs and CHAs.

■

Cambodia should proceed to review all newly added mined areas to cancel any uncontaminated areas from
its database. It should introduce quality control of newly surveyed areas to ensure that mined areas are being
identiﬁed through high-quality, evidence-based survey.

■

Cambodia should continue to improve its information management systems by eliminating discrepancies with
operator data and ensuring synchronisation of reporting.

■

Cambodia should provide regular progress updates on the implementation of its Gender Mainstreaming in
Mine Action Plan for 2018–22.

■

Cambodia should agree with Thailand to complete its pilot border clearance project by end 2019.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

All outstanding mine contamination in Cambodia continues to be classiﬁed by the CMAA
as SHA. Its own classiﬁcation system disaggregates dense from scattered anti-personnel
mine contamination. The baseline survey (BLS) of the remaining districts will be
completed by 2020; survey of 23 districts was completed in 2018. While land reclamation
and the BLS are cancelling uncontaminated land a substantial amount of previously
unrecorded contamination continues to be added to the database.

8

The CMAA continued to strengthen in 2018. There is good, although at times superﬁcial,
consultation with operators and a permissive environment. The Cambodian government
contributes national resources for mine action, but to achieve completion by 2025 it
intends to seek additional international assistance.

7

In 2018, Cambodia released its GMAP 2018–22, which is embedded in both its national
mine action strategy and implementation plan. The aim is to increase female participation
across the mine action sector.

6

Cambodia made improvements to its information management system in 2018 setting
up a virtual private network to allow operators to input directly into the database.
Strengthening information management is one of the goals of the national mine action
strategy, but data inconsistencies and a high turnover of information management staff
remain an issue.

7

Cambodia has a comprehensive National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 with a detailed
three-year implementation plan 2018–20. Cambodia has clear criteria and processes for
the prioritisation of tasks, involving consultation with key stakeholders. Cambodia fell
short of its land release target for 2018 but has set itself an even higher target for 2019.

7

Cambodia’s mine action standards are consistent with international mine action
standards (IMAS) and reﬂected in operators’ standing operating procedures (SoPs).
Operators’ clearance capacity increased in 2018 but Cambodia has estimated an
additional 2,000 deminers will be needed to meet its land release targets. A wide range
of assets are deployed for demining in Cambodia, including machines, dogs, and rats.

7

Overall land release output in Cambodia fell slightly in 2018 compared to the previous
year, although clearance increased signiﬁcantly. To reach its ambitious targets tor 2025,
Cambodia will need to secure additional funding and extra capacity and gain access to
the non-demarcated border areas.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

6

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
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(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.8

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD)
National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management,
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■
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APOPO
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

STATES PARTIES

As at December 2018, Cambodia estimates remaining
anti-personnel mine contamination as over 890km2 across
9,804 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)1 (see Table 1).
The CMAA, which oversees the mine action database,
operates its own classiﬁcation system for anti-personnel
mine contamination that disaggregates land containing a
dense concentration of anti-personnel mines (A1) from land
containing scattered anti-personnel mines (A4).2 The CMAA
only classiﬁes contamination as SHA despite the operators
classifying contamination into both SHAs and CHAs. In 2019,
the CMAA planned to migrate CHA data resulting from the
cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) process into its
database but has no plans to reclassify landmine data. 3
The baseline survey (BLS) was originally conducted between
2009 and 2012 across 124 districts. As at July 2019, BLS
activities were ongoing across districts that were not
surveyed or were only partially surveyed during the original
implementation period. At end 2018, according to Cambodia’s
National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, 23 districts had
been surveyed and the remaining 50 were expected to be
surveyed by 2020. 4 Most of these districts are in the central
and eastern provinces which have a high concentration of
contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW) with
moderate to little mine contamination. 5
The CMAA and demining operators acknowledge that the BLS
data are somewhat imprecise with contamination being found
outside BLS polygons and substantial areas identiﬁed by the
BLS now under cultivation. 6 The CMAA analysed land release
data and found that, on average, 32% of land classiﬁed as A1,
and 51% of land classiﬁed as A4 had been reclaimed.7 In 2015,
the CMAA introduced the land reclamation non-technical
survey and baseline survey (LRNTS+BLS) methodology, a
stand-alone process to re-survey or re-verify SHAs identiﬁed
during the BLS. In 2015–18, the LRNTS+BLS has led to
release of more than 44.4km2 of anti-personnel mined area
across 1,076 SHAs. 8 According to Cambodia’s Three-Year
Implementation Plan, LRNTS will be conducted in 12,000
polygons across the country between 2018 and end 2020 and
will continue if sufﬁcient funding is available.9
Cambodia has extensive contamination from mines and
ERW left by 30 years of conﬂict that ended in the 1990s. It is
estimated that four million anti-personnel mines were laid
after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 until the end of the
internal armed conﬂict in 1998. Cambodia’s anti-personnel
mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21
north-western districts along the border with Thailand,
which account for the large majority of mine casualties.
The K5 mine belt, which was installed along the border

with Thailand in the mid 1980s in an effort to block inﬁltration
by armed opposition groups, ranks among the densest mine
contamination in the world.10
Cambodia also has signiﬁcant contamination from cluster
munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW. In 2018, CMR
contamination was estimated at 738km2 while ERW
contamination was estimated at 468km2 (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report
on Cambodia for further information).
Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2018)11
Province

SHAs

Area (m2)

Banteay Meanchey

2,547

172,665,603

Battambang

1,898

213,133,756

Kampong Cham

12

976,234

Kampong Chhnang

52

4,158,738

Kampong Speu

424

48,236,143

Kampong Thom

556

56,448,570

Kampot

137

12,486,197

2

63,203

Kandal
Kep

6

641,691

Kratie

361

24,092,367

Koh Kong

103

19,041,908

Mondul Kiri

46

7,476,491

1,092

120,169,272

532

34,012,575

Phnom Penh

13

1,122,444

Preah Sihanouk

22

1,681,420

480

34,786,425

Oddar Meanchey
Palin

Preah Vihear
Prey Veng
Pursat
Ratanak Kiri
Siem Reap

1

5,900

521

44,982,657

20

2,690,487

813

76,906,134

Svay Rieng

94

9,394,723

Takeo

56

3,770,625

Tboung Khmum

16

1,493,673

9,804

890,437,236

Totals

NEW CONTAMINATION
The LRNTS+BLS has also led to the identiﬁcation of 1,363
SHAs of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination, covering a total area of 117.9km2.12 In 2018
alone, the LRNTS+BLS captured 39.4km2 over 499 SHAs
of additional contamination, see Table 2.13 The CMAA have
stated that it is working with the database unit and operators
to investigate all newly added mine contamination.14 The
CMAA’s Department of Regulation and Monitoring and its
quality management teams (QMTs) have been tasked with an
increased focus on baseline survey operations to ensure that
previously unrecorded mined areas added to the national

database are supported by strong and clear evidence and
are of an appropriate size. In addition, the Database Unit
will review newly captured mined areas and veriﬁcation will
be conducted by the QMTs on any questionable polygons.
The CMAA will also hold an annual meeting with operators
to discuss baseline survey and resurvey activity to ensure
that they are conducted in accordance with the national
standard. The meeting will also cover land release methods
to strengthen their application and to ensure a consistent
approach is taken by all operators.15
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Table 2: Newly added anti-personnel mined area in 201816
Province

Operator

Banteay Meanchey

CMAC

SHAs

Area (m2)

112

8,068,216

Banteay Meanchey

HALO Trust

34

1,068,551

Battambang

CMAC

55

5,917,685

Battambang

MAG

23

1,902,392

Battambang

HALO Trust

8

577,817

Kampong Speu

HALO Trust

21

1,840,533

Kampong Thom

CMAC

19

1,496,981

Oddar Meanchey

CSHD

1

15,333

Oddar Meanchey

HALO Trust

42

6,032,885

Pailin

CMAC

40

2,759,137

Pailin

CSHD

1

15,557

Pailin

MAG

6

595,108

Pailin

HALO Trust

11

676,796

Preah Vihear

CMAC

10

947,450

Preah Vihear

HALO Trust

14

559,141

Pursat

CSHD

1

38,417

Pursat

HALO Trust

14

667,802

Siemreap

CMAC

81

5,306,041

Siemreap

CSHD

1

159,932

Siemreap

HALO Trust

5

712,504

499

39,358,278

Totals

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CMAA was established by royal decree in 2000 with
the mandate to regulate, monitor and coordinate the mine
action sector in Cambodia.17 Cambodian Prime Minister Hun
Sen is the CMAA President and Senior Minister Ly Thuch
its First Vice-President, overseeing the authority. Former
CMAA Secretary-General, H.E. Prum Sophakmonkol, who
was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016, was
reappointed to the position with effect from the start of
January 2018 bringing extensive experience and knowledge
of mine action to planning and operations. It has been
reported that the CMAA has strengthened over the past two
years, with roles and responsibilities more clearly deﬁned.18
The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established
in 1992, ostensibly as the national mine action centre. Before
the existence of the CMAA, it had the responsibilities to
regulate and coordinate the sector as well as undertake
clearance. Since 2000, CMAC’s activities have been limited
to conducting demining, risk education, and training.19 CMAC
conducts both humanitarian and commercial demining within
Cambodia and is the country’s largest operator.20
In 2004, the Cambodian government passed Sub-decree
70 on the Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance
Operations, which established the Provincial Mine Action
Committees (PMACs) and the Mine Action Planning
Units (MAPU). The PMACs and MAPUs were tasked with
establishing clearance priorities in consultation with the
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affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses
their housing, agricultural and infrastructure needs. 21
The Cambodian government established the Technical
Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative
mechanism between the government and development
partners. The Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC)
and several Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have
been established by the CMAA to facilitate coordination
and feedback at a strategic and technical level in areas
such as survey and clearance, risk education, victim
assistance, information management, gender, and capacity
development. 22
Consultation is built into every stage of Cambodia’s
Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20 and operators
provide input into key strategic documents through open
discussion forums and written feedback. 23 However, it has
been reported that at times the process can be rather
superﬁcial, with feedback not necessarily taken into account. 24
The operating environment in Cambodia is permissive,
with the Cambodian government open to the presence of
international operators and supportive in administrative
actions such as the granting of visas, approval of Memoranda
of Understanding (MoUs), and importation procedures. The
CMAA is open to the trialling and use of innovative clearance
methods and tools to improve efﬁciency. 25

STATES PARTIES

UNDP is in the third phase of its “Clearing for Results”
programme, which was due to come to an end in 2019,
although UNDP has put together a proposal for phase four
of the programme from 2020 to 2025 which would focus on
institutional capacity development as well as clearance. Its
key capacity development deliverables are to support the
development of the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025,
establish a Performance Monitoring System (PMS) that
links human development to mine action, and strengthen
the CMAA’s international and national participation in
relevant fora. 27 In 2019, UNDP is commissioning consultants
to assess the CMAA’s institutional capacities and develop
a comprehensive Capacity Development Plan. The Plan
will also inform the development of a formal partnership
strategy following the recommendations of a mid-term
review that found that capacity development needed to be
institutional rather than individual and that there was a lack
of coordination among capacity development stakeholders. 28

The GICHD provides information management and risk
management support to the CMAA. 29 In 2018, the GICHD
presented a case study on the Management of Residual ERW
in Cambodia, and hosted a Long Term Risk Management
workshop and an exchange visit between the CMAA and the
national mine action centre in Sri Lanka. 30
The Cambodian government contributes funding towards
clearance and the management of the sector.31 From 2010 to
2018, the Cambodian government has reported contributing
just under 30% of the total funding to the mine action sector
(US$99.49 million of US$340.2 million).32 This includes
US$110 million for mine clearance operations in support of
public infrastructure projects such as hydropower plants,
irrigation system, roads, and bridges. Cambodia has also
provided funding to the institutions responsible for managing
and delivering mine action in the country. Indirectly, tax
exemptions on mine action equipment has contributed to
humanitarian demining operations, the CMAA reports.33 From
2020 to 2025, Cambodia has estimated it will require $372
million for mine action, of which $38 million is for sector
management and $165 million for release of anti-personnel
mined area. It is expected that the Cambodian government will
continue to contribute towards clearance and the management
of the sector. It will also settle the importation taxes for mine
clearance equipment and provide a 10% in-kind contribution
to any new donor funding, and a 10% in-cash contribution to
the UNDP Clearing for Results programme.34 Cambodia has a
resource mobilisation strategy and intends to secure additional
funding from the government, existing and emerging donors,
and the private sector.35

GENDER
The CMAA has developed a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine
Action Plan (GMAP 2018–2022), an objective of the National
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, which consists of six goals.
These include:
■
■
■

Preparation of guidelines to aid gender mainstreaming
across all mine action
Capacity building of relevant stakeholders to implement
the GMAP 2018–2022
Female representation and participation in planning
and prioritisation, risk education, and in mine action
and advocacy at all levels.

The Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–2020 sets out
activities in support of these goals. 36 NPA, as part of its
capacity development, will support the CMAA with training
on gender mainstreaming in mine action, on implementation
of the GMAP 2018–22 and the development of associated
guidelines, and on how to use gender- and age-disaggregated
data in planning and prioritisation processes. 37 As at March
2019, across all operators engaged in demining, women
accounted for just 21% of staff overall. 38

The HALO Trust and MAG both have organisational gender
and diversity policies. Within MAG, Cambodia’s staff
handbook contains guidelines on equal opportunities and
diversity but, as at May 2019, no speciﬁc national policy
or implementation plan had been elaborated. One of MAG
Cambodia’s key strategic objectives in 2019–20 is to focus
on “meaningful” gender mainstreaming and gender equity
within the programme. The programme will closely review
recruitment policies and procedures to identify areas in
which MAG can further encourage the recruitment and
retention of women, as well as their development and
promotion into more senior positions. 40 MAG’s community
liaison teams are gender balanced to ensure full
representation of all groups during data-collection and
community liaison activities. In MAG’s survey and clearance
teams 42% of staff are female, while 21% of their managerial
level/supervisory positions are staffed by women. 41
As at May 2019, 44% of HALO Trust’s operational staff were
women while only 8% of HALO Trust’s staff in managerial
level/supervisory positions were female. HALO has mixed
gender survey, risk education and clearance teams. 42

CMAC provides equal employment opportunities to both
men and women. As at April 2019, women made up 10.5%
of CMAC’s workforce. CMAC operates in accordance with
Cambodian Labour Law and is actively recruiting women
to reach 15% female employment. Women currently work
across all levels of the organisation, including in managerial
level/supervisory positions. As at April 2019, two of the six
directors were women. 39
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The UN Development Programme (UNDP), Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA), and the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) all provide capacity
development support to the CMAA. NPA, as part of a
United Kingdom Department for International Development
(DFID)-funded partnership that includes Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) and The HALO Trust, focuses on information
management, planning and prioritisation, gender
mainstreaming, quality management, and strategic planning. 26

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The CMAA upgraded to the Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation in 2014. The CMAA
Database Unit (DBU) is responsible for collecting, storing,
analysing and disseminating data in support of planning
and prioritisation. 43
The CMAA shares all available data with operators on a
monthly basis. In 2018, the DBU set up a virtual private
network (VPN), which allows operators to send their daily
data input directly into the DBU IMSMA database. The DBU
controls the quality of all submitted reports and approves
them via this online network. 44 Information management
remains a challenge, though, with incompatibilities between
operator databases and IMSMA, and inconsistencies between
operator data and the data held by the CMAA. 45 Strengthening
the national information management system for mine action
is an objective of Goal 8 of the National Mine Action Strategy
2018–25. 46

Cambodia submits timely Article 7 transparency reports
and gives regular statements on progress at the APMBC
meetings of states parties. There have, though, been issues
with the accuracy of information in Cambodia’s reporting in
the past, evidenced by discrepancies between data submitted
by operators and that offered by the CMAA. To reduce further
discrepancies, as at September 2019, the CMAA has ofﬁcially
declared that all relevant mine action stakeholders should only
report ofﬁcial mine action data from CMAA. 47 In 2019, Cambodia
submitted a six-year Article 5 deadline extension request from
1 January 2020 to 31 December 2025. Cambodia’s extension
request was submitted on time and is comprehensive,
outlining achievements in 2010–18, the extent of the remaining
challenge, its workplan to 2025, and its ﬁnancial requirements.
The CMAA has provided updated land release data for 2018 to
Mine Action Review which differs from the land release data
for 2018 submitted in its latest Article 7 report and 2019 Article
5 deadline extension request.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 was
ofﬁcially launched in May 2018 with eight goals for clearance
of mines, CMR, and other ERW. The accompanying
Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20 sets out the
activities and indicators that will need to be completed in
order to meet these goals and objectives. The ﬁrst goal is to
release all known mined areas by 2025 through planned land
release of 110km2 a year. 48 Cambodia fell well short of this
target for 2018, releasing only 65.8km2. 49 In 2019, Cambodia
submitted its Article 5 extension request with revised land
release targets for 2019–25, as set out in Table 3. The targets
seem arbitrary to say the least, and assume no contamination
will be added, a highly questionable supposition.
Table 3: Annual targets for release of mined area in
2019–25 50
Year

Targets (m²)

2019

84,250,000

2020

110,000,000

2021

110,000,000

2022

146,546,809

2023

146,546,809

2024

146,546,809

2025

146,546,809

Total

890,437,236

The CMAA maintains the annual clearance workplan made
up of all the provincial clearance workplans. The MAPU is
responsible for developing these workplans in accordance
with the planning and prioritisation guidelines. The PMAC
approves the workplans, which are then endorsed by the
CMAA. The MAPU uses the provincial workplan to monitor
clearance performance and report progress to the PMAC
and the CMAA. 51
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The CMAA pursues a national mine action policy that is said
to be “people centred”, balancing top-down policy-making
with bottom-up community-up requirements. 52 The CMAA
establishes an annual list of priority villages based on area
of BLS, casualty data, levels of poverty, and population size
in accordance with the revised planning and prioritisation
guidelines. At least 75% of funding and resources are
allocated to these villages. The MAPU then develops a list of
priority mineﬁelds within these villages, in consultation with
operators, according to BLS land classiﬁcation, casualty data,
intended beneﬁciaries, level of threat, development needs
and post-clearance land use. 53 In accordance with objective
three of goal one of Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy
2018−25, the CMAA has identiﬁed 500 priority villages that
will be released by 2021. 54
Operators have expressed some reservations about
the “mine-free village” approach with MAG advocating
a province-by-province approach and The HALO Trust
prioritising clearance of the highest impact, highest density
mineﬁelds in the K5 minebelt. The HALO Trust has expressed
concerns that the mine-free village approach will lead to
clearance of low-impact, low-density mineﬁelds in order to
declare the village mine-free, diverting resources from high
impact areas. 55 MAG’s concerns that impact should be taken
into account in the prioritisation criteria have been noted
by CMAA who have stated that there will be some degree
of ﬂexibility in the planning and prioritisation process.56
The CMAA has stated it does not believe that high-density
mineﬁelds should be the deciding factor for prioritisation as
they believe the “mine-free village” approach addresses the
needs of the affected communities. 57
Goal seven of the national mine action strategy focuses
on establishing a sustainable national capacity to address
residual contamination after 2025. Objectives include
reviewing by 2020 the legal, institutional and operational
framework, strategy, and capacity needed to address the
residual threats. 58 The CMAA have stated that it is likely
that the Royal Cambodian Army (RCA) will be tasked with
addressing explosive threats after 2025. 59
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine
Action Standards (CMAS), which are consistent with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In 2018, a new
CMAS on cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) was
adopted.60 From 2019-21, the CMAA, with support from NPA,
was planning to develop new standards – on animal detection,
mechanical demining, information management, quality
management, the environment, victim assistance and mine risk
education – and to review the standards on accreditation of
demining organisations and licensing of operations and on the
monitoring of demining organisations.61 All operators will be
consulted as part of this process and will provide feedback
on any proposed modiﬁcations. 62
National standards are reﬂected in operators’ standing
operating procedures (SoPs). 63 Updates to the SoPs are
conducted as and when required, such as when a need is
identiﬁed through the CMAA-led Technical Reference Group.
Reviews are conducted in consultation with all operators,
and against IMAS and best practice.64

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 emphasises the need
for more efﬁcient use of demining assets. A 2016 review by the
GICHD found that almost half the land released by full clearance
or technical survey in 2015 contained no mines (26%) or very
few (one to three) explosive items (23%).65 In 2018, over 3.8km2
was cleared without any anti-personnel mines being found.66
While in a 2018 monitoring visit to Pailin province it was found
that one in three of the mined areas could have been released
by LRNTS rather than full clearance. UNDP has now mandated
that all mineﬁelds in its targeted villages will be re-surveyed
before clearance assets are deployed.67 The CMAA recognises
that for Cambodia to complete clearance by 2025 the full toolbox
of land release methodologies must be properly applied and
encourages operational efﬁciency amongst operators.68 As at
September 2019, the CMAA was planning to review the CMAS
on baseline survey to strengthen the criteria on the evidence
needed to capture polygons with new contamination. In addition,
the CMAA will improve efﬁciency of the quality management
team to strengthen quality assurance (QA) and quality control
(QC) of survey and clearance activities.69

OPERATORS
Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator,
CMAC, and two international mine action non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), MAG and The HALO Trust. To a lesser
extent, mine clearance is also conducted by national operator
the National Centre for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW
Clearance (NPMEC), and by national NGO, Cambodian Self-help
Demining (CSHD). International operator APOPO also conducts
clearance in partnership with CMAC.70
In 2018, CMAC deployed 25 non-technical survey personnel
across ﬁve teams, the same as in 2017. In 2019, there were no
plans to deploy non-technical survey teams. CMAC also deployed
a total of 202 technical survey personnel across 30 teams of
between ﬁve and seven staff each. This was an increase from the
187 staff deployed across 27 teams in 2017. In 2019, the number
of technical survey personnel was due to increase to 231 across
37 teams. In 2018, CMAC deployed 1,248 clearance personnel, an
increase of 7% from the 1,164 clearance personnel deployed in
2017. This decreased to 1,037 clearance personnel in 2019.71
In 2018, the HALO Trust deployed 45 personnel in nine teams
of ﬁve, conducting non-technical survey, risk education and
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts. HALO Trust
considers technical survey equivalent to clearance so does not
deploy separate personnel. In 2018, HALO deployed an average
of 760 personnel per month for clearance (730 in teams and 30 in
supervisory roles). There was no change in capacity from 2017
and HALO did not expect a change in 2019.72
In 2018, MAG deployed a total of 228 personnel for mine
survey and clearance. There was a signiﬁcant increase from
the 152 personnel in 2017 due to increased donor support
with no signiﬁcant change in numbers expected in 2019. MAG
also deployed 15 community liaison staff, including its cluster
munition remnant capacity, who undertake non-technical
survey and risk education alongside other activities. This was
an increase from the 11 staff deployed in 2017, with no change
in capacity expected in 2019.73
UNDP has supported the CMAA through the Clearing for Results
(CFR) programme since 2006, awarding contracts funded by
international donors through a process of competitive bidding.

In 2018, the CFR programme issued four contracts worth a total
of $1.43 million: three going to CMAC and the other to The HALO
Trust. CMAC was also awarded land reclamation non-technical
survey and baseline survey contracts worth about US$180,000.74
In 2019, CMAC was awarded three clearance contracts totalling
$1.06 million dollars with clearance targeted in high-priority
villages in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin provinces.
As at April 2019, CFR was on track to exceed the target of
47km2 of mined areas located in the most affected and poorest
provinces are impact-free.75
The CMAA has calculated that in order to meet its 2025 land
release targets for anti-personnel mined area, an extra 2,000
deminers and 100 support personnel will be needed. The CMAA
proposes that these deminers will come from the RCA and that
the Cambodian government will cover the salaries, insurance,
uniforms, and operational costs with additional funding from the
international community. It is estimated that during the ﬁrst year
of deployment the deminers will be able to release 35km2, rising
to 57km2 from the second year.76 As at August 2019, two meetings
had been held between the CMAA and the Commander of the
RCA. It was agreed during the second meeting in June 2019 to
establish a Task Force comprising of ofﬁcials from the CMAA
and the RCA and to formulate a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) which has since been drafted and shared for review.77
The CMAA is responsible for quality management and since 2016
has deployed eight quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC)
teams.78 In 2017, with UNDP support, it developed the PMS, which
will track land use and socio-economic changes after release
of mined area/ERW-contaminated land as well as monitor the
implementation of NMAS as a management tool for the sector.79
The CMAA approved the PMS, which was launched in May 2018
and in 2019 a pilot-test was planned for 122 completed mineﬁelds
in Banteay Meanchey province. The pilot test will allow the CMAA
to ﬁnalise the PMS output and outcome matrix, data collection
tools, and reporting templates.80 It is planned that use of half of
the mined areas cleared in 2018 will be tracked by the PMS; these
areas were to be selected by the end of 2019.81
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In 2018, The HALO trust deployed three mechanical clearance
teams and a remote-controlled vegetation cutter for ground
preparation. 82

States Humanitarian Demining Research and Development
programme, and uses drones to conduct non-technical
survey, task planning, and post-impact monitoring. 83

MAG used mine detection dogs (MDDs) subcontracted from
CMAC to conduct survey and clearance. Mechanical assets
were used to conduct both ground preparation and clearance
with seven mechanical teams in total. MAG also continues
to trial advanced detection systems, provided by the United

APOPO provides CMAC with mine detection rats (MDR). In
2018, MDRs were used for clearance in Siem Reap and Preah
Vihear provinces working together with vegetation-cutting
machines and manual deminers. At the end of 2018, seven
teams in total were working in the programme. 84

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of almost 73.51km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 41.01km2 was cleared, 8.69km2 was reduced through
technical survey, and 23.81km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. Over the course of the year, however, 39.4km2 of
previously unrecorded mine contamination across 499 SHAs was added to the database.

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, just under 32.5km2 was released through survey, of which 23.81km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey
(see Table 4) and almost 8.69km2 through technical survey (see Table 5). This is a 20% drop from the 40.37km2 released
through survey in 2017.
Overall non-technical survey output decreased by almost 9% from 2017 to 2018 although the ﬁgures provided by CMAA differ
from the ﬁgures provided by operators by 154,150m2. 85 Both CMAC and HALO Trust reported a decrease in non-technical survey
output, this reduction was most pronounced for CMAC and was due to a reduction in their non-technical survey capacity. 86 MAG
reported increased output due to increased non-technical capacity, and a greater proportion of polygons that had already been
ploughed three times, therefore meeting the cancellation criteria. 87
Overall technical survey output fell by 39% from 2017 to 2018 although there was a marked difference in the ﬁgures provided
by the CMAA when compared to the operators. 88 CMAC reported that it had reduced almost 21.6km2 of land in 2018, signiﬁcantly
more than the 14.7km2 reported by the CMAA. 89
Table 5: Reduction by technical survey of
anti-personnel mined area in 2018 91

Table 4: Cancellation of mined area through
non-technical survey in 2018 90
Province

Operator

Province

Operator

Banteay Meanchey

CMAC

Area cancelled (m²)
1,944,335

Banteay Meanchey

CMAC

Area reduced (m²)

Banteay Meanchey

HALO Trust

1,478,095

Banteay Meanchey

HALO Trust

Battambang

CMAC

1,001,713

Battambang

CMAC

6,464,971

Battambang

HALO Trust

670,599

Battambang

CSHD

15,162

Battambang

MAG

4,839,639

Battambang

HALO Trust

277,406
42,083

128,761

Kampong Chhnang

HALO Trust

204,199

Battambang

MAG

Kampong Speu

HALO Trust

1,671,965

Oddar Meanchey

HALO Trust

23,926

Oddar Meanchey

HALO Trust

7,025,640

Pailin

CMAC

75,084

Pailin

CMAC

192,281

Pailin

HALO Trust

Pailin

HALO Trust

770,774

Pailin

MAG

53,587

Pailin

MAG

764,542

Siem Reap

CSHD

50,502

Preah Vihear

HALO Trust

23,150

Pursat

HALO Trust

321,327

Siem Reap

CMAC

580,901

Siem Reap

HALO Trust

Total

54 Clearing the Mines 2019

2,323,016
23,812,176

Total

1,319,649

235,859

8,686,990
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Overall technical survey output fell by 39% from 2017 to 2018 although there was a marked difference in the ﬁgures provided
by the CMAA when compared to the operators.92 CMAC reported that it had reduced almost 21.6km2 of land in 2018 a massive
14.7km2 more than was reported by CMAA.93
In 2018, during EOD spot tasks, a total of 4,301 anti-personnel mines were destroyed: 2,193 by HALO Trust, 1,457 by CMAC,
374 by CSHD, and 277 by MAG.94
Table 6: Mine clearance in 2018 95
Province

Operator

Banteay Meanchey

CMAC

Banteay Meanchey

HALO Trust

Battambang

CMAC

Battambang

Areas
cleared

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

162

5,181,424

1,066

5

603

97

3,353,242

1,640

21

27

299

22,737,788

3,334

29

3,028

HALO Trust

23

578,396

269

0

10

Battambang

MAG

88

246,001

343

25

100

Kampong Thom

CMAC

9

1,068,029

35

0

99

Kampong Thom

CSHD

4

31,667

2

4

Oddar Meanchey

CSHD

3

92,782

13

20

Oddar Meanchey

HALO Trust

70

1,761,619

2,187

2

5

Pailin

CMAC

33

2,097,716

319

2

485

Pailin

CSHD

2

11,089

10

Pailin

HALO Trust

37

747,655

407

Pailin

MAG

16

77,157

323

Preah Vihear

CMAC

19

1,314,475

1,233

Preah Vihear

CSHD

1

29,959

59

Preah Vihear

HALO Trust

3

127,390

2

Pursat

CSHD

2

43,539

72

11
2

10
3

0

217

6

0

2

17

Pursat

HALO Trust

13

446,242

302

4

32

Siem Reap

CMAC

22

923,495

80

0

98

Siem Reap

CSHD

3

78,626

22

Siem Reap

HALO Trust

Totals

35

25

57,023

0

0

0

931

41,005,314

11,718

96

4,806

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMBODIA: 1 JANUARY 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2010
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET REQUESTED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
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Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

41,005,314

2017

27,680,000

2016

25,330,000

2015
2014

46,470,000
54,380,000

96

Total

194,865,314

Cambodia has committed to clearing all anti-personnel
mine contamination by the end of 2025. It plans to steadily
increase annual land release output from 84km2 in 2019 to
110km2 from 2020 to 2021, when 500 priority villages will be
declared mine free, to 146.5km2 from 2022 to 2025. Cambodia
has released an average of 84km2 per year since the 2014
Maputo Conference, so the land release targets it has set
itself are very ambitious and require both additional funding
and capacity. Cambodia has stated it will require an average
of US$62 million for sector management and clearance of
mines, CMR, and other ERW.97 From 2010 to 2018, Cambodia
was averaging $42.5 million in funding from the government
and donor community, which would mean a 45% annual
increase in funding.98 While Cambodia expects to increase
funding from domestic and private sources in the coming
years there will still be a funding shortfall without increased
donor support. The CMAA is working with the Convention’s
Committee on Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance
to seek support from states parties under the individualised
approach with the ﬁrst meeting planned for the Fourth
Review Conference in November 2019.99 In addition to the
increased funding Cambodia has also calculated that it will
need an extra 2,000 deminers to complete anti-personnel
mine clearance by 2025. It is proposed that these deminers
will come from the RCA.100

Cambodia has made improvements to its planning and
prioritisation system and implemented more targeted
and efﬁcient land release methodologies.101 However, the
signiﬁcant amounts of previously unrecorded contamination
being added to the database hampers land release progress.
It is vital that Cambodia ensures through quality management
processes that anti-personnel mine contaminated land is only
being identiﬁed through high-quality evidence-based survey
and that land without contamination is not being added to
the database.
The high-density K5 mineﬁeld lies along the Cambodian-Thai
border some of which is not demarcated and where access is
limited.102 Improved relations between Thailand and Cambodia
have opened the way for increased border cooperation. The
Thailand-Cambodia General Border Committee, chaired by
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from
both countries, has agreed that CMAC and the Thailand Mine
Action Centre (TMAC) can cooperate to conduct demining
along the Thai-Cambodian border.103 In September 2018,
CMAC and TMAC met and agreed to ﬁnd a task for a pilot
project, a small area that could be cleared within a month as
a symbolic demonstration of two sides working together. As
at April 2019, the task had yet to be decided but CMAC hoped
to complete the pilot project by the end of the year.104
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Mines of an improvised nature continued to claim casualties, particularly in Cameroon’s northern districts along the border
with Nigeria amid escalating military activity by Boko Haram.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Cameroon should inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of the discovery
of any anti-personnel mine contamination, including mines of an improvised nature. It should report on
the location of all suspected or conﬁrmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status
of programmes for their destruction in its Article 7 transparency report.

■

Cameroon should request a new APMBC Article 5 deadline.

■

As soon as security conditions permit, non-technical survey should start in the Extrême-Nord (Far North)
region, which is reportedly the region most affected by conﬂict.

■

Cameroon should try to mobilise and facilitate assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining
organisations for survey and clearance.

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

No national mine action authority or national mine
action centre

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army Engineer Corps
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■

None
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Cameroon faced a continuing threat from mines of an
improvised nature and other explosive devices as a result
of escalating Boko Haram insurgency spilling over from
Nigeria into the Lake Chad region. The threat appears to be
concentrated in Cameroon’s Far North region between Nigeria
and Chad where its armed forces continue to conduct counterinsurgency operations as part of the Multinational Joint Task
Force (MNJTF). The extent of contamination is unknown.
One member of Cameroon’s elite Rapid Intervention Battalion
was killed and 11 others injured in February 2019 when their
truck detonated a mine of an improvised nature in the vicinity
of Kerawa on the border with Nigeria. The troops were
returning from an operation in which soldiers reportedly
destroyed four workshops which were producing improvised
mines and found to hold hundreds of containers of explosives,
batteries, and detonators. Two other detonations in the
area in October 2018 involving mines or improvised devices
reportedly caused the deaths of three soldiers and injured

six others. Seven soldiers were killed in two separate
incidents in the same area in April 2019.1 Media also reported
that two Cameroonian soldiers were killed after their truck
drove over a mine near the town of Eyumedjock in an area
of the South West region near the border with Nigeria where
English-speaking separatists are active. 2
A senior army ofﬁcer commented in 2017 that some roads
in areas bordering Nigeria were “riddled with mines.”3
A Cameroonian analyst commented that insurgents were
using “homemade mines” with increasing frequency on
roads, houses and vehicles. 4 The effect has been to reduce
access for humanitarian organisations working in the area.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) personnel
who visited the Far North region in September 2018 were
denied permission to visit a number of towns in Mayo-Tsanaga5 ,
a department bordering Nigeria, because of the presence of
mines and reports of kidnappings. 6

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Cameroon does not have a functioning mine action programme. Mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are the
responsibility of the Cameroon Military Engineer Corps.
Over the past four years, the Army has received military training in demining and counter-IED [improvised explosive device]
measures, mainly from the France and the United States.7 Cameroon received demining/EOD equipment from the United States
and Russia in 2015, with armoured mine-detection vehicles being provided by the US Army Africa Command. 8 The US also
donated signiﬁcant quantities of demining equipment, including metal detectors, to Cameroon in 2017.9 US Army Africa and
the French Army’s French Elements in Gabon (EFG) provided further demining and EOD training up to Level 4 EOD in
March–April 2018.10

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Cameroon did not report results of clearance and EOD conducted by its Army engineers.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMEROON 1 MARCH 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUEST REQUIRED
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Cameroon is a state party to the APMBC. Its Article 5
deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control expired on 1 March 2013.
Cameroon has previously reported there were no areas of
mine contamination under its jurisdiction or control. In view
of the casualties reported by Cameroon from mines and/or
victim-activated mines of an improvised nature, Cameroon
needs to revise its position.

Under the APMBC’s agreed framework, Cameroon should
immediately inform all states parties of any newly discovered
anti-personnel mines following the expiry of its Article 5
deadline in 2013 and ensure their destruction as soon as
possible. It should also submit a request for a new Article
5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not
more than ten years. Cameroon must continue to fulﬁl its
reporting obligations under the convention, including on the
location of any suspected or conﬁrmed mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for
the destruction of all anti-personnel mines within them.

mineactionreview.org 59

CAMEROON

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

1

“Boko Haram landmines inﬂict heavy toll on Cameroon”, Latin American Herald Tribune, 30 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2XUT4ef; “Cameroon: Boko Haram mine kills four
soldiers in Far North region”, Journal du Cameroun.com, 13 April 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z50o3u.

2

“Mine blast kills two Cameroon soldiers”, News24, 21 April 2018, at; bit.ly/2JRyDoR .

3

P. Kum, “Landmine explosion kills two Cameroon soldiers”, Anadolu Agency, 28 September 2017, at: bit.ly/2LxKjQO.

4

“Boko Haram landmines inﬂict heavy toll on Cameroon”, Latin American Herald Tribune, 30 May 2019.

5

The towns were Talla-Katchi, Assighassia, Zéméné and Cherif Moussari.

6

IOM, “Cameroon, Far North Region, Displacement Report, Round 15, 3−15 September 2018”, p. 8.

7

“Military Cooperation: mine clearing training (Sept. 19-30th 2016)”, French embassy in Yaounde webpage at: bit.ly/2Z3ShnY; M. E. Kindzeka, “Cameroon Vigilantes
Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines”, Voice of America News, 4 March 2016, at: bit.ly/2XZGxGM.

8

M. E. Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram”, Voice of America News, 3 March 2015, at: bit.ly/2XXOfkD; and “US Helps
Cameroon in Fight Against Boko Haram”, Voice of America News, 17 October 2015, at: bit.ly/2y1GeeR.

9

“US donates mine-clearing devices to Cameroon”, Journal du Cameroun, 24 April 2017; at: bit.ly/2Z3Hryl.

10

“Génie Militaire – Des démineurs formés”, Cameroon Tribune (Yaoundé), 23 April 2018, at: bit.ly/2M2uoJO.
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020
FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 JANUARY 2025
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
For a second consecutive year, Chad did not release any mined area as a result of survey or clearance. Humanity & Inclusion
(HI) started demining operations under the European Union (EU)-funded PRODECO project in the Borno region. Strikes by
unpaid deminers halted operations and delayed Mine Advisory Group (MAG)’s implementation of the PRODECO project in
the most contaminated northern area of Tibesti, forcing it to redeploy teams to the Lac region. Chad has submitted a fourth
request to extend its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, this time for a further ﬁve years.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The National High Commission for Demining (HCND) needs urgently to facilitate survey and clearance to
demonstrate donor support for operators is delivering results.

■

Chad needs urgently to elaborate a resource mobilisation strategy to secure and diversify funding and attract
international technical and operational support.

■

Chad should take the necessary measures to strengthen the effectiveness of its national mine action centre
(the HCND). It should ensure that demining personnel and resources are fully mobilised and deployed on
areas which are conﬁrmed to contain anti-personnel mines.

■

The authorities should streamline bureaucratic procedures to facilitate operators’ ability to conduct survey
and clearance.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Contamination estimates are based on outdated and incomplete data underscoring
the need for resurvey. This did not occur in 2018 but work on the database made some
progress consolidating gaps in data, clarifying which areas need resurvey.

4

Chad’s national mine action authority coordinates the sector but lack of funds and
deminer discontent over failure to pay salaries crippled progress in the last two years.

3

Gender is not yet a priority in a programme that has undergone signiﬁcant downsizing
and struggled to mobilise resources to implement survey or clearance. Women ﬁnd
employment mainly in administrative roles, risk education, or victim assistance.

4

Under the EU-funded PRODECO programme the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
(FSD) is upgrading the National High Commission for Demining (HCND)’s information
management capacity. A key question is whether the improvements in data and data
management will be sustained.

4

In March 2019, Chad submitted a request for an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention Article 5 deadline but implementation depends on availability of funding.

6

Chad has national standards, which were updated by HI in 2017, that comply with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

2

The national mine action authority reported no land was released through survey or
clearance in 2018 for the second successive year.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

4

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

3.9

Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

National High Commission for Demining (HCND)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

HCND

OTHER ACTORS
■
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Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
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Chad reported that anti-personnel mines covered more than
117km2 across 188 areas at the end of 2018 (see Table 1). Of
the 10 affected regions, Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti in the
north alone accounted for 97% of contamination.1 Although
no land was released through survey or clearance in 2018,
this represented a 3% drop over the previous year’s estimate
of 122km2. 2
The decrease was achieved through a clean-up of data by
the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). 3 However, many
survey reports were missing and the HCND also identiﬁed
suspected mined areas that need to be re-surveyed. The
HCND’s own operational plan acknowledged that lack of
information about mine contamination means the estimate
will need continuous revision and updating to take account
of the results of further survey. 4 Survey in 2015–16 continued
to locate previously unrecorded mined areas, including a
mineﬁeld in the Tanoi region of Tibesti said to be around
50km long and another mined area in the south between
Sarh and Kyabé. 5
Mine contamination in Chad’s resource-rich northern regions
resulted from Libyan support for rebels dating back to the
early 1970s and sporadic clashes between the two countries
that continued until 1987. The HCND reports the presence of
16 types of anti-personnel mine and 17 types of anti-vehicle
mine. The north also has most of the country’s unexploded
ordnance, reportedly affecting some 5.8km2. 6

Chad contends with a number of security challenges, including
rebel group activity in the north and Boko Haram’s expanding
insurgency in the Lake Chad region. Chad cited insecurity in
Tibesti and the probability that mines had been newly laid
there as among the reasons for its failure to meet its extended
Article 5 deadline.7 The Multinational Joint Task Force
reported casualties in clashes with Boko Haram ﬁghters in
2018 from mines, including mines of an improvised nature. 8
Table 1 : Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)9
Conﬁrmed
mined areas

Area
affected (m2)

51

25,354,623

1

241

Ennedi

13

16,524,754

Moyen-chari

12

3,139,713

6

593

Province
Borkou
Chari-baguirmi

Salamat
Sila
Tibesti
Wadiﬁra
Lac
Totals

5

6,005

94

72,729,915

1

662

5

872

188

117,757,378

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Chad’s mine action programme is coordinated by the National
High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National
de Déminage, HCND) which comes under the Ministry of
Economy and Development Planning.10 The National Demining
Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND), which earlier
conducted clearance operations, appears to have been
dissolved. In July 2017, nine years after the government ﬁrst
ordered the HCND to restructure, a new government decree
reduced the number of personnel by more than half from 744
to 329. At the end of 2018, it had 324 staff.11
The HCND is responsible for preparing a national demining
strategy and annual workplans and proposing a budget
to support their implementation.12 Chad’s latest Article
5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2019,13
observed that its mine action programme lacked a strategic
vision, operational planning and effective coordination,
weakening its credibility nationally and internationally.14
The European Union is the principal source of international
funding for mine action in Chad. A two-year EU-funded
project (Projet d’appui au secteur du déminage au
Tchad, PADEMIN) involving capacity development for the
HCND and survey and clearance of mines and explosive

remnants of war (ERW) in the Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti
(BET) region ended in 2016.15 In September 2017, the EU
agreed to support a new four-year mine action project,
PRODECO, from 2017 to 2021 at a projected cost of €23
million providing for survey and clearance by international
operators HI and MAG in the BET region. It also provided for
further training and capacity building for the HCND by FSD,
including in information management.16
Government funding for mine action is limited to payment
of salaries for national staff.17 However, the government’s
persistent non-payment of salaries has badly affected sector
performance. A long-running strike by deminers starting
halted survey and clearance in 2017. Threats by former
deminers over government non-payment of salaries also
prevented survey and clearance from proceeding in the
Tibesti region in 2018 and forced MAG to redeploy staff to
the Lac region.18 Further delays in payment were reportedly
occurring in 2019. Operators also report lengthy delays
obtaining the permits required to import equipment as well
as in other bureaucratic procedures.
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GENDER
Gender is not discussed in Chad’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request or the July 2018 operational plan accompanying it.
Gender balance and recruitment of female staff is not a priority for the HCND, which has undergone drastic downsizing in the
past two years and still faces demands for back pay from staff.
Chad employs women in a variety of mine action roles. A woman underwent EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] Level 3
training for the ﬁrst time in 2018, but HCND female staff are reported to be mostly in managerial, technical, and support jobs.19
Operators reported that risk education targeted all members of the community and disaggregated resulting data by gender. 20

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HCND uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but many records of past survey have
been lost. As part of the PRODECO project, the database was being updated in 2018 by the HCND’s information management
team, under the supervision of an FSD expert.21
Chad submits Article 7 reports annually and in April 2019 submitted a request for a fourth extension to its Article 5 clearance
deadline, providing updated estimates of contamination and attaching a July 2018 operational plan.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Chad published an Action Plan 2020−24 in July 2018, which
set out contamination estimates, strategy, and priorities that
provided a basis for the Article 5 deadline extension request
submitted in April 2019. Objectives appeared aspirational
rather than realistic. The operational plan provided
for survey and clearance in 86 of Tibesti’s 89 identiﬁed
hazardous areas, but Chad’s extension request observes
that in Tibesti, the most heavily contaminated region, it was
realistic to target survey and clearance in only 20% of the 89
hazardous areas. 22
Since September 2017, the main focus of Chad’s mine action
programme has been on implementing the EU-funded
four-year mine action project (PRODECO) conducted by a
consortium of four international operators.23 HI was due to

focus on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi
regions, MAG was to work in the Tibesti and Lake Chad
regions, and FSD would provide training and support for
information management while Secours Catholique et
Développement (SECADEV) would address victim assistance.24
PRODECO’s initial targets included conducting non-technical
survey in 30 zones in the Lake Chad and Tibesti regions,
release of 2.7km2 of mined land in BET region, to release
200,000m2 of mined land along roads in Tibesti, and, in the
Lake Chad and Tibesti regions, to either release 50,000m2
of land contaminated with ERW or conduct 100 spot tasks. 25
FSD is to provide technical support, training, and capacity
building to the HCND, including support for the use of the
IMSMA database. 26

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chad’s national mine action standards are believed to be consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
HI started a review of Chad’s standards in 2016 and reported in September 2017 that 11 national mine action standards had
been updated and issued, following HCND approval. 27

OPERATORS
The HCND had a total staff of 324 at the end of 2018. HI did not provide details of its capacity. MAG employed 47 deminers,
survey, and mechanical personnel in its total staff of 97 but conducted no survey or clearance operations in 2018 because of
insecurity in its designated operating area. 28 FSD did not conduct operations but provided support to information management,
training in administration, logistics and procurement, and offered technical advice on QA/QC.29

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine clearance is largely manual. However, HI, working with Mobility Robotics and the HNCD, started testing drones for
inspection and mapping of hazardous areas. Tests were continuing in 2019 on various categories of drones and sensors,
over different sites, at different altitudes. In the process the tests were developing standing operating procedures (SoPs)
for drone use and compiling a database of ground signs for analysis of drone-generated imagery.30
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
The HCND reported that no land was released as a result of
survey or clearance in 2018. 31
After long delays importing equipment, MAG set up two
bases in Tibesti but was unable to start operations because
of insecurity. MAG later deployed survey teams to the Lac
region and reported conducting non-technical survey in 25
areas without identifying any new hazardous areas. It also
conducted technical survey, which reduced 49,000m2 of
mined area. 32

Under the EU’s PRODECO project, MAG had planned to deploy
demining teams to the Tibesti region in June 2018 but it was
prevented from operating there by security problems. 33
HI did not provide results of its activities in 2018. Chad
reported HI started demining in the Borkou region in
November 2018. 34

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 NOVEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR, 2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2011
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2014
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2020
FOURTH EXTENSION REQUESTED (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2025
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Chad has made little progress since the Third Review
Conference in Maputo in 2014 and prospects remain
uncertain. Mine action in Chad has been largely crippled
by lack of funding, political inertia, and cumbersome
bureaucracy. A variety of mainly local threats to security
also obstruct progress. The EU-funded PRODECO project is
the main focus of mine action sector activities, but between
its launch in September 2017 and the end of 2018 it did not
result in any signiﬁcant release of land.

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.0

2017

0.0

2016

0.5

2015

0.3

2014

N/R

Total

0.8
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CHILE

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,
(ESTIMATED)

2.5KM

2

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

962,948M

2

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

Area of Land Released (m2)
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Chile increased clearance output from 2017 to 2018 but still fell short of its planned land release target for the year. Chile has
reiterated its commitment to completing clearance of outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination by its Article 5 deadline
of March 2020, which makes 2019 a crucial year. Chile has set itself a very ambitious target for the year and will need to
signiﬁcantly increase its clearance output in the face of challenging climatic conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Chile should clarify the amount of outstanding contamination in Seilao, Antofagasta, following technical
survey of mined area there in 2017.

■

Chile should accelerate clearance to ensure it meets its planned targets, increasing operational capacity
to offset the challenging climatic conditions and delays to demining.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Chile is contaminated with both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines with the majority
of contamination in hard-to-access areas with technical survey planned in Antofagasta to
more accurately deﬁne outstanding contamination.

8

There is strong national ownership in Chile with leadership of the programme from the
National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CNAD) and demining
operations being fully funded by the Chilean government.

6

Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed forces with women
working at all levels of the mine action programme. Chile should take the next steps
and formulate a mine action-speciﬁc gender and diversity policy.

6

Chile uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which
it updated to Version 6 in 2017. Chile submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and
provides regular updates on progress in Article 5 implementation at the annual meetings
of states parties. However, there are inconsistent and inaccurate ﬁgures within reports
and across reporting periods.

6

Chile has a National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020 and submitted updated
clearance plans in 2017 and then again in 2019. Chile failed to meet its land release target
in 2018 and has set itself a very ambitious target for 2019.

7

Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). All survey and
clearance is undertaken by the military and both machines and dogs are used
during operations.

5

It is unclear whether Chile is on track to meet its Article 5 deadline as the small increase
in clearance output in 2018 will not be nearly enough to meet its target. Chile faces delays
to demining operations from the challenging climate and it is hard to see how it will meet
its deadline without a major increase in capacity.
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Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de
Desminado, CNAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army Corps of Engineers, Navy Peace and Demining
Division
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■

None

STATES PARTIES

CHILE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Chile had almost 4.5km2 of mined area (see Table 1) down from just over 5.1km2 at the end of the
previous year.1
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018) 2
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs
and CHAs

Total area
(m2)

Arica and Parinacota

5

797,357

1

145,297

6

942,654

Antofagasta

4

158,278

2

3,129,888

6

3,288,166

Magallanes and Antártica Chilena

6

157,632

0

0

6

157,632

Tarapacá

3

49,199

0

0

3

49,199

Valparaíso

0

0

1

14,000

1

14,000

18

1,162,466

4

3,289,185

22

4,451,651

Region

Totals

CHA = Conﬁrmed Hazardous Area SHA = Suspected Hazardous Area

The mines were all laid during the Pinochet regime in the
1970s on Chile’s borders with Argentina in the south, and
with Bolivia and Peru in the north. The mined areas, which
typically contain both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines,
are generally difﬁcult to access and mostly in unpopulated
regions. The regions of Antofagasta, Arica and Parinacota,
and Magallanes and Antártica Chilena are contaminated with
both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines while the regions
of Tarapacá and Valparaíso are contaminated only with
anti-personnel mines. 3 Of the 22 mined areas identiﬁed in
Table 1 ten contain only anti-personnel mines. 4 The vast
majority of the mines were laid in the northern region, with
some mineﬁelds located as high as 5,000m above sea level. 5

In 2017, a technical survey was carried out in Seilao,
Antofagasta, identifying contamination estimated to cover
2.28km2, an increase from the previous estimate of 1.97km2. 6
Chile had planned to conduct further survey in 2018 of newly
identiﬁed mined area in San Pedro de Atacama to more
accurately determine the extent of contamination.7 In May
2019, Chile stated that it planned to reduce the conﬁrmed
area of 2.28km2 through technical survey and that a
geomorphological study of the whole area was needed. 8
Chile is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants,
currently estimated at 97km2 although actual contamination
is likely to be much lower, and to a limited extent other
unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Chile
for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the
National Demining Commission (CNAD), which is chaired
by the Minister of Defence. In May 2002, Supreme Decree
No.79 created CNAD as an advisory body to the President
of the Republic and interministerial coordinator to support
the fulﬁlment of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC).9 Its main functions are to advise the President,
mobilise resources, coordinate demining with state agencies,
and develop plans for implementing the APMBC.

Demining operations are all funded by the Government
of Chile. In 2018, some US$4.25 million was allocated to
the demining programme, a drop from the $4.325 million
allocated in 2017. The amount allocated corresponds to the
planned budget.10

GENDER
While there is no speciﬁc gender policy within CNAD, Chile’s
policy of integrating women into the armed forces has been
in place since 2000. As at May 2019, 14.4% of total armed
forces personnel were female. In 2016, restrictions on the
type of military positions a woman could hold were lifted
and legislation was adopted to modify the military grading
system, allowing women to be promoted in the same way as
men. Women have been working in demining in Chile since
2004 across all types of roles, including as deminers and

in managerial/supervisory roles. In 2007, the ﬁrst woman
was appointed as Manual Demining Section Commander in
Arica. In May 2018, a woman was appointed as Demining
Company Commander in Arica. Chile has made provisions
to make it easier for women to work in the sector by, for
example, adapting demining equipment to better suit female
speciﬁcations, providing childcare and eliminating the gender
wage gap.11
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since 2003, Chile has been using the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During
2017, Chile upgraded to Version 6 of IMSMA after starting
the MARS (Mine Action Reporting System) application that
replaced IMSMA Mobile. This application has equipped
Chile with high-quality geographic information to support
decision-making around clearance.12

Chile has submitted its Article 7 reports almost every year
since its accession to the convention in 2002 and makes
regular Article 5 statements at meetings of states parties,
although there have been some problems with the accuracy of
the information presented. In previous years, Chile submitted
clearance plans that contained estimates that were more than
the amount of area that had been indicated as remaining.13

PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020
was formulated in accordance with the request of the
Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP) that Chile
provide updates relative to the timelines presented in its
2011 extension request.14 The main objective of the plan is
to eliminate all existing anti-personnel mines on national
territory by the March 2020 deadline.15
In its Article 7 report for 2017, Chile submitted an updated
annual clearance plan for 2018–20 taking into account
contamination newly found in San Pedro de Atacama during
2017 (see Table 2).16 In its statement at the Seventeenth
Meeting of States Parties, Chile indicated that by the end
of 2018 it planned to clear 13 mined areas, followed by
clearance of 14 mined areas in 2019, and clearance of the ﬁnal
mined area, which would be completed in 2020.17 In fact, Chile
fell short of its land release target, clearing six mined areas
totalling 962,948m2.18

Table 2: Mine clearance plan 2018–20
Year

Planned clearance (m2)

2018

1,388,304

2019

3,664,338

2020

50,600

Total

5,103,242

Table 3: Updated Mine clearance plan 2019–20
Year

Mined areas

Planned clearance (m2)

2019

18

4,374,448

2020

1

50,600

Total

19

4,425,048

As at April 2019, Chile had cleared three mined areas totalling
26,603m2 since January and planned to clear an additional 18
mined areas by the end of the year, leaving one mined area to
clear in 2020 (see Table 3).19
Annually, CNAD issues a National Directive on the Execution
of Demining Activities from the Government of Chile, which
contains a set of provisions and tasks that supports the
planning of demining activities.20 Clearance is prioritised
according to proximity to populated areas, impact on land
that has been designated a national park or is a historical
site of touristic interest, and impact on land that obstructs
development. 21

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Chile is guided by the international mine action standards
(IMAS). 22 It ﬁrst developed a joint demining manual for its
armed forces in 2009. 23 As at June 2019, the Armed Forces
Manual of Humanitarian Demining and Clearance of Explosive
Remnants of War was awaiting ﬁnal approval. 24

Since 2008, mechanical assets have been used to support
manual demining in Chile. During 2018, machines were
deployed to conduct clearance in Arica and Parinacota and
Antofagasta. 26 Chile also used explosive detection dogs for
the ﬁrst time in 2018 to carry out quality control of an area
that had been cleared using machines. 27

OPERATORS
Mine clearance in Chile is conducted by the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Navy Peace and Demining Division. In 2017,
Chile deployed seven manual demining teams with a total of
207 deminers. 25
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DEMINER SAFETY
In 2018, a deminer working in the Arica and Parinacota
region detonated an M-14 anti-personnel mine while
conducting clearance, which resulted in serious injuries
to his face and hand. 28

STATES PARTIES

CHILE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 0.96km2 was released through clearance in three regions and 3,908 anti-personnel mines and 1,117
anti-vehicle mines were found and destroyed (see Table 4). This was an increase from the 860,000m2 cleared in 2017.
No mined area was cancelled or reduced through survey in 2018.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 2018 29
Province

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

Arica and Parinacota

2

715,920

2,310

883

Antofagasta

1

91,409

1,157

234

Magallanes and Antártica Chilena

3

155,619

441

0

Totals

6

962,948

3,908

1,117

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH

Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

962,948

2017

860,000

2016

3,520,000

2015

1,890,000

2014

2,140,000

Total

9,372,948

Chile reiterated its commitment to fulﬁl its Article 5
obligations by 2020 in its statements to the Seventeenth
Meeting of States Parties and at the 2019 Intersessional
Meetings. 30 But Chile did not meet its clearance targets
for 2017, clearing 0.86km2 of its forecast 3.24km2, or 2018,
clearing 0.96km2 of its forecast 1.39km2, and has set itself
the rather ambitious goal of clearing 3.37km2 in 2019. This
is a marked increase from the average 1.9km2 per year
of clearance Chile has achieved since the 2014 Maputo
Conference. In a slightly confusing turn of events, Chile has
stated that it will reduce 2,279,112m2 of the total through
technical survey in Seilao, Antofagasta, despite identifying
this same area as suspected of having mine contamination
through technical survey in 2017. 31

Chile is moving into the ﬁnal phase of operations but, by
its own admission, will face considerable challenges to
implementation from the climate and topology. The mined
areas in the Altiplano and the Austral Islands are difﬁcult to
access and are subject to heavy rains and snow which restricts
the length of the demining season.32 Chile has reported that
over the past three years these highland areas have been
hit with particularly intense winters.33 In 2018, clearance in
Arica and Parinacota and in Antofagasta was interrupted for
a number of months due to heavy snowfall.34 While Chile may
have taken steps to mitigate this by making changes to the
operational plans, redistributing clearance machines, and
transferring specialist personnel to provide further support,
it has still been unable to meet its annual clearance targets
for the past two years.35 With the majority of remaining
contamination in Arica and Parinacota and in Antofagasta it is
difﬁcult to see how Chile will reach its targets for 2019 without
a major increase in demining capacity.
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COLOMBIA

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,
(ESTIMATED)

10KM

2

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

962,232M

2

Area of Land Released (m2)

1,200,000

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

2017
2018

1,000,000

962,232
800,000

600,000

524,326
400,000

383,951

346,301

200,000

239,068

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

48,054

322

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Following the Presidential election in August 2018, Descontamina
Colombia was reallocated to the Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner
for Peace and a new leadership appointed. It is expected that
changes will be made to the mine action programme in 2019
and beyond with a new mine action strategy being developed
and a new prioritisation model being implemented. However,
the sector continues to face numerous challenges, not least
because of a worsening security situation that restricts access
to the most heavily contaminated mined areas and reports of
new anti-personnel mines being emplaced.
Colombia is not on track to meet its current Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline and has

stated that it will request a second extension in 2020. Mine
Action Review believes that this extension should be only
an interim request to better determine the baseline of
anti-personnel mine contamination. In order to meet this
new date, Descontamina Colombia will need to increase the
effectiveness and efﬁciency of the demining programme by
making much needed improvements to information management
and reporting, land release methodologies, quality management,
and task prioritisation. Colombia continues to be without an
accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination, making
it difﬁcult to measure progress, not least because its reporting
of survey and clearance is inaccurate.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Colombia should conduct a baseline survey
to elaborate a meaningful understanding of
contamination and to accelerate signiﬁcantly
clearance of remaining mined areas in accordance
with its obligations under APMBC Article 5.

■

Colombia should report more accurately and
consistently on land released through survey and
clearance and rely on survey rather than “events”
to understand anti-personnel mine contamination.

■

Colombia should elaborate its land release
national mine action standard (NMAS) and
correctly implement both its technical survey
and new quality management NMAS. Operators
should be supported to use the full toolbox of

land release methodologies to ensure they are
conducting efﬁcient survey and clearance.
■

Colombia should elaborate a gender policy and
implementation plan for mine action.

■

Colombia should engage more positively with
civilian operators, particularly in its strategic
planning processes, tasking them in a manner
that ensures the best use of resources and
prioritises the highest impact areas in response
to humanitarian and community needs.

■

Quality management of operations should be
enhanced and applied equally to all operators,
including the military.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination in Colombia. While
the security situation makes access to some contaminated areas difﬁcult, there has been
no systematic survey undertaken of accessible areas, nor is there a plan to do so. There
have also been reports of new mines being emplaced.

6

Following the election of President Duque, Descontamina Colombia was without a
director for six months. Operators have reported that slow decision-making and approval
processes at the national level have delayed survey and clearance. In early 2019,
Descontamina was reallocated to the Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Peace and a
new leadership appointed. However, most decisions related to mine clearance remain
with the Instancia de Desminado, led by the Ministry of Defence.

6

Descontamina does not have gender or diversity policy and implementation plan but certain
minority groups do have legal protections. In 2019, a female lead for Descontamina was
appointed. In total, women make up 63% of staff in the national authority.

4

Poor information management and reporting continues to be a problem. Colombia relies
on “events” where more recent survey data is unavailable to determine anti-personnel
mine contamination, prioritisation, and planning despite their unreliability. Some capacity
and improvement of information management systems has taken place. However,
Colombia’s Article 7 report for 2018 contained inconsistent land release ﬁgures.

4

Colombia has a Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines
2016–2021, which categorises mined areas according to impact. Operators outside the military,
which are by far the largest operator, are typically assigned high-impact areas, which are
often inaccessible due to security issues. Operators have found they are locked into scattered
tasks by Descontamina without consideration for efﬁcient resource deployment. The Armed
Forces receive more tasks than they can manage, resulting in more than 60% of the assigned
municipalities without operations on the ground, but still blocked to other organisations.

5

Colombia has 15 national mine action standards (NMAS) in place, but no deﬁned land release
concept. The technical survey and new quality management NMAS has yet to be implemented
effectively and the land release NMAS is still under development. Colombia has a large
demining capacity with nine active operators who use an increasing range of demining assets.
Efﬁciency and effectiveness of survey and clearance could still be improved with a quality
management system causing unnecessary delays and mined areas that prove to have no
contamination still being cleared.

4

It is unclear how much land was released in 2018 due to discrepancies within Colombia’s
latest Article 7 transparency report. Colombia is not on track to meet its Article 5
deadline and it has already stated that it will request an extension.
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3

(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.4

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP)
– Descontamina Colombia

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

■
■

Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado
Humanitario (BRDEH)
Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association
(AEDIM)
Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
Asociación Colombiana de Técnicos y Expertos en
Explosivos e Investigadores de Incendios y NBQR (ATEXX)
(not operational in 2018)
Humanicemos DH (not operational in 2018)
Colombia sin Minas (not operational in 2018)
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■
■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
The HALO Trust
Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Perigeo
Polus Colombia

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■
■

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
Organization of American States (OAS)

STATES PARTIES

The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in
Colombia remains highly uncertain, but as at October 2018
at least 28 of Colombia’s 32 departments were suspected
to have a mine threat.1 As at July 2019, Colombia still lacked
an accurate understanding of total contamination, which
according to its strategic plan for 2016–21 was 52km2 across
673 municipalities from a total of 1,122. 2 This estimate is
unreliable. It is based on a calculation that takes 15% of the
number of IMSMA “events” from 1990 to 2009 and adds them
to 24% of the number IMSMA events from 2010 to 2015, with a
further 20% added for both periods. These percentages were
calculated based on information from historic humanitarian
demining operations. The ﬁgure it generates is then
multiplied by an estimated average conﬁrmed hazardous
area (CHA) of 5,000m2, which generated the baseline
contamination ﬁgure for the country. 3 Historically, the most
affected departments are said to be Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá,
Arauca, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Cauca, Bolívar, Tolima,
and Putumayo. 4
In May 2019, Colombia provided a revised estimate that
713 municipalities had anti-personnel mine contamination,
of which 350 have been declared free of mines, 163 are
assigned, and the remaining 200 are awaiting intervention. 5
However, this ﬁgure was not derived from a more
systematic survey approach, and as at August 2019, there
were no reported plans to conduct a national baseline
of contamination. In 2018, Colombia reported that 166
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling 852,871m2 and
199 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 1,133,303m2
were added to the database through non-technical survey. 6 Of
this, The HALO Trust reported adding 527,603m2, Humanity
and Inclusion (HI) 290,000m2, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
196,201m2, and Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
69,832m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination.7 None of this newly recorded contamination
corresponds to new or recent use of anti-personnel mines;
security still restricts access to areas where new mines are
being laid. 8
All the landmines remaining in Colombia are said to have
been laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and are
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature. According to
The HALO Trust, mined areas in Colombia are low-density,
nuisance mineﬁelds that average 4,000m2 in size.9 Mines were
planted in isolated rural areas to protect strategic positions;

often coca cultivations whose crops were used to fund
operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left
behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other
civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.10
As there was little, if any, mapping of mined areas by NSAGs
and the intended victims were the military or paramilitaries,
local communities were often informed that certain areas
were mined, though no speciﬁcs were given. This has led
to a widespread belief that mines are everywhere and local
people are afraid to use vast areas of land for fear of mines,
despite scant ﬁrm evidence of their presence.11
In many areas where the FARC demobilised, the government
has yet to arrive in force, with other NSAGs now struggling
for power.12 This includes FARC dissidents, the National
Liberation Army (ELN), and drug-trafﬁcking groups,
especially the largest among them, the Gaitán Self-Defence
Forces. Most of the ﬁght for control is concentrated in
about one-quarter of the country’s municipalities. Mine
action operations will only be undertaken with the local
community’s agreement, often in areas where mistrust of the
state is high and community members are sceptical of the
operator’s intentions due to the perception that operators
are linked to the military. This negatively affects the ability
of humanitarian demining organisations to conduct survey
and clearance and to determine an accurate estimate of
contamination in these areas.13

NEW CONTAMINATION
In 2018, the amount of land used for coca leaf production
reached an all-time high and it has been reported that new
mines are being emplaced to protect these plantations.
According to Miguel Ceballos, the High Commissioner for
Peace, the government is particularly concerned about the
resurgence of this practice in the northern Chocó region, an
ELN stronghold.14 There was a dramatic rise in the number of
civilian and military victims due to anti-personnel mines in
2018 to 178 from 57 the year before. As at June 2019, there
had already been 72 victims of anti-personnel mines and,
according to the High Commissioner, at least half of these
are related to coca cultivations.15 HI estimated that of the
290,000m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination they identiﬁed in 2018, about 10% was new
contamination mostly found in the department of Cauca.16
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In April 2017, following the adoption of a Presidential Decree,
the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección
para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA)
became Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas
Antipersonal – Descontamina Colombia. Descontamina
Colombia was ostensibly made Colombia’s national mine
action authority, with responsibility for formulating
the strategic direction of mine action, coordinating and
monitoring mine action at national and local level, applying
technical guidance and regulating state and non-state
operators, and elaborating and implementing national
standards. In practice, it also serves as the national
mine action centre.17 In February 2019, responsibility for
Descontamina Colombia was reallocated to the Ofﬁce of the
High Commissioner for Peace with a new Director, the Deputy
Commissioner for Peace, elevating decision-making to the
presidential level.18 As stipulated in the National Development
Plan 2018–2022, the President has overall responsibility
for public policy on mine action.19 However, in this process
mine action has been disconnected from the Ofﬁce of the
Presidential Counsellor for Stabilization, limiting access to
stabilisation and development funds for the sector. 20
In 2011, Decree 3750 created the Instancia Interinstitucional
de Desminado Humanitario (IIDH – Interinstitutional
Tribunal for Humanitarian Demining) which is composed
of a representative from the Ministry of National Defense,
the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and
Descontamina Colombia. It is responsible for recommending
or suspending the certiﬁcation of humanitarian demining
organisations to the Ministry of National Defence and,
determining and assigning demining tasks.21 In addition,
Decree 3750 called for the elaboration of National Standards
for Humanitarian Demining and regulates the quality
management of demining operations. 22
Promulgated in July 2017, Decree 1195 outlines mitigation and
correction measures that must be applied by operators when
demining in National Parks and other areas of ecological

value. 23 Operators are currently expected to reforest in
protected areas after clearance to mitigate environmental
impact. 24
While roles and responsibilities at a national level are
generally clear, operators often experience costly delays
due to slow approval and lengthy decision-making
processes. 25 The HALO Trust has reported that the importing
process is often complicated which delays the importing of
equipment from overseas. 26
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has been helping
Descontamina Colombia to develop and implement national
standards and to improve their information management
capacities, albeit with mixed success. In July 2019, following
the start of FSD’s new contract, an additional information
management advisor was hired to support Descontamina
with data analysis and evidence-based decision making. 27
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
provides technical assistance to the national authority
and provides training and capacity building with a focus
on national operators. In 2018–19, UNMAS worked closely
with Humanicemos DH to support capacity development
with the ultimate aim of it becoming a fully self-sufﬁcient
operator.28 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) provides capacity development support
to Descontamina Colombia for information management,
operational efﬁciency including survey, and national standards.
As at August 2019, Colombia had not provided information
on how much it contributes to support the cost of the
mine action centre and/or demining. It does receive very
signiﬁcant international donor support for mine action and
has also secured funding from the Warren Buffet Foundation
for demining equipment for the BRDEH. Colombia has
estimated it will need $320 million dollars to complete
anti-personnel mine clearance in the country. As at June
2018, it had received almost $150 million in external funding. 29

GENDER
In 2019, Colombia appointed Martha Hurtado as the head of
Descontamina Colombia, one of the few female heads of a
national mine action authority in the world. In the Ofﬁce of
the High Commissioner for Peace, of the 30 ofﬁcials dedicated
to mine action 19 (63%) are women and of these (63%) are in
managerial/supervisory positions. 30 In 2017, at the request
of the previous Director of Descontamina Colombia, GMAP
initiated a consultative process to develop a national gender
and diversity policy, but due to a change in management the
process stalled. 31
Operators often conduct non-technical survey in communities
that were previously inaccessible due to the security
situation. All the operators stressed the importance of
community liaison and of working with local people, including
by employing “local guides” who have either direct or indirect
links with the FARC, as a way of both building relationships
with the community and as a source of accurate information
about the existence of contamination. 32 The HALO Trust,
HI, NPA, and the CCCM all reported consulting women and
children during non-technical survey and community liaison
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and employing women in their non-technical survey teams,
but this is not done systematically nor is it required by the
non-technical survey NMAS although it is a requirement of
the mine risk education NMAS. 33
Colombia does have special constitutional protections for
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities which are
taken into account during planning and prioritisation
and stipulate that these communities require a different
engagement approach. 34
The OAS has 55% of women employed in managerial or
supervisory positions. 35 However, of the 4,076 accredited
personnel in the BRDEH only ﬁve are women, one of whom
leads a demining battalion. 36
The HALO Trust has an organisational gender and diversity
policy. Open recruitment for jobs such as deminers
speciﬁcally encourages women to apply because manual
labour is often seen as not appropriate for women in some
rural regions of Colombia. Women hold senior positions in the
organisation, including deputy programme manager, location
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As at July 2019, NPA Colombia is in the process of developing
a gender and diversity policy and has made gender and
diversity the focus of one of its key performance indicators
(KPIs). NPA is currently working to redress the gender
balance in operations and at the managerial level. Women
and people from indigenous communities were targeted
during a recent recruitment drive where of 32 new staff,
11 were female (34%), 2 were persons with disabilities (6%),
and 4 were from indigenous communities (13%). In 2018,
25% of staff at an operational level (37 of 150) and 41% of
managerial staff were female (15 of 37). In 2019, NPA is
planning to deploy an all-female demining team to challenge
gender bias within Colombian society. 38

HI has an organisational disability, gender, and age policy
which speciﬁes that HI Colombia will need to elaborate an
implementation plan. HI actively recruits women and offers
gender-appropriate working conditions, such as separate
living quarters in the ﬁeld. Despite receiving fewer job
applications from women, overall female representation in
demining teams is at about 30%. In 2018, 14 of 48 survey and
clearance personnel were women (29%), 2 of 3 Demining
Area Managers were women (66%), 6 of 15 supervisors/team
leaders were women (40%), and the Demining Manager was
a woman. 39
CCCM has a gender and diversity policy and implementation
plan. All non-technical survey teams are trained in gender
sensitivity and inclusivity and CCCM has made gender and
diversity part of its project indicators. In 2018, one ﬁfth of
operational roles and half of supervisory/managerial roles
were ﬁlled by women. 40

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Poor information management has been a feature of
Colombia’s mine action programme since its inception.
Government Decree 1649 of 2014 assigned Descontamina
Colombia responsibility for IMSMA database and to “compile,
systematise, centralise, and update relevant information” to
serve as a basis for programme planning. 41 Descontamina
Colombia uses the IMSMA database and its own Periferico
database. While there continue to be issues with information
management, the GICHD has noted improvements since 2017
in data sharing and data quality following a signiﬁcant review
and correction of IMSMA data. 42
Since 1990, Colombia has collected and reported on “events”
related to anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO),
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This data has been
the main indicator of contamination and has formed the basis
of demining planning and prioritisation. 43 In areas where
non-technical survey has been carried out, there is a much
clearer understanding of contamination. IMSMA “events” are
the main source of contamination information in areas that
have not yet been surveyed. 44 As at December 2018, 24,647
of these “events” had been registered in IMSMA across 28
departments. 45 Operators have reported that these IMSMA
events are beset with errors, including duplications and
inaccuracies. Despite some improvements to the registration
of these events and a clean-up of the database when
operators are assigned a task and investigate each event they
are still ﬁnding that most do not correspond to the presence of
either mines or UXO. 46 For example, HI stated that 76% of areas
tasked in 2018 that were reported to contain anti-personnel
mines were not linked to recorded IMSMA events. 47

In March 2018, FSD took over information management
support for Descontamina Colombia from NPA. Descontamina
Colombia in conjunction with FSD has been training the OAS
to use IMSMA and claims that the quality of the database
is improving. 48 Access to data has improved with IMSMA
now available online and licences granted to the operators
for access to the, separate Descontamina run, Periferico
database. Training has also been provided for operators in
the management of the online platforms that are required
to submit demining outputs. HI has reported that there is a
willingness from Descontamina to listen and provide support
in solving problems. 49 Data collection forms for inputting data
into Periferico are missing data ﬁelds and some information
cannot be captured though a number of improvements have
been made. 50 As at July 2019, the new national standard on
information management was still under development. 51
In the almost three years since the implementation of the
Strategic Plan, Descontamina Colombia has not conducted
signiﬁcant analysis of the newly available data nor have they
updated the categorisation of municipalities to prioritise
actions on the ground. 52
Article 7 reports are submitted on a timely basis but the
data is inconsistent and inaccurate. Colombia has stated that
the numbers in its Article 7 report for 2018 are provisional,
which may account for some of the discrepancies with
operators’ ﬁgures. However, this does not account for the
inconsistent land release ﬁgures in its Article 7 report, with
varying numbers provided for survey and clearance. 53 A
major issue for Descontamina Colombia in providing timely
and accurate land release data is the lengthy approval
process which can mean that reports are approved six
months after they have been submitted. 54 Colombia makes
regular statements on Article 5 implementation at meetings
of states parties but there are inconsistencies in the data
reported between statements. 55
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manager, demining and non-technical survey supervisors and
team leaders. An average of 17% of operations staff employed
in 2018 were women. Of the senior management positions
available, approximately 38% are occupied by women. 37

PLANNING AND TASKING
Colombia developed a ﬁve-year Strategic Plan for
Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines
2016–2021. The aim is to address anti-personnel mine
contamination in 673 municipalities, of which 199 are
high-impact municipalities (type I), 291 medium-impact
municipalities (type II), and the remaining 183 low-impact
municipalities (type III), covering a total estimated area of
51km2. 56 Type I comprise incidents involving casualties from
anti-personnel mines or UXO registered on IMSMA since
2010; type II are incidents involving anti-personnel mines
and UXO and relate to casualties registered on IMSMA
before 2010; and type III are IMSMA “events” without
human impact. 57
In May 2019, Colombia revised the estimated number of
municipalities to 713 and reported that the suspicion of mines
had been removed in 350 municipalities, though this was
only achieved through actual survey or clearance in 174 of
these and the majority of these areas have had very low, or
even no contamination at all. Descontamina has assigned 163
municipalities to operators for demining operations although
access to the most contaminated areas is constrained due to
the prevailing security situation. In addition, 200 municipalities
suspected to be contaminated with anti-personnel mines have
seen no survey or clearance yet. 58
It is expected that a new strategic plan, directed by the new
government and the development of which is being facilitated
by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), will be elaborated by the
end of 2019. In March 2019, a participatory review of the mine
action sector began. Operators and other sector stakeholders
such as UNMAS and FSD were asked to help redesign the
mine action strategy through workshops, but these ceased
in June 2019 along with any feedback or progress updates
from Descontamina. 59 As at August 2019, there was no
indication that the participatory reviews would continue,
raising concerns that the new strategy will not respond to the
operational reality on the ground or humanitarian and local
community needs. 60 Additionally, some operators reported
concerns that the framework for the strategy lacks speciﬁc
detail in addressing some key issues, such as prioritisation,
technical survey, insecurity, and lack of capacity at the
national authority. 61 Descontamina Colombia has also stated
that it will work with the local authorities on the inclusion of
demining in local development plans. 62
Descontamina Colombia had an action plan for 2018, but it
did not include any speciﬁc targets for land release. 63 In its
Article 7 transparency report for 2017, Colombia projected
that it would release 1,445,971m2 of anti-personnel mine, UXO
and other IED contamination in 2018. 64 The reported total for
2018 of 1,535,213m2 exceeded the target by 89,242m2, but
it is likely that the reported land release ﬁgure for 2018 is
inaccurate. Colombia has projected that it would release 80
municipalities with a total area of 1,616,802m2 in 2019. 65
Colombia prioritises its task allocation according to the
IIDH and the Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action
against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021. The IIDH takes
into account information provided by local bodies, the
Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Ofﬁce, and the
General Command of the Military Forces, and Descontamina
Colombia. 66 The Strategic Plan has categorised municipalities
in Type (Priority) I, II, and III, which are then proposed for
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task allocation to the demining organisations without a given
order, hindering a systemic approach to the demining of the
territory. Civilian organisations can generally only bid for
tasks in assigned type I areas while the armed forces have
been assigned more of the type II and III areas, many of which
they have been able to cancel and release through discussion
with the local community and local security councils. 67 Type I
areas tend to have the highest levels of anti-personnel mine
contamination and the most security issues. In these areas
contaminated territories are often inaccessible to operators
or operators are forced to suspend survey and clearance
operations due to security concerns. These suspensions can
last anywhere from a few days to indeﬁnitely depending on
the situation severely disrupting operations. 68 For example,
as at July 2019, of the ten Type I municipalities currently
assigned to NPA, nine were inaccessible due to insecurity. 69
The impact of this differential approach to task assignment
is that it is difﬁcult to directly compare the output and levels
of operational efﬁciency between operators.
Descontamina Colombia’s ability to coordinate has come
under scrutiny, as it has been locking in operators to tasks
before the extent of the challenge is known and without a
clear appreciation of operators’ future capacities. In the
view of UNMAS, in Descontamina Colombia’s push to assign
tasks demonstrating the peace accord’s new opportunities,
operators are often deployed into new areas disconnected
from their existing areas of operation and without prior
consideration of their capacity. This is not an efﬁcient use
of resources.70 While an operator can lose an assigned
municipality through inactivity, the bar for what constitutes
an activity is so low that in reality no municipalities are
reassigned. This had led to some operators running out of task
sites while other tasks remain dormant.71 Under Article 6(8) of
the APMBC, states parties receiving international assistance
are obligated to cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and
prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.
Within municipalities, operators prioritise tasks in agreement
with municipal authorities, local leaders and the national
mine action authority.72 There are no speciﬁc criteria for
task prioritisation within municipalities and operators are
at liberty to follow their own priorities.73
In May 2019, Descontamina Colombia reported working with
the Armed Forces on a new model of prioritisation. This
model will integrate IMSMA data with more than 40 indicators
that take into account security conditions, public policy,
and bids from demining operators.74 However, there was no
consultation with operators on this new model nor has this
model been discussed in the strategic review workshops as
was previously agreed.75
If an anti-personnel mine is found in an area that has been
“declared free of the suspicion of mines” it is expected that
the community will inform the national authority or demining
operator. This reporting mechanism is communicated during
non-technical survey and community liaison activities
as stipulated in the non-technical survey and clearance
NMAS. If the national authority is informed of any residual
contamination then either the operator or the BRDEH will be
tasked with carrying out the necessary survey and clearance.76
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Colombia now has 15 national mine action standards (NMAS)
in place, including a glossary of mine action terms, up from
just three when the 2016–21 strategic plan was launched.77
In 2018–19, discussions took place on the land release and
medical support NMAS and adjustments were made to the
non-technical survey, manual demining, and mine detection
dog (MDD) NMAS.78 A new system of conﬁdence levels has
been introduced into the revised quality management
standard. Each operator will be assigned a conﬁdence level
and an operator with good conﬁdence levels will be subject
to less frequent visits from OAS, allowing them to focus on
operators that need more support.79 As at July 2019, a pilot
phase for this new system was in development. 80
The non-technical survey NMAS was amended to allow
operators to investigate IMSMA events that fall outside their
assigned area. 81 The NMAS on technical survey was approved
by Descontamina Colombia in December 2017 but is not yet
implemented by all operators, as according to the standard
if any contamination is found during survey full clearance
must be carried out, negating the efﬁciencies of technical
survey. 82 A revised technical survey NMAS was expected to
be approved by the end of 2019. 83

Colombia does not yet have a land release NMAS that has
been approved and implemented by Descontamina Colombia.
This is due mostly to the lack of experience and exposure
of the national authority to the concept, despite ongoing
technical support to the authority from FSD. 84 As a result
there is an over-reliance on full clearance. The national
standard does not allow cancellation of an area being cleared
before at least 50% of the clearance is completed, even if all
indications are that no explosive items will be found. 85
From Descontamina Colombia’s 2018 ﬁgures, of 193 mined
areas cleared, in as many as 95 (49%), no explosive device
was found. While still extremely high, this is actually an
improvement on 2017 when no explosive devices were found
in 65% of areas cleared. 86 In the ﬁgures reported by operators
for the CCCM, 44% (eight of eighteen) of areas cleared did not
contain any anti-personnel mines; for HI it was 21% (three of
fourteen), for NPA it was 26% (seven of twenty-seven). 87 In
July 2019, work on the land release NMAS was halted until
key staff at Descontamina had been replaced, due to occur
by the end of August 2019. 88

OPERATORS
There are 12 operators accredited for demining in Colombia.
The largest clearance operator is the Armed Forces
Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado
Humanitario (BRDEH). The Marine Corps Explosives and
Demining Association (AEDIM), a smaller military operator,
conducts clearance and destruction of anti-personnel mines
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in areas under the
jurisdiction of the National Navy. 89 Demining is also conducted
by international mine action NGOs. The HALO Trust, NPA and
HI are the largest of these operators, while Danish Demining
Group (DDG), Perigeo, and Polus Colombia also conduct
limited survey and clearance. National NGO the CCCM
was also active in 2018. Humanicemos DH, the demining
organisation comprised of ex-ﬁghters from the FARC-EP,
was accredited in August 2017.90 As at July 2019, however, it
was still not operational due to the OAS’s inability to certify
former ﬁghters being reintegrated under the 2016 peace
accord (see below).91 Another national NGO, Colombia sin
Minas, has also been accredited but is not yet operational.92
As at September 2019, the military had been assigned 57% of
the total number of areas tasked for demining.93
BRDEH has been conducting humanitarian demining in
Colombia since 2005.94 In 2017, there were seven demining
battalions operational across the country composed of
between one and sixty deminers each.95 In 2018, a total of
4,076 personnel had been accredited to conduct demining
operations in the BRDEH along with two mechanical assets
and 15 MDDs.96 AEDIM has been operational since 2014. In
2018, a total of 206 personnel had been accredited to conduct
demining operations.97
In 2013, The HALO Trust became the ﬁrst NGO to conduct
demining in Colombia.98 In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed 102
non-technical survey personnel and 235 clearance personnel.

There was a slight increase in clearance capacity from 2017
and a much larger 35% increase in non-technical survey
capacity due to non-technical survey-only contracts funded
by international and local donors. The HALO Trust reduced
non-technical survey capacity in 2019 due to a lack of newly
assigned areas but clearance capacity was expected to
remain the same.99
NPA formally initiated a mine action programme in April
2015, having taken part in the peace talks between the
government and the FARC that concerned demining. In 2018,
NPA deployed 18 non-technical survey personnel, three
community liaison/non-technical survey ofﬁcers and 146
clearance personnel including 65 deminers. There was an
increase in capacity from 2017 and NPA hoped to expand
stafﬁng in 2019.100
HI began humanitarian demining in Colombia in 2017. In
2018, HI deployed 10 non-technical survey personnel and 38
clearance personnel, broadly the same capacity as in 2017.
In 2019, HI planned to decrease the number of clearance
personnel in favour of non-technical survey and Multi-Task
Teams.101
The CCCM began humanitarian demining work in Colombia
in 2017. UNMAS have supported the CCCM to go from an
advocacy organisation to a demining operator, assisting in the
development and review of operational plans and providing
initial funding to the CCCM for this transition.102 In 2018, the
CCCM deployed 60 non-technical survey personnel across
15 teams and 36 clearance personnel across six teams. The
CCCM increased non-technical survey capacity by 115%
from 2017 and hoped to increase capacity by another 60% in
2019. Clearance capacity also rose by 20% from 2017 to 2018;
CCCM were hoping for a further 32% increase in 2019.103
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DDG has been active in Colombia since 2011 and received
Phase 1 accreditation to conduct demining in 2017.104 In April
2018, DDG began non-technical survey operations with one
team in the department of Caquetá. As at April 2019, DDG
was conducting non-technical survey in two municipalities
in Caquetá.105
Humanicemos DH are still not operational despite having
124 former ﬁghters trained in survey and clearance as the
United States (US) still recognises the FARC as a terrorist
organisation so former ﬁghters cannot be associated with
any US-funded projects which means that the OAS is unable
to QA/QC such deminers.106 The Government of Colombia has
therefore decided to mandate UNMAS to assume this role,
though the formal mandate to do so was still unsigned as
at September 2019. This has led to delays in Humanicemos
DH being able to start clearance operations with personnel
sitting idle while they wait for their accreditation.107
The OAS serves as the body for accreditation and
monitoring of humanitarian demining in Colombia. It has
been criticised for being too focused on compliance rather
than on supporting the operators to run effective demining
operations. This has manifested itself in non-critical
conformities being determined by rigid application and varied
interpretation of national standards and/or SoPs, leading

to delays in operations.108 At the request of Descontamina
Colombia, FSD has been seeking to build capacity in the OAS,
including by refocusing monitoring on QA and QC, rather
than on minor administrative non-conformities.109 It is hoped
that revising the quality management NMAS and introducing
conﬁdence levels will improve these processes. However, the
OAS has been without a director since May 2019, reducing the
possibility of capacity building.110
There have also been long waiting times after paperwork has
been submitted, which has delayed operations. The HALO
Trust reported that once a non-technical survey report has
been submitted to the OAS, there can be a signiﬁcant delay
before the report gets approved.111 NPA waited 127 days
for approval to use its mechanical assets, with MDD assets
standing idle as a result, despite the dog teams having
already been accredited.112
Each operator carries out their own internal QC in accordance
with the provisions in the Quality Management NMAS and
their organisational SoPs. From June 2016 to June 2018,
Descontamina Colombia had a team of Quality Managers
providing technical assistance to operators on issues such
as accreditation of personnel and demining techniques,
interpretation of and compliance with national standards,
and conﬂicts between the OAS and the operators.113

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
According to the national standards MDDs can be used in
Colombia to conduct technical survey and clearance while
mechanical assets can be used for ground preparation.114

were the problem. NPA developed detailed plans to correct
the problems identiﬁed and is conﬁdent that MDDs are an
effective asset for Colombia when used correctly.116

NPA uses a toolbox comprising manual deminers, MDDs,
and machines. In 2019, these assets were rebalanced to
achieve optimal output, which was found to be a ratio of,
three manual teams, three MDD teams, and two mechanical
teams. Mechanical teams undertake ground preparation.115 In
2018, NPA had two incidents where mines were found after
clearance had been conducted by MDD teams. After thorough
investigation it was concluded that it was the way MDDs were
used and not the effectiveness of the assets as such that

In 2018, The HALO Trust conducted only manual clearance but
carried out ﬁeld trials of both a newly acquired mechanical
asset for vegetation clearance and four MDDs.117 The CCCM
conducts clearance using manual techniques only, though
it planned to introduce MDDs into its operations in 2019.118
HI conducts clearance using only manual demining but was
hoping to start machine-assisted clearance in the course
of 2019.119

DEMINER SAFETY
In April 2018, FARC dissidents in La Reforma, San Martin
municipality in the department of Meta seized a CCCM vehicle
and held it for just over a month before returning it to the
CCCM. When non-technical survey had been conducted in
the area, the FARC dissidents had felt ignored, but after
consultation the CCCM were allowed to conduct operations.120
In the same month, BRDEH had a vehicle set alight in the
Suarez municipality in Cauca. In addition, in 2018, BRDEH
had to suspend operations in Aguazul, Casanare, and Quibdó,
Chocó due to ELN presence and lack of community support,
respectively.121
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In July 2018, The HALO Trust had a vehicle seized and set on
ﬁre in the village of Santander, Uribe municipality, in Meta.
An armed group of 15 FARC dissidents detained a team of
four conducting non-technical survey, forcing them to leave
the vehicle before setting it on ﬁre. The group threatened the
non-technical survey team and informed them that they did
not want The HALO Trust operating in the Uribe or Mesetas
municipalities.122
In February 2019, NPA staff were threatened and had a vehicle
set alight in Puerto Lleras, Meta and were informed that they
should leave the area. The area where the incident happened
was close to coca production and distribution routes.123
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, Colombia released124 a total of almost 1.54km2, of
which 0.05km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey,
0.52km2 reduced through technical survey and 0.96km2 was
cleared. A total of 322 anti-personnel mines and 104 items
of UXO were found and destroyed.
Colombia also stated in its annual Article 7 report that
559,773m2 was “released” through data clean-up in 2018.125
This occurs in low-impact areas after discussions between
the armed forces and the local security councils.126

In addition, Colombia reported that 166 suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs) totalling 852,871m2 and 199 conﬁrmed
hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 1,133,303m2 were added to
the database through non-technical survey.127 As Colombia
continues to operate without a land release NMAS, technically
land is not “released” but declared free of the suspicion of
mines and subsequently handed back to the communities.

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 48,405m2 was cancelled through nontechnical survey (see Table 1),128 a massive 80% reduction
from the 239,068m2 cancelled in 2017. Operators’ ﬁgures
differ signiﬁcantly from those reported by Descontamina.129
In part, this misreporting may be due to Colombia’s national
standards which specify that land can also be cancelled
through technical survey and clearance.130
A total of 524,936m2 was reported as reduced by technical
survey in 2018 (see Table 2), double the output from the
346,301m2 reduced in the previous year. Neither Handicap
International nor The HALO reported reducing any mined
areas through technical survey, as in 2018 it had not been
properly implemented.131 This would suggest that Colombia
is misreporting its survey results.

Table 1: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 2018132
Department

Operator

Antioquia

BRDEH

Area cancelled (m²)

Antioquia

HALO Trust

6,196

Bolivar

The National Army

6,032

Cauca

HI

1,600

Meta

NPA

Meta

HI

373

26,996
6,848

Total

48,045

Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018133
Area reduced (m2)

Province

Operator

Antioquia

BRDEH

167,385

Caldas

BRDEH

15,221

Caquetá

BRDEH

107,913

Huila

BRDEH

13,299

Meta

BRDEH

12,527

Meta

HI

1,298

Nariño

BRDEH

12,340

Putumayo

BRDEH

57,235

Santander

BRDEH

7,151

Sucre

National Army

Tolima

BRDEH

Tolima

HALO Trust

Valle del Cauca

BRDEH

Total

1,077
66,874
9,822
52,794
524,936
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 962,232m2 was cleared across 193 mined areas (see Table 3), a 150% increase on the 383,951m2 cleared
in 2017. Operators ﬁgures were again different from those reported by Descontamina.134 The increased clearance output
from the previous year is due to increase in operator capacity, improvements in operational efﬁciency, and more targeted
deployment of clearance resources.135
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2018136
Department

Operators

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Antioquia

BRDEH

19

91,934

39

1

Antioquia

HALO Trust

32

112,206

72

1

Bolivar

National Army

7

55,657

0

1

Caldas

BRDEH

9

39,107

18

0

Caquetá

BRDEH

18

101,997

35

1

Caquetá

HI

2

2,410

1

0

Cauca

HI

3

4,228

0

0

Cauca

HALO Trust

1

490

3

0

Huila

BRDEH

4

15,377

8

1

Huila

CCCM

7

12,861

2

1

Meta

BRDEH

5

69,528

6

0

Meta

CCCM

9

18,415

2

1

Meta

HI

5

26,207

13

0

Meta

HALO Trust

11

99,389

11

2

Nariño

BRDEH

3

18,000

7

1

Putumayo

BRDEH

3

8,535

3

5

Putumayo

CCCM

3

3,845

5

0

Santander

BRDEH

2

712

25

0

Sucre

National Army

3

11,691

1

0

Tolima

BRDEH

20

120,827

62

88

Tolima

HALO Trust

15

81,983

4

1

Valle del Cauca

BRDEH

10

54,564

3

0

Valle del Cauca

HALO Trust

2

12,269

2

0

193

962,232

322

104

Totals

AP = Anti-personnel UXO = Unexploded Ordnance IED = Improvised explosive device
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STATES PARTIES

COLOMBIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

962,232

2017

380,000

2016

290,000

2015

360,000

2014

540,000

Total

2,532,232

In May 2019, Colombia stated it was planning to request
a further extension to its Article 5 deadline as Colombia
would not complete clearance by 2021.137 It is expected that
Colombia will request a new deadline to 2025 but it is unclear
whether Colombia will even be able to meet this new date. In
order to do so there are numerous challenges that Colombia
will have to overcome, some of which are outside of the
control of the mine action programme and some which are
of its own making.

In 2018, Colombia reported “release” of 1.54km2 of mined
area, though this ﬁgure is likely to be inaccurate. Colombia
has projected an increase in land release for 2019, but the
areas declared free of mines so far have had very low or even
no contamination. Most high-impact areas are inaccessible
due to the difﬁcult security situation. The ongoing issues
with security, with the rise of FARC dissidents, the ELN, and
drug trafﬁcking, means it is unlikely humanitarian demining
organisations will be able to access these areas any time soon.
Focus for demining operations should remain on the high
impact areas that can be accessed while ensuring that these
operations are effectively and efﬁciently planned.
Non-technical and technical survey is vital to efﬁcient
demining operations and are particularly important in
Colombia when the initial information given at the task
allocation stage has been found to be so unreliable. As at
August 2019, the NMAS for land release was under discussion
and the technical survey and new quality management
NMAS had still to be implemented effectively. It is vital that
operators are facilitated by Descontamina Colombia and the
OAS to use the full toolbox of land release methodologies to
ensure effective and efﬁcient demining operations.

It is very difﬁcult to conduct an accurate assessment of
Colombia’s progress to date as it continues to be without
a reliable estimate of outstanding anti-personnel mine
contamination through evidence-based survey. Its estimate
of anti-personnel mine contamination of 52km2 across 673
municipalities is based on IMSMA data that operators have
found to be consistently unreliable. In May 2019, this was
revised to 713 municipalities, of which 350 had been declared
free of the suspicion of mines, though in only 174 of these was
this achieved through actual survey or clearance.
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2019

CROATIA

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

HEAVY,
(ESTIMATED)

100KM

2

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

49.01KM

2

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

1,095

Area of Land Released (km2)

60

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

2017
2018

50

49.01
40

30

30.4

20

10

(including 111 destroyed as
part of the “less arms, fewer
tragedies” programme)

6.6

Clearance

7.2

Technical Survey and
Non-Technical Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Croatia released almost 49km2 through clearance
and 7.2km2 through survey – a signiﬁcant increase on the
30.4km2 released through clearance and 6.6km2 released
through survey the previous year. However, many of the
mined areas cleared in 2018 did not contain mines. This calls
into question the efﬁciency of the demining and indicates
the need for better use of pre-clearance survey to conﬁrm

contamination before time- and cost-intensive full clearance
is undertaken on mined areas recorded by the Croatian Mine
Action Centre (CROMAC) as “conﬁrmed”. The failure of the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) to release mined area, in line with
Croatia’s Article 5 extension request plans for annual output,
is also cause for concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

CROMAC should ensure that it has sufﬁcient survey capacity in place to meet the targets outlined in its 2018
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request.

■

In addition to survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), CROMAC should also review the basis on which
conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are established.

■

The MoD should ensure sufﬁcient capacity is in place and should signiﬁcantly increase clearance to release
mined areas on military land, in line with Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request.

■

CROMAC should fulﬁl the pledge in Croatia’s 2018 extension request to explore the potential for mine
detection dogs (MDDs) to enhance the efﬁciency of technical survey. The 2015 demining law, which only
allows use of MDDs in clearance, should be amended if necessary.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Large areas of CHA were cleared in 2018 (and previous years) without ﬁnding
anti-personnel mines. This raises doubt regarding the evidence underpinning CHAs
and indicates the need for better survey prior to any clearance.

8

There is strong national ownership of mine action in Croatia, with political will to
implement Article 5. In January 2019, CROMAC and the Ofﬁce for Mine Action (OMA)
were integrated within the Ministry of Interior (MoI), but this is not expected to impact
Article 5 implementation.

5

Gender policies and implementation regarding mine action in Croatia are addressed
under the national Gender Equality Act, which includes guidelines of gender equality
and regulates against gender-based discrimination. However, it is hard to determine
the extent to which this is mainstreamed and implemented in the mine action sector.

8

Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and which allows disaggregation of contamination by type
and land release by method. Croatia provides regular updates on its progress in Article 5
implementation at APMBC meetings.

7

Croatia has a national mine action strategy which expires in 2019, in addition to annual
operational workplans for mine survey and clearance. Elaboration of a new national mine
action strategy now falls is the responsibility of MoI.

6

The 2015 law on mine action encompasses national mine action standards. Clearance of
a signiﬁcant number of CHAs in 2018 where no contamination was found, highlights the
need for robust evidence-based survey prior to any clearance.

8

Land release output in 2018 was signiﬁcantly greater than the previous year, although
Croatia is still not reaching the planned survey output. Furthermore, the MoD cleared
less than 5% of the 2018 output planned in Croatia’s 2018 extension request.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

6

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.8

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Ministry of Interior, in which CROMAC and OMA were
integrated at the beginning of January 2019.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Forty demining companies are accredited for mine and
battle area clearance, of which 26 conducted clearance
in 2018.

■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
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CROATIA

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Croatia is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent,
explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition
remnants (CMR), a legacy of four years of armed conﬂict
associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in
the early 1990s (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster
Munition Remnants report on Croatia for further information).

This represents a decrease compared to the 269km2 across
57 CHAs and 142km2 across 47 SHAs, as at the end of the
previous year. 5 A total of 49km2 was released through
clearance and 7.2km2 through survey in 2018. In addition,
survey in 2018 added 1.4km2 of previously unrecorded mined
areas to Croatia’s information management database. 6

At the end of 2018, Croatia had a total of more than 355km2
of mined area, excluding military areas.1 Of this total, 220km2
was CHA, while mines were suspected to cover a further
135km2 of SHA (see Table 1), collectively containing an
estimated 31,862 anti-personnel mines and 6,430 anti-vehicle
mines. 2

Eight of Croatia’s twenty-one counties are still mineaffected. Sisak-Moslavina and Lika-Senj are the most
heavily contaminated with anti-personnel mines, containing
an estimated 12,479 and 11,129 mines, respectively, and
accounting for 74% of the total number emplaced.7

A further 32.5km2 of conﬁrmed mined area exists in areas
under military control, said to contain 25,276 anti-personnel
mines and 1,040 anti-vehicle mines. More than 90% of this
mined area is across three military training sites, but a
barracks and three storage sites are also believed to be
contaminated. 3 The Demining Battalion of the Engineering
Regiment is responsible for the clearance of all military
facilities. 4

At the end of 2018, 95.7% of mine contamination was on
forested land; 4% on agricultural land; and 0.3% on other
areas (e.g. water, marshland, and coastal areas). 8 Of the
total 355.5km2 combined SHA and CHA, 60.12% is deﬁned as
Nature 2000 protected area.9 Much of the remaining mined
area is in mountainous areas and has not been accessed
for twenty years, so the terrain and conditions will pose
challenges to demining.10

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by county (at end 2018)*11
County
Karlovac
Lika-Senj
Osijek-Baranja
Požega-Slavonia
Split-Dalmatia

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

7

14.99

5

31.07

9

86.81

8

31.75

10

35.19

9

17.63

2

9.97

2

5.92

3

16.4

2

3.35

10

30.97

9

27.43

Šibenik-Knin

4

13.54

2

4.6

Zadar

7

12.44

8

13.46

Totals

52

220.31

45

135.21

Sisak-Moslavina

* A further 32.47km2 of mined area exists in areas under military control.12

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In August 2018, the Croatian government formally concluded
that some 54 government agencies, including CROMAC
and the OMA, were to be integrated within existing state
administration bodies. This was formally concluded through
two pieces of legislation enacted in December 2018 and which
entered into force on 1 January 2019.13 As a consequence of
these laws, CROMAC and OMA ceased to exist as separate
government entities and have been integrated into the
Ministry of Interior (MoI).14
Prior to 2019, both CROMAC (established in 1998 as the
umbrella organisation for mine action coordination),15 and the
OMA (created in 2012 as a government focal point for mine
action),16 had operated as independent entities.
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A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian
Parliament on 21 October 2015.17 While the 2015 Law, which
was initiated by the OMA with the text drafted by the Ministry
of Interior, marked an improvement in certain respects
(for instance, by permitting land release through technical
survey), there were concerns that the new law would impede
efﬁcient and effective mine action.18
Regarding accreditation, the Ministry of Interior now provides
three separate permits: approval for manual mine detection,
approval for mechanical mine detection, and approval for
operations by mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) detection
dogs. This replaces the former uniﬁed accreditation licence.19
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As an integral part of the MoI, the Civil Protection Directorate
implements the Gender Equality Act (Ofﬁcial Gazette 82/08
and 69/17), which establishes national guidelines for gender
equality, regulates against gender-based discrimination, and
creates equal opportunities for men and women, including
with regards to employment. 20

According to the national authorities, women, men, boys
and girls are all effectively consulted during survey and
community liaison. 21
No information was available from the national authorities
on the proportion of women employed in operational roles in
survey and clearance teams, or on the proportion of women
in managerial/supervisory level positions.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
For the purpose of information management, CROMAC
established a mine information system (MIS), which is said
to be compliant with the IMAS and customised to meet
CROMAC’s needs. The MIS uses databases and a geographic
information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated
information management system. 22 There are ongoing efforts
to improve the quality of mine-related data, as a part of the
regular activities of CROMAC’s survey personnel. 23

Croatia submits annual Article 7 transparency reports
and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation
at the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of
states parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Croatia has a national mine action strategy for 2009–19, which
was drafted by CROMAC with the agreement of concerned
ministries, the OMA, the National Protection and Rescue
Directorate, and local administration and self-administration
bodies whose responsibility covers regions with hazardous
areas. 24 The strategy, which was adopted by the Croatian
Parliament, includes among its main goals the completion of
mine clearance by 2019. 25 Elaboration of a new national mine
action strategy falls under the jurisdiction of the MoI, which
implies it could be a part of a nationwide strategy or the
national programme of the Civil Protection Directorate for
2019–26. 26
In 2018, Croatia submitted and was granted a seven-year
request to extend its APMBC Article 5 deadline from 1 March
2019 to 1 March 2026. In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension
request, Croatia stated it has prioritised the remaining mined
areas according to those which affect safety; pose barriers to
socio-economic development; and impact the environment in
other ways. Priorities at the operative level are elaborated in
annual demining action plans.27

Based on approved funding, CROMAC drafts annual
workplans, which are submitted to the responsible ministries
and other state bodies for comment and approval. 28 According
to its 2019 annual mine action plan, CROMAC planned to
release a total of 54.8km2 in 2019. 29
The Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment is
responsible for clearance of all military facilities. The
MoD submits its demining plan for military facilities to
CROMAC annually. 30
In 2018, Croatia discussed the issue of national survey and
clearance capacity to address mine and ERW contamination
discovered after the release of contaminated areas or post
completion (i.e. residual contamination), with the Geneva Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). CROMAC is working
with the GICHD on a case study entitled “national capacities
and residual contamination in Croatia”, which will document
progress that is being made on this issue. The integration of
CROMAC within the MoI, which took effect from January 2019,
is reported to be one of the ﬁrst steps to deal with residual risk
and liability and will elevate the issue within the MoI.31

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian
Parliament on 21 October 2015, incorporating developments
from the IMAS agreed upon at that time, and speciﬁcally those
relating to the use of technical survey to conﬁrm the presence
or absence of contamination.32 The 2015 law introduces a new
procedure for “supplementary general survey” (a form of
non-technical survey) and enables “exclusion” (i.e. reduction)
of SHAs through technical survey, which was not possible
under the previous law.33 The 2015 law has eliminated the
need for standing operating procedures (SoPs), as all aspects
of mine action are now clearly deﬁned.34 National mine action
standards are also encompassed within it.35

As clear from Table 3 on page 92, a signiﬁcant number of
CHAs were cleared in 2018 which were found to have no
contamination. Furthermore, other large, overly-inﬂated
CHAs were cleared with very few anti-personnel mines
discovered. This strongly suggests the need for further
evidence-based non-technical and technical survey prior to
full clearance, in order to conﬁrm direct evidence of mines
and task areas for clearance or else cancel or reduce mined
areas where no evidence of contamination exists.
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OPERATORS
As a result of conditions for earlier World Bank funding,
Croatia has an unusually commercialised mine action sector,
with almost all civil clearance conducted by local companies
competing for tenders. Much foreign donor funding is
tendered by ITF Enhancing Human Security, while CROMAC
manages tendering for the Croatian Government and
European Union (EU) money in accordance with the Law on
Public Procurement. The trust fund, “Croatia without Mines”,
raises money from private sources. 36
In 2018, 40 commercial companies were accredited to
conduct mine and CMR clearance. 37 Of this, 26 companies
were engaged in mine clearance operations in 2018 (see
Table 3). 38 NGOs are barred from competing for commercial
tenders as CROMAC views their subsidy by other funds as
unfair. 39 The Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment
is responsible for clearing all military facilities. 40
The state-owned enterprise, MUNGOS, was dissolved and its
assets auctioned during the ﬁrst half of 2018. 41 The Croatian
government decided to transfer MUNGOS employees to
CROMAC, to help enhance QC activities and increase
survey capacity. 42
CROMAC undertook all non-technical survey in 2018,
deploying nine survey personnel. In 2018, CROMAC had
approximately 40 deminers for technical survey, of whom
21 were previously employed by MUNGOS. 43
As barriers to entry into the mine clearance market are
relatively low, there is considerable fragmentation. Of the
26 companies demining in 2018, 12 cleared less than one
square kilometre (see Table 3). 44
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2014
needs assessment observed that in the preceding years
the number of demining companies in Croatia had grown,
but capacity overall had decreased. 45 A representative of
the Croatian Employers’ Association (CEA) – Humanitarian
Demining Association – reported that the 2015 Mine Action
Law had resulted in an increase in the number of demining
organisations in Croatia. 46 This rise is in part due to deminers
leaving employment and starting new ﬁrms, with the
2015 Law requiring a minimum of only ﬁve deminers per
company. 47 The current number of demining companies is
disproportionate to the number of deminers, and according
to a representative from CROMAC, it would be better to
have half the number of companies, but with each one being
properly managed. 48
Lower demining costs are said to make it more difﬁcult
for ﬁrms to make a proﬁt on clearance. Larger ﬁrms
claimed they were hampered by earlier over-investment in
mechanical assets and equipment based on assumptions
that funding would match the levels outlined in the 2009–19
mine action strategy. 49 A non-governmental organisation
(NGO) representative claimed that the quality of demining
suffers when the price of demining is low. 50 A director of a
commercial demining ﬁrm echoed this concern, saying that
lower prices put greater pressure on deminers to clear

more square metres a day. 51 The Humanitarian Demining
Association indicated that the 2015 Law on Mine Action
has resulted in more pressure on deminers to work longer
periods each year, as the new law does not set a minimum
wage. 52 In 2018, CROMAC reported that the average price of
demining operations had increased compared to the previous
year, which it believed is due to market stabilisation in the
mine action sector. 53
In 2014, CROMAC reported it had started issuing larger
value tenders, to allow companies to reduce the cost of their
operations, saying that this had provided an incentive for
companies to do better planning and to cooperate with each
other. 54 A CROMAC representative claimed that although
prices were lower, the larger tenders allowed continual
work, resulted in fewer stoppages, and enabled companies
to negotiate on better terms with hotels and services in their
project areas. 55
However, bigger contracts, some of which covered areas as
large as 5km2, resulted in companies needing to form large
consortia to compete for the new tenders. It was envisaged
that four or ﬁve companies would form each consortium, but
CROMAC has seen instances of 25 companies per consortium,
and even of 30 companies bidding together. 56 In some
instances, this has resulted in disputes over the allocation of
funds and areas assigned for clearance within the consortia,
often to the disadvantage of smaller organisations. 57 Very
large project tenders are also more complicated to draft and
demand more time and resources to administer and monitor. 58
The 2014 UNDP needs assessment recommended that
CROMAC consider longer-term contracting to maximise use
of operational assets in Croatia for both technical survey and
mine clearance. 59 However, CROMAC plans operations on a
yearly basis, in accordance with the annual and three-year
demining plans, which are set by the Government. CROMAC
is unable to award multi-year contracts because it has to
budget year-by-year, and in accordance with its own by-laws
it is not possible to contract and reserve funds for the next
year until the corresponding annual budget had been set. 60
UNDP also noted that the current contracting of deﬁned
polygons is suitable for mine clearance but would not be
conducive to effective technical survey, and called for a
new procedure to be drafted once the law is changed. 61
The Humanitarian Demining Association said it would be
preferable if, where possible, technical survey was already
undertaken on project tasks prior to tendering them, so that
commercial companies have as much information as possible
to accurately plan for the tender. 62
With the adoption of the new law, which enables use of
technical survey, CROMAC planned to target demining on
conﬁrmed mined areas and to conduct technical survey on
the remaining SHA. 63 As noted previously, CROMAC took on
employees from the dissolved national clearance operator
MUNGOS at the end of 2017, to help increase survey and
QC capacity. 64

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Clearance operations in Croatia are conducted manually, with mechanical assets, and using MDDs. In accordance with the 2015
Act on Mine Action and its prescribed demining methodologies, MDDs were used only for clearance and not technical survey. 65
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 56km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of
which over 48.8km2 was cleared by commercial demining
companies and 7.2km2 was released by CROMAC through
survey (4.9km2 reduced through technical survey and 2.3km2
cancelled through non-technical survey). 66 In addition,
a further 0.2km2 was cleared by the Croatian army on
military sites.

During land release operations a total of 1,095 anti-personnel
mines were destroyed (968 by CROMAC and 127 by the MoD
and MoI); 53 anti-vehicle mines (11 by CROMAC and 42 by the
MoD and MoI); 460,406 other items of UXO (1,409 by CROMAC
and 458,997 by the MoD and MoI). 67

SURVEY IN 2018
CROMAC released a total of 7.2km2 through survey in 2018, 68
of which 2.3km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey
and almost 4.9km2 was reduced through technical survey
(see Table 2). This is a small increase on the 6.6km2 released
through survey in 2017. 69

Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018 71
County

Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Karlovac

CROMAC

484,228

No data was available on survey activities of the MoD.

Požega-Slavonia

CROMAC

1,199,034

In addition, survey in 2018 resulted in the addition of
1.4km2 of previously unrecorded mined areas to Croatia’s
contamination in information management database.70

Split-Dalmatia

CROMAC

448

Sisak-Moslavina

CROMAC

1,347,716

Zadar

CROMAC

Total

1,865,646
4,897,072

CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, 49km2 of mined area was released through clearance
(48.8km2 by operators working under the direction of
CROMAC (see Table 3) and a further 0.2km2 by the Croatian
army). During land release operations a total of 1,095
anti-personnel mines were destroyed (968 by CROMAC
and 127 by the MoD and MoI); 53 anti-vehicle mines (11 by
CROMAC and 42 by the MoD and MoI); 460,406 other items of
UXO (1,409 by CROMAC and 458,997 by the MoD and MoI).72
The 49km2 of total mined area cleared in 2018 is a huge increase
on 2017, when 30.4km2 of mined area was released through
clearance (29.9km2 by operators working under the direction
of CROMAC and a further 0.2km2 by the Croatian army).

The increase in clearance output for 2018, compared to
the previous year, is in part because of a change in when
Croatia records clearance output, which is now only upon
ofﬁcial certiﬁcation. Consequently, several clearance projects
completed in 2017, only received certiﬁcation in 2018, thereby
increasing the 2018 clearance output. In addition, realisation
of €5.3 million in forest-related demining funds contracted in
2017 was delayed to 2018 (in addition to realisation of funds
already allocated to 2018), thereby increasing funding and
resulting clearance output in 2018.73
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Table 3: Mine clearance in 2018 74
Areas
cleared

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Karlovac

1

70,903

0

0

0

Capsula Interna

BP/Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavina

4

3,377,363

21

0

203

Cor

BP/Lika-Senj/Šibenik-Knin

5

1,531,484

46

0

5

Detektor

Lika-Senj

1

1,167,209

35

0

40

Diz-Eko

Šibenik-Knin

1

108,950

0

0

0

Dok-Ing

Karlovac/Lika-Senj/
Sisak-Moslavina/Šibenik-Knin

7

4,815,397

58

0

202

Eksplorator

Lika-Senj

1

1,541,424

40

0

0

Fas

Karlovac/Osijek-Baranja/
Sisak-Moslavina/Split-Dalmatia

4

484,522

19

0

2

Fossio

Lika-Senj

1

266,802

0

0

0

Harpija

Karlovac/Lika-Senj/
Požega-Slavonia

6

1,795,312

201

0

245

Heksogen

Osijek-Baranja/
Požega-Slavonia/Šibenik-Knin/
Sisak-Moslavina

5

4,612,619

116

8

3

Istraživač

Lika-Senj/Osijek-Baranja/
Požega-Slavonia/
Sisak-Moslavina/Osijek-Baranja

6

3,306,913

40

0

323

Istraživač-Benz

Zadar

1

71,610

0

0

0

Operator

County

Alfa

Kripton

Sisak-Moslavina

1

1,068

0

0

0

Maper

Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavin

2

663,538

0

0

0

MKA demining

Požega-Slavonia

1

199,558

0

0

0

Orkan

Sisak-Moslavina

1

147,605

7

0

0

Piper

Karlovac/Lika-Senj

8

4,131,492

1

0

0

Piper

Sisak-Moslavina

1

10,241

0

0

0

Piton

Lika-Senj/Požega-Slavonia/
Sisak-Moslavina

3

1,263,840

24

3

4

Rumital

Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavina/ Zadar

4

3,924,642

78

0

113

Tetrazen

Lika-Senj/Požega-Slavonia

3

1,078,242

86

0

0

Titan

Karlovac/Lika-Senj/
Požega-Slavonia/Sisak
Moslavina/ Šibenik-Knin

10

5,089,204

9

0

6

TNT7

Lika-Senj/Split-Dalmatia

3

982,852

0

0

0

Tornado

Lika-Senj/Šibenik-Knin

2

717,842

38

0

3

Zeleni kvadrat

Karlovac/Lika-Senj/
Sisak-Moslavina/ Šibenik-Knin
Zadar

10

7,465,555

149

0

260

92

48,826,187

968

11

1,409

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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through conducting more clearance (48.83km2) than planned
and less survey (7.2km2). In 2018, the largest proportion
of clearance was in areas planned for economic activities,
especially agricultural land, which the local and regional
governments have stated as their priority.79

According to its 2018 Annual Plan of Mines Action, CROMAC
had planned to release a total of 56.5km2 in 2018: 39.8km2
through clearance and 16.7km2 through technical survey and
supplementary general survey (during which control samples
are taken to determine the absence of mines and UXO). 78
Actual 2018 output was 56.03km2, although was achieved

The ﬁrst part of the Swiss-funded project “Demining and
Socio-Economic Integration”, focused on demining of
heavily-mined Kotar forest, started on 6 August 2018 and
ﬁnished on 17 September. In total, 1.74km2 of forest was
demined, with more than 3,500 mines and UXO discovered.
According to Croatia, this is the highest number of mines/
UXO found on a single mined area in the 20 years of Croatia’s
mine action programme. At the height of clearance, around
260 deminers from 26 companies were deployed on a
daily basis. 80

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
second extension (of seven years) granted by states parties
in 2018), Croatia is required to destroy all anti-personnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. It is unclear
if Croatia is on track to meet this deadline, as clearance of
military facilities appears to be falling behind schedule.
Croatia’s 2018 request for a further seven-year extension to
its Article 5 deadline, was submitted on “the basis that this is a
realistic but not unambitious amount of time given the extent of
the remaining problem and the human, material and ﬁnancial
resources available or expected, and the demining and survey
capacities currently available.”81 All relevant stakeholders
in the Croatian mine action system are reported to have
been involved in the analysis conducted as part of extension
request process, and the request has also been “veriﬁed by
the Croatian Government, which adopted the text of the 2nd
Request thus giving it much needed political weight.”82

While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March
2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will
be completed by the end of 2025, leaving only administrative/
paperwork issues to be settled in the beginning of 2026. 83
The remaining mined area to be addressed during the period
of Croatia’s second extension (1 March 2019 to 1 March 2026)
covers 387.3km2. Implementing the extension request will
require clearance of CHA (with mineﬁeld records), totalling
173.9 km2 (including 32km2 of mined area on MoD land);
clearance of CHA (with no mineﬁeld records, but for which
there is evidence of contamination), totalling 79.5km2; and
survey and release of SHA totalling 133.9km2 (see Table
4). 84 Survey will take place between 2019 and 2025, but any
resulting clearance required, expected to be completed by
the end of 2025. 85

Table 4: Planned demining output in km2 (2019–26) 86
Area
Mined area
(with mineﬁeld
records)

Authorised demining
organisations
Croatian Army (MoD area)
Totals

Mined area
(no records)
Survey
Sum totals

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

1 March
2026

Totals

29.4

28.7

28.3

24.7

20.8

10

0

0

141.9

5

5

5

6

6

5

0

0

32

34.4

33.7

33.3

30.7

26.8

15.0

0

0

173.9

6

6

8.2

12.5

16.3

19.5

11

0

79.5

14

14

14

14

15.5

23.7

38.7

0

133.9

54.4

53.7

55.5

57.2

58.6

58.2

49.7

0

387.3
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In addition, the Croatian army searched and cleared 185,416m2
of military facilities in 2018, during which 16 anti-personnel
mines and 12 items of UXO were found and destroyed.75 This
is a decrease on the 0.48km2 of military facilities cleared in
2017.76 As part of the continued “less arms, fewer tragedies”
programme, the Croatian Police (under the MoI), and in
partnership with the UNDP, also collected 111 anti-personnel
mines and 42 anti-vehicle mines, which were subsequently
transported to Croatian military facilities and destroyed.77

Given current capacity and the type of terrain and structure
of remaining mined area, Croatia expects to be able to
release roughly 56km2 per year over the next seven years. 87
For comparison, in the seven-year period 2011–17, a total
of 440km2 was released: 238km2 through clearance and
202km2 though survey, which included signiﬁcant amounts of
cancellation between 2011 and 2015. 88 Considering that most
of the remaining mined area is in more challenging terrain,
which will signiﬁcantly reduce the use of demining machinery,
the 253.4km2 of clearance (and 133.9km2 of survey) forecast
over the next seven years is very ambitious, without
increased capacity or improved efﬁciency.
Demining of military facilities/MoD area is conducted by
Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment, according to
plan made by the MoD. 89 The 5km2 to 6km2 per year planned
for in the 2018 extension request, is substantially more than
what the armed forces have cleared in recent years, and in
2018, the MoD cleared less than 0.2km2, which is even less
than the previous year.
Croatia reportedly has sufﬁcient mine action capacity for
release of remaining mined area on its territory by 2026 but
asserts that completion of Article 5 by 2026 is contingent on
securing the necessary budget.90 However, Croatia did not
reach its planned survey output in 2018, calling into question
whether it yet has sufﬁcient (and sufﬁciently capable)
survey capacity.
Funds from the EU have steadily increased over the last
few years, surpassing funds from the state budget in
recent years. CROMAC was in the ﬁnal stage of securing
funding from ESI funds (e.g. structural and cohesion funds,
cross-border cooperation fund), which gives it conﬁdence in
ﬁnancing the implementation of the land release goals set
out in the 2018 extension request. Croatia expected to also
secure funding from the public company “Croatian Forests”
(state budget of forest management positions).91

Croatia’s 2018 extension request stresses that as the
remaining areas to be cleared are mainly forested (89.7%),
there will be a signiﬁcant reduction in the use of demining
machinery, especially medium and heavy machines.95 Croatia
foresees that more use will be made of small, mobile
machines that can be efﬁciently transported and used in
affected areas, and that the resulting increase in manual
demining will reduce productivity and increase the cost of
clearance and technical survey. Use of mechanical assets
is also further restricted in the Nature 2000 protected
area.96 Croatia plans to research and develop methods and
techniques for the use of MDDs, especially for technical
survey operations, as a potentially more effective tool to
address mined areas in mountainous terrain.97 However, this
would require amendment to the 2015 demining law, which
does not currently permit use of MDDs for technical survey.
More than 196km2 of mined area in Croatia has been cleared
over the last ﬁve years (see Table 5). However, while annual
clearance output exceeds the targets in Croatia’s 2009–19
mine action strategy,98 the amount of land released through
survey each year has fallen well behind the yearly targets
outlined in the strategy. In order to ensure Croatia meets
its Article 5 obligation by 1 March 2026, CROMAC will need
to increase its capacity and implementation of survey
operations to more accurately determine the size and location
of contamination, and to cancel and reduce areas in which no
evidence of contamination is found.
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)

Since the APMBC entered into force for Croatia, more than
€727 million has been invested in humanitarian demining,
of which Croatia’s national budget had accounted for the
majority (€417 million) for the Article 5 implementation.92
Croatia estimates that the fulﬁlment of its Article 5
obligations will cost a total of a further €459 million.93 Funding
for the remainder of demining under the extension request is
expected to come from the national budget (52.3%); EU/ESI
funds (21.8%); EU/cross border cooperation with BiH (15.3%);
state budget of forest management positions (10.2%); and
from donations (0.4%).94

Year

Area cleared (km²)

2018

49.0

2017

30.4

2016

38.8

2015

40.6

2014

37.7

Total

196.5

1

APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.

8

2

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C. The contamination table in Croatia’s
Article 7 report contains a very small discrepancy in that the correct sum of
the total number of anti-personnel mines is 31,864.

9

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

10

Interview with Nataša Mateković, CROMAC, Sisak, 18 May 2017.

11

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C; and email from Slavenka Ivšić,
Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

12

Ibid.

13

Act on Amendments to the Act on Mine Action (OG No. 118/2018) and
Act on Amendment to the Act on the Government (OG No. 116/2018).

3

Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form C, Table 2 lists the number of anti-personnel
mines in military facilities as 25,276, but the sum of the table values totals
25,283. The total number of anti-vehicle mines is listed as 0 on the Article 7
report, but the sum of the table values totals 1,040.

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.

4

2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

5

Email from Nataša Mateković, Assistant Director and Head of Planning and
Analysis Department, CROMAC, 2 May 2017.

14

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019;
and CCM Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form J.

6

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

15

7

2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33; and Article 7 Report
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2022
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
No survey and clearance took place in Cyprus in 2018 following
a breakdown of settlement talks in July 2017 and a subsequent
reduction of the UN demining budget. No anti-personnel
mines are believed to remain in mineﬁelds on territory
under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus does not
exercise effective control over remaining anti-personnel mine
contaminated areas and, as at July 2019, settlement negotiations
between the two parties remained in a hiatus. The United
Nations (UN) Security Council, most recently in Resolution
2453 in January 2019, called on “both sides to allow access to

deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining mines in
Cyprus within the buffer zone”, and urged “both sides to extend
demining operations outside the buffer zone”.
In a positive development, a series of conﬁdence-building
measures agreed upon in February 2019 by the President of
Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader,
Mustafa Akinci, included the survey and clearance of 18
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), nine on each side of the
buffer zone. It is expected that this work will be completed by
February 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in northern Cyprus should comply with the UN
Security Council’s renewed call for access to all remaining mined areas within and outside the buffer zone.1

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None (Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DOK-ING were
last active in 2017)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■
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United Nations (UN)-supported mine action in Cyprus is
coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on
behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

STATES PARTIES

As no survey or clearance was conducted in 2018, the
estimate from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) data for contamination in Cyprus has not changed
since 2017. As at December 2018, 29 SHAs and 18 conﬁrmed
hazardous areas (CHAs) remained across Cyprus covering
just over 1.7km2. Contamination in these areas is either mixed
(anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines), of unknown nature,
or from anti-vehicle mines only (see Table 1). 2

Cyprus is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines. The island has been divided geographically and
politically since 1974 by what was once a heavily mined,
180km-long buffer zone, following Turkish Forces’ operations
in the north of the island. Mineﬁelds were laid by both the
Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces.
The exact extent of the remaining mine contamination across
the island is not known, and permission for UNFICYP to
access areas outside within and outside the buffer zone
remains limited. 3

Table 1: Mined area (at December 2018) 4
CHAs

Contamination

Area
(m2)

13

AV mines

418,543

15

Buffer Zone

4 AV mines (3 areas)
Unknown (1 area)

703,581

North of the buffer
zone (territory
controlled by Turkish
Cypriot authorities)

1

Location
South of the buffer
zone (territory
controlled by Cyprus)

Totals

18

Mixed

Area
(m2)

Total
SHA/CHA

Total area
(m2)

AV mines

299,898

28

718,441

0

N/A

N/A

4

703,581

170,493

14

Unknown

130,784

15

301,277

1,292,617

29

430,682

47

1,723,299

SHAs Contamination

TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

TURKISH CYPRIOT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY
IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

Cyprus has reported that no anti-personnel mines remain in
the mineﬁelds laid by the National Guard that are in territory
under its effective control. 5 In total, between becoming a state
party on 1 July 2003 and its original Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of 1 July 2013, Cyprus
released all 20 mined areas under its effective control. 6

The extent of mine contamination in areas controlled by
Turkish Forces is not known. However, Cyprus claimed in its
latest Article 7 transparency report (for 2018) that at least
20 mineﬁelds laid and maintained in the occupied areas by
Turkish Forces are yet to be cleared of anti-personnel mines,
of which one is situated within the buffer zone.10 According
to the UN, some military mine clearance appears to have
been conducted over most locations that are still recorded
as mineﬁelds.11

BUFFER ZONE
UNFICYP reported that, as at December 2018, three of the
mined areas in the buffer zone were contaminated with
anti-vehicle mines and the type of contamination in the fourth
mined area was unknown.7 In July 2018, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s report on the UN operation in Cyprus stated that
“the two sides have not begun clearance of the four known
remaining mineﬁelds in the buffer zone, of which three belong
to the National Guard and one to the Turkish forces. While the
Turkish Cypriot side has indicated that it would accept the
clearance of all four areas as a package, the Greek Cypriot
side maintains the position that its three mineﬁelds are
required to counter a perceived threat.”8 The Government
of Cyprus considers the three mineﬁelds contaminated with
anti-vehicle mines to be under its control and not within the
buffer zone.9

In addition, there is a mineﬁeld just north of the buffer zone
in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed
into the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015. UNFICYP has raised the
issue of clearance of this mineﬁeld with the Turkish forces and
has offered assistance in this regard.12 In 2017, a small area of
the Mammari mineﬁeld was cleared by a Croatian commercial
operator contracted by the Turkish Armed Forces.13
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are
coordinated by UNMAS on behalf of UNFICYP.14 In July 2016,
UNMAS became an integral component of UNFICYP, providing
its expertise in mine action planning and coordination,
quality assurance (QA) oversight, and management of mine
action information.15 UNMAS also provides assistance to the
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) to ensure safe access
to areas it conducts activities and to UNFICYP for explosive
ordnance disposal call-out tasks.16

UN-facilitated settlement talks between the two sides in
Crans-Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017, came to an abrupt
halt after 10 days, and, as at July 2019, the negotiations
remain in hiatus. Since the breakdown of these talks a
budget reduction resulted in the demobilisation of the UN
demining capacity on 20 November 2017. UNFICYP retains a
technical capacity and non-technical survey contingency to
conduct new activities when access is permitted.17 For the
2018–19 ﬁscal year, UNMAS was funded by the UN Nations
peacekeeping assessed budget for UNFICYP. The budget
covers technical capacity for planning and coordination;
awareness training for UNFICYP personnel; advocacy
activities; and data management of mine action information.18

GENDER
UNMAS is guided by the UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes and maintains gender parity in its stafﬁng
positions within the team deployed in Cyprus. Within UNFICYP, a dedicated Gender Advisor provides guidance on
mainstreaming gender in the Mission’s policies and activities. It is not known whether gender and diversity feature in the mine
action policies or strategies in territory controlled by Cyprus or in Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory in northern Cyprus.19

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
UNFICYP uses the IMSMA database. In 2017, a review and reconciliation of all electronic and hard-copy mineﬁeld database
documentation revealed that a number of SHAs had already been cleared and/or cancelled. However, due to capacity
limitations between 2011 and 2016, the information had not been removed from the database. The review resulted in the
removal of seven SHAs (totalling more than 950,000m2) from the database. 20
Cyprus submits annual Article 7 reports and has done since acceding to the APMBC in July 2003. Cyprus has submitted
three Article 5 deadline extension requests: in 2012, 2015, and 2018. Cyprus submitted the reports and extension requests
in a timely manner but the information provided is limited due to it not having effective control over the remaining
anti-personnel mined areas.

PLANNING AND TASKING
As at July 2019, it is not known if Cyprus or Turkish
Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus has a strategic
plan for survey and clearance of mined areas.
In February 2019, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) President Mustafa Akıncı and President of Cyprus,
Nicos Anastasiades, announced their commitment to follow
through with various conﬁdence-building measures including
the survey and cancellation and/or reduction of 18 SHAs, nine
on each side of the island, with a view to working towards a
mine-free Cyprus. 21 With support from UNFICYP and UNMAS
work began in May 2019 with an expected completion date
of February 2020. 22 No mine or other ERW contamination
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is expected to be found in these SHAs but to ensure due
diligence they will be subject to non-technical survey and,
where necessary, technical survey. The non-technical survey
will be conducted by UNMAS staff, and a representative
from UNFICYP and from either the Turkish Cypriot Security
Force (TCSF) or the Greek Cypriot National Guard (NG). It is
expected that technical survey will only be necessary in the
southern SHAs and will be conducted by the NG with site
visits by the UNMAS Chief of Operations. 23

STATES PARTIES

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

All UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are said
to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). 24 In 2016, to guide UN operations,
UNMAS updated the national technical standards and
guidelines that are used in UNFICYP to reﬂect current best
practice and to ensure the highest standards are applied for
UNFICYP clearance operations. 25

No operators were active in 2018. In previous years, survey
and clearance in the buffer zone has been carried out by
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) on behalf of UNMAS and
UNFICYP. 26 In 2017, the Turkish Armed Forces contracted
DOK-ING to conduct clearance, and MAG, to conduct quality
assurance of demining in the Mammari mineﬁeld.27 No further
clearance was conducted in 2018, nor was any planned for
2019 as the TCSF has not agreed to any further survey or
clearance on this mineﬁeld. 28

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No survey or clearance took place in Cyprus in 2018.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CYPRUS: 1 JULY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2019
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

2

Area cleared (m )

2018

0

2017

22,000

2016

6,772

2015

18,538

2014

7,032

Total

54,342

Cyprus has reported clearing all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas that it accepted were under its control within
ten years of becoming a state party, namely by 1 July 2013. In
2012, Cyprus submitted the ﬁrst of its three Article 5 deadline
extension requests, the reason for which has remained the
same throughout, namely that Cyprus does not have effective
control over remaining contaminated areas. 29 According to the
website of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus in Geneva, “Once
Turkey ceases the military occupation of Cyprus and returns
control of the occupied areas under proper conditions to the
authorities of the Republic, they [the Republic of Cyprus] will
be able to assume full responsibility and compliance with the
provisions of Article 5 for the entire sovereign territory of the
Republic of Cyprus.”30

Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March
2014. In 2013, states parties granted Turkey an eight-year
extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in
Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for
clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus. 31 The
last settlement talks between the two sides were held in
June and July 2017 in Switzerland but broke down after ten
days. 32 As at July 2019, the settlement talks had not resumed,
although in February 2019 a number of conﬁdence-building
measures were agreed between the two sides, one of which
was the clearance of 18 SHAs which is due to be completed
by February 2020. 33
The UN Security Council, most recently in January 2019, has
called on both sides to facilitate clearance of all remaining
mined areas on the island. 34 The Council noted with regret
“that the sides are withholding access to the remaining
mineﬁelds in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus
must continue”. The Council also noted “the continued danger
posed by mines in Cyprus”, referring to “proposals and
discussions as well as positive initiatives on demining”, and
urging “rapid agreement on facilitating the recommencement
of demining operations and clearance of the remaining
mineﬁelds”. 35 The Council called on “both sides to allow
access to deminers and to facilitate the removal of the
remaining mines in Cyprus within the buffer zone”, and
urged “both sides to extend demining operations outside
the buffer zone”. 36
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s mine action
programme’s land release output remained relatively static
in 2018, though with a signiﬁcant decrease in the number of
anti-personnel mines found and destroyed compared to the
previous year. It remains on track to meet its Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline
by 2021. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
and international mine action operators believe that the DRC
could complete clearance by end 2020 with existing capacity
and sufﬁcient funding, as projected in its latest strategic plan.
This is, though, considerably after the 2016 deadline set out in
its 2012–16 national mine action strategy.1

The national mine action programme continued to be
hampered by a range of information management challenges
in 2018, and the ability of the authorities to produce a clear
and accurate estimate of remaining mine contamination
remained questionable. The inexperience of many national
survey teams, the incorrect recording of items of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) as mined areas, and a lack of rigorous quality
assurance of survey reports, give cause for concern. Greater
scrutiny and support from international operators to ensure
the DRC successfully meets its Article 5 obligations are
needed at this critical time, when the end is nearly in sight
after almost two decades of mine action in the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The DRC should establish a realistic and accurate understanding of the remaining mine contamination,
including through re-survey of all remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), many of which are thought
to be inaccurate or outdated.

■

Survey in Aru and Dungu territories should be prioritised as soon as security permits in order to gain a fully
comprehensive picture of the remaining challenge.

■

The DRC should detail how it will meet its clearance obligations by its extended Article 5 deadline of
1 January 2021.

■

Signiﬁcant efforts should be made to ensure the national mine action database is accurate and effectively
managed and resourced by the national authorities. Updated information should be regularly shared with
all mine action stakeholders.
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■

Mine action data should be recorded and reported according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
land release terminology.

■

The Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), should enhance collaboration with, and support the work
of, international mine action organisations.

■

Focus should also be placed on building national capacity to address contamination following the exit of
international operators.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Performance Commentary

5

The latest estimate of contamination almost certainly exaggerates the true extent of the
mine problem. It is nonetheless a very light problem.

6

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) had provided capacity-building support
to the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM) for its operations for several years. The
transfer of responsibility for coordinating mine action activities was, in theory, completed
in early 2016. In 2018, however, UNMAS continued to provide guidance and operational
support to CCLAM.

6

The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 includes a section on gender. It
stipulates that all activities of the mine action programme, particularly those related
to risk education and victim assistance, must reﬂect the different needs of individuals
according to age and gender groups, in a non-discriminatory manner.

4

CCLAM assumed responsibility from UNMAS for information management in January
2016. Despite many years of capacity-building support from UNMAS, and again from
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2018, serious concerns persisted over the quality of
the database and CCLAM’s capacity and resources to manage it. Gaps in data, a lack of
maintenance, a lack of capacity to extract and share information from the database, and
the lack of frequent coordination meetings with operators, all remained evident in 2018.

5

The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 focuses on fulﬁlling the DRC’s
APMBC Article 5 obligations by 2020, one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline.
Despite this, the DRC has not submitted an operational workplan containing clear
milestones for completion of survey and clearance obligations under its extended Article
5 deadline.

5

National Technical Standards and Guidelines were revised during 2018, with the main
areas of revisions made to standards on demining techniques and the occupational safety
of deminers.

4

UNMAS and international operators believe that the DRC could complete clearance by
end 2020 with existing capacity and sufﬁcient funding. This is, though, considerably after
the 2016 deadline set out in its 2012–16 national mine action strategy.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.9

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

National NGOs conduct non-technical survey and
mine risk education

■
■

DanChurchAid (DCA)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (operations ended in 2018)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
The Development Initiative (TDI)

OTHER ACTORS
■

102 Clearing the Mines 2019

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

The DRC is affected by anti-personnel mines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW), a result of armed conﬂict involving
neighbouring states, militias, and armed opposition groups,
which have increased since the late 1990s. Its remaining
contamination challenge is primarily that of ERW; mine
contamination appears limited with anti-personnel mines
no longer found in signiﬁcant numbers. Areas suspected to
contain anti-personnel mines often proved instead to contain
UXO, abandoned ordnance (AXO), or small arms ammunition. 2

However, NPA reported that it was likely that more explosive
ordnance, potentially including landmines, would be found
in the eastern parts of the country (including Bas Ulele,
Haut Ulele, Ituri, Lubero, and North Kivu provinces) due
to the intensity and duration of armed conﬂicts affecting
those regions. NPA said these areas would be priorities for
operations on the basis of humanitarian impact, and was still
attempting to secure resources for expanding the re-survey
activities as at June 2019. 8

Throughout 2018, the DRC’s national mine action programme
continued to suffer from a lack of coordination between
stakeholders and critical information management issues. Its
ability to produce a clear and accurate estimate of remaining
mine contamination from the national database remained
open to question. According to CCLAM, as at 31 March 2019,
a total of 53 mined areas with a total size of 741,559m2
remained to be addressed across Bas-Uele, Ituri, Kasaï,
Lomami, Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Ubangi,
South Ubangi, Tanganyika, Tshopo, and Tshuapa provinces. 3

The DRC’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2019 set out among its objectives completion of survey
of mine and ERW contamination in Aru and Dungu territories
by the middle of 2018. While this objective was not met, as at
mid 2019, survey was ﬁnally underway in Aru territory in Ituri
province.9 CCLAM informed Mine Action Review in July 2019
that lack of funding was the only obstacle to commencing
survey in Dungu territory; it reported that there was no
evidence of mines having been used in recent conﬂicts in
the territory.10

Previously, according to ﬁgures provided by UNMAS, at the
end of 2017, a total of 36 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
and SHAs with a total size of 502,591m2 remained to be
released. 4 According to CCLAM, nine additional mined areas
with a size of close to 170,000m2 were identiﬁed in 2018 in
North Ubangi, South Ubangi, Tanganyika, Kasaï, Maniema,
and Tshopo provinces. 5

CCLAM likewise conﬁrmed that there were no reports of
new use of anti-personnel mines in 2018, including mines
of an improvised nature, but said there were reports of use
of other improvised explosive devices by non-state armed
actors in the north-east of the country, in Goma and Beni in
North Kivu province.11

On request of the CCLAM, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
agreed to assist with a re-survey of areas remaining in
the national database. 6 In 2018, NPA discussed with Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) and DanChurchAid (DCA) the
possibility of a joint national resurvey of the SHAs remaining
in the country as reported by CCLAM. In May 2019, NPA
reported that it had started the re-survey on its own, and
that, as at mid June, a total of 115,000m2 had been cancelled
in South Ubangi province. It considered this to be evidence
that many of the remaining SHAs will be either discredited or
at least signiﬁcantly reduced in size.7

EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
Of the DRC’s considerable contamination from ERW as a
result of years of conﬂict involving neighbouring states,
militias, and rebel groups, a small amount of cluster munition
remnant contamination remained to be addressed as at July
2019 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants 2019 report on the DRC for further information).
Successive conﬂicts have also left the country with signiﬁcant
quantities of AXO.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
CCLAM was established in 2012 with support from the UN
Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and UNMAS.12
Subsequently, UNMAS provided capacity-building support to
CCLAM for its operations until the transfer of responsibility
for coordinating mine action activities to CCLAM was
completed in early 2016.13 In 2018, however, UNMAS continued
to provide guidance and operational support to CCLAM.14
Law 11/007 of 9 July 2011 underpins the national mine
action programme.15

Although CCLAM took over responsibility from UNMAS
as the national focal point for demining in early 2016, its
capacity to carry out accreditation, issue task orders, and
report remained very limited in 2018. Its lack of capacity
to manage an up-to-date national database and carry out
quality management activities continued to be highlighted
by operators as critical areas of concern.18 In 2018, NPA
continued its support to develop CCLAM’s capacity through
training and in-kind assistance.19

Previously, UNMACC, established in 2002 by UNMAS,
coordinated mine action operations through ofﬁces in the
capital, Kinshasa, and in Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani,
and Mbandaka. UNMACC was part of the UN Stabilization
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). In accordance with
Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014), humanitarian mine
action was removed from MONUSCO’s mandate.16 In 2018,
UNMAS was assisting MONUSCO operations under the
Mission’s protection of civilians’ mandate.17

CCLAM reported that in 2018, as in previous years, the
Government of the DRC provided more than US$530,000
for its operating expenses. The government did not, though,
provide any funding for mine action operations. CCLAM
reported that priorities for the national programme in 2019
were improving the national database, conducting a new
national contamination survey, organising a workshop
to develop an annual workplan, and capacity building
of operational staff.20 Key challenges, it said, included a
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lack of funding; the withdrawal of mine action operators;
the availability of good training of CCLAM staff to ensure
coordination and quality management; a lack of adequate
training for surveyors; and the absence of state budget to
cover salaries of CCLAM staff. 21
In 2018, operators and UNMAS reiterated concerns over
a continuing decline in funding for mine action in the DRC.

They reported that with the deteriorating political climate in
the country, donors were reluctant to support mine action,
prioritising instead support to address other higher-impact
humanitarian crises such as cholera and yellow fever,
ﬂooding, and internally displaced persons. 22 In 2019, this was
compounded by new humanitarian crises from Ebola and
ongoing armed conﬂicts.

GENDER
The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 includes
a section on gender. It stipulates that all activities of the mine
action programme, particularly those related to risk education
and victim assistance, must reﬂect the different needs of
individuals according to age and gender groups, in a
non-discriminatory manner. It also states that the principles
of non-discrimination against women as set out in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution
1325 (2000) are to be respected, ensuring that women are
involved in all essential stages of mine action (planning,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation), and that activities
take into account the special needs of women and girls.23
According to CCLAM, mine action survey teams in 2018 were
gender balanced, and efforts were undertaken to ensure
that all community groups, including women and children,
were consulted. It also noted, however, the ongoing need for
awareness-raising within certain communities on gender

equality as local customs can discriminate against women
undertaking certain categories of work. CCLAM reported
that approximately 30% of operational staff in survey and
clearance teams were female in 2019, but only around 7%
of managerial or supervisory positions were held by women,
reportedly due in part to barriers presented by local customs
about women’s employment roles. 24
NPA’s demining staff were 50% female in 2018. It reported
that it was able to hire ﬁve women in operational roles
(four deminers and one medic) during the year, following
an awareness-raising seminar on women’s opportunities
in mine action and demining training. It offered ﬂexible
working hours for parents (especially women) and
encouraged women to enrol in training programmes
aimed at improving their chances for managerial positions.
An internal women’s network was formed as a subset of
the programme’s staff union. 25

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CCLAM assumed responsibility from UNMAS for information
management in January 2016. Subsequently, despite many
years of capacity-building support from UNMAS, and again
from NPA in 2018, serious concerns persisted over the quality
of the database and CCLAM’s capacity and resources to
manage it. Gaps in the data, a lack of maintenance, a lack of
capacity to extract and share information from the database,
and the absence of coordination meetings with operators, all
remained evident in 2018. 26
In 2019, NPA elaborated that ongoing information
management issues included a lack of reporting according
to land release terminology, the misreporting of items of
UXO as mines (resulting in new areas of contamination being
incorrectly added to the database as mined areas), and a lack
of veriﬁcation of incoming reports. 27
NPA held refresher training courses on information
management and use of the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and geographic
information system (GIS) for CCLAM staff during 2018. It
reported that while CCLAM had competent technical staff, its
limited administrative and ﬁnancial resources continued to
adversely affect its ability to maintain the database and that,
as a consequence, a system of parallel reporting to CCLAM
and UNMAS had developed. 28
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In 2018 and the ﬁrst half of 2019, UNMAS reported that,
through extra budgetary funds, it provided assistance to
CCLAM to develop a workplan on information management,
including provision of IT equipment and support in assessing
needs based on the DRC’s mine action strategic priorities. 29
In July 2019, the CCLAM informed Mine Action Review that
progress had been made in 2018 to separate recording and
reporting of mines from ERW in the national database. It
said that improvements to information management could
be made by standardising reporting forms with operators
and through the use of better software. 30 It also said that
further capacity-building support for managing the national
database would be welcomed, along with support to improve
communication with operators and coordination meetings. 31

STATES PARTIES

The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 focuses
on fulﬁlling the DRC’s APMBC Article 5 obligations by 2020,
one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline. 32 The strategy
contains the following three strategic pillars: effective and
efﬁcient management of the explosive threat; ensuring the
national programme has the capacity to manage residual
contamination in a sustainable manner; and that the legal
framework of the mine action programme is strengthened
through the adoption of national laws and other implementing
measures and adherence to relevant treaties. 33
The DRC’s previous national mine action strategy for 2012–16
had set the goal of clearing all areas contaminated with
anti-personnel mines or unexploded submunitions by the
end of 2016. 34 The DRC failed to meet these goals.
Despite the positive development of the development
and adoption of the DRC’s 2018–19 national mine action
strategy, the DRC has not submitted an operational workplan

containing clear milestones for completion of survey and
clearance obligations under its extended Article 5 deadline
of 1 January 2021. The DRC was requested to provide such
a workplan by 30 April 2015, as part of the states parties’
decision to approve the DRC’s latest (third) Article 5 deadline
extension; however, as at July 2019, it had yet to do so. 35
NPA informed Mine Action Review that it operates on
a province-by-province approach to tasks, rather than
prioritising clearance of one type of contamination over
another, as remaining hazardous areas are sparsely located
and more efﬁciently addressed by geographic location. 36 As
noted above, it raised concerns, however, about wasting
resources in non-contaminated areas due to misreporting in
the database, particularly the addition of new mined areas
without robust evidence of the presence of anti-personnel
mines, and a lack of an accurate overview of the remaining
contaminated areas to be addressed. 37

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In June 2019, CCLAM reported that the DRC’s National
Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) had been
revised during 2018, with the main areas of revisions made
to standards on demining techniques and safety of deminers
in the workplace. 38
In 2018 and the ﬁrst half of 2019, UNMAS reported providing
technical and logistical support to CCLAM on monitoring,
coordinating, and assessing quality of activities conducted
by mine action implementing partners. 39

OPERATORS
Four international operators carried out mine action
operations in the DRC in 2018: non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) DCA, MAG, and NPA, and commercial
operator, The Development Institute (TDI). 40 A number of
national operators also carried out non-technical survey
and risk education activities during the year.
In 2018, NPA’s teams focused on manual clearance, explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, non-technical survey,
and risk education in partnership with a local organisation
APPEI, and impact assessment in the north-west of the DRC
in North and South Ubangi provinces. It deployed three
operational teams, which carried out clearance and EOD
spot tasks. 41
MAG ended its demining in the DRC in August 2018 following
completion of a Netherlands-funded clearance project
under which it deployed two multi-task teams (MTTs) and
two community liaison teams in North and South Ubangi

provinces. MAG reported that while the clearance project
had been successful, overcoming the many challenges and
complexities of working in the DRC, combined with the lack
of anti-personnel mines being discovered, contributed to
making further demining operations in the DRC a lower
priority for the allocation of global resources. Following
discussions with NPA and DCA, it was agreed that MAG
would cease its demining operations, but that NPA would
continue survey and clearance in the north and north-west
of the country, while DCA would continue to operate in the
central-eastern areas. 42 MAG has also pledged to continue
to work together with CCLAM, NPA, DCA, and UNMAS to
develop a strategy to address residual contamination in
the DRC, and said it was committed to working closely with
CCLAM and to ﬁnding resources to carry out necessary
activities in the future. 43
UNMAS continued to contract TDI in support of MONUSCO
operations in 2018. It deployed three six-person MTTs to
conduct EOD spot tasks in areas where MONUSCO was
operational and also to carry out destruction of obsolete
weapons and ammunition held by the DRC armed forces.
In 2018, through extra budgetary funds, UNMAS also
contracted national organisations to conduct risk education
to complement TDI’s activities. 44
Humanity and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI)
and its local partner AFRILAM, ceased mine action operations
in 2017. 45

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Only manual mine clearance is conducted in the DRC.
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
According to the CCLAM, in January 2018 to end March
2019, a total of 422,461m2 of contaminated area was cleared
(275,700m2 in 2018 and a further 146,761m2 in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2019), along with a total of 457 spot tasks. It reported that
as a result, a total of 13 mines were destroyed (11 PMA2
anti-personnel mines and 2 anti-vehicle mines), along with
a total of 7,295 items of ERW. 46 Clearance operations only
involved the destruction of ﬁve anti-personnel mines but
there may have been others destroyed in spot tasks.

SURVEY IN 2018
According to CCLAM, a total of 16,936m2 was released
through survey in 2018, all by DCA in Tshopo province. This
included a total of 15,416m2 cancelled through non-technical
survey and 1,520m2 reduced through technical survey. 47 As
noted above, according to CCLAM, nine additional mined
areas with a size of close to 170,000m2 were also discovered
in 2018 in North Ubangi, South Ubangi, Tanganyika, Kasaï,
Maniema, and Tshopo provinces. 48
This compared to 2017, when operators cancelled a total of
nearly 444,300m2 through non-technical survey and reduced
a further 192,500m2 of anti-personnel mined area through
technical survey, while conﬁrming just under 264,500m2 as
mined. 49 CCLAM reported that the reason for the signiﬁcant
decrease in survey output in 2018 was the reduction in the
number of operators and operational capacity. 50

According to CCLAM, TDI carried out non-technical survey
in Ituri province in 2018, which, as at June 2019, was still
underway with results yet to be reported. 51 CCLAM also
reported that a series of targeted surveys were conducted
in Shabunda territory, South Kivu province. CCLAM said
it had become clear that the initial survey of mine and
ERW contamination in the DRC had “had many ﬂaws and
underestimated the size of certain areas”. 52 UNMAS has
reported it conducted surveys in Aru territory in March and
April 2019 with survey reports submitted to CCLAM in early
May 2019. 53
As reported above, in the ﬁrst half of 2019, NPA initiated
re-survey activities on its own, and as at mid June, had
cancelled a total of 115,000m2 in South Ubangi province, in
the north-west of the DRC. It expects that many remaining
SHAs will be discredited or signiﬁcantly reduced in size
following new survey. 54

CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of 275,700m2 was reportedly released through
clearance in 2018, with the destruction of 5 anti-personnel
mines and 1 anti-vehicle mine, along with 6,117 items of
UXO/AXO. 55
Despite the area released through clearance remaining
comparable with that in 2017, there was a considerable drop
in the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed
in 2018, compared to 2017 when a total of just over 226,000m2
was reportedly released through clearance, with the
destruction of 32 anti-personnel mines and 3,173 items
of UXO. 56

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2018 57
Province

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

North Ubangi

NPA

4

7,718

0

0

South Ubangi

NPA

1

750

0

0

South Ubangi

MAG

1

69,900

0

0

Tshopo

DCA

2

197,332

5

1

8

275,700

5

1

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE DRC: 1 NOVEMBER 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

2

Area cleared (m )

2018

275,700

2017

226,025

2016

211,293

2015

314,562

2014

225,484

Total

1,253,064

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
six-year extension granted by states parties in June 2014),
the DRC is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 January 2021. It appears to be
on track to meet this deadline. As stated above, according
to its National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–19, the DRC
expects to complete its Article 5 obligations by 2020, one
year ahead of its 2021 deadline.
Optimistically, in July 2019, CCLAM informed Mine Action
Review that it was possible that the DRC could complete mine
clearance even during 2019, with sufﬁcient funding. 58 In 2018,
operators and UNMAS conﬁrmed that it is likely that the DRC
can clear all mined areas on its territory, with existing mine
action capacity and the maintenance of sufﬁcient funding,
before its extended Article 5 deadline of 1 January 2021. 59

The DRC’s ﬁrst Article 5 deadline request in 2011 largely
blamed poor survey by demining operators for the failure to
meet its deadline, though poor management and insufﬁcient
national ownership of the programme were also major
factors. 60 In April 2014, the DRC submitted a second request
to extend its Article 5 deadline starting in January 2015. 61
The purpose of its current (second) Article 5 deadline
extension is to “(a) conduct technical surveys and clear the
130 identiﬁed mined areas; and (b) conduct non-technical and
technical surveys as well as clear and/or release areas in the
territories of Aru and Dungu in the Orientale province”. 62 The
extension request estimated that on average 0.21km2 would
be cleared each year. 63
The DRC has reported that challenges for implementing its
current extension request plan milestones include funding
and logistics, security, geography, and climate, including
dense vegetation and heavy rainy seasons. 64 Operators
attributed the DRC’s inability to ﬁnish clearance by the end
of 2016, as originally planned, to a lack of access and the
remote, difﬁcult terrain of remaining areas, and additional
concerns over sustained funding, upcoming elections, and
deteriorating security in certain areas.
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Email from Steven Harrop, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 23 April 2018; JeanDenis Larsen, Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 5 March 2018;
Guillaume Zerr, Programme Director DRC, Humanity and Inclusion (formerly
Handicap International, HI), 24 May 2018; and Bill Marsden, Regional Director,
East and Southern Africa, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 11 May 2018.

36

Skype interview with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 April 2019; and email,
24 May 2019.

37

Ibid.

38

Ibid.

2

Email from Pehr Lodhammar, UNMAS, 5 April 2017.

39

Email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 20 June 2019.

3

Article 7 Report (for 2018), pp. 2–6.

40

4

Email from Steven Harrop, UNMAS, 23 April 2018.

Email from Julien Kempeneers, Deputy Desk Ofﬁcer, Mine Action Department,
HI, 14 April 2016.

5

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, Coordinator, CCLAM, 10 July 2019;
and Article 7 Report (for 2018), p. 8.

41

Skype interview with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 April 2019; and email,
24 May 2019.

6

Statement of DRC, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018; and Article 7
Report (for 2017), Form D, p. 12. According to the DRC’s latest Article 7 report,
as at 17 April 2018, a total of 56 areas with a size of 535,359m2 remained to be
addressed: 27 mined areas in the nine provinces identiﬁed in its initial survey
and 29 newly identiﬁed mined areas. The total of 56 areas included 16 areas
with a total size of 286,640m2 and 15 areas with a size yet to be determined.

42

Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 20 May 2019. MAG reported that its arms
management and destruction operations continued in the DRC.

1

7

Skype interview with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 April 2019; and emails,
24 May and 26 June 2019.

8

Ibid.

9

Emails from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 3 June and 10 July 2019.

10

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 10 July 2019.
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Ibid.

12

Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Michelle Healy,
UNMACC, 29 April 2013.
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UNMAS, “About UNMAS Support of One UN and the GODRC”, March 2016, at:
bit.ly/2Wtyl0A.

14
15

UNMAS, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Democratic Republic of Congo,
2019”, at: bit.ly/2wHkvIt.
Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 3 June 2019.

43

Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 20 May 2019.

44

Emails from Philippe Renard, Head of Programme, UNMAS, 20 May 2019;
and Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 20 June 2019.

45

Email from Guillaume Zerr, HI, 24 May 2018.
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Article 7 Report (for 2018), pp. 6–7 and 18.
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Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 10 July 2019.

48

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, Coordinator, CCLAM, 10 July 2019;
and Article 7 Report (for 2018), p.8.

49

Emails from Steven Harrop, UNMAS, 23 April 2018; Jean-Denis Larsen,
NPA, 5 March 2018; Guillaume Zerr, HI, 24 May and 30 August 2018; and
Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2018.

50

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 10 July 2019.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Email from Daniella Marelli, UNMAS, 10 September 2019.
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Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 10 July 2019.
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Article 7 Report (for 2018), pp. 6–7 and 18.
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Emails from Steven Harrop, UNMAS, 23 April 2018; Jean-Denis Larsen,
NPA, 5 March 2018; Guillaume Zerr, HI, 24 May 2018; Gerrard Kerrien, MAG,
28 August and 30 August 2018; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2018.
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Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 10 July 2019 ; and Article
7 Report (for 2018), pp. 6-7, and 18. Different ﬁgures were provided by the
operators: MAG reported clearing 130,285m2 and destroying 1 AV mine and
71 ERW in 8 months of 2018 before closing operations. NPA reported clearing
1 area in North Ubangi province with a size of 1,618m2 and destroying 1 AP
Mine and 1AV Mine during the year
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UN Security Council Resolution 2147, 28 March 2014; and UNMAS,
“DRC Overview”, updated April 2014, at: bit.ly/31d6IYm.
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UNMAS, “Support to one UN and the GO of DRC”, March 2018, at: bit.
ly/31d6IYm; and email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 20 June 2019.

18

Emails from Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 5 March 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG,
11 May 2018; and Guillaume Zerr, Humanity and Inclusion, 24 May 2018.
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Skype interview with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 April 2019; and email,
24 May 2019.
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Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 3 June 2019.
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Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 10 July 2019.
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ECUADOR

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2022
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

80,238KM

2

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

14,068M

2

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

Area of Land Released (m2)

(GOVERNMENT
ESTIMATE)

2017
2018

16,000

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

LIGHT,

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

18,000

15,476

14,000

14,068
12,000

0.02

10,000
8,000

7,332

6,000
4,000
2,000

2,539
0.0

263

Clearance

Technical
Survey

0.0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Ecuador submitted an updated Action Plan
2019–2022 and the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational
Humanitarian Demining Unit completed clearance of the
Tiwinza square kilometre. Ecuador continues to provide
contradictory ﬁgures for outstanding mine contamination,
survey, and clearance across its reports and statements.

In 2018, it cleared only 14,068m2, a small decline from the
previous year’s output. Ecuador did not meet its land release
targets for 2018 and, as at April 2019, was not on track to
meet its targets for 2019. Ecuador is at risk of not completing
mine clearance by its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) Article 5 deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Ecuador should ensure it is deploying its limited resources in the most efﬁcient manner and that it conducts
non-technical and technical survey, as necessary, before full clearance.

■

Ecuador should further assess whether dogs could also be deployed for survey and clearance.

■

Ecuador should make the necessary improvements to its information management systems to ensure it
reports accurately on mine contamination, survey, and clearance.

■

In seeking international support, Ecuador should provide a more detailed breakdown of its ﬁnancial
requirements, including any national contributions from the government.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

In 2018, Ecuador reported 80,230m2 of outstanding mine contamination, a ﬁgure
established through non-technical and technical survey. Lack of consistency across
reporting periods, though, calls into question its accuracy.

5

There is clarity of roles and responsibilities at a national level and Ecuador has necessary
demining infrastructure in place. A decrease in national funding has left the national
programme without sufﬁcient resources to conduct operations.

4

Ecuador has a small proportion of women employed in demining but the approach to
gender mainstreaming seems superﬁcial. All community members are consulted during
liaison activities, but it is unclear how this features in planning, tasking, and prioritisation.

4

Information management continues to be problematic with inconsistent and inaccurate
ﬁgures for mine contamination, survey and clearance within reports and across
reporting periods.

6

Ecuador submitted an Action Plan for 2019–22 with annual land release targets that
it should be able to reach but which are resource dependent. It did not meet the land
release targets set in its annual workplan for 2018 and is not on track to meet its
targets for 2019.

6

Ecuador claims it conducts survey and clearance according to the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). All clearance is conducted by manual deminers as the terrain
is deemed unsuitable for machines while dogs are used only for quality control.

3

Ecuador’s land release outputs fell in 2018 and it is on track to fall again in 2019. It is
unclear whether Ecuador will meet its long extended Article 5 deadline despite having
only a small amount of contamination.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

6

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.9

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI)
Army Corps of Engineers (CEE)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

CEE Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI”
General Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD)
Joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian
Demining Unit
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■

None

STATES PARTIES

In its latest Article 7 report, Ecuador reported that, as at
December 2018, it had 80,230m2 of anti-personnel mine
contamination across 34 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
and 26 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the province of
Zamora Chinchipe (see Table 1). Contamination is believed
to comprise a total of 3,260 mines.1 Ecuador has stated that
it applies non-technical survey and, if necessary, technical
survey to mined areas that have been identiﬁed through,
for example, an emergency survey, military archives, or
information from the local population. 2

Ecuador’s reporting of contamination has often been
inconsistent. For instance, the ﬁgure given for anti-personnel
mine contamination in Zamora Chinchipe province in its
2017 Article 5 deadline extension request was 65,006m2,
but this rose without explanation to 89,874m2 in its Article 7
transparency report for 2017. 3
Ecuador’s contamination results from its 1995 border conﬂict
with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is
the Condor mountain range (Cordillera del Condor) which
was at the centre of the dispute.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province and district (at December 2018) 4
Province

District

Zamora
Chinchipe

Chinchipe
Yanzatza
Centinela del Condor

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total CHA/SHA

1

7,009

0

0

1

7,009

3

6,565

0

0

3

6,565

2

130

0

0

2

130

CHAs

Total area (m2)

Nangaritza

16

4,827

0

0

16

4,827

El Pangui

12

54,186

26

7,521

38

61,707

Totals

34

72,717

26

7,521

60

80,238

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the
National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI). The
Ecuadorian government created CENDESMI by an Executive
Decree in 1999. 5 It is an interministerial body chaired by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility and is made
up of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public
Health, and the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE) through the
Engineers Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI” and the General
Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD). 6 CENDESMI is
responsible for overseeing compliance with the APMBC,
while the CEE is responsible for coordinating the planning
of demining and COTOPAXI is tasked with conducting land
release operations.7

Ecuador currently funds all of its demining operations. It
has allocated almost US$21 million for demining personnel,
materials and equipment for 2014–22. 8 This amounts to
around $2 million per year from 2019 to 2022. However, only
$821,953 was actually provided to the demining programme
in 2019 and Ecuador has called on the international
community for ﬁnancial support to complete demining by
its Article 5 deadline.9 Ecuador has claimed that it requires
just over $8 million dollars to complete clearance. This will
be used to replace personal protective equipment and other
demining tools which are no longer usable, as well as for
vehicles, training, food and shelter for the deminers.10

GENDER
Ecuador has trained women in both demining and the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.11
Since 2014, Ecuador has employed three female deminers, 3% of the total trained.12 Ecuador has reported that it will continue
to include and train female personnel according to their availability.13
Ecuador has stated that it considers all populations affected by mines, without discrimination, in the planning and execution
of demining operations.14

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Ecuador uses the IMSMA database.15
Ecuador submits its Article 7 reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC
intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties. Often, however, these reports and statements contain inconsistencies
and inaccuracies. For instance, Ecuador’s clearance plan for 2018–22, included in its Article 7 report for 2017, sought to clear
a total of 65,006m2 in Zamora Chinchipe. But in the same report it stated that 89,874m2 of area remained to be cleared. Ecuador
is now on its third extension request and while they are submitted in a timely manner there are similar problems with clarity
and accuracy.
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ECUADOR

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

PLANNING AND TASKING
Ecuador submitted an updated work plan for implementation
of Article 5 in May 2019, as requested by the Sixteenth
Meeting of the States Parties.16 This included planned mine
clearance in the last remaining contaminated province of
Zamora Chinchipe for 2019 to 2022 (see Table 2).
Ecuador submitted annual workplans for 2018 and 2019 in
its Article 7 reports. Its workplan for 2018 sought release
of 26,159m2 with 12 demining teams working from May to
December.17 This target was not reached, with only 16,607m2
of mined area being released in 2018.

In 2019, Ecuador planned to clear 23,383m2 of contamination
from the El Pangui and expected to ﬁnd and destroy 478
anti-personnel mines. Clearance was expected to take
place in August and September with 12 demining teams.
Astonishingly, however, due to the lack of budget for demining
operations for the year, only two days of clearance operations
were planned for the whole of 2019 as of writing.18
Ecuador prioritises contaminated areas for clearance
according to the proximity of the local population and the
impact on socio-economic development.19

Table 2: Planned mine clearance in Zamora Chinchipe in 2019–22 (Action Plan) 20
Mined areas

Area (m2)

El Pangui

12

23,383

Yanzatza; Centinela del Condor, Nangaritza

12

18,299

2021

Chinchipe; Nangaritza

10

20,688

2022

El Pangui

Year

District

2019
2020

Totals

26

17,868

60

80,238

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

The process of humanitarian demining in Ecuador is
carried out in accordance with the Binational Manual for
Humanitarian Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado
Humanitario), developed under the Binational Cooperation
Programme with Peru, and the Manual of Humanitarian
Demining Procedures of Ecuador, based on the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which were adapted to the
Ecuadorian context. 21 Ecuador has adopted the IMAS for land
release, non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance
requirements, and explosive ordnance disposal. 22

Demining is conducted by COTOPAXI and the CGDEOD with a
combined total of 140 trained deminers. 25 In 2018, COTOPAXI
conducted clearance in Zamora Chinchipe province. 26

In granting Ecuador’s 2017 Article 5 deadline extension
request, the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties noted
that Ecuador should use the most relevant land release
standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with IMAS,
and encouraged it to continue seeking improved land release
and certiﬁcation techniques which could lead to Ecuador
fulﬁlling its obligations more quickly. 23 Ecuador stated in
its 2017 extension request that non-technical and technical
survey would be carried out to determine the location, size,
and other characteristic of the mined areas before operations
begin using records of mined areas. 24 No non-technical survey
and very limited technical survey was reported in 2018.

The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining
Unit is deployed to areas that were at the centre of the
conﬂict between the two nations. In October 2015, the unit
began operations in a mined area estimated to extend over
43,500m2 within the Tiwinza square kilometre. 27 In 2018,
clearance of the Tiwinza square kilometre was completed. 28
CENDESMI is responsible for observing and monitoring
compliance of the demining, including quality control and
certiﬁcation of clearance operations. 29 In 2018, quality
control was carried out in El Oro and Loja provinces. 30

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, clearance was conducted only manually. Mechanical
assets are only deployed in favourable weather conditions
and where there is not too steep an incline. 31 In the additional
information provided alongside its 2017 extension request,
Ecuador stated that the remaining clearance will only be
carried out by manual deminers, due to the unsuitability of
terrain for the machine. 32 Mine detection dogs (MDDs) are
used only for quality control following clearance. 33

DEMINER SAFETY
Ecuador has reported that no demining accidents occurred
over the past 18 years. 34
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STATES PARTIES

ECUADOR

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 16,607m2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 14,068m2 was cleared and 2,359m2 was released through
technical survey. A total of 247 anti-personnel mines and 3 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found and destroyed.
An additional 16 mines were found outside the survey area. 35

SURVEY IN 2018
No non-technical survey took place in 2018. A total of 2,539m2
was reduced through technical survey in the Tiwinza square
kilometre by the Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit. This
is a reduction from survey output in 2017 when 7,332m2 was
reduced through technical survey and 10,919m2 cancelled
through non-technical survey in the square kilometre,
covering a total of 18,251m2. 36

Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018 37
Area reduced (m2)

Province
Tiwinza

2,539

Total

2,539

CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, clearance of 5,056m2 remaining in the Tiwinza province was completed by the Binational Humanitarian Demining
Unit. In total, 14,068m2 was cleared in 2018 along with the destruction of 247 anti-personnel mines, a reduction from the
15,476m2 cleared and 453 anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2017. An additional 16 mines were found outside the area
recorded as mined.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 2018 38
Province

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

Tiwinza

3

5,056

188

Zamora Chinchipe

4

9,012

59

Totals

7

14,068

247

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ECUADOR: 1 OCTOBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 OCTOBER 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2017
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM

Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

14,068

2017

15,476

2016

1,410

2015

66,414

2014

39,660

Total

137,028

Ecuador has submitted three extension requests since the 2014
Maputo Review Conference. In May 2016, Ecuador announced
that, of the remaining 0.13km2 of contamination, 0.08km2 would
be cleared in 2016 and the remaining 0.05km2 in 2017 prior to
its October 2017 deadline.39 This did not happen. Instead, on 28
November 2016, Ecuador unexpectedly submitted a request
to extend its mine clearance deadline to 31 December 2017.
At the time of the request, Ecuador stated that “the technical
survey and clearance in the provinces of Zamora Chinchipe
and Morona Santiago (Tiwinza square kilometre) is about to
conclude, pending the destruction of 5,478 anti-personnel
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mines in an area of 137,653 square metres.” Ecuador explained
that the failure to meet the 1 October 2017 deadline was due
to a serious earthquake on 16 April 2016, which required the
diversion of the armed forces away from demining, as well
as to the physical characteristics of the land and climate
conditions in the areas requiring clearance. 40 In its Article 7
report for 2016, Ecuador suddenly and without explanation
determined that it would need a further ﬁve years to fulﬁl its
Article 5 obligations. It submitted another Article 5 deadline
extension request in March 2017 and was granted a deadline
extension to 31 December 2022.

Survey and clearance outputs fell from 33,000m2 in 2017 to
16,607m2 in 2018, with just under half of output in 2018 from
the Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit that has now
completed operations in the Tiwinza square kilometre. At
the time of the 2017 extension request, Ecuador had a total
of 140 trained deminers, but in its latest Article 7 report
Ecuador stated that only two days of clearance were planned
for 2019. 42 This means it is highly unlikely to meet the land
release target for the year as set out in its Action Plan for
2019 to 2022 (see Table 2) and is at risk of not meeting its
Article 5 deadline.

Although Ecuador’s survey and clearance output has fallen
considerably since 2015, it could still meet its Article 5
deadline of 31 December 2022 if it were so minded. Annual
targets it has set are unambitious but require capacity to
be maintained. Due to a decline in the demining budget,
Ecuador is not doing so. In 2015, Ecuador signiﬁcantly
increased clearance output by incorporating an MV-4
remotely controlled ﬂail into operations. However, Ecuador
then determined that the remaining mines were in areas
inaccessible to the machine and that clearance would only
be conducted with manual deminers. 41

Despite allocating more than $20 million for demining in
2014–22, enough to complete operations, the annual budget
was reduced in 2019 and operations were limited. Ecuador
is requesting ﬁnancial support from the international
community and, in 2019, is participating in the APMBC’s
“Individualised approach”. It is unclear how much Ecuador
is willing to fund itself or how much of this support could
be in the form of equipment or personnel rather than
direct funding.

1

APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D.

24

2

Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 5.

25

Ibid, pp. 39–40.

3

2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.

26

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D.

4

Ibid., Annex I.

27

5

Executive Decree No. 1297, issued on 22 September 1999.

2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information provided
on 8 September 2017, p. 1.

6

2017 Article 5 deadline Extension request, Annex I.
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2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.
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Ibid.; and Statement of Ecuador, Committee on Article 5 implementation,
Geneva, 22 May 2019.
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Program of Ecuador Status and Challenges in Implementation”, Geneva,
23 May 2019; and Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 21.
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23 May 2019.
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2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information provided
on 8 September 2017, p. 1.
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2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 39 and 41.
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Ibid.
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2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
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Ibid.
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Decisions on the request by Ecuador for an extension of its Article 5 deadline,
16MSP, 21 December 2017.
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Ibid.

39

Statement of Ecuador, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva,
19 May 2016.

40

Letter from Efraín Baus Palacios, Director of Neighbourhood Relations and
Sovereignty for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility and
President of the National Humanitarian Demining Centre of Ecuador, to Amb.
Patricia O’Brian, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations
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CENDESMI, Quito, 26 November 2016.
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2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.
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ERITREA

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2020
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,
(ESTIMATED)

20KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

NONE
REPORTED

NONE
REPORTED

Area of Land Released (km2)

40

2017
2018

35
30
25
20
15
10
5

None reported

None reported

None reported

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Eritrea’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 5 deadline expires on 1 February 2020. As at July
2019, it had not indicated whether it would submit a request
to again extend its Article 5 deadline. It was the only state
party with a deadline in 2020 which failed to acknowledge its
upcoming deadline or report on plans for an extension.

Eritrea is failing to comply with its obligation under Article
5 of the APMBC to complete clearance as soon as possible.
There is no indication of any progress in mine action since
the end of 2013. Eritrea failed to submit an updated Article
5 workplan as required by states parties upon granting its
second extension and did not respond to repeated requests
for updated information from Mine Action Review in 2019.
It last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2014,
in and of itself a violation of the Convention.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Eritrea needs to return to compliance with its obligations under the APMBC. The authorities should ensure
that mine survey and clearance are undertaken for humanitarian and developmental purposes as a matter
of urgency.

■

Eritrea should urgently submit an extension request for its Article 5 deadline, which includes an up-to-date
list of all known or suspected areas with anti-personnel mines and a detailed timeline of activities planned
for the extension period sought.

■

Eritrea must urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 transparency reports, the latest of which was
due by 30 April 2019.

■

Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance in mine action, which would
support efﬁcient land release and re-open international funding paths.

■

Eritrea should cooperate in cross-border mine action activities with Ethiopia, including as part of recent
efforts towards a peace agreement with its neighbour.

■

Eritrea should develop and make public a resource mobilisation strategy on the basis of a clear understanding
of remaining contamination.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, when
Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained with a size of 33.4km2. All area is
reportedly suspected hazardous area. Mine Action Review is unaware of any indication
of progress in land release or updated information on the extent of contamination since
this time.

4

Eritrea’s mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrean Demining
Agency (EDA) is responsible for mine clearance.

3

It is not known if Eritrea has policies in place relating to gender and mine action.

1

Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. However,
its lack of submissions of Article 7 reports over the past ﬁve years is a violation of
the Convention. It has failed to provide any updates on the status of its mine action
obligations in recent years.

1

Recent details on Eritrea’s planning and tasking system are not available.

4

Eritrea is reported to have National Mine Action Standards dating back to 2012. The EDA
was responsible for the implementation of quality management activities.

1

Eritrea has made little, if any, progress at all in land release to meet its obligations
under its second Article 5 extension request. In 2014, Eritrea reported that it expected
to require a third extension, but, as at July 2019, it had taken no apparent steps towards
requesting one. It remains in violation of the Convention for failing to complete mine
survey and clearance as soon as possible, and for not respecting other procedural
provisions of the Convention.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

4

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

2.7

Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Engineering units of the Eritrean Armed Forces
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

STATES PARTIES

Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) dating back to World War II, but largely as the result
of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed
conﬂict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.
In May 2015, in response to Mine Action Review’s request for
updated information on the state of contamination and mine
action activities in Eritrea, the Deputy General Manager of
the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) reported “no signiﬁcant
progress registered by the EDA currently”. He claimed,
though, that the EDA was being reorganised in an effort
to make “better progress”.1 Since 2015, the EDA has not
responded to repeated requests from Mine Action Review for
further information, most recently in the ﬁrst half of 2019.
The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates
back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported 434 mined
areas covering an estimated 33.4km. 2 This was a two-thirds
reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km2 of June 2011, 3 and
signiﬁcantly lower than the 129km2 identiﬁed by the 2004
landmine impact survey. 4

Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2013) 5
SHAs

Estimated area (m2)

Semienawi Keih Bahri

166

9,462,537

Anseba

144

10,230,940

Zoba (region)

Gash Barka

63

6,252,951

Debub

29

3,894,036

Maakel

24

2,423,325

Debubawi Keih Bahri
Totals

8

1,169,029

434

33,432,818

SHA = suspected hazardous area

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Eritrea mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The EDA, established in July 2002, is responsible for
policy development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. The EDA reports directly to
the Ofﬁce of the President.
Eritrea projected that costs for its current Article 5 extension period would amount to more than US$7 million, all to be
raised nationally. 6 In 2011–13, Eritrea managed to raise only $257,000 annually. Eritrea acknowledged at the time that its
progress in clearing mines would be slow due to its lack of resources, but it has never been clear how Eritrea intended
to secure the funding necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its regrettable policy not
to accept international technical assistance.7

GENDER
Eritrea did not respond to Mine Action Review’s inquiries in 2019 about the national mine action programme’s policies
relating to gender.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. However, its lack of submissions of Article 7
reporting over the past ﬁve years is a violation of the Convention. It has also failed to provide an updated Article 5 workplan
or any updates on the status of demining in recent years.

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no apparent recent information on how Eritrea plans its demining operations. Re-survey during the second
extension period was planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas across six
regions, and to run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions. 8
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

Eritrea reportedly has National Mine Action Standards that
date back at least to 2012. It is not known if any updates to
the standards have been made in the seven years since.
It was reported that the EDA was responsible for the
implementation of quality assurance (QA) and quality
control (QC) activities.9

In the past, demining has been primarily conducted by the
engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the
supervision of the EDA.10 According to its second Article
5 deadline extension request, Eritrea planned to deploy
“at least” ﬁve demining teams during its second extension
period.11
Following expulsion of international non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in 2005, the authorities do not allow
international operators to conduct survey or clearance
in Eritrea.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up
to 15.4km2 of mined area could be cleared within ﬁve years.
It reported that 67.3km2 of contaminated area had been
cancelled through non-technical survey and that 5.7km2
was cleared over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.12
Eritrea has not provided any updates to states parties to the
APMBC, nor responded to Mine Action Review requests for
information on any mine action activities (including survey)
undertaken in since 2014. In 2013, Eritrea had reported
release of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km2, leaving 385 mined
areas of close to 24.5km2 to be surveyed.13 Forty-nine new

mined areas with a total size of 9km2 were discovered in ﬁve
of the country’s six regions during non-technical survey in
2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi
Keih Bahri.14
Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on
any mine clearance undertaken in 2018 or recent years. In
2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approx. 2.26km2 of mined
area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km2).15 The
number of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines destroyed
in 2013 was not reported.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
As stated, no land release output, including survey or clearance, was reported in 2018.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ERITREA: 1 FEBRUARY 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:
NO AND AS AT AUGUST 2019 HAD NOT SUBMITTED AN EXTENSION REQUEST
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
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Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

N/R

2017

N/R

2016

N/R

2015

N/R

2014

N/R

Total

N/R

* N/R = Not Reported

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
three-year extension granted by states parties in 2011 and
a further ﬁve-year extension granted in 2014), Eritrea is
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 February 2020. It is not on track to meet this
deadline, is failing to comply with its Article 5 obligations,
and as at August 2019 had not submitted a request for an
extension to its Article 5 deadline. If Eritrea fails to submit
an Article 5 extension for consideration and approval by
states parties at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in
November 2019, it will be in serious violation of Article 5 as
of its Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2020.

In January 2014, Eritrea submitted a second Article 5
deadline extension request seeking a further ﬁve years to
continue clearance and complete re-survey of SHAs, but not
to fulﬁl its clearance obligations under the treaty. In June
2014, however, states parties granted Eritrea its extension
request until 2020, but noted that ﬁve additional years beyond
Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline “appeared to be a
long period of time to meet this objective”.16
Based on a predicted clearance rate of 0.384km2 per team
per year and 1.92km2 per ﬁve teams per year, Eritrea
estimated that ﬁve teams operating at this pace could clear
almost 15.4km2 in the ﬁve-year period.17 It acknowledged,
though, that this was “ambitious” and the amount projected
still accounted for less than half of the total area Eritrea
estimated as requiring either clearance or re-survey
(33.5km2), leaving some 18km2 unaccounted for.18
In April 2014, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Eritrea
stated that the extension period was designed to gain greater
clarity about its mine problem, at which point Eritrea “could
plan and think about the ﬁnancial resources to be allocated
for mine action”.19 It was further stated that Eritrea “won’t
complete clearance in the next ﬁve years”, and will likely
require a third extension. 20 Eritrea has not provided states
parties with any information since, nor did it submit an
updated Article 5 deadline extension request workplan as
requested. It did not attend any meetings of the APMBC in
2018 or the ﬁrst half of 2019. As at August 2019, Eritrea was
in clear violation of the Convention, both substantively and
procedurally, and had yet to submit an extension request to
its Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2020.

1

Email from Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, 6 May 2015.

9

Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 5.

2

2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7. This was despite ﬁnding
49 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in ﬁve regions
across an estimated area of 9km2 during non-technical survey in 2013.
Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted
by the President of the 13th Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the
States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 20 June 2014,
p. 2.

10

Ibid.

11

Ibid., p. 10.

12

Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June
2014, p. 2.

13

Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.

14

Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June
2014, p. 2.

15

Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 10.

16

Decision on Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Third
APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

17

Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 10.

18

ICBL Comments on Eritrea’s Article 5 Extension Request, March 2014.

3

Eritrea’s reply to questions from the Article 5 Analysing Group about its
Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.

4

Survey Action Center (SAC), “Landmine Impact Survey, Eritrea, Final Report”,
May 2005, p. 7.

5

2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

6

Ibid., p. 11.

7

Statement of Eritrea, 13th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December
2013.

19

Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 9 April
2014. Notes by ICBL.

8

Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva,
9 April 2014.

20

Ibid.
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Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
(2014–18)*

CLEARING
THE MINES
2019

ETHIOPIA

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2020
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

100

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

(ESTIMATED)

27KM

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

1.1KM

2

94.3

90

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

582

Area of Land Released (km2)

HEAVY,

2017
2018

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Reported
in 2018

10

0.4

1.1

Clearance

9.9

0.0

Technical
Survey

N/R

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In March 2019, certain that it would fail to meet its Article
5 extended deadline of 1 June 2020 owing to insufﬁcient
progress in land release, Ethiopia submitted a second
extension request to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) Article 5 deadline, this time for a period of ﬁve
years until 31 December 2025. This second extension request
indicates a number of positive developments have occurred,
including the restarting of demining and land release, which
is welcome after years of little or no progress. The request
states there is increasing access for mine action operations
in the previously inaccessible contested border area with
Eritrea, owing to recent progress in peace negotiations with its
neighbour. Also positive is the news that responsibility for the

national mine action programme will be moved directly under
the Ministry of Defence’s Head Ofﬁce, which may increase
efﬁciency and the implementation of mine action operations,
as well as enhance access to government resources.
A number of reported challenges remain unchanged,
however, including the remoteness of certain areas of
contamination, technical and logistical challenges, a lack of
basic infrastructure, and a critical lack of funding. Signiﬁcant
questions also remain as to the feasibility of the extension
request’s land release targets and the demining capacity and
resources required to meet them. Ethiopia’s second extension
period must not be another lengthy period of inactivity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

If granted the second Article 5 extension by States Parties, Ethiopia should act immediately to carry out
demining operations, seek additional capacity and resources, and renew its commitment to meet its
treaty obligations.

■

Ethiopia should ensure the re-established national mine action authority has sufﬁcient resources to establish
and sustain an effective mine action programme, as well as to develop a robust resource mobilisation plan to
address the wide gap in funding projected under its extension request.

■

Ethiopia should clarify its ability to meet the annual land release targets in its extension request and the
capacity of the demining companies to be deployed to address the remaining challenge.

■

Ethiopia should cooperate in cross-border mine action activities with Eritrea, including as part of recent
efforts towards a peace agreement with its neighbour.
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Ethiopia should report on plans to carry out survey on the border with Eritrea as well as on any changes to the
security situation that could affect mine action operations.

■

All mine action data should be reported and recorded according to the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) land release terminology. Ethiopia should report regularly with updates on the number and extent of
all mined areas and disaggregated land release output.

■

Ethiopia should reconsider use of additional mine action tools, including mine detection dogs, given the vast
amount of suspected hazardous area (SHA) that is projected to be released through survey.

■

Ethiopia should re-establish conditions that would allow for the re-entry of international demining
organisations.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Ethiopia has a baseline estimate of remaining contamination, largely on the results of
an inﬂated and inaccurate landmine impact survey concluded in 2004. The estimate of
contamination reported as at April 2019 includes a vast amount of suspected hazardous
area, of which only 2% is expected to contain mines.

5

In 2019, it was reported that Ethiopia’s national mine action programme would be moved
to report directly to the Head Ofﬁce of the Ministry of Defence, which is hoped will raise
the proﬁle of mine action, and improve the efﬁciency of operations and availability of
national resources.

3

Ethiopia claimed to have a gender policy in place for its mine action centre and reﬂected
in its national mine action standards. It reported that according to the policy, there is
equal access for employment for qualiﬁed men and women in survey and clearance
teams, including for managerial positions, but, in practice no women were involved in
any survey or clearance activities in 2018.

4

Some improvement in Ethiopia’s reporting capacity was evident in its 2019 Article 5
deadline extension request and Article 7 report, but data discrepancies remained, along
with a lack of detail and inconsistencies in the use of land release methodology.

5

The second Article 5 extension request contains new annual targets for survey
and clearance for the extension request period, but whether they are realistic and
achievable, based on the demining capacity and rates of clearance projected, deserves
careful scrutiny.

6

The extension request details the land release methodology and quality management
measures to be employed during the extension period.

5

In 2019, Ethiopia requested a second Article 5 deadline extension of ﬁve years until
end 2025. On the basis of the request, it is not impossible that Ethiopia could meet this
new deadline. But given its poor track record, key questions about assumptions in land
release productivity, and lack of current funding, meeting even this extended deadline
seems questionable. It is encouraging, however, to see a substantial increase in the
amount of land released in 2018, of over 95km2, primarily through non-technical survey.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

5

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.9

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Head Ofﬁce of the Ministry of Defence
Ethiopia Mine Action Ofﬁce (EMAO)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

National Demining Companies (Ethiopian Armed Forces)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 30 April 2019, and according to Ethiopia’s Article 5
deadline extension request submitted in March 2019, a total
of 261 suspected and conﬁrmed hazardous areas with a size
of 1,056km2 remained.1 The request, however, contains a
number of discrepancies in reporting, possibly due in part
to previous inconsistencies in reporting on area remaining
in its 2017 updated workplan and previous ﬁrst Article 5
extension request. 2
Of the total contamination remaining in 2019, Ethiopia
reported that 35 areas with a size of just over 6.3km2 were
conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 226 areas with a
size of 1,050km2 were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).
In keeping with previous reporting, the request states that
only 2% of the suspected hazardous area is expected to
actually contain mines. 3 As such, the request projects a total
of 27.3km2 (6.3km2 of existing CHA and 21km2 of the SHA
reported) will require clearance, while 1,029km2 will be
cancelled or reduced. 4
There appears to be a relatively consistent and coherent
narrative in the second extension request of progress
made since Ethiopia’s original Article 5 deadline expired
in 2015. At that time, Ethiopia reported that a total of 314
CHA and SHA with a size of 1,193km2 remained to be
addressed. During 2015-18, 53 areas covering 136.8km2
were reportedly released. 5
Positively, the second extension request claims increasing
potential for mine action operations to take place in the
contested border areas with Eritrea due to ongoing efforts
towards a peace agreement in 2019, and that negotiations

through a joint border commission will allow mine action
in previously inaccessible areas to begin. Speciﬁcally, new
“military humanitarian demining” operations are to start in
the Tigray border mineﬁeld. 6
At the same time, the extension request also states that
access to mined areas in Afar and Somali regions continued
to present a challenge for operations due to insecurity and
their remoteness, while technical and logistical challenges
and a lack of infrastructure continued to hamper access to
Gambela and Benishangul regions.7
As at April 2019, CHAs and SHAs continued to remain across
six regions (Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, Somali,
and Tigray), as set out in Table 1. The Somali region is
believed to be by far the most heavily affected, followed by
the Afar region.
Ethiopia’s mine problem is a result of internal and
international armed conﬂicts dating back to 1935, including
the Italian occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns
(1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war
with Somalia (1997–98), internal conﬂict (1974–2000), and
the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000).
In 2001–04, a LIS identiﬁed mine and explosive remnants
of war (ERW) contamination in 10 of Ethiopia’s 11 regions,
with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000km2 impacting more
than 1,492 communities. 8 The Ethiopian Mine Action Ofﬁce
(EMAO) stated that the LIS overestimated the number of
both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack of military
expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for
the overestimate.9

Table 1: Mined area by region (at 30 April 2019)10
CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (km2)

Afar

6

1.76

8

1.92

14

3.67

Benishangul

2

0.05

0

0

2

0.05

Region

Gambela

0

0

20

0.84

20

0.84

Oromia

0

0

13

1.03

13

1.03

Somali

24

3.81

185

1,046.27

209

1,050.08

Tigray

3

0.69

0

0

3

0.69

Totals

35

6.31

226

1050.06

261

1,056.36

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In 2001, following the end of the conﬂict with Eritrea,
Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an
autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance
and mine risk education.11 EMAO developed its operational
capacities effectively with technical assistance from
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the UN Development
Programme (UNDP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).12
In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the
Ministry of Defence was better suited to clear the remaining
mines because Ethiopia had made signiﬁcant progress in
meeting its APMBC clearance obligations and the remaining
threat did not warrant a structure and organisation the size
of EMAO. It has further asserted on numerous occasions that
a civilian entity such as EMAO would have difﬁculty accessing
the unstable Somali region.13
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In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer
demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers
Division, NPA ended its direct funding support and had
completed the transfer of its remaining 49 mine detection
dogs (MDDs) to EMAO and the federal police by the end
of April 2012. The Combat Engineers Division took over
management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto where
it conducted training in demining in early 2012.
The transition of EMAO to the Ministry of National Defence
appeared to be in limbo until September 2015, when Ethiopia
reported that oversight of national mine action activities had
been re-established as “one Independent Mine Action Ofﬁce”
under the Combat Engineers Main Department.14 In 2017,
Ethiopia conﬁrmed that this “autonomous legal entity” had

STATES PARTIES

In 2019, however, Ethiopia reported that the responsibility for
the national mine action programme had been transferred
back to the Head Ofﬁce of the Ministry of Defence. It said
this was done to enable the Ministry of Defence to directly
manage resources and mine action activities; to improve
access to remaining CHAs, which it stated are more “easily
reachable” by the Ministry of Defence; and to raise the proﬁle
of mine action operations at a time when resources for
demining are increasingly limited, as the Ministry of Defence
is said to be better placed to communicate with donors and
secure government resources for demining.16
According to Ethiopia’s second extension request, just under
US$41 million is required to fulﬁl its Article 5 obligations by
2025, a decrease from $46 million reported in its 2017–20
workplan, which it said was due to progress made in land
release in 2016–18. The request includes a breakdown of
the budget required ($28.7 million for demining, $6.1 million
for coordination and administration, $4.1 million for training
and equipment to manage “residual issues”; and $2 million

for quality assurance and information management).17 In
2018, the Ethiopian government was the sole funder of mine
action operations.18 Of the $41 million projected in the second
extension request, the government is projected to cover 20%
of required remaining funding, or $8.2million.19
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request notes
the positive contribution of the availability of trained and
highly experienced demining teams ready to be deployed.
Ethiopia has also made numerous requests for international
assistance, most recently, to complete the capacity building
of its demining training centre, and training for deminers
to be better equipped to conduct battle area clearance and
disposal of ERW. 20
In 2018, EMAO reported that all administrative costs of the
EMAO were covered by the Government of Ethiopia, along
with all costs for survey and clearance activities.
EMAO informed Mine Action Review that the transfer
of responsibility for the mine action ofﬁce to be directly
accountable to the Ministry of Defence would help allocate
funding and a budget directly from the head ofﬁce of the
Ministry of Defence. Positively, EMAO reported it expected
to receive increased funding in 2019 as a result.

GENDER
In August 2019, EMAO claimed to have a gender and diversity plan in place and to have mainstreamed gender in the national
mine action standards. It stated that all groups affected by anti-personnel mine contamination are consulted during survey and
community liaison activities through face-to-face interviews and using elders to disseminate information to local communities,
assisted by mine risk education ofﬁcers. It also noted, though, that no female deminers were employed in the operational
demining companies. It claimed that, according to EMAO’s policy, there is equal access for employment for qualiﬁed men and
women in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial positions, but, in practice no women were currently involved
in survey or clearance activities in 2018. 21

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Although a version of the Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database software was installed and
customised by EMAO prior to 2015, in 2019, Ethiopia continued
to report it was still using an “alternative data processing
package” alongside the IMSMA database, due to a “gap” in
the IMSMA system’s installation. It reported that efforts to
upgrade capacity and data processing had been ongoing
under EMAO, but again requested additional IMSMA training
and assistance from the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to ﬁnalise the transfer
of the database. 22

While a number of inconsistencies, a lack of detail, and errors
in data calculations persisted in Ethiopia’s Article 5 extension
request and subsequent Article 7 report, both are evidence
of improvements in reporting from previous years, when
reporting was of especially poor quality.
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been re-named the EMAO, and was responsible for survey,
clearance, and mine risk education activities, accountable
to the Ministry of National Defence’s Engineering Main
Department.15

PLANNING AND TASKING
Ethiopia’s second Article 5 extension request for the period
2020–25 is to achieve the following:
■
■
■
■

■
■

Address the remaining 1,065km2 of mine contamination
Complete the survey of the buffer zone areas between
Ethiopia and Eritrea once demarcation is completed
Obtain the support of donors and international advisors
Fully equip and train the demining companies, Rapid
Response Teams (RRT), and explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) teams
Implement risk education in affected communities and
mark SHAs
Finish the building of the demining training centre.23

The extension request contains annual targets and a
workplan, which foresee a total land release of some 175km2
per year in 2020–24, and 3.9km2 in the ﬁnal year (2025).
Despite some data discrepancies, this would appear to
include a breakdown of 171.5km2 released through survey
annually from 2019–24, along with 1.9km2 released through
clearance in 2019, 4.3km2 released through clearance each
year in 2020–24, and a ﬁnal 3.9km2 cleared in 2025. 24

Ethiopia’s second Article 5 deadline extension request sets
new annual targets for the ﬁve-year completion period. 25 The
workplan, however, raises a number of critical questions
as to whether it is realistic and achievable. For example,
Ethiopia does not provide detail on how the signiﬁcant jump
in projections for clearance from 1.9km2 in 2019 to 4.3km2
in 2020 is to be realised. The request indicates that one
additional “demining company” will be added during the
extension period, but does not specify at what time this will
occur or the number of deminers who will form the company.
EMAO later informed Mine Action Review that 90 deminers
formed a demining company. 26 The request also foresees that
one deminer will clear on average 40–50 square metres per
day, 22 days a month, 10 months a year; projections which
would seem potentially improbably high. 27

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

Ethiopia’s second extension request elaborates in detail
the land release methodology intended to be employed
in demining operations. 28 The request claims that manual
demining is the most efﬁcient and least costly method of
clearance, and states that machines cannot be used due to
the terrain of the remaining contaminated areas.29 However,
with such large projections for cancellation and reduction of
SHA, Ethiopia could consider other options in the mine action
tool box beyond manual clearance, such as the use of MDDs
in technical survey.

According to EMAO, two companies were deployed for
clearance in 2018, along with two technical survey teams,
and one EOD team. 31

Ethiopia previously reported in 2107 that its National Mine
Action Standards (NMAS) would be “developed and updated”
and that standing operating procedures (SoPs) for mine
clearance and land release would be revised according to the
current IMAS. It had also reported that this would happen in
2015, according to its extension request targets. 30 As at 2019,
Ethiopia had not, however, reported that the revisions have
been completed.

Ethiopia’s second extension request foresees that following
a “rearrangement” of its four demining companies and four
RRTs, which include two technical survey/RRTs and two
specialist EOD teams in 2019, these four demining companies
and four RRTs are to be deployed each year through to the
completion of its Article 5 extension request in 2025. 32
The request claims that the manual clearance, technical
survey, and EOD teams have carried out extensive trainings
and “are enough capable to implement the activities
mentioned in the detailed workplan”. 33 At the same time,
the request anticipates the deployment of an additional
demining company, though it does not specify the number of
deminers which comprise a company, nor when it would be
operational. 34 As noted above, EMAO informed Mine Action
Review that 90 deminers form a demining company. 35

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Ethiopia has reported that only manual clearance has
been used in recent years. While its national mine action
programme is in possession of six ground preparation
machines, it reported that these were not in use as all
remaining hazardous areas are located in remote areas,
which it claims are only suitable for manual clearance. 36
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STATES PARTIES

ETHIOPIA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2016–18
According to EMAO, a total of more than 95.4km2 of antipersonnel mined area was released in 2018: nearly 94.3km2
through survey and 1.1km2 through clearance.
In its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7
report, Ethiopia detailed its land release activities for the ﬁrst
time in recent years. According to the 2019 extension request,
over the previous extension period, a total of 53 areas with
a size of 136.8km2 were released with the destruction of 582
anti-personnel mines, 70 anti-vehicle mines, and 7,286 items
of unexploded ordnance (UXO). 37
Ethiopia’s extension request reports that in total, 0.1km2 was
released in 2016 with the destruction of 30 anti-vehicle mines;
just over 41.4km2 was released in 2017 with the destruction
of 37 anti-vehicle mines and 21 items of UXO; and just over
95.3km2 was released in 2018, with the destruction of 582
anti-personnel mines, 3 anti-vehicle mines, and 7,265 items of
UXO. 38 The extension request underlines that this doubling in
land release output from 2017 to 2018 was due to an increase
in resources and government commitment. 39

SURVEY IN 2018
According to EMAO, a total of over 94.3km2 was cancelled by
non-technical survey by the Engineering Main Department in
2018, all in Somali region. No area was reported reduced by
technical survey in 2018.
This is a signiﬁcant increase in overall survey output
compared to 2017, when EMAO informed Mine Action Review
that in 2017, a total of just over 9.9km2 was reduced by
technical survey, also all by the Engineering Main Department
in Somali region. 40 No cancellation through non-technical
survey was reported during that year.
In 2016–18, EMAO reported that in total, 53 areas with a
size of 136km2 was released in Fik, Misrak Gashamo, and
Degehabur districts in the Somali region, of which a total of
125km2 was reportedly cancelled and almost 10km2 reduced
through technical survey. 41

CLEARANCE IN 2018
According to EMAO, a total of ﬁve areas with a size of just
under 1.1km2 were cleared in 2018, with the destruction
of 582 anti-personnel mines, 3 anti-vehicle mines, and
7,265 items of UXO. 42 It reported that the increase from the
0.4km2 cleared in 2017 was due to an increase in budget and
trainings previously carried out. 43

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ETHIOPIA: 1 JUNE 2005
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION):
1 JUNE 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5-YEAR, 7-MONTH
EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

1.1

2017

0.40

2016

*0.50

2015

N/R

2014

N/R

Total

2.0*

* Estimated clearance based on report for 2016–18

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with a
ﬁve-year extension granted by states parties in 2015) Ethiopia
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 June 2020. It will not meet this deadline and
submitted a request for a second extension of its Article 5
deadline in March 2019, for a period of ﬁve years, until
31 December 2025. 44
Ethiopia has listed the following reasons for its inability
to comply with its Article 5 obligations: insecurity in and
around some mined areas; the lack of basic social services
and infrastructure necessary for operations in rural areas;
continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered
mined areas; lack of funding; the identiﬁcation of additional
hazardous areas; climate (such as a three-month rainy
season); and a lack of precise information on the number
and location of mined areas. 45
Ethiopia has been at best, overly ambitious, or at worst,
misrepresentative in its projections and estimations for
completion of survey and clearance in recent years. Its
2017–20 workplan, submitted in October 2017, stated that
it was “realistic” that all 314 areas then remaining could be
addressed using “all available demining assets in Ethiopia”
within the extension time period, and that donor funding
will enable it “successfully to complete the clearance of
contaminated areas from land mines and fulﬁl the legal
obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by
2020”. 46 This was not the case.
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The second extension request clearly sets out primary
assumptions and risk factors in implementing its targets:
that donor funding will increase steadily; that old demining
equipment is replaced by “licensed” demining equipment;
that one deminer will clear on average as much as 50 square
metres per day, 22 days a month, and 10 months a year; and
that one additional demining company will be added, for a total
of ﬁve deployed. As noted, however, the average clearance
average per deminer would appear unrealistically high. 47

While these concerns deserve greater scrutiny and
clariﬁcations from Ethiopia, its increased engagement to fulﬁl
its Article 5 obligations evidenced in its second extension
request, the reported improvements in border security and
greater access for mine action operations, the increase in
government resources for mine action in 2017–18, and the
new political reporting lines of the national mine action
programme ofﬁce, are welcome signs of progress. Building
on these positive developments, Ethiopia’s efforts to reach
its goal of Article 5 completion by 2025 should be fully
encouraged and supported by the international community.
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2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
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IRAQ

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

70

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

At least

(ESTIMATED)

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018
Unclear, but at least

8.44KM 9,112

Area of Land Released (km2)

500KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2017
2018

60

MASSIVE, extent unclear but certainly
at least

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
57.86

50

48.49
40

30

20

10

2

and likely much higher

8.44

Clearance

Not
known

Not
known

Technical
Survey

1.7

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Iraq reported a sharp rise in clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State in 2018. The areas were heavily contaminated
with mines of an improvised nature. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) issued operational accreditation to six international
demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A new director general of the DMA was appointed ad interim in February
2019 and in June 2019 the ofﬁce was allocated to a former DMA director.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for
staff to enable it to discharge its responsibilities.

■

International donors also should address the severely limited capacity and resources in the national mine
action structures.

■

The government, the DMA, the United Nations and mine action stakeholders should address the lack of
transparency that continues to prevent a clear, credible determination of operating results in one of the
world’s largest mine action programmes.

■

The DMA should develop and consistently apply a standard procedure for tasking and reporting non-technical
survey, technical survey, clearance, and land release, preferably in consultation with implementing partners.

■

The DMA should ensure that victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the deﬁnition
of an anti-personnel mine are reported as such in accordance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC).

■

Iraq should update its Article 5 extension request to provide more detail and clarity on plans for meeting its
Convention obligations.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Iraq has a good understanding of the location of legacy mined areas but estimates of
the extent need to be reﬁned through further survey. Contamination by mines of an
improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State has not been comprehensively
surveyed but intensive demining operations have improved understanding of the scope
of the challenge.

4

Iraq’s mine action authorities have responsibility for planning and coordination but their
work is overshadowed by the powerful ministries of defence, interior, and oil and lack
funding at a time when most international donor support has been channelled through
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

4

The Iraq National Strategic Plan mentions gender equality and gender mainstreaming
within mine action activities. Some international operators and their national partners
employ women in a wide range of roles, subject to cultural sensitivities in different
areas of the country.

4

Iraq has submitted its Article 7 transparency reports annually and in 2019 made them
accessible to a wider audience by reporting in English. Mine action data accuracy and
timeliness, however, remained a critical challenge in 2018, and persistent inconsistencies
in ofﬁcial data prevent a precise determination of progress.

3

Iraq’s strategic plan sets general goals but implementation depends on the level of donor
support. Cumbersome tasking procedures slowed progress and proved a source of
tension between the DMA, UNMAS, and implementing partners in 2018.

5

National standards need to be strengthened and updated. Iraq lacks any national
standard for survey and clearance of mines of an improvised nature – its mine action
priority in the last three years – and operators work according to their own standing
operating procedures. UNMAS reports standards are being developed.

6

Outputs appear to have risen sharply in a difﬁcult context but lack of consistent,
comprehensive data prevents a precise determination of progress in survey and
clearance.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

6

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.9

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

Federal Iraq:
Ministry of Health and Environment
Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
Kurdish region of Iraq (KRI):
Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
IKMAA
Akad International Co. for Mines
Al Danube
Al Fahad Co. for Demining
Al Khebra Co. for Demining
Al Safsafa
Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
Al Waha
Eagle Eye
Ta’az Demining
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
The HALO Trust
Humanity & Inclusion
(HI, formerly Handicap International)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
G4S
Janus
Optima

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

Iraq is the world’s most contaminated country by extent of
mined area. Total contamination by anti-personnel mines,
including those of an improvised nature, was estimated at the
end of 2018 to amount to 1,818km2. In Federal Iraq, the DMA
estimated total contamination at 1,636 km2 (see Tables 1 and
2).1 The Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) reported anti-personnel
mined area of 182km2. 2

accounted for 86% of these mined areas, including many of
the barrier mineﬁelds along its borders with Iran which also
stretch into Missan and Wasit.
In addition, large areas occupied by Islamic State after 2014
added extensive contamination with mines of an improvised
nature and other explosive devices. The DMA reported
611km2 were affected by improvised explosive devices. 3
This includes signiﬁcant but unspeciﬁed contamination by
victim-activated devices of an improvised nature prohibited
by the APMBC because they fall within the deﬁnition of
anti-personnel mines. Anbar and Nineveh governorates
appear to be the most affected, accounting for more than
40% of the total recorded improvised mine contamination.

Federal Iraq
In Federal Iraq, legacy mined areas amounted to 1,025km2,
including contamination resulting from the 1980–88 war
with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the
United States (US)-led coalition. Basrah governorate alone

Table 1: Federal Iraq mined area (at end 2018) 4
Contamination
Anti-personnel mines
Anti-vehicle mines

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

107

206,848,260

14

13,625,700

220,473,960

6

176,732

0

0

176,732

Mixed AP/AV mines

180

801,993,129

6

2,539,672

804,532,801

Improvised devices, including
improvised mines*5

200

282,785,643

219

328,468,957

611,254,600

Totals

493

1,291,803,764

239

344,634,329

1,636,438,093

*The area attributed to improvised mine CHAs and SHAs in this table exceeds the area reported in Table 3.

Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2018) 6
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

22

7,558,635

23

123,620,173

131,178,808

0

0

4

63,347,436

63,347,436

Basrah

55

886,234,437

0

0

886,234,437

Diyala

4

206,537,237

20

62,486,389

269,023,626

Kirkuk

65

32,281,006

6

757,473

33,038,479

Missan

200

45,192,914

3

400,183

45,593,097

2

37,845,692

0

0

37,845,692

113

33,652,129

182

93,922,948

127,575,077

Salah al-Din

2

2,918,535

0

0

2,918,535

Thi-Qar

0

0

1

99,728

99,728

Wassit

30

39,583,178

0

0

39,583,178

Totals

493

1,291,803,763

239

344,634,330

1,636,438,093

Province
Anbar
Baghdad

Muthanna
Nineveh

Table 3: IED/Improvised mine contamination (at end 2018)
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

17

5,459,666

23

123,620,173

129,079,839

0

0

4

63,347,436

63,347,436

Diyala

3

206,537,237

5

46,880,927

253,418,164

Kirkuk

61

31,992,611

6

757,473

32,750,084

Nineveh

98

32,794,261

175

93,564,110

126,358,371

Province
Anbar
Baghdad

Salah al Din
Totals

2

2,918,535

0

0

2,918,535

181

279,702,310

213

328,170,119

607,872,429
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IRAQ

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

Table 4: KRI mine contamination (at end 2018)10
2

The KRI recorded mine contamination of 181km at the
end of 2018, 14% less than a year earlier.7 KRI data did not
include areas on the border with Turkey which have never
been surveyed because of continuing ﬁghting and Turkish
airstrikes. 8 The Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)
declined to provide any mine action data because
of unspeciﬁed differences with the DMA, preventing
further assessment.9

Governorate
Dohuk

Area (m2)
20,793,723

Erbil

49,369,166

Halabja

12,127,439

Slemani

99,664,679

Total

181,955,007

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along
regional lines. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
represents Iraq internationally and oversees mine action
for humanitarian purposes in 15 of Iraq’s 19 governorates.11
Mine action in the KRI’s four governorates is overseen by
IKMAA, which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led
by a director general who has ministerial rank.
Federal Iraq
The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,12 which
reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves
mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans,
coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the
activities of mine action.” The DMA draws up the national
strategy and is responsible for setting national standards,
accrediting, and approving the standing operating
procedures (SoPs) of demining organisations and certifying
completion of clearance tasks.13
Coordinating the planning, tasking and information
management among all the actors remained a signiﬁcant
challenge. As a department of the Ministry of Health and
Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically
powerful Ministries of Defence and Interior, which manage
signiﬁcant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine
clearance capacity, as well as the Ministry of Oil. Additionally,
the DMA’s status is not formally established by law.14`
Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management
and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the
tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different ofﬁce
in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment
Kamran Ali took over as acting director of the DMA until June
2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, a former DMA
director, was reappointed to the position.
The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres
(RMACs):
■
■
■

North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk,
Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din;
Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala,
Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit;
South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC South, located in Basra City, operated its own database
and was responsible for tasking operators. RMAC North and
MEU were located in Baghdad. The DMA was preparing to
locate RMAC North in Mosul as at August 2019.15
Federal Iraq’s spending on the DMA and mine action is
not known. The sector remains heavily dependent on
international donor funding, most of it channelled through

130 Clearing the Mines 2019

UNMAS and signiﬁcant bilateral funding to clearance
operators. In the past two years, Iraqi government and
donors have given priority to tackling massive contamination
by mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated
from Islamic State, leaving scant resources for tackling
contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERW) in others
areas of Iraq, including the substantial cluster munition
remnant threat concentrated in the south.
The DMA accredits operators after they have ﬁrst registered
with the NGO Directorate or the Ministry of Trade, a process
that previously could drag on for years. In the past year,
Iraq has taken steps to accelerate the process enabling a
signiﬁcant shift of mine clearance capacity from the KRI
to Federal Iraq. Operators reported that cumbersome and
frequently changing bureaucratic procedures governing
tasking, reporting, team deployments, and residency
consumed considerable time and energy, signiﬁcantly
hampering productivity in 2018. DMA management changes
in 2019 reportedly smoothed relations between the DMA
and UNMAS and appeared to pave the way for some internal
restructuring within the DMA.16
KRI
IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI.
It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government’s
Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in
Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Financial
constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three
years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant,
but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA planned
to ﬁll vacant posts.17
Capacity at the start of 2018 included 37 12-strong manual
demining teams, 7 mechanical teams, 5 survey teams, 3 EOD
teams, 10 risk education teams, and 37 quality assurance
(QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the
work of all operators.18 IKMAA declined to provide details of
any changes in capacity or results of their activities.19
IKMAA’s priorities for areas affected by mineﬁelds remained
unchanged and included clearing agricultural land and
infrastructure, tackling conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine
incidents and casualties. 20
Operators identiﬁed areas affected by improvised mines for
clearance in consultation with district-level authorities and
submitted requests for task orders to IKMAA. Areas to which
communities were returning were the main priority. IKMAA
teams conducted QA.

STATES PARTIES

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess
the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas
and set three priorities: explosive threat management to
support stabilisation and recovery, including the return of
people displaced by conﬂict; deliver risk education, nationally
and locally; and build capacity of government entities to
manage, regulate and coordinate Iraq’s response to explosive
contamination. UNMAS had a staff of 100 people in Iraq as of
late April 2019, of which 48 were international. 21
Among other roles, UNMAS has functioned as the main
channel for international donor funding for mine action in
Iraq. In 2018, UNMAS received US$76.9 million, some of it
for activities in 2019–20, and by the end of April 2019 had
received pledges of an additional $10.9 million. UNMAS
reported spending approximately $39 million on clearance

operations in 2018 with the balance of programme spending
going on a range of activities including risk education and
capacity building activities such as improvised explosive
device disposal (IEDD) training for Civil Defence and police
and explosive hazard ﬁrst responder training courses.22
UNMAS contracted and issued grants to implementing
partners and tasked them to conduct assessment, survey,
“high-risk” search, and clearance in liberated areas on
tasks prioritised by a government-UNDP Funding Facility
for Stabilisation, along with other government priorities.
Focus was on critical infrastructure as well on tasks in other
locations identiﬁed by local authorities. UNMAS said tasks
were agreed with the DMA. 23 UNMAS’s role, however, faced
criticism in the DMA in 2018 under its previous director.
Relations reportedly improved after the change in DMA
leadership in early 2019. 24

GENDER
The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan speciﬁcally
mentions gender equality and gender mainstreaming within
mine action activities, and as objectives of an effective
programmatic response. 25 International operators and their
national partners individually recruit women for a variety of
roles, subject to cultural sensitivities that vary in different
parts of the country. Most operators employ women in
administrative ofﬁce roles, many also have a signiﬁcant
representation of women in community liaison and risk
education functions, while some also employ women in
clearance teams, including as team leaders. The possibilities
for employing women depended on cultural sensitivities that
varied between regions. 26
Danish Demining Group (DDG) engaged women in
management and administrative roles and similarly employed
women in mixed risk education/non-technical survey teams
but did not deploy them in clearance. 27 The Swiss Foundation
for Mine Action (FSD) employed women in community liaison
and administrative roles in 2018 and planned to stand up
an all-women clearance team to work in Mosul district in
2019. 28 G4S in Mosul employed mainly women community
liaison ofﬁcers and in Sinjar mobilised two mixed female-male
clearance teams, with half of the high-risk searchers being
Yazidi females. 29
MAG’s staff of 1,067 people included 111 women employed
across its programme – 88 in operational roles and the other
23 in support functions. Clearance teams with a total capacity
of 786 staff employed 48 women, including 26 deminers, four
of whom are team leaders and four deputy team leaders.
MAG’s community liaison/survey teams are all two-person,
mixed gender teams. Among the Yazidi community in
northern Sinjar district, MAG was able to employ women for
manual clearance, as mine detection dog (MDD) handlers,
and in mechanical teams. 30

NPA’s Iraq operation employed women in survey and
clearance roles, including as team leaders, as well as in most
administrative departments and in senior management. It
employed mixed teams of men and women for risk education
and community liaison in Nineveh in 2018, with at least one
woman per team conducting non-technical survey, and
with women as team leaders in Ramadi and Mosul districts.
Recruitment of women for non-ofﬁce jobs was more difﬁcult
in culturally more conservative governorates in southern
Iraq but NPA’s survey teams there also included at least
one woman. 31
UNMAS Iraq appointed a dedicated Senior Gender Adviser
in 2019, the ﬁrst UNMAS programme to create such a
post. It required implementing partners to apply Gender in
Mine Action guidelines and developed Standard Working
Practices to provide guidelines for implementing partners
with a focus on recruitment and activities in explosive threat
management, risk education, and building capacity. 32
There also exists a fully staffed Gender Unit at the DMA that
UNMAS is supporting. UNMAS implementing partners use
mixed gender teams in their community liaison/risk education
work, such as the mixed-gender Yazidi team in Sinjar
operating under G4S, and communications and advocacy
work is being done to promote women’s empowerment
within mine action. 33
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Information management and access to reliable data remain
a major challenge for mine action in Iraq but appeared poised
for improvement in 2019.
The DMA and IKMAA maintain Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation databases
with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service
provider working under contract to the US Department of
State’s Ofﬁce of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA).
Operators complain about a marked reluctance on the part
of iMMAP to share data with them.
The national mine action database is located at the DMA’s
Baghdad headquarters. RMAC South (RMAC-S) maintains
a database in Basrah, receiving reports from demining
organisations in its area of operations, which is synchronised
with Baghdad’s at intervals determined by the volume of
data to be uploaded. Operators working on projects funded
through UNMAS report directly to UNMAS, which in turn
forwards the data to the DMA. Although iMMAP coordinates
data on behalf of the DMA and IKMAA, operators report the
extent to which information was shared by all national actors
is unclear. 34
Operators are required to submit results in hard copy
delivered by hand every month to the DMA, which then
uploads results into the database. The procedure meets Iraqi
legal requirements, which do not recognise electronic copies,
but can cause long delays in uploading results of survey and
clearance. As a result, operators say task orders issued by
the DMA have often lacked the most up-to date information. 35

In March 2019, RMAC-S started receiving data reports
electronically as well as in hard copy. Improvements in
cluster munitions survey are strengthening the quality of
available data through the RMAC-S database. But in the mine
action sector in general, operators report limited access to
data and expressed concern about the limited quantity and
quality of data available with task orders. 36
All mine action stakeholders identiﬁed challenges to the
sector’s information management. The DMA and iMMAP
reported problems with the timeliness and accuracy of
reporting by implementing partners. 37 The DMA said it did not
receive any reports from UNMAS until May 2018, 38 a situation
that UNMAS said was attributable to its agreement with the
DMA at the time. 39 Operators voiced frustration with the lack
of consistency in DMA tasking and reporting requirements,
difﬁculties gaining access to data, and expressed a lack
of conﬁdence in its quality. 40 As at May 2019, the DMA was
preparing to roll out an Online Task Management System
(OTMS) prepared by iMMAP and designed to facilitate
investigation of data and streamline tasking. 41
In 2018, UNMAS set up an online tasking request form for
UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs to expedite explosive
threat management and to report potential explosive threats
in areas where they worked or intend to work in liberated
areas. Once a request had been validated, and where UNMAS
had capacity to respond, an implementing partner would be
tasked after the DMA was informed. Alternatively, UNMAS
would submit a suspected hazardous area (SHA) report to
the DMA. 42

PLANNING AND TASKING
Iraq’s APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request,
submitted in April 2017, laid out a general direction for
mine action, but its proposed actions were overtaken by
the emergency response launched for clearance of areas
liberated from Islamic State. Iraq’s mine action priority
in 2018 remained tackling the massive contamination by
mines of an improvised nature as well as ERW in liberated
areas to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons,
rehabilitation of public services, and restoration of the
economy. The scale of the challenge has largely marginalised
efforts to address legacy mineﬁelds in Federal Iraq. 43
Tasking and reporting proved a contentious issue in relations
between the DMA, UNMAS, and international operators in
2018, aggravated by weak coordination and the absence of
an agreed mechanism and frequent policy shifts. Operators
identify potential task sites and request task orders from
the DMA. Task orders were issued by the DMA’s Operations
Department and by the RMACs until the last quarter of 2018,
when responsibility for issuing task orders was centralised
in Operations in Baghdad. The DMA reported that operators
requested task orders for survey or clearance of areas that
had already been surveyed or cleared and failed to follow
up some task orders issued by the DMA. 44 International
actors reported multiple concerns, including long delays in
receiving DMA responses to task order requests, holding
back productive use of survey and clearance assets, the poor
quality of data accompanying task orders, and lack of clarity
or consistency in reporting requirements. 45
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In the KRI, IKMAA started work on a ﬁve-year strategy in the
last quarter of 2017, which focused on clearance of legacy
mineﬁelds. This followed the KRI’S independence referendum
and subsequent loss of control over much of the disputed
Grey Area heavily affected by mines of an improvised nature
and IEDs. IKMAA’s priorities remain unchanged and include
clearing agricultural land, infrastructure, tackling CHAs
close to populated areas as well as areas reporting most
mine incidents and casualties. 46 Population return from cities
and big towns to rural areas as a result of changing socioeconomic conditions has increased pressure for rural area
clearance. 47 Operators have already completed clearance of
high-risk areas and are now focused on medium-risk tasks,
including mined areas close to villages and impacting key
infrastructure. 48
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle
area clearance, non-technical survey and technical survey
that were written in 2004–05, and some have been updated,
but standards on land release reportedly have not kept up
with amendments to the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS). 49 National standards for IEDDs were under development
as of September 2019.50 International operators conducted
area clearance of mines of an improvised nature and other
devices according to their own SoPs which were reviewed
and approved by the DMA in the process of accreditation.
Operators conducted little clearance of residential buildings in
2018, but with strong demand from people displaced by conﬂict
to return to their houses the issue drew increasing attention
in 2019, highlighting the need for international and national
standards and Iraqi government policy decisions on issues
relating to liability for compensation claims in the event of
damage to private residences.51

Iraq’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) exist in Arabic
but there is no ofﬁcial English translation and international
operators have found it difﬁcult to get access to the Arabic
version. The DMA was discussing with Norwegian People’s
Aid (NPA) in mid-2019 a plan for updating standards in
consultation with other mine action stakeholders and also
had discussions with the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on the possibility of setting
up a programme of capacity development, including updating
standards and providing training. 52
The rapid expansion of mine action since 2017 and pressure
to accredit operators imposed acute strain on DMA’s quality
assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) capacity and left it with
limited ability to conduct effective QC. The DMA reported
it had six two-person QA teams in 2018, insufﬁcient for the
size of the sector. To keep up with the growth of the sector it
accredited ﬁve commercial companies and six NGOs for QA. 53
UNMAS had limited capacity to QA work by organisations it
contracted early in 2018, but in the course of the year hired
additional QA staff. 54

OPERATORS
The DMA identiﬁed a total of 61 organisations accredited for
some aspect of mine action of which at least 14 national and
9 international organisations are believed to have conducted
survey or clearance in 2018. 55
The Ministry of Defence reported it had 12 600-man engineer
battalions conducting EOD and clearance of mines of an
improvised nature in which approximately half the personnel
were operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identiﬁed
as priorities by local government authorities. 56 In Federal
Iraq, cleared items are the property of the Army which is
the only organisation authorised to conduct demolitions. 57
The Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence units employ 494
personnel divided into teams deployed in every governorate
tackling unexploded ordnance and other ERW but not
clearing IEDs or mines of an improvised nature. 58
In the KRI, IKMAA reported in May 2018 that it had maintained
capacity unchanged from the previous year: 37 demining
teams (444 personnel), 7 mechanical teams, 3 EOD teams,
5 survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams.
IKMAA teams are focused on clearing legacy mineﬁelds,
prioritising agricultural land, but it operated under severe
ﬁnancial constraints that led it in 2016 to cut salaries in half. 59
IKMAA declined to provide additional information in 2019. 60
Major national commercial operators included Arabian Gulf
and Ta’az Demining, both of which were active in the oil
sector. Other commercial companies identiﬁed by the DMA
as conducting mostly small amounts of survey or clearance
in 2018 included Al-Waha, Al-Danube, Al-Fahad Co. for
Demining, Alsiraj Almudhia, AKAD, Al-Khebra Company for
Demining and Eagle Eye. 61 International commercial operators
active in 2018 included Janus Global Operations, working
in partnership with Al-Fahad in Anbar, Kirkuk, and Nineveh
governorates and Optima working with Al-Danube teams
under contract to UNMAS in Anbar. G4S, also under contract
to UNMAS, was operational in 2018 and 2019 conducting
clearance in Nineveh governorate, including Mosul and Sinjar,
and in Kirkuk. 62

Among international humanitarian organisations, MAG,
the longest serving operator which has been present 27
years, also remained the biggest. It had a total staff of 1,067
at the end of 2018, up by more than 20% on its capacity a
year earlier. MAG continued to work in the KRI, operating
in 2018 with 24 teams (14 demining teams, 2 MDD teams,
1 mechanical team, and 7 risk education teams). The shift
in control of the former Grey Area from the KRI to Federal
Iraq at the end of 2017 saw most of MAG’s area of operations,
concentrated in Nineveh governorate, come under the
authority of the DMA. By the end of 2018, MAG had 89 teams
active in Federal Iraq, including 49 teams of deminers, 5
survey teams, 5 mechanical teams, 3 MDD teams and 27 risk
education teams. MAG also operated with 14 demining teams
in the KRI, as well as 1 mechanical team, 2 MDD teams, and
7 risk education teams. 63
Iraqi authorities and the DMA took steps in 2018 to accelerate
registration and accreditation of demining organisations but
continuing delays experienced by MAG in 2018 exempliﬁed
procedural and regulatory issues suffered to varying degrees
by all international operators. MAG lost the right of access to
Nineveh governorate for most of the ﬁrst half of 2018. Three
years after applying, it received registration from the NGO
Directorate in January 2018, temporary accreditation from the
DMA in March 2018, permission to deploy teams in May and
visas for Federal Iraq in June and it resumed operations in
ﬁve districts of Nineveh governorate between May and July. In
September, MAG received full accreditation for two years for
technical survey, manual clearance, mechanical survey and
clearance and IED disposal but not for non-technical survey,
risk education, and MDDs, which continued with temporary
accreditation extended until the end of the year. In October,
MAG lost permission for movement of teams between the KRI
and Federal Iraq because of an incident at a border checkpoint.
The permissions were reinstated in November allowing full
operations to resume. In the interim, MAG redeployed many of
the affected teams to support operations in the KRI’s Dohuk
and Slemani governorates.64
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DDG reduced its capacity in the KRI from six teams at the
end of 2017 to one four-person EOD team a year later but
expanded capacity in Federal Iraq from 20 to 29 teams.
These included two clearance and two risk education/
non-technical survey teams in Basra with the remainder
divided between Kirkuk, Mosul, and Salah al-Din, where
DDG opened an ofﬁce in September 2018 to support teams in
Tikrit and Baiji districts. Among issues DDG confronted was a
demand from local authorities in Kirkuk that its staff in that
governorate include 32% Arabs, 32% Turkmen, 32% Kurds,
and 4% Christians. Its inability to comply with this condition
meant that teams were denied access to operational sites
for extended periods of time and it regained access only
after the intervention of the UN Ofﬁce for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. 65
FSD started 2018 with four demining teams based in the KRI
who conducted some clearance of mineﬁelds in areas under
IKMAA’s control but after receiving temporary accreditation
from the DMA in April it added two teams in July and
conducted survey and clearance of mines of an improvised
nature in Nineveh. FSD received full, two-year operational
accreditation from the DMA in October 2018 and was able to
add two more clearance teams to ﬁnish the year with eight
teams and sixty-one deminers. It expected to add additional
capacity in 2019, recruiting deminers from minorities and
deploying them on clearing improvised mine belts around
minority villages. 66 Humanity & Inclusion (HI, previously
Handicap International), also based in Erbil, operated
one team and six deminers in the KRI and three teams
(one survey, two demining) with 10 personnel in DMA-run
areas of Kirkuk. After long delays, HI received operational
accreditation from the DMA in May 2018 and expected to
receive additional funding to expand capacity in 2019. 67
The HALO Trust, after setting up a Baghdad ofﬁce to complete
formalities establishing a programme at the end of 2017,
received six-month provisional accreditation in May 2018
and was able to start operations in Fallujah with one survey
and one mechanical team in 2018. HALO Trust operations
experienced delays when its provisional accreditation expired
in November before DMA conducted the operational audit
for full accreditation. HALO Trust later opened a sub-ofﬁce
in Tikrit with four manual clearance teams, two mechanical
teams and two survey teams, and a second sub-ofﬁce in
Ramadi for a total capacity of just over 100 staff. 68
NPA, which moved its management ofﬁce from Erbil to
Baghdad in December 2017, opened a project ofﬁce in Ramadi
in 2018 which covered Anbar governorate, where NPA also
opened a forward operating base in Haditha and an ofﬁce in
Ana. NPA also deployed non-technical survey teams to Diyala
governorate which were managed from Baghdad. After shifting
operations in the north from Erbil to Mosul, it closed its Erbil
ofﬁce in December 2018. With additional capacity in Basra
focusing on cluster munitions survey and clearance, NPA
ﬁnished 2018 with 108 operations staff in six manual clearance
teams, two mechanical teams, and thirteen survey teams. 69
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OPERATIONAL TOOLS
For area clearance of mines of an improvised nature (the
main focus of Iraq’s mine action in 2018), operators mostly
employed a combination of manual and mechanical assets.
Operators early on identiﬁed that mechanical assets rapidly
accelerated search and clearance of improvised mine belts
and employed a variety of assets, including armoured
Backhoes ﬁtted with a boom and rake for lifting the main
charge. Commercial operators conducting post-conﬂict
clearance of urban sites have employed front-end loaders
and sifters to tackle sometimes huge quantities of rubble.70
MAG also worked with MDDs engaged in the clearance of
medium-and low-risk conventional mineﬁelds in the KRI’s
Sulimaniya governorate.71

DEMINER SAFETY
The army acknowledged it had “sacriﬁced a lot of people”
in clearance operations but did not give details of casualties
and it was not apparent if engineer units had sustained
casualties in 2018.72 A MAG deminer was killed by detonation
of an improvised mine in October 2018. Investigations did
not produce a deﬁnitive ﬁnding as to what had caused the
detonation but pointed to the possibilities of it either being
while excavating in response to a signal or in the course of
marking a new lane.73
An NPA staff member working in an armoured Backhoe was
injured by the blast from an improvised mine as it was being
lifted from the ground. Part of the machine’s lifting arm
sheared off and hit the armoured glass, shattering but not
penetrating it. NPA replaced the glass and added a wire
grill placed over the glass which withstood subsequent
test detonations.74
More than a year after the military defeat of the Islamic State,
insecurity continued in certain localities, notably parts of
western Anbar governorate, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk.
Two HALO Trust national staff were killed in Anbar in an
attack by insurgents on a social gathering unrelated to mine
action in November 2018.75 In addition, insurgents continued
to carry out sporadic attacks with remote controlled and
vehicle-born IEDs.76 UNMAS reported one attack with small
arms ﬁre directed at a task site from multiple directions
prompting its evacuation.77 The United Nations reported
in July 2019 that Islamic State was expanding as a covert
network with large numbers of ﬁghters and supporters
in Iraq and Syria, operating freely in many locations and
creating conditions for an eventual resurgence.78
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Iraq continued to give top priority in 2018 to clearance of massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature as well as
IEDs from areas liberated from Islamic State in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by
conﬂict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery. The concentration of resources in these areas left little
capacity for tackling earlier, so-called legacy mineﬁelds, though some clearance continued of northern mined areas in the
KRI and in southern oilﬁelds.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Productivity appears to have risen sharply in 2018 but gaps
and inconsistencies in data prevented a clear determination
of progress. In Federal Iraq, the DMA reported release of
a total of 135.1km2, including clearance of 83.3km2 of areas
contaminated by improvised devices, thought to consist
mainly of mines of an improvised nature (however, the DMA
did not provide details of clearance by operator or identify
device types, making it difﬁcult to determine the basis
or reliability of the data, and Mine Action Review has not

included the clearance in its national total for Iraq); clearance
of 1.6km2 of areas affected by anti-personnel mines;
cancellation of 1.7km2 through non-technical survey, and
area reduction through technical survey of 48.5km2.79
IKMAA declined to provide details of mine action results in
the KRI. 80 In Iraq’s Article 7 report for 2018, IKMAA recorded
3,484 anti-personnel mines destroyed during the year but
provided no details of land released. 81

SURVEY IN 2018
Iraq reported little cancellation through non-technical survey
in 2018 but considerable area reduction through technical
survey. The unusual balance underscored lack of clarity in
requirements for reporting cancellation and area reduction. 82
Iraq’s Civil Defence and the Ministry of Defence accounted
for a little over half the total area reduced and commercial
companies for 40%. The basis for this data was unclear. 83
Land release data reported by international humanitarian
NGOs did not match the area reduction that the DMA
attributed to them.
MAG reported reducing 739,870m2 through technical
survey, 80% of which was in Nineveh governorate, with a
small amount in Kirkuk, and a total of 70,882m2 in the KRI
governorates of Dohuk and Sulimaniya. 84

Table 6: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018 87
Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Civil Defence

13,447,963

Ministry of Defence

12,486,340

RMAC South
Al-Waha
Al-Danube
Al-Fahad
Alsiraj Almudhia
Arabian Gulf

3,150
6,881,831
90,888
2,445,140
981,327
7,867,967

NPA assessed a total of 94,243,575m2 in 2018, of which 95%
was in Anbar province, including 65.7km2 in Haditha district,
12.5km2 in Ana district and 11.1km2 in Ramadi. The other
areas assessed were Hamdaniya district of Nineveh (2.7km2)
and four districts of Diyala governorate (2.3km2). NPA said it
cancelled or reduced 1.82km2. 85

Nabaa Al-Hurya

Table 5: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 2018 86

Handicap

161,392

HALO

179,291

Operator

SHAs
cancelled

Area cancelled
(m²)

Civil Defence

2

857,509

Ministry of Defence

2

254,919

Handicap International

17

596,549

Total

21

1,708,977

Ta’az
Wtorplast Demining

12,116
1,995,169
900

DDG

27,607

FSD

296,778

MAG

58,685

NPA

1,552,168

Total

48,488,712

CLEARANCE IN 2018
Federal Iraq reported release of 83.3km2 of areas affected
by IEDs and improvised mines and 63,596 devices, a 50%
increase in area cleared compared with results reported by
the DMA the previous year and a more than fourfold increase
in the number of devices cleared. The DMA did not provide
details of clearance by operator or identify device types,
making it difﬁcult to determine the basis or reliability of the
data. 88 Given this, Mine Action Review has not included the

clearance in its national total for Iraq. The total clearance
recorded for Iraq (8.44km2) comprises clearance of antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature by humanitarian
demining organisations in Federal Iraq (5.65km2; see Table 8);
clearance reported by the Ministry of Defence (1.59km2;
see Table 9); and clearance in northern Iraq by (1.2km2;
see Table 10). 89
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Clearance results underscored the focus on Nineveh
governorate, including the heavily contaminated districts of
Mosul, al-Hamdaniya, Sinjar and Telafar, which apparently
accounted for 90% of the area cleared and 94% of devices
(see Table 7). Mosul city, occupied for three years by Islamic
State and saturated with improvised devices, was a priority
for clearance by the military and international commercial
operators who were the only operators conducting
systematic building clearance in 2018. Mosul district,
including the city, accounted for 0.01% of the area that the
DMA reported cleared in Nineveh governorate but for 81% of
devices destroyed.90 In 2018, operators in the city dealt with
782 suicide belts, many of them still attached to corpses of
Islamic State ﬁghters, and shifted 7.6 million tons of rubble.91
Janus reported releasing 1,462,301m2 in Anbar province,
more than recorded by the DMA in that governorate, and
1,716,436m2 in Nineveh and Kirkuk governorates.92
Table 7: Clearance of areas affected by IEDs and improvised
mines in 2018 93
Areas
cleared

Area cleared
(m2)

Devices
destroyed

Anbar

29

1,380,180

3,483

Kirkuk

1

7,020

10

438

75,404,782

59,881

Governorate

Nineveh
Salah al-Din
Totals

6

6,546,255

222

474

83,338,237

63,596

International humanitarian operators reported more modest
results with clearance of areas affected by improvised
mines, mostly pressure-plate mines, amounting to
5.6km2 (see Table 8), about 18% less than the 6.9km2 of
this contamination cleared the previous year. Most of the
clearance in both years was conducted by MAG, much the
biggest operator, and the downturn appears to reﬂect its
inability to deploy teams for most of the ﬁrst half of the
year pending receipt of its DMA accreditation.94

Table 8: Clearance of improvised mines by humanitarian
demining organisations in 2018 95
Area cleared (m2)

Operator

Mines destroyed

DDG

24,086

3

FSD

1,165,775

2,743

HALO Trust

13,216

125

HI

11,077

48

4,281,620

1,494

MAG
NPA
Totals

149,840

268

5,645,614

4,681

UNMAS reported that the operators it funded cleared
1,158 hazardous areas and 847,004m2, but it also did not
disaggregate results by operator. Organisations working
for UNMAS cleared 1,117 structures and 17,956 explosive
devices. UNMAS reported clearance of two anti-personnel
mines, two anti-vehicle mines, and 14,443 ERW.96
The intensive effort to clear areas liberated from Islamic
State left little capacity available to tackle Iraq’s extensive
legacy mineﬁelds. The DMA reported clearance of a total of
1.59km2, two-thirds of it apparently conducted by the Ministry
of Defence and the rest by national commercial companies
(see Table 9).
International NGOs reported additional clearance of legacy
mined areas in 2018 (see Table 10). MAG and FSD both
conducted clearance in areas of the KRI coordinated by
IKMAA, which declined to report any details of operations by
its own clearance teams. Nearly two-thirds of the additional
clearance was conducted by MAG in Kirkuk governorate.97

Table 9: Mine clearance in 2018 98
Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

ERW destroyed

64

1,064,339

2,122

461

3,759

Ministry of Defence
AKAD

4

124,522

15

0

24

Al-Khebra

107

336,261

1,370

10

1,594

Eagle Eye

7

63,603

17

0

26

182

1,588,725

3,524

471

5,403

UXO destroyed

Totals

Table 10: INGO mine clearance in the KRI and Federal Iraq in 2018 99
Province

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

Kirkuk

MAG

24

736,135

290

56

Diyala

HI

3

41,751

20

38

Nineva

MAG100

123

4,386,484

1

2,358

Federal Iraq

Federal Iraq totals

150

5,164,370

311

2,452

Dohuk

MAG

16

203,265

160

41

Erbil

FSD

3

16,955

17

3

Sulimaniya

MAG

11

125,385

415

40

Sulimaniya

FSD

2

76,624

2

91

32

422,229

594

175

182

5,586,599

905

2,627

KRI totals
Overall totals
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 FEBRUARY 2008
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2017), Iraq is
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 February 2028.
The scale of mine contamination in Federal Iraq and the
KRI makes it highly unlikely that Iraq will meet its Article
5 deadline. On current contamination estimates it would
require release of more than 200km2 a year to meet its 2028
deadline, signiﬁcantly more than present levels. Moreover,
the data on area contamination does not capture the extent
and complexity of clearing a major city such as Mosul,
devastated by conﬂict, or the thousands of residential
buildings in towns and villages across liberated areas that
were seeded by Islamic State with explosive devices and
require systematic search.101
Iraq has not taken a clear ofﬁcial position acknowledging
victim-activated explosive devices as part of its Article 5
obligation and debate continues on which of the wide range
of improvised devices, such as booby-traps encountered
in buildings come under the APMBC. Irrespective, devices
encountered in structures represent a humanitarian
imperative that in any event will consume signiﬁcant time,
capacity, and resources of the mine action sector.
Iraq’s Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in
April 2017 at a point it was still gearing up a response to
contamination in liberated areas, provided few details of its
plans, priorities, or timelines for clearance. It also did not
include contamination by mines of an improvised nature as
part of its treaty obligation. Iraq is due to present an update
to the request in 2019 which should provide more clarity on
its prospects for addressing its treaty obligations.
Accelerating clearance reported by the DMA in 2018, if
validated, shows the potential for Iraq sharply reducing
contamination by 2028, even if clearance is not completed.

1

Email from Ahmed Aljasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA,
7 May 2019.

2

Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 7 Report (for 2018), p. 21.

3

Ibid.

4

Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.

5

Iraq does not use the term improvised mines or mines of an improvised
nature. The DMA reports improvised explosive devices and available data
do not disaggregate items that qualify as mines of an improvised nature,
even though this is what the APMBC requires.

Additionally, Iraq is conﬁdent that re-survey of legacy
mined will lead to signiﬁcant reduction in estimates of
contamination.102 Iraq, however, faces challenges that leave
prospects for progress uncertain. The difﬁculty obtaining
quality data on either contamination or clearance points
to deep rooted structural issues in Iraq’s mine action
programme that hold back efﬁcient use of available assets.
They include institutional relationships between Iraqi
government entities and between the DMA, UNMAS, and
international operators and the need to build capacity in
the national mine action authority.
Continued progress will depend heavily on sustained
international donor support. The extension request envisaged
expenditure from government sources of $30 million in
2018−19 and $238 million over the 10-year period to the end
of 2027. The Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties invited Iraq
to report annually on funding available from external sources
and the government for its treaty implementation efforts.103
Most funding in 2018 continued to be channelled through
UNMAS and bilaterally to mine action NGO operators and
the DMA was unable to give details of government funding
available to mine action in 2017, 2018 or 2019.104
Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
(2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

8.4

2017

23.3

2016

16.4

2015

5.2

2014

8.6

Total

61.9
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101 In Mosul’s Al-Shifa hospital complex, formerly the biggest and most modern
in Iraq but used by Islamic State as its headquarters, Optima reported
clearing 340,000m2 and more than 1,800 explosive devices.
102 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, Director, DMA RMAC South, in Basrah,
29 April 2019.
103 “Decisions on the request submitted by Iraq for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention”, 21 December 2017.
104 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, Assistant Director General, DMA,
Baghdad, 5 May 2019.
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018 – six years after formally declaring it had fulﬁlled its Article 5 clearance obligations – Jordan ﬁnally completed the
veriﬁcation and sampling project of previously cleared mined areas in the Jordan Valley and checks of previously cleared
mined areas on the northern borders, bringing it back into compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC).
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
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(2018)
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OF CONTAMINATION
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There are no remaining mined areas suspected or conﬁrmed to contain anti-personnel
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8

The NCDR is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality assuring
all mine action organisations in Jordan. Jordan provided government funding to the
NCDR and for veriﬁcation of previously cleared mined areas.

6

According to the NCDR, there is equal access to women and men in survey and clearance
teams. Survey and community liaison teams in Jordan are mixed and women and children
are consulted during these activities.

9

Jordan uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
and submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 reports.
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5

The sampling and veriﬁcation project in the Jordan Valley was conducted by manual
demining teams under the NCDR, and the checks on the northern border by the Armed
Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC).
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In 2018, Jordan completed the veriﬁcation and sampling project of previously cleared
mined areas in the Jordan Valley and checks of previously cleared mined areas on the
northern borders, bringing it into compliance with APMBC Article 5.
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Jordan reports that it completed sampling and veriﬁcation
for missing mines in previously cleared areas in the Jordan
Valley and checks of previously cleared mined areas on
the northern borders by June 2018.1 According to Jordan’s
most recent APMBC Article 7 report, there are no remaining
areas in need of veriﬁcation in either the Jordan Valley or the
northern borders. 2

that sampling and veriﬁcation in the Jordan Valley, overseen
by the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation
(NCDR), had been completed in June 2018.12 Jordan
subsequently announced completion of its “veriﬁcation for
missing mines” project in June 2018, in its Transparency
Statement at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in
November 2018.13

Jordan had previously declared fulﬁlment of its Article 5
clearance obligations on 24 April 2012, having determined
that no areas under its jurisdiction or control remained in
which anti-personnel mines were known or suspected. 3
However, in formally declaring completion of its Article 5
obligations at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in
December 2012, Jordan noted that: “While all mined areas
that Jordan had made every effort to identify were cleared
by 24 April 2012, Jordan, as a responsible State Party,
has proceeded with veriﬁcation efforts in two parts of the
country, with these veriﬁcation efforts having resulted in
the discovery of additional mined areas.”4

With respect to the northern border, in its 2012 Article
5 Declaration of Completion, Jordan reported that some
6.9km2 remained to be veriﬁed, and that the process being
undertaken by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had been
delayed for security reasons.14 NPA’s veriﬁcation procedure
involved a mixture of visual inspection of areas adjacent to
the mine belt, ground preparation with mechanical assets,
and limited involvement of manual deminers, with full
technical survey of areas where evidence and experience
pointed to a risk of contamination.15 By May 2013, the
estimated area needing veriﬁcation had been reduced to
around 5km2, but operations by NPA were halted because
of the security situation.16

This pertained ﬁrst to the need for veriﬁcation in the
Jordan Valley, as earlier clearance by the Jordanian Armed
Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC) did not comply with
national and international standards and was not subject
to quality control;5 and second to veriﬁcation needed along
Jordan’s northern border with Syria, due to a considerable
discrepancy between the recorded number of emplaced
mines and the number actually cleared (estimated to be more
than 10,000 mines6). Some of the difference in the ﬁgures
was ascribed to the movement of mines to outside identiﬁed
areas, due to ﬂooding and terrain ﬂuctuations, detonations,7
and unrecorded clearance operations by the army or by
smugglers. 8 In February 2019, Jordan offered a further
explanation for some of the difference: the failure to record
some of the earlier clearance.9
With respect to the Jordan Valley, Jordan reported in its
December 2012 declaration of Article 5 completion that
5km2 remained to be veriﬁed in an effort expected to take
two years.10 As at the end of 2017, 1.4km2 of area in need of
veriﬁcation remained across 36 areas in the Jordan Valley.11
In September 2018, Jordan reported to Mine Action Review

In its 2015–20 National Plan, Jordan reported that 3.7km2
remained to be veriﬁed and inspected by QC teams along the
northern border.17 Jordan reported that, as at end 2017, just
over 2.8km2 across 18 areas along the northern border still
needed veriﬁcation.18 In September 2018, Jordan reported to
Mine Action Review that the Jordanian military had “checked”
the remaining areas on the northern border,19 and in its
Transparency Statement at the Seventeenth Meeting of States
Parties in November 2018, Jordan subsequently announced
completion of quality control procedures by its armed forces,
and the use of the land for military purposes.20 In February
2019, Jordan reconﬁrmed to Mine Action Review that the
required checks in this area had been completed before June
2018 and no future action was needed from the NCDR.21
Jordan remains contaminated by explosive remnants of war
(ERW), primarily the result of the 1948 partition of Palestine,
the 1967 Arab-Israeli conﬂict, the 1970 civil war, and the
1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and
cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Jordan established the NCDR under a Royal Decree, which
the government subsequently incorporated into law. 22 The
NCDR’s board of directors includes representatives of the
Jordanian Armed Forces, the government, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), landmine survivors, and the media.23
The NCDR did not, though, become fully operational until
2004, when a new administration, chaired by Prince
Mired Raad Zeid al-Hussein, was appointed. 24 The NCDR is
responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and
quality-assuring all mine action organisations, as well as for
fundraising.25 It is also responsible for ensuring mine action is
integrated into the country’s wider development strategies. 26

In addition, Jordan’s national plan reports that the NCDR
will transition from a national institution focusing largely
on its own explosive ordnance clearance, to one that will
concentrate on assisting other conﬂict-affected countries to
overcome the challenges of mine action and ERW removal. 27
In 2018, the Jordanian government provided 220,000
Jordanian dinars (approximately US$310,300) towards the
cost of the NCDR and 20,000 Jordanian dinars (approximately
US$28,200) for veriﬁcation of areas in the Jordan Valley. 28
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JORDAN

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

GENDER
All groups affected by anti-personnel mine contamination,
including women and children, were consulted during survey
and community liaison activities, as speciﬁed in Jordan’s
national standards. 29 Survey and community liaison teams are
mixed gender and in some surveys women made up 50% of
the team. Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by
sex and age. 30

According to the NCDR, there is equal access for women
and men in survey and clearance teams, including
managerial-level positions, but there is a greater proportion
of women in survey teams than in clearance teams. 31

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The NCDR uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. 32
Jordan submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 reports under the APMBC.

PLANNING AND TASKING
The NCDR’s 2015–20 National Plan aimed to verify, sample,
and release the remaining 5.4km2 in the Jordan Valley by
the end of 2017, by deploying six manual clearance teams
and one mechanical demining team at a projected cost of
US$2 million. 33 Jordan fell slightly behind schedule, due to
not deploying the capacity assumed in the National Plan, but
completed the sampling and veriﬁcation in the Jordan Valley
in June 2018. 34

According to the 2015–20 National Plan, resuming veriﬁcation
and release of the remaining mined areas along the northern
border with Syria was dependent on the security situation
but, would require one year’s work with three manual teams
and one mechanical team, at an expected cost of $1 million.35
According to the National Authorities, Jordan’s military
reportedly “checked” the areas on the northern borders and
that, as a result of these checks, further QC by the NCDR in
that region was deemed unnecessary. 36

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The veriﬁcation and demining operations in Jordan were
conducted by the NCDR and REC. From October 2015, the
NCDR deployed four operational teams, totalling 35 deminers,
for veriﬁcation and clearance. 37 From January 2018, capacity
was reduced to three operational teams. 38

According to the NCDR, a shortage of funds prevented it from
deploying mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs)
in its Jordan Valley operations. 39

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, Jordan reported ﬁnding and destroying six
anti-personnel mines (ﬁve M14 mines and one M35 mine)
and releasing a total of 961,860m2, during sampling and
veriﬁcation efforts in the Jordan Valley. 40

sampling and veriﬁcation efforts in the Jordan Valley were
completed in June 2018, 42 and, according to Jordan, no mined
areas suspected or conﬁrmed to contain anti-personnel
mines remain. 43

This represents a decrease on the 1.44km2 of land veriﬁed
and released in 2017, when 75 anti-personnel mines (72
M14 mines and 3 M35 mines) and 2 anti-vehicle mines were
destroyed. 41 The decrease in 2018 is due to the fact that

In addition, Jordan’s military reportedly “checked” the areas
on the northern borders, 44 but Jordan did not report any
anti-personnel mines as having been found and destroyed
in 2018, as part of that process. 45
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JORDAN

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR JORDAN: 1 MAY 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MAY 2012
DATE OF ACTUAL COMPLETION: JUNE 2018

Jordan is believed to no longer have outstanding Article 5
obligations. In its latest Article 7 transparency report, Jordan
reported that, as at the end of 2018, no mined areas requiring
veriﬁcation or quality control (QC) remained. 46
Prior to June 2018, Jordan declared fulﬁlment of its Article
5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of its 1 May 2012
Convention deadline, in accordance with the three-year
extension request granted by states parties in 2008. When
Jordan submitted its formal declaration of completion to
the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, 47
it acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas
where landmines have been emplaced”, 48 and noted that
veriﬁcation efforts had resulted in the discovery of additional
mined areas. 49 Between declaring completion in 2012 and
completion of the sampling and veriﬁcation project in 2018
in the Jordan Valley and of checks of remaining areas on the
northern border, Jordan had been in violation of the APMBC
as it had failed to request an extension to its 2012 Article
5 deadline while it undertook the required sampling and
veriﬁcation.

Jordan had continued to discover and clear signiﬁcant
numbers of mines in areas it veriﬁed, despite having
declared completion.
In the period between 2014 and 2018, Jordan veriﬁed close to
5km of mined area (see Table 1), during which a total of 463
anti-personnel mines, 10 anti-vehicle mines, and 181 other
items of UXO were discovered and destroyed. 50
Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (veriﬁed) (km2)

2018

0.96

2017

1.44

2016

1.36

2015

0.65

2014

0.55

Total

4.96
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Niger experienced a surge in attacks by non-state armed groups employing mines and other explosive devices of an
improvised nature in 2018. Niger pledged to resume mine clearance from the end of 2018 but has not recorded any
survey or clearance since that date.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Niger should submit a comprehensive Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline
extension request, including details of past survey and clearance, an updated list of mined areas requiring
clearance, and a detailed workplan for meeting its international legal obligations.

■

Niger should submit annual Article 7 reports detailing the progress of mine action as the APMBC requires.

■

Niger should develop and implement a fundraising strategy to ensure it fulﬁls commitments made in its
earlier Article 5 deadline extension request.

■

Niger should seek and facilitate engagement of international demining organisations.

■

Niger should ensure its national mine action standards are in accordance with international standards and
that there is a quality management system in place to safeguard the quality of demining operations.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Niger has identiﬁed limited anti-personnel mine contamination in the Agadez region but
it lacks clarity on the extent. It also now faces escalating attacks by non-state armed
groups and new contamination from mines of an improvised nature.

5

The limited mine action in the past ﬁve years was funded by Niger’s limited resources
but while stipulating the need for international funding and for further progress has not
availed itself of support offered by humanitarian organisations.

2

Niger’s limited statements on mine action make no reference to gender.

3

Inconsistent reporting of mine clearance points to weak information management.
Niger has submitted only one Article 7 transparency report since 2012 (in 2018).

3

Niger lacks a strategic plan for mine action or detailed workplans.

4

Niger has reported that it has national standards that are compliant with the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) but it is not known if they have been formally adopted.

2

Niger did not release any mined area in the last two years and there is a lack of clarity
about the extent of clearance since 2014.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

6

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

3.7

Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des
Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■

None

CNCCAI
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NIGER

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Niger reported in 2018 that it had two mined areas totalling
235,557m2 near Madama, a military base in the north-east of
the country: a conﬁrmed hazardous area (CHA) of 39,304m2
and a suspected hazardous area (SHA) of 196,253m2.1 Three
hazardous areas visited by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
in Madama in 2017 were believed to contain mostly French
M51 minimum-metal anti-personnel mines. Nigerien army
engineers, conducting earlier clearance operations, had
found the mines buried in sand at depths of up to one metre. 2
Niger’s varying statements on clearance activities leave
some uncertainty about the extent of the CHA remaining to
be cleared (see Article 5 compliance section below). 3

Niger also identiﬁed ﬁve additional SHAs in the Agadez region
(in Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga)
but said non-technical and technical survey in 2014 had
determined they were not contaminated by anti-personnel
mines and that communities in the area had reported
accidents only involving anti-vehicle mines. 4 A PRB M3
anti-vehicle mine was also discovered in March 2019 near
the central town of Intikane. 5 The areas are all located
in Niger’s Agadez region, in the north in a remote desert
area, 450km from the rural community of Dirkou in Bilma
department and reported to contain mines that date back
to the French colonial era. 6

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by region (at 2016) 7
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

Agadez

1

39,304

1

196,253

2

235,557

NEW CONTAMINATION
The growing use of mines of an improvised nature in western
Niger over the past year has added another dimension of
uncertainty over the scale of Niger’s challenge. Starting in the
second half of 2018, Niger experienced a surge in attacks by
groups affiliated with Islamic State or al-Qaida. Attacks were
concentrated in the western Tillabery and Tahoua regions,
employing a range of artisanal explosive devices, including
anti-vehicle mines; victim-activated, pressure plate devices
that appear to meet the APMBC deﬁnition of anti-personnel
mines; and command-detonated devices. 8

A mine or improvised explosive device (IED) detonation in
January 2019 injured four Niger soldiers near Titahoune
(Tillabery)9 and an improvised device detonated under a
convoy of vehicles in an ambush by heavily-armed insurgents
in Tillabery in May 2019 during which 28 soldiers were
killed.10 A 12-ton armoured US Army vehicle was disabled
in June 2019 by an improvised mine on the outskirts of
Ouallem town (Tillabery). The device was activated by a
weather-proofed pressure plate linked to an 81mm mortar.
Its explosion detonated a main charge consisting of nearly a
dozen 60mm mortar shells.11 A car bomb attack on a Nigerien
army base near the border with Mali in July started an
assault in which insurgents killed 18 Nigerien soldiers.12

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the
National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit
Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le
Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly
to the President.

NPA conducted evaluation missions to Niger in May 2015 and
December 2017 to assess the possibility of assisting Niger
to meet its Article 5 deadline. Contacts continued in 2019,
exploring the possibility of NPA setting up a programme to
support CNCCAI clearance operations.14

All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army.
In 2015, Niger said it had 60 deminers but lacked sufﬁcient
equipment for them to be able to work at the same time.13

GENDER
Niger’s latest (third) Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2016, made no reference to gender.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Niger submitted an Article 7 report in 2018, the ﬁrst report since 2012. It also delivered statements to the APMBC
Intersessional Meetings and Meeting of States Parties in 2018.
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STATES PARTIES

Niger does not have a strategic plan for mine action. Its third Article 5 deadline extension request in 2016 did not set out
a workplan or benchmarks for survey or clearance as requested by the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation.
Niger’s Article 7 Report for 2013–18 set out a rudimentary operational timeline providing for clearance of 196,253m2 by
2020, including 56,000m2 in 2018, 100,253m2 in 2019, and 40,000m2 in 2020.15

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In its Third Article 5 Extension Request Niger reported that,
it had drafted national mine action standards (NMAS) in
accordance with the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) and standard operating procedures.16 No information
has been provided on whether Niger’s NMAS have been
ﬁnalised and adopted.
A Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) team’s visit to Adama in
December 2017 noted manual clearance was the main tool
of demining by Niger’s army engineers but highlighted the
operational challenges. The M-51 mines mostly found in the
area contained no components and were largely undetectable

by conventional metal detectors and sufﬁciently small as to
make detection by GPR-based detectors unreliable calling
for full manual excavation. The process was slow and the
sandy environment, prone to subsidence and back-ﬁlling,
made it difﬁcult to maintain consistent excavation depths.
Mechanical excavation using sifting and screening equipment
would dramatically improve the speed of technical survey
and clearance but faced severe logistical challenges because
of the long distances, absence of roads, limited provisions
for maintenance and cost. Mine Detection Dogs were also
deemed unsuitable because of the extreme climate and the
potential for deep-buried mines.17

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
CLEARANCE IN 2018
Niger claimed it was unable to conduct any clearance in 2018 because of the lack of ﬁnancial resources, the higher priority
given to counterterrorism activities, and the “failure” of unspeciﬁed international organisations to respect their commitments.
It pledged to resume demining activities at the start of 2019.18 CNCCAI reportedly deployed 30 deminers in mid-June 2019 to
conduct mine clearance in Madama. The operation was reportedly funded by Niger from national resources.19

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 4-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2016
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
four-year extension request granted by states parties in
2016), Niger is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 31 December 2020. It is not on
track to meet this deadline.
It is unclear what progress Niger has made since the
Maputo Review Conference in 2014. The amount of clearance
reported by Niger from 2014 to 2016 in Madama has varied
from 17,000m2 and 750 mines to 39,304m2 and 1,075 mines. 20
NPA’s assessment mission in December 2017 received
reports of clearance ranging from 29,000m2 to 39,304m2. 21

Niger submitted a second request for an extension to its
Article 5 deadline on 12 November 2015, less than two
months before the expiry of its ﬁrst extended deadline. States
Parties observed this did not conform to procedure and left
insufﬁcient time for analysis and discussion. The decision
also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request
was “workable but lacks ambition”. States parties agreed
to give Niger a one-year extension and requested that it
provide, in its revised submission, information on the areas
already released disaggregated by the method of release and
an updated workplan listing all areas known or suspected
to contain anti-personnel mines and annual clearance
projections during the period covered by the request. 22
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PLANNING AND TASKING

The third extension request Niger submitted in 2016 did not
include such a workplan and a request from the Committee
on Article 5 Implementation for additional information
received no reply. 23
Niger’s third extension request said it needed more than
US$3.2 million in funding to fulﬁl its remaining Article 5
obligations, including $1 million for the CNCCAI from the
national budget over the ﬁve-year period, and $2.2 million
to be mobilised from external donors.24 At the June 2018
APBMC Intersessional Meetings, Niger stated that without the
support of partners it was unlikely that Niger would be able
to complete clearance by its Article 5 deadline and reserved
the right to submit another extension request by the end of
December 2019. 25

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (veriﬁed) (km2)

2018

0

2017

0

2016

0.01

2015

0.01

2014

0

Total

0.02

Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance
for mine action and claimed receiving no external support
for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical
evacuation in the case of demining accidents.26 NPA and DDG
have made offers of assistance to Niger but received no reply.27
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16

2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8−9.

2

NPA, “End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs”, undated but 2018.

17
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Nigeria’s military reopened the strategically-important Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road in March 2018 after four years when it was
closed due to insecurity and the presence of explosive devices. Nigeria informed states parties in May 2019 that non-technical
survey and clearance of mines and improvised explosive devices would start “as soon as security conditions permit”, enabling
Nigeria to report on suspected or conﬁrmed contamination. Conﬂict, which is ongoing, features continued use of munitions by
non-state armed groups.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Nigeria should urgently take all possible measures to clear anti-personnel mines, including those of an
improvised nature.

■

Nigeria should give priority to mine action in the humanitarian response to the emergency in the north-east
and establish a mine action centre to work with humanitarian partners to develop a structured programme for
survey and, when security permits, clearance.

■

Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining
organisations and continue to provide risk education to the civilian population.

■

Nigeria should support systematic collection of data on incidents, casualties, and contamination,
disaggregated by device types.

■

Nigeria should submit an Article 7 report to inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) of the discovery of any contamination from anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised
nature, and report on the location of all suspected or conﬁrmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.
It should also report on the status of programmes for their destruction and request to its Article 5 deadline
which expired on 1 March 2012.

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army, police

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■

UNMAS
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Nigeria continued to experience casualties in 2018 and 2019
from Boko Haram’s widespread use of explosive devices,
including mines of an improvised nature, in Adamawa, Borno
and Yobe states in the north east. The extent and nature of
contamination remains unclear.
A scoping mission by UNMAS to assess explosive threats in
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in 2017 noted widespread
use of pressure-plate devices along the main supply routes
which were conﬁgured to detonate from the weight of a person
and function as very large anti-personnel mines.1 These
fall within the APMBC. Borno state was the most severely
impacted. Civilians reported the presence of victim-activated
devices in 76% of Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno;
59% of LGAs in Yobe; and 52% of LGAs in Adamawa.2
Improvised devices, whether body-borne, vehicle-borne,
command-detonated, or victim-activated, continue to pose
the main explosive threat. The widespread presence of these
devices holds back the resettlement of people displaced by
conﬂict, prevents access to agricultural land and obstructs
delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services. 3

Assessments in 2015 and 2017 both cited reports of
the presence of mines but that perception is changing.
Interviewees in a DDG assessment in Borno and Adamawa
in November 2015 reported the presence of Chinese Type
4 anti-personnel mines and Type 72 anti-vehicle mines. It
noted local community reports of local government areas in
Borno state that were believed to need clearance, including
Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, Kala-Balge, Kukawa, Marte, and Ngala. 4
UNMAS’s scoping mission said “reliable resources” had
reported the use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines
around defensive positions. 5 In 2019, UNMAS said that despite
such oral reports, “no physical evidence of (manufactured)
landmine(s) has been found”. 6

NEW CONTAMINATION
Operators report continued re-contamination of roads that
have been opened by the military and police.7 Troops took
back control of the town of Gwoza in 2014 but a roadside
device explosion close to the town in March 2019 killed eight
people and injured seven more. 8

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nigeria does not have a formal mine action programme.
The Nigerian army and police conduct explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) operations coordinated by the Theatre
Commander to respond to operational priorities. The army’s
clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is primarily
focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads
and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks
on Boko Haram and keep military supply routes open.9
The police have seconded units to the military to conduct
clearance in newly-secured areas and deployed EOD teams
to Maiduguri and a number of other towns.10
The United Kingdom and the United States each provided a
military support team to the Theatre Command headquarters
in Maiduguri. The teams included EOD advisers capable
of providing training and equipment. In 2018, the Nigerian
authorities were reportedly unwilling to receive their
advice or support and made no request for UN support, but
cooperation with British military experts was reported to
have developed in 2019.11

The 2016 Buhari Plan for Rebuilding the North East from the
Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI)
includes a plan for demining as part of clean-up operations
in reclaimed communities before resettlement of internally
displaced persons (IDPs). It assigns responsibility for
clearance to the National Emergency Management Agency
(NEMA), the Nigerian Military, and paramilitary bodies. The
plan provided a budget of 76 million naira (approximately
$380,000) for clearance of 38 local government areas but
provided no details of how the plan would be implemented
or the basis for this budget.12 In September 2018, it was
announced that the federal government was planning to
spend $6.7 billion to deliver the Buhari Plan.13
The humanitarian response programme for the north-east
has a Mine Action Sub-sector co-chaired by the Ministry of
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement and UNMAS.
At the request of the UN humanitarian coordinator, UNMAS
deployed a team of ﬁve to the capital of Bornon state, Maiduguri,
in July 2018 to provide planning, coordination and technical
advice notably to support plans for resettlement of IDPs and
for the delivery risk education, survey and clearance.14

GENDER
Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up
gender in the context of mine action.
The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21
unveiled in December 2018 said women, girls, boys, and
men living in, or potentially returning to, areas suspected
or known to be contaminated with mines or other explosive
devices would be involved in all stages of mine action
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programming. It called for “age and gender appropriate risk
education activities to minimize loss of life and injuries as a
result of explosive remnants of war”, targeting 200,000 girls,
178,000 boys, 51,000 women, and 45,000 men.15 UNMAS was
conducting an analysis in 2019 on the impact of explosive
devices on different socio-economic groups, genders, and
age groups to inform the humanitarian response.16

STATES PARTIES

Nigeria does not have a mine action information management
system and has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2012.
In a statement to the 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings,
Nigeria said it would provide information on all areas of
contamination “as soon as security conditions permit” access
for non-technical survey of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe
states. It acknowledged that “much needs to be done” and
called for international technical support.17
UNMAS said it started to collect data on explosive incidents
in 2018. Information was gathered mainly from open sources,
including the Armed Conﬂict Location & Event Data Project
(ACLED), as well as security information provided by the UN,

NGOs, and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Information
was also provided by the Nigerian army and police EOD
units but not on a systematic basis.18 MAG also maintained
a database of different incidents related to mines and
other explosive ordnance, as well as collecting information
on casualties.19
UNMAS, DDG, and MAG developed standardised reporting
forms to capture data on risk education, non-technical
survey, and victims. Incidents and victims are not recorded
due to the limited geographic reach of operators as a result
of insecurity. To strengthen the reporting, UNMAS was
developing a reporting network and planned to provide
training for NGOs. 20

PLANNING AND TASKING
Nigeria does not have an institutional framework for
humanitarian mine action, a strategic plan for mine action
or annual workplans for the humanitarian organisations
responding to emergency needs in the north-east.

However, humanitarian mine action activity in 2018 and
the ﬁrst half of 2019 was restricted by insecurity to limited
survey and risk education in areas that were accessible,
which included Banki, Gwoza, and Ngala in Borno state. 21

The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21
provided for mine action activities focusing on:
■

■

■

risk education on the dangers posed by explosive threats,
with the aim of reducing the risk to a level where people
can live safely
non-technical surveys to collect and analyse data on
the presence, type, and level of contamination, in order
to support land release and the prioritisation of any
subsequent clearance; and
clearance of contaminated areas.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS
All clearance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police
with support from paramilitary groups.
MAG has worked in Nigeria since 2016, initially in arms
management and destruction. In 2017 it opened an ofﬁce
in Maiduguri and started providing risk education to
IDPs, refugees, and host communities affected by the
conﬂict. In 2018, MAG operated with 12 community liaison
teams delivering risk education and working to develop

understanding of contamination in Borno state, mainly
through remote assessment (see Survey in 2018 section
below). Since 2017, MAG has worked in Maiduguri, Ngala,
Mafa, Konduga, Bama, Jere, Dikwa, Biu, Chibok, Damboa,
Gwoza, Gubio, Kaga, Mobbar, Monguno, and Nganzai. 22
DDG undertook a limited explosive threat assessment in
December 2015 and subsequently undertook risk education
in IDP camps. 23

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
SURVEY IN 2018
UNMAS reported that MAG and DDG conducted
“23 non-technical surveys” in 2018, believed to have
actually been preliminary assessments, which identiﬁed
two victim-activated explosive devices and a range of other
items, including hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades
and air-dropped ordnance. 24

MAG said it had not had sufﬁcient access to locations to
conduct non-technical survey, but between March 2017 and
December 2018 it conducted “initial survey” in 36 areas in
Borno state and marked and mapped 43 explosive ordnance
devices for destruction by the army or police. In 2019 MAG
has also conducted remote contamination assessments,
interviewing individuals from displaced communities and
compiling a proﬁle of contamination in their villages.25
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CLEARANCE IN 2018
Nigeria has not released results of any clearance activities.
In March 2018, the army reopened the main road linking
Maiduguri, Bama (Borno state’s second biggest town), and
Banki, which had been closed by Boko Haram activity for
four years. The re-opening was made possible by clearance
of mines, including those of an improvised nature, but
no details were reported. The theatre commander, Major
General Nicholas Rogers, said authorities envisaged
insurgents would continue to lay mines. 26

The Acting Brigade Commander of the 21st armoured
Brigade, Colonel Garba Nura, said in March 2018 that it was
conducting operations around Bama to prepare the way for
the return of IDPs. 27
Between January and the end of July 2019, army and
police EOD teams were reported to have cleared 105 IEDs
planted on roads in north eastern states, “including 46
victim-activated devices”. 28

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
NO EXTENSION REQUESTED
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: DEADLINE EXPIRED
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Nigeria was required to
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in
November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known
anti-personnel mines from its territory. 29
Under the Convention’s agreed framework, in the event
mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a state party’s
Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform
all other states parties of this discovery and undertake to
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines
as soon as possible. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7
transparency report since 2012.

Given the extent of apparent contamination from mines of an
improvised nature, Nigeria should request a new extended
Article 5 deadline, which should be no more than ﬁve years.
It must also continue to fulﬁl its reporting obligations under
the APMBC, including by reporting on the location of all
suspected or conﬁrmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control and on the status of programmes for the destruction
of all anti-personnel mines therein. 30

UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 3.

16

Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 17 July 2019.

17

Statement of Nigeria, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 May 2019.

2

Email from Lionel Pechera, Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.

18

Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.

3

Ibid; and email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 2 September 2019.

19

Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019.

4

DDG, “Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno
States) 1–15 November 2015”, undated, at: bit.ly/2xS56FZ.

20

Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.

21

UN, “Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019–December 2021”,
December 2018, pp. 43, 48.

1

5

UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 3.

6

Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.

7

Interview with Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019.

8

Agence France Presse, “Landmine killed eight in NE Nigeria”, 19 March 2019.

24

Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019.

9

DDG, “Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno
States) 1–15 November 2015”.

25

Email from and telephone interview with Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019.

10

UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 5.

26

A. Haruna, “Military reopens Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road held by Boko Haram
for years”, Premium Times, 24 March 2018, at: bit.ly/2GhEZgq.

11

Ibid.

27

A. Haruna, “How Bama IDPs will return home – Gov. Shettima”, Premium
Times, 30 March 2018, at: bit.ly/30IBLKD.

12

PCNI, “The Buhari Plan: Rebuilding the North East: Volume II”, June 2016,
pp. 23–26.

28

Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 2 September 2019.

29

Statement of Nigeria, APMBC 11th Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh,
29 November 2011.

30

Final Report of the APMBC 12th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January
2013, p. 10.

13

“Federal government to spend $6.7 billion Northeast reconstruction,
rehabilitation, resettlement plan”, News Agency of Nigeria, 1 September 2018,
at: bit.ly/2Z8u1ko.

14

Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019.

15

UN, “Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019 – December 2021”,
December 2018, pp. 43, 48.

152 Clearing the Mines 2019

22

Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 2 October 2018.

23

UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 6.

CLEARING
THE MINES
2019

OMAN

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

2017
2018

700,000

638,314*

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

LIGHT,
BUT PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

79,200M 0M
2*

2

Area of Land Released (m2)

600,00

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

79,200*
0.0

*Area cleared included in Oman’s Article 7 report for 2018.
Number of AP mines destroyed not reported and therefore
assumed to be zero.

Clearance*

0.0

Technical
Survey

0.0

0.0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Oman informed states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that it was considering setting
up a mine action centre. Oman is conducting “re-clearance” of certain suspected mined areas and plans to complete release
of these areas ahead of its Article 5 deadline in 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Oman should proceed with setting up a mine action centre and programme to oversee and ensure release of
all suspected mined areas as soon as possible and no later than its Article 5 deadline in 2025.

■

Oman should ensure it conducts land release operations according to international standards and seek to
apply non-technical and technical survey, to conﬁrm contamination prior to clearance, whenever possible.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Oman does not have any conﬁrmed mined areas, but does have suspected mined areas
resulting from contamination during the 1960s and 70s. Oman reported that it has cleared
most of the suspected mined areas in accordance with available resources, but that it
is now “re-clearing” certain suspected mined areas to make sure they are free from
anti-personnel mine contamination.

7

The Army is the only institution involved in mine action.

2

Oman’s statements on mine action make no reference to the issue of gender.

5

Oman has submitted an Article 7 transparency report for 2018, detailing clearance and
its plans for land release.

6

In its Article 7 transparency report for 2018, Oman included a work plan to release all
remaining suspected mined areas before its 2025 Article 5 deadline.

3

It is unknown if Oman has any system in place for land release.

5

Oman reported clearance of a small amount of mined area between July and December
2018. Oman did not include information on the number of anti-personnel mines
discovered during clearance in 2018, which Mine Action Review has therefore assumed
to be zero.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

7

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

5.0

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Royal Army of Oman
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

STATES PARTIES

Oman is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though
the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not
known. In its initial Article 7 report, submitted in 2015, Oman
declared that there were no areas in the Sultanate conﬁrmed
to be mined, but reported “many” suspected mined areas in
the south, particularly Dhofar Region.1 In a statement to the
APMBC Intersessional meeting in Geneva in June 2018, and
in its Article 7 report for 2018, Oman repeated there were no
conﬁrmed mined areas and no record of any mine casualties
in the last 20 years. 2
According to its 2015 report, during the mid-1960s to
mid-1970s the presence of rebel movements in Dhofar
led to “vast” areas being affected by anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines. Mines were planted randomly by
militants in small quantities and there are no maps or
registers detailing contamination. Friendly forces reportedly

cleared their own contaminated area directly after the end
of actions in 1976 and the Armed Sultan’s Engineering Unit
Forces started clearance of the areas suspected to have
been mined by the militants. However, Oman has reported
that it is impossible to be sure that the areas have been fully
cleared, and therefore re-clearance of certain suspected
mined areas is required to ensure no anti-personnel mines
remain. 3 This is for three reasons: the size of the region
(about 99,000km²); the lack of maps or marking; and the
terrain (which includes mountains and valleys), with many
mined areas located on steep slopes. In addition, the rain
over the years may have scattered the mines. 4
In 2001, it had been reported that the Royal Army of Oman
had mapped seven zones of suspected mined areas based on
historical records of battleﬁeld areas, unit positions, and mine
incident reports. 5

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Oman has not had a functioning mine action programme. Clearance is being performed by its army engineers. 6
Oman stated in June 2018 that it began implementing a national programme in 2017 and was planning to set up a national
mine action centre and would then appeal for supply of equipment but it did not specify when this would occur.7

GENDER
Details are not available on the extent to which gender is considered and reﬂected in Oman’s national mine action efforts.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
After joining the APMBC in 2015, Oman submitted annual Article 7 reports.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In its most recent Article 7 report, submitted in August 2019, Oman provided a workplan for the release of all remaining
suspected mined area before its Article 5 deadline in 2025.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Standards applied by the army are not known. According to its latest Article 7 transparency report, mined cleared have
historically been cleared in accordance with the resources available. 8

OPERATORS
Oman’s army engineers are responsible for mine/ERW clearance.
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OMAN

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Between July and December 2018, Oman cleared 79,200m2 of suspected mined area. Oman did not report the number of
anti-personnel mines discovered during clearance, which Mine Action Review has therefore assumed to be zero. This
compares to clearance of 638,314m2 between April 2017 and January 2018, during which no anti-personnel mines were
discovered or destroyed.9

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR OMAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2015
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025.
In its most recent Article 7 report, Oman presented a plan to complete clearance of remaining suspected mined areas by its
Article 5 deadline.10
Oman has cited the challenges it faces in locating and clearing mines in large and remote areas of desert. Conditions were
further complicated in 2018 by severe weather, including Cyclone Mekunu in May 2018 and Tropical Storm Luban in October
2018, which caused ﬂooding likely to have compounded the shifting of mines.11

1

Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.

2

Oman statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7−8 June 2018; and Article 7 Report, (for 2018).

3

Article 7 Reports submitted in 2015 and 2019.

4

Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.

5

“Humanitarian Demining”, Journal of Mine Action, 2001, p. 49.

6

Article 7 Report (for 2018).

7

Statement of Oman to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7−8 June 2018.

8

Article 7 Report (for 2018).

9

Article 7 Report (for 2018).

10

Ibid.

11

Statement of Oman, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018.
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PALAU

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2018
HAS FULFILLED ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In April 2019, the Governor of Peleliu – the only Palauan
State in the Second World War where a prolonged ground
battle took place – issued an ofﬁcial statement declaring
that “Peleliu State believes the presence of anti-personnel
(AP) landmines has been eradicated from our state.” The
Governor further noted that, “Cleared Ground’s local teams
from Peleliu have been systematically surveying and clearing
ERW [explosive remnants of war] across Peleliu Island for
almost 10 years now with funding from many countries

including Palau, and of the hundreds of caves, no known cave
has gone unchecked for AP landmines. In May 2018, Palau’s
10 year treaty deadline to be free of AP mines was met, and
continuing ERW surveys have found no AP landmine since.”1
Mine Action Review has, as a consequence, deleted Palau
from the list of mine-affected states parties with outstanding
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5
obligations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Palau should submit an APMBC Article 7 transparency report conﬁrming there are no mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control suspected to contain anti-personnel mines.
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Until recently, it was unclear whether or not Palau still had
mined areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, as the
results of survey in Peleliu state, by Cleared Ground Demining
(CGD), had not been made public. In 4 April 2019, however, the
Governor of Peleliu issued an ofﬁcial statement noting that
while small stocks of anti-personnel mines were discovered by
survey teams, before and since the expiry of Palau’s APMBC
deadline for clearance of emplaced anti-personnel mines no
emplaced anti-personnel mine has been discovered. 2
Palau became a state party to the APMBC in 2008 and
invited CGD to help Palau deal with its Second World War
explosive ordnance contamination, with particular emphasis
on determining whether anti-personnel mines remained.
According to the Governor, Peleliu state was the only one
in Palau where signiﬁcant combat took place during the
Second World War. 3 Survey activities “discovered some small
stores of Japanese Type 93 AP landmines in the defensive
caves constructed by Japanese Forces in 1944 on Bloody
Nose Ridge (Omlebelochek Mountains) on Peleliu Island,
with 22 mines found the ﬁrst year, 7 mines the next year, and
one or two in the next years. The mines, some still in their
packing boxes, had decayed badly over 75 years, and in many
instances the explosives were eaten away by termites”. 4
According to the Governor of Peleliu, there have been no
reported accidents on Peleliu from anti-personnel mines. 5
Furthermore, military maps made available by Japan did
not indicate the use of anti-personnel mines, 6 and archival
research, including a 1945 Cave Fighting Manual by the
US military, based on the Peleliu cave systems, shows no
reference to the use of anti-personnel mines. Rather, artillery
was wheeled out from protection within the caves and
Japanese Forces frequently reinﬁltrated the cave system,
often at night, supporting the argument that mines would
not have been emplaced around the caves.7
However, since 2011, there has been a lack of clarity and
consistency in the reporting of anti-personnel mines
destroyed in Palau, in particular whether anti-personnel
mines discovered and destroyed were abandoned stocks
of anti-personnel mines, which fall under Article 4 of the
APMBC, or emplaced and armed anti-personnel mines,
which fall under Article 5.
In its initial Article 7 report following entry into force of the
APMBC, Palau had declared no known or suspected mined
areas.8 However, in 2011, Palau stated for the ﬁrst time that
it had mined areas on its territory and that contamination to
date had included Japanese anti-vehicle and anti-personnel
mines as well as sea mines, with anti-personnel mines
reported in the Umubrogol mountains and Death Valley
regions of Peleliu state.9 In December 2011, in its statement to
the APMBC Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Palau claimed
(wrongly) that it was not “obligated under the AP Convention
to destroy emplaced antipersonnel mines because it never
produced, stockpiled, used, nor transported them.”10
In its subsequent Article 7 report submitted in 2012, Palau
stated that clearance had been completed of all antipersonnel mines at the only two areas with conﬁrmed
contamination. Palau further reported that areas containing
abandoned anti-personnel mines remained in caves at Bloody
Nose Ridge in the Umubrogol mountains in Peleliu state,
recording that: “Landmines have been found stored in the
complex cave and tunnel systems of the former battleﬁeld.
A total of 608 caves exist – operations have only taken
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place in 34 caves to date.”11 At that time, CGD conﬁrmed that
anti-personnel mine contamination was only of abandoned
stockpiled mines.12
In its Article 7 report for 2012, Palau reported that “AP
Landmines have been found on Bloody Nose during the
course of ERW clearance over the past three years. The AP
landmines have been found emplaced and fused but unarmed
in the ground as well as stored within defensive cave and
tunnel complexes”, and that “ongoing clearance operations
are removing these AP Landmines”.13 In addition, Palau also
reported that sea mines had been found in two locations
in Airai state, noting that the mines had been used in both
anti-boat and anti-personnel roles.14 Palau also reported that
its contamination “was a result of a ﬁercest battle fought
in the Paciﬁc during WWII [the Second World War]. With
such circumstance, Palau is seeking assistance toward [an]
island-wide survey to know its mine[d] areas and or suspected
mine[d] areas.”15
In December 2015, CGD reported having cleared emplaced
and armed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines in Palau
between January 2014 and November 2015 in Peleliu state.16
This included clearance of ﬁve type 93 HE blast anti-personnel
mines, which were reportedly laid and armed, in two separate
caves, between January 2014 and November 2015.17 Palau
did not submit Article 7 reports for 2013, 2014, or 2015, as
it is obligated to do by the APMBC, but in its Article 7 report
for 2016, submitted in 2017, it included the back-dated period
and reported the ﬁve type 93 HE blast anti-personnel mines
destroyed by CGD under Article 4, rather than Article 5, of the
APMBC.18 CGD also reported clearing during the same period:
one yardstick anti-vehicle mine, found on a beach; three JB
spherical anti-vehicle mines, found in three separate locations
(underwater and in mangroves); 12 JE HE blast mines, found
in nine different locations (in mangroves and residences); and
one mine of an improvised nature (using modiﬁed aircraft
bomb components), found on a beach.19 According to CGD,
these mines can “be classed as anti-vehicle or anti-personnel
(as both of those types deployed in World War II in Palau
can be activated by people)”.20 These mines are covered and
prohibited by the APMBC, but were not included in Palau’s
reporting under Article 7 of the Convention.
In its UXO [unexploded ordnance] Action Plan 2017–19, Palau
records that “A total of 43 anti-personnel landmines have
been cleared”, and that “it has ‘cleared all known mined
areas’ in compliance with the APMBC.”21
While it has now been conﬁrmed that Palau does not have
mined areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel
mines, it continues to be contaminated by ERW, including
UXO on many of its 200 islands, and sea mines, left over
from World War II, 22 when it was the scene of land and naval
battles between Japanese and American forces. An estimated
total of 2,800 tons (2.8 million kg) of ordnance was dropped
or ﬁred on Palau. 23 Much of this ordnance failed to detonate
or was abandoned after the war, and as a result, an unknown
amount of UXO remains on the land and in the sea, including
in sunken ships. 24 In February 2017, defensive maps detailing
laid aircraft bombs, depth charges, and sea mines were
provided to the Palau authorities by the Japanese military,
via a Japanese demining non-governmental organisation
(NGO), the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS). 25

STATES PARTIES

Palau is in the process of establishing a mine action
programme to address its ERW contamination. Under the
authority of Executive Order No. 335 of 14 May 2013, issued
by the Ofﬁce of the President, a UXO Advisory Committee was
established. 26 The UXO Advisory Committee is composed of
government ministries, states, agencies, and organisations.
The Director of the Bureau of Domestic Affairs within the
Ministry of State acts as the secretariat.27

As at August 2018, the National Safety Ofﬁce team had an
operational capacity of 16 personnel, in addition to 2 safety
ofﬁcers (responsible for coordinating operations) and 1
international NPA advisor. 29 National Safety Ofﬁce ERW team
personnel also provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
cover to Palau’s water and sewer improvement projects, 30
and will conduct risk assessments for all planned
infrastructure work. 31

Palau’s national mine action programme is now structured
according to its UXO Policy, which was enacted by
Presidential Executive Order 392 in March 2017, and which
authorises the establishment of a national coordination
system and a uniﬁed database mechanism. 28

GENDER
Details are not available on the extent to which gender is reﬂected in Palau’s ERW action programme.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
With the support of NPA, the National Safety Ofﬁce
established a national UXO database in January 2017, 32 to
help in the coordination of survey and clearance of explosive
ordnance. With the adoption of the UXO Policy and UXO
Action Plan 2017–19, the Palau authorities now have a formal
mandate to collect historical data from operators conducting
ERW clearance in Palau, and to verify and assess data for
reporting to the Palau authorities, local communities, and
the international community. 33

The National Safety Ofﬁce now receives both historical and
current data on contamination, survey, and clearance, to
populate the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) database.34 All items found to date have been reported
by clearance operators, and entered into the UXO database,
with the exception of certain historical data from CGD.35

PLANNING AND TASKING
The UXO Advisory Committee has overseen the development
of the UXO Policy and UXO Action Plan 2017–19, which were
enacted by Presidential Executive Order 392, signed on 1
March 2017. 36
The UXO policy outlines national coordination measures
and assigns responsibilities to the relevant ministries and
documents the role of the UXO Advisory Committee.

Palau, in conjunction with international partners including
NPA, CGD, and JMAS, has been implementing a nationwide,
non-technical survey, referred to in the UXO Action Plan
2017–19 as a “general UXO survey”, to conﬁrm the
UXO-affected areas of the country.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In March 2017, Palau enacted Presidential Executive Order
392, which formally adopted the Palau UXO Policy. 37
The UXO Advisory Committee is also tasked to determine
rules and regulations for the quality and standard of work
performed by agencies such as the National Safety Ofﬁce,
the police, international organisations, NGOs, and foreign
militaries. These rules and regulations, known as ‘Palau
UXO Standards’, are based on the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) and have been drafted with the support
of NPA. 38

In July 2017, the draft standards were streamlined to
concentrate more on permissions and legalities for the
removal of ERW rather than the technical aspects of
clearance. 39 As at August 2018, the draft UXO standards had
been accepted and disseminated, but had yet to be formally
approved and adopted by the national authorities. 40
In its Article 7 report (for 2017), Palau reported that UXO
Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) had been drafted and
were undergoing review prior to adoption. 41 As at July 2019,
Palau had not submitted an Article 7 report for 2018.
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PALAU

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

OPERATORS
CGD has been conducting ERW clearance operations in Palau,
both on land and in the sea, since 15 September 2009. 42 The
clearance project is focused on Peleliu and Angaur – two
southern islands of Palau – and aims to reduce the immediate
risk from ERW to local people and tourists. 43
In 2012, JMAS, a Japanese demining NGO, began working in
Palau, with a focus on underwater UXO clearance. 44

In 2015, NPA received a grant to assist Palau to strengthen
national capacity to manage and coordinate the UXO
sector, and to help undertake surveys and UXO clearance;
and subsequently initiated a programme of support. NPA
reported that from April 2017 it had begun working under
the National Safety Ofﬁce, as the “ERW/UXO team
Palau now has capacity to direct trained national personnel
to clear priority areas of ERW. 45 A new government demolition
area became operational in early 2018, which is run by the
National Safety Ofﬁce, and which is also used by JMAS. 46

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No operators in Palau reported ﬁnding any anti-personnel mines in 2018. 47

SURVEY IN 2018
NPA started a nationwide non-technical survey on 18
September 2016 and, as at August 2018, NPA had completed
non-technical survey of all states in Palau, except for Peleliu,
where permission had not yet been granted for non-technical
survey. Pre-2017 survey and clearance data had not yet
been provided by CGD. NPA has found no evidence of
anti-personnel mine contamination in its non-technical
survey operations to date. 48
In 2017, CGD concentrated its activities in validating whether
any anti-personnel mines remain on Peleliu state, in the
vicinity of the caves in the Umubrogol Mountains. CGD’s
work, which included non-technical survey, technical
survey, and clearance, was reportedly requested by the
UXO Advisory Committee and Government of the state of
Peleliu, and funded by a consortium of donors including
Palau itself, as well as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland,
and New Zealand. As part of this process, CGD stated that
“methodologically wise any caves surrounding those caves
where AP landmine stockpiles were previously found have
also been checked thoroughly, and utilising sub-surface

landmine detection drills and equipment to search for
the presence of emplaced (buried) landmines at the cave
entrances, CGD teams have been systematically working
their way up and down the valleys and sub-ridges of the
Umurbrogol Mountain range.” In addition, CGD reported
that “cave search activities are taking place on the fringes
of the Ridge, as well a number of cave systems not actually
on Bloody Nose Ridge, even including caves on neighbouring
Ngedebus Island, have been searched for the presence of
landmines during these last 2 quarters to conﬁrm that no AP
mines remain in Palau”. 49
CGD reported undertaking door-to-door survey of every
household in Peleliu, during which an example of a landmine
found previously on Peleliu was shown. CGD’s non-technical
survey also included Second World War research on how the
caves were used during the conﬂict, which indicated that
anti-personnel mines had not been emplaced. 50 Finally,
military maps made available by Japan did not indicate the
use of anti-personnel mines. 51

CLEARANCE IN 2018
No operators in Palau reported ﬁnding any anti-personnel mines in 2018. 52

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALAU: 1 MAY 2008
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2018 (COMPLETED FULFILMENT OF ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Palau was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2018. On 4 April 2019, the Governor of Peleliu issued a statement that,
“Peleliu State believes the presence of anti-personnel (AP) land mines has been eradicated from our state.”53
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
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*Excludes 2018 clearance output for the Karne Shomron and
Jinsafut mineﬁelds in the Qalqiliya governorate of the West Bank,
which was not reported by Israel

5,221

Clearance

0.0

0.0

Technical
Survey

0.0

0.0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Palestine acceded to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December 2017, becoming a state party on 1 June
2018. All mined areas are located in territory under Israeli control. To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to
be conducted by or on behalf of the Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC), but progress is being made in clearance of mine
contamination in the West Bank.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

PMAC should report accurately and consistently on the extent of mined area and annual clearance output.

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Higher Committee for Mine Action
Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

The HALO Trust

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■

4M (clearance now completed)
■
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Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

In its initial APMBC Article 7 report submitted in November
2018, Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain
anti-personnel mines on the border with Jordan, covering a
total area of 18.51km2 and all under Israeli control.1 Palestine
also reported that is it not possible for it to know if there
are further mined areas in eastern Jerusalem or in other
areas under Israeli control, including in the region of Israeli
settlements or closed military zones. 2
A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identiﬁed 90
mineﬁelds, 13 of which were laid by the Jordanian military
in 1948–67, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli
military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. All
mineﬁelds, including those laid by the Jordanian military,
are under Israeli military control. 3 In addition, HALO Trust
reported being made aware of three other anti-personnel
mined areas in the Jordan Valley, namely at Shademot
Mehola (65,000m2) and Sokot (228,000m2), containing mixed
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination; and at
Taysir (5,500m2), which contains only anti-vehicle mines. 4
Clearance operations must therefore be coordinated with
the Israeli authorities, 5 in addition to PMAC.

According to The HALO Trust, as at July 2019, there was
nearly 0.3km2 of conﬁrmed mined area (excluding the Jordan
Valley) across four mineﬁelds in Palestine and two mineﬁelds
in no-man’s-land between the West Bank and Israel (see
Table 1). 6 All six mineﬁelds were laid by the Jordanian army.
This is a reduction of two mined areas, compared to mine
contamination at the end of 2017, as clearance of Karne
Shomron and Jinsafut mineﬁelds in Qalqiliya governorate
was completed in 2018 by Israeli demining company, 4M,
which won an Israeli Ministry of Defence tender.7
Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo
II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three
areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security
control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint
Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to
areas where Israel has full civil and security control. 8
Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank,
along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately
60% of the West Bank.9

Table 1: Mined area (at July 2019) (excluding the Jordan Valley)*10
Governorate

Mineﬁeld Task

Contamination

Jenin

Araba

AV and AP mines

Tul Kareem
Ramallah

CHAs

Area (m2)

1

1,257

Qabatiya

AV and AP mines

1

8,212

Yabad

AV and AP mines

1

42,829

Nur a-Shams

AV and AP mines

1

37,810

No Man’s Land Yalo

AV and AP mines

1

104,226

No Man’s Land - Canada Park

AV and AP mines

1

85,708

6

280,042

Totals
CHA = Conﬁrmed hazardous area AV = Anti-vehicle AP=Anti-personnel

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian
Minister of Interior decision on 25 March 2012,11 which
appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for
Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members
representing the ministries of education, foreign affairs,
health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as
well as the police and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society.
The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the
national mine action authority, is tasked to develop mine
action legislation and allocate resources for the sector.12
PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah,
is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the
West Bank. It receives technical advice from the UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS).13 The committee has established a
number of sub-committees to deal with technical issues, risk
education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.14

In November 2016, Palestine announced that it was seeking
to adopt and enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful
of completing the legal procedures within a year and
then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for
endorsement, followed by signature by the President.15 As at
February 2019, however, the process was still ongoing.16
PMAC, which has 12 employees,17 is staffed with personnel
from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police,
and Civil Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were
trained by UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently
authorised by Israel to conduct clearance.18 The Civil Police
have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42
personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya,
Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate
and remove items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The EOD
unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.19
A new director of PMAC was appointed in July 2017, following
the previous director’s retirement. 20
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian
authority only provides funding for the salaries of PMAC
employees and the costs of the PMAC ofﬁce. 21 Israel
does not grant Palestine authorisation to conduct mine
clearance operations. 22

Neither PMAC nor the Israeli National Mine Action Authority
(the INMAA) provides direct funding for HALO Trust’s
clearance operations. 23 At the baptism site clearance task
in the West Bank, the INMAA contributes ILS2 million
(approximately US$548,000) to quality assurance (QA). 24
The HALO Trust’s clearance programme in the West Bank is
primarily funded by the governments of the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as by private
donors, and since 2018, by the European Union too.25

GENDER
It is not known whether national mine action programme has a gender policy and implementation plan.
The HALO Trust has a global policy on gender and diversity. HALO Trust’s operations team works and lives within
the Palestinian communities and is all male. During 2018, The HALO Trust deployed a female ﬁnance ofﬁcer, who also
participates in survey work in the ﬁeld as a native speaker, and a female doctor at the baptism site. 26

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
PMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, Level 1. 27
The HALO Trust follows the INMAA’s national standards and provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports
for every task. The information is shared with PMAC. 28 As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO Trust survey
and clearance data relating to demining operations in the West Bank.
Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in November 2018, as required by the APMBC. 29 However, Palestine’s Article 7
report for 2018 (submitted in 2019), does not contain any further details, including the amount of mined area cleared in 2018. 30

PLANNING AND TASKING
PMAC has a Strategic Plan for 2017–20, in which primary objectives are the clearance of the Araba, Deir Abu Daif, Nur a-Shams,
Qabatiya, and Yabad mineﬁelds. 31 Clearance of Deir Abu Daif was completed in 2017.
HALO Trust’s survey and clearance in the West Bank is prioritised by its international donors, in conjunction with the INMAA
and PMAC. 32

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The HALO Trust’s standing operating procedures (SoPs),
which are based on its international standards and which also
comply with national standards, are approved by the INMAA.
Once a year, The HALO Trust submits its SoPs, including any
necessary amendments, to the INMAA for approval.33

OPERATORS
To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to
be conducted by or on behalf of PMAC. 34 In September 2013,
however, the INMAA gave formal authorisation for The HALO
Trust to clear two mineﬁelds in the West Bank deemed high
priority by PMAC. Following INMAA authorisation, HALO Trust
began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014, 35 and
continues to conduct clearance operations in the West Bank.
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The HALO Trust works under the auspices of both the INMAA
and PMAC. Its manual clearance team in the West Bank is
composed of deminers from Georgia with capacity varying
between 10 and 33 deminers according to the task/work
cycle. 36 In addition, during 2018, HALO Trust deployed three
armoured CASE721 wheeled medium loaders, one armoured
CAT320B tracked excavator, and one industrial rock crusher.
The machines were operated by a Palestinian team. 37 HALO
Trust added a second armoured tracked excavator and a
screener to its operations in April 2019, with EU funding, to
support mechanical clearance of the three mineﬁelds in the
Jenin governorate. 38
The HALO Trust planned to deploy up to 24 deminers at
the baptism site and in Jenin governorate in 2019. Since
the manual segments of the three mineﬁelds in Jenin
governorate have been completed, up to six deminers will
support the mechanical team. 39

STATES PARTIES

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust conducts both manual and mechanical
clearance in the West Bank. HALO Trust also uses a drone
for survey and mapping purposes, and maps generated are
shared with all parties involved for planning and follow up. 42

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
2

The HALO Trust released 5,221m through clearance in 2018
and did not release any land through survey.
Under Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Amended Protocol II, Israel reported that the INMAA
had overseen clearance of approximately 1.2km2 in 2018,
destroying 1,350 mines and ERW, in addition to cancellation
of 0.7km2 non-technical survey. 43 However, there was no
disaggregation on what proportion of this land release was
of mined area (as opposed to battle area) or whether it
also includes land released in Palestinian territory in the
West Bank.
In 2018, clearance of Karne Shomron and Jinsafut mineﬁelds,
in the Qalqiliya governorate of the West Bank, was completed
by Israeli operator, 4M, contracted by the Israeli Ministry of
Defence, but clearance output is not known. 44

SURVEY IN 2018
No land was reduced by The HALO Trust through technical
survey in 2018 or cancelled through non-technical survey. 45
HALO Trust performs survey as part of its clearance
operations of the Jordanian-laid mineﬁelds in Area C of the
West Bank, which includes joint site visits with PMAC and the
INMAA, but it is part of pre-clearance task preparation, and is
of CHAs already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps. 46

CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, The HALO Trust cleared 5,221m2 of mined area, at
the Yabad mineﬁeld in Jenin governorate, during which 12
anti-personnel mines were destroyed. 47 This is a decrease
compared to 2017, when HALO Trust cleared 41,857m2,
and the drop in output is due to the fact that HALO Trust’s
operations in Jenin district were suspended between April
to October 2018, due to a change in US Foreign Policy which
led to the cessation of US funding for the external QA. 48

The HALO Trust also commenced clearance of the West Bank
mineﬁeld at Qaser al-Yahud (the baptism site), in the Jordan
Valley, in March 2018, 49 with both funding from international
donors and Israel. 50 The project aims to remove mines and
explosive ordnance in the area of the baptism site, which
covers a total estimated area of 870,000m². 51 Approximately
90,000m2 is thought to potentially contain anti-personnel
mines, including those of an improvised nature. 52 IDF
mineﬁeld records provided to The HALO Trust separate the
land for clearance outside of the church compounds into
eleven areas, all of which contain a potential UXO threat. Six
of the eleven areas are known to contain signiﬁcant numbers
of M15 anti-vehicle mines in multiple lines and more than
2,600 anti-vehicle mines in total. The land and buildings
inside the seven church compounds are suspected to contain
mines and booby-traps, but no ofﬁcial records exist regarding
this contamination. 53
In addition, from October 2017 Israel funded clearance of
the Karne Shomron and Jinsafut mineﬁelds in the Qalqiliya
governorate of the West Bank. Israeli operator 4M was
awarded the demining tender by the Israeli Ministry of
Defence, and clearance of the two mineﬁelds was completed
in 2018. 54 The INMAA has not, however, provided details of the
area of land cleared in these two mineﬁelds or the number of
mines destroyed.

PROGRESS IN 2019
The HALO Trust secured funding for external QA from a
private foundation, and in May 2019 resumed clearance
operations at Araba mineﬁeld in Jenin Governorate. 55
The HALO Trust completed clearance of the seven
churchyards and their compound buildings at the baptism site
by the end of July 2019. 56 It was also looking to secure Israeli
funding to clear the remainder of the valley ﬂoor (anti-vehicle
mine lines (some of which are being cleared by the IDF and
sub-surface battle area contamination). 57
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The HALO Trust’s work in the West Bank complies with the
Israeli Standard Institute for Standards, in particular ISO
9001, 14001, and 18001. The HALO Trust carries out its own
internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior
programme staff, and which complies with the ISO standards
and HALO Trust’s own SoPs. 40 In addition, as required by the
INMAA, 4CI Security, an external INMAA-certiﬁed QA/QC
company, is contracted to monitor HALO Trust’s clearance in
accordance with Israeli National Mine Action Standards. 41

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE.
COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY ISRAEL AND
THE HALO TRUST, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

PMAC planned to complete clearance of mined areas by
the end of 2020, if there were no obstacles from the other
parties. 58 Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by
available funding59 and is impacted by political factors,
including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for
Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations. 60
It is, however, a positive development that The HALO Trust
was permitted to begin mine clearance operations in April
2014, and, as at July 2019, HALO Trust had completed
clearance of ﬁve mineﬁelds in Area C of the West Bank.
Clearance of a sixth mineﬁeld, Araba, was planned to be
completed by the end of September 2019. 61

Furthermore, the INMAA began survey of the Jordan Valley
mineﬁelds in the West Bank in 2017, using Israeli national
budget and operating with Israeli companies. The INMAA
sees signiﬁcant potential for cancellation and reduction of
land in the Jordan Valley, and is using various technologies
and scientiﬁc tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift. The
INMAA planned to invest around ILS 900,000 (approximately
US$250,000) on this project in 2017–19. 64
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance in the
West Bank (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

As at the end of 2018, four Jordanian-laid mineﬁelds in the
governorates of Jenin and Tul Kareem, which fall within
HALO Trust’s donor agreement, remained to be cleared.
After completion of the four priority Jordanian-laid
mineﬁelds, HALO Trust planned to look into clearance of
mined areas in the Jordan Valley, the majority of which are
Israeli-laid. 62

2018

5,221

In February 2019, the INMAA hoped that clearance of mined
areas in the West Bank would be ﬁnished in two years.
According to the INMAA, the Yalo and Canada Park mineﬁeld
will be cleared, but according to humanitarian prioritisation,
noting that mineﬁelds are fenced and marked, and pose little
humanitarian impact. 63
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2017

41,857

2016

34,057

2015

63,411

2014

21,832

Total

166,378
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KEY DATA

18,000

2017
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

LIGHT,
(ESTIMATED)

0.1KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
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14,000
12,000
10,000
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7,171

6,000
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2,000

1,817

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian
Demining Unit completed clearance of the Tiwinza square
kilometre. In other respects, however, Peru fell well short
of its land release targets for the year. Peru’s estimate of
outstanding mine contamination is not based on high-quality
survey and no progress appears to have been made in
realising Peru’s promised improvements of its mine action

programme. In May 2019, a helicopter accident with four
casualties caused a delay to operations and even before then,
Peru was not on track to meet its targets for the year. Peru
is at growing risk of not completing clearance of outstanding
mine contamination by its Article 5 deadline, already
extended for far too long.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Peru should conduct quality survey on its outstanding mined areas to develop an accurate baseline of
anti-personnel mine contamination.

■

Peru should develop and implement new policies for land release to ensure that targeted clearance is being
conducted as part of a comprehensive land release methodology.

■

Peru should provide updates in its annual Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7
transparency reports on progress with respect to its “Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining
2018–2024”.

■

Peru should develop and implement prioritisation criteria for survey and clearance tasks.

■

Peru should seek international assistance to expand its use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) to ﬁnd mined areas
and also to reduce and release land within those areas.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Peru has yet to carry out quality survey to determine accurately the extent of its
outstanding mine contamination. The ﬁgure given in its latest Article 7 report cannot be
reconciled with the amount of clearance conducted in 2018 and is inconsistent across
reports and reporting periods.

6

Peru has the requisite legislation and the necessary management structure in place to
oversee demining operations. Peru funds all its own operations and while the budget
increased in 2018 there was still a gap between budget and costings.

2

Peru has not provided any information about gender within its mine action programme.

4

Anti-personnel mine contamination, survey and clearance ﬁgures are inconsistent and
in accurate within reports and across reporting periods. Peru has not reported on any
improvements to information management in 2018.

5

Peru has a national plan for demining 2018-24 with annual land release targets. However,
it did not meet its targets for 2018 and is not on track to meet its targets for 2019. There is
a lack of clarity about whether Peru has a criteria for prioritisation in place.

6

Peru has twice made commitments to develop new policies for land release and
implement new demining techniques. As at July 2019, Peru has not reported on whether
these have been achieved. In May 2019, a helicopter accident killed two deminers and
injured two others.

3

Peru’s land release output rose very slightly in 2018 but was expected to fall in 2019.
Peru could easily meet its Article 5 deadlines with the implementation of improved land
release methodologies given a modicum of political will.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

4

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.3

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian
Demining (DIGEDEHUME)
CONTRAMINAS Security Division (DIVSECOM)
Joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian
Demining Unit

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None
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PERU

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The estimate of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination
in Peru’s latest APMBC Article 7 report, as at end 2018, was
358,867m2 across 116 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
within four “sectors” (see Table 1). Previously, Peru reported
that as at the beginning of 2018 mine contamination totalled
396,171m2 across 124 SHAs.1 The difference between the
beginning and end of 2018 is not reconciled by the amount
of land release reported. 2
Peru’s reporting of outstanding mine contamination is
inconsistent between reports. In its Article 7 transparency
report for the previous year (for the period March 2017 to
March 2018) Peru stated that as at March 2018, remaining
mine contamination totalled 426,325m2 across 134 SHAs
and, in the same report, 396,171m2 across 124 SHAs. 3 In
its statement to the Article 5 Committee in May 2019 Peru
reported that it had 117 mined areas of 411,660m2 remaining
and 7,556 anti-personnel mines to destroy. 4
The size and extent of the 116 suspected mined areas varies
widely, with one area only 5m2 in size while the largest, by far,
is estimated to extend over 160,000m2. 5 In fact, most of this
large area should be released by survey, without the need for
recourse to full clearance. The true amount of contaminated
land is probably no more than 100,000m2 as Peru does not
use polygons to delineate hazardous areas, despite having
detailed mine maps of almost all the affected areas.

In its 2016 Article 5 extension request and “Updated National
Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024” Peru stated that
it would carry out survey activities to determine the size and
location of the mined areas using mine records. 6 Since 2016,
however, Peru has only reduced 34,736m2 by technical survey
and 25,433m2 by non-technical survey. As at end 2018, all of
Peru’s outstanding contamination was in SHAs.
Mine contamination in Peru results from a 1995 border
conﬂict with Ecuador. The mined section of the border was
predominantly in the Condor mountain range that was at
the centre of the dispute.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by sector
(at end 2018) 7
Sector

Area (m2)

CHAs

SHAs

Santiago

0

42

70,690

Tiwinza

0

16

88,922

Cenepa

0

40

18,290

Achuime

0

18

180,965

Totals

0

116

358,867

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by
the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de
Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS).
CONTRAMINAS is responsible for setting strategy and
priorities and for overall coordination of mine action
activities. It consists of an Interministerial Executive Council,
chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Technical
Secretariat, which oversees the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
Directorate of Security and Defence. 8
CONTRAMINAS was created in December 2002 after the
issuance of a “Supreme Decree”, an additional “Supreme
Decree” issued in July 2005 regulates CONTRAMINAS.9
Directive 001 regulates demining operations at the Peruvian
Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining
(DIGEDEHUME) while Directive 006 regulates compliance
under the APMBC.10

In its revised second Article 5 deadline extension request,
submitted in August 2016, Peru estimated that US$38.6
million would be needed to ﬁnish the job, all of which was
due to be funded by the Peruvian government.11 This
estimate was also included in its “Updated National Plan
for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024”. Since 2010, Peru
has reported contributing about $1.4 million annually for
anti-personnel mine survey and clearance which is less than
the annual amount costed by Peru as needed to complete
clearance by 2024. Based on the ﬁgures it has supplied,
almost half of this total could be saved by completing
clearance by 2021. In its 2016 extension request Peru
pledged to increase the annual budget to meet its requested
deadline and that it would reach out to international entities
for support in order to conclude implementation well in
advance of its deadline.12 In 2018, the Executive Council of
CONTRAMINAS increased the annual budget to $2.36 million
although it had been costed at $3.88 million.13

GENDER
As at July 2019, no information had been provided by the national authority on gender within the Peruvian mine action
programme. Gender does not feature in Peru’s 2016 Article 5 deadline extension request or in its Updated National Plan
for Humanitarian Demining.14
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STATES PARTIES

CONTRAMINAS uses the Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.15 Peru submits its Article
7 reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in
Article 5 implementation at intersessional meetings and
Meetings of States Parties. However, the quality of data
in these reports are poor with frequent inconsistencies
and inaccuracies both within reports and across reporting
periods.16 The Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, in their
decision on Peru’s 2016 extension request, noted the
importance of Peru providing updated information on an
annual basis within its Article 7 reports and that Peru
should report on progress in accordance with the Guide
to Reporting.17

Peru submitted its last Article 5 deadline extension request
in 2016.18 In granting Peru’s request, the Fifteenth Meeting
of States Parties called on Peru to provide, by 30 April 2018,
an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by
the extension detailing the results of the activities to meet
its strategic objectives; an updated list of all areas known
or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines; annual
projections of which areas would be dealt with during the
remaining period covered by the request and by which
organisation; and an updated budget.19 Peru submitted
an “Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining
2018-2024” on 30 May 2018. Included is an annual plan for
demining of 127 areas covering almost 0.5km2, which is
more than the remaining mine contamination. 20

PLANNING AND TASKING
According to Peru’s Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24, remaining suspected mine contamination of some
0.49km2 spread across 127 SHAs will be released by 31 December 2024. Peru expected to clear 8,089 mines from the areas. 21
The plan for the seven years beginning 1 January 2018 is as follows:
Table 2: Planned clearance in 2018–24 (Updated Plan) 22
Year

Sector

2018

Tiwinza

Mined areas

Area (m2)

AP mines

16

119,415

2,697

2019

Cenepa

13

92,850

627

2020

Achuime

20

9,458

746

2021

Cenepa

16

12,301

653

2022

Cenepa – Santiago

18

180,965

392

2023

Santiago

16

28,225

838

2024

Santiago

28

48,065

2,136

127

491,279

8,089

Totals
In its Article 7 Report for 2018, Peru included a plan for
clearance of 116 mined areas from 2019 to 2024:
Table 3: Planned clearance in 2019–24 (Article 7) 23
Year

Sector

Mined areas

2019

Tiwinza
Cenepa

16
4

2020

Cenepa

20

2021

Cenepa

16

2022

Achuime

18

2023

Santiago

21

2024

Santiago

21

Total

116

In 2018, Peru was due to clear 16 mined areas totalling
119,415m2 from the Tiwinza sector according to its Updated
National Plan for Demining for 2018–24 or 12 mined areas
from Tiwinza of unspeciﬁed area according to its Article 7
Report for 2017. In fact, Peru released just 27,303m2 across
eight mined areas in the Tiwinza sector.24
Peru had a Demining Action Plan for 2019, with clearance in
the Cenepa sector beginning in April, but in May demining
operations were suspended following a helicopter accident. 25
Peru’s criteria for prioritising survey and clearance
operations are unclear. In its decision on Peru’s 2016
extension request, the Article 5 Committee noted that Peru
should prioritise operations based on the socio-economic
impact of mined areas. 26 One of the activities listed as
part of CONTRAMINAS objective to develop new demining
policies was to determine the priority of the objectives
for the clearance, in coordination with DIGEDEHUME and
DIVSECOM. 27 As at July 2019, Peru has not reported on
whether this activity has been completed.
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Peru conducts demining in accordance with the Binational
Manual for Humanitarian Demining, developed under the
Binational Cooperation Programme with Ecuador, and with
the Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual, based on
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) which were
adapted to the Peruvian context. 28
One of CONTRAMINAS four objectives in Peru’s 2016
extension request was to develop new policies for land
release, with the aim of ﬁnalising these policies within six
months of approval of the plan. The same objective was
included in its Updated National Plan for Demining for
2018–24. 29 As at July 2019, it is not known if these new
policies have been developed, and Peru had not provided
an update on the issue in its latest Article 7 report. As
noted by the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Peru
should conduct evidence-based survey to deﬁne its SHAs
and identify conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHA). 30

OPERATORS
DIGEDEHUME is responsible for demining on the border
with Ecuador with two teams each of 60 deminers. 31 In 2018,
DIGEDEHUME carried out eight “work days” of 20 days each
between April and October. 32 The CONTRAMINAS Security
Division (DIVSECOM), which is responsible for supporting
DIGEDHUME with demining operations, has 40 police ofﬁcers
trained in demining. 33
In its 2016 extension request, Peru committed to
strengthening the capacity of the Humanitarian Demining
School of CONTRAMINAS, with the aim of increasing capacity
by 20% in the second semester of 2017. This was deferred to
the second semester of 2018 in Peru’s Updated National Plan
for Demining for 2018–24. 34 As at July 2019, no information
has been provided on whether this has occurred.

The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining
Unit is deployed to areas that were at the centre of the
conﬂict between the two nations. In October 2015, the unit
began operations in a mined area estimated to extend over
43,500m2 within the Tiwinza square kilometre. 35 In 2018,
clearance of the Tiwinza square kilometre was completed. 36

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Peru has not yet used machines for demining, and until 2015
mine detection dogs (MDD) were only used for quality control
after clearance. In 2015, MDDs were used for the ﬁrst time
to locate mines. 37 Their use should be expanded signiﬁcantly
to both identify the location of mined areas and to reduce
and release land within those areas. Peru should consider
seeking international assistance for this work.
In its revised Second Article 5 deadline extension request,
Peru announced that it would be using both machines and
MDDs for demining which, as at April 2019, had not yet been
introduced. 38 In its updated multi-year plan submitted in
May 2018, one of Peru’s strategic objectives for 2018–24
included the development, design, and implementation of
new humanitarian demining techniques, such as with
machines or dogs. 39

DEMINER SAFETY
In May 2019, a helicopter carrying four demining personnel
crashed killing two and wounding two others. After the crash
the Accident Investigation Board of Army Aviation went to the
scene to determine the cause of the accident. 40

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 27,303m2 was released in the Tiwinza sector, of which 15,576m2 was cleared, 9,911m2 cancelled through
non-technical survey, and 1,817m2 reduced through technical survey. A total of 140 mines were destroyed.

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 11,728m2 was released through survey
in the Tiwinza sector, including 9,911m2 cancelled through
non-technical survey (see Table 4), and 1,817m2 reduced
through technical survey (see Table 5). 41
This is a reduction compared to 2017, particularly in technical
survey output, when Peru reduced 7,171m2 through technical
survey and cancelled 10,738m2 through non-technical survey
in Tiwinza. 42
There is some overlap between the ﬁgures for 2018 and
2017 due to the reporting periods of Peru’s Article 7 reports.
In its 2017 Article 7 report the reporting period ran from
March 2017 to March 2018, while in its 2018 Article 7 report
the reporting period was from January to December 2018.
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Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2018 43
Sector

Area cancelled (m²)

Tiwinza

9,911

Total

9,911

Table 5: Reduced by technical survey in 2018 44
Sector

Area reduced (m2)

Tiwinza

1,817

Total

1,817

STATES PARTIES

In 2018, a total of 15,576m2 was cleared in the Tiwinza sector and 140 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed. 45
This is an increase in the area cleared from 2017 when Peru reported clearance of 9,246m2 in Tiwinza. 46 From March 2017
to March 2018, Peru was clearing 24m2 per mine, while from January to December 2018, Peru was clearing 111m2 per mine.
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201847
Sector

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Tiwinza

8

15,576

140

N/R

N/R

Totals

8

15,576

140

N/R

N/R

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle N/R = Not Recorded

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PERU: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR, 9-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
2

Year

Area cleared (m )

2018

15,576

2017

*9,246

2016

**18,317

2015

***76,336

2014

8,458

Total

127,933

* Covers the period March 2017 to March 2018
** Covers the period March 2016 to March 2017
*** Covers the period March 2015 to March 2016

In its decision on Peru’s 2016 extension request, the Fifteenth
Meeting of States Parties noted that as Peru was seeking
to develop enhanced processes of land release “Peru
may ﬁnd itself in a situation wherein it can proceed with
implementation faster than that suggested by the amount
of time requested”. 48 Peru should easily be able to complete
clearance well before its Article 5 deadline if it used the
full range of land release techniques and efﬁcient, targeted
clearance. At least 75,000m2 can be released each year based
on an earlier review of data and on discussions with senior
ofﬁcials at the General Directorate. 49

In its Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24, Peru
outlined three scenarios for the completion of anti-personnel
mine clearance by the 2024 deadline. The ﬁrst, the “probable”
scenario, involves completing demining operations with
the current available personnel (two demining companies
and 40 police ofﬁcers trained in demining) but to achieve
this, the annual budget needs to be increased. The second,
the “possible” scenario, is to complete clearance before
the deadline with increased personnel (three demining
companies and the police deminers, equipment and budget.
The third scenario, the “desirable” scenario, is to complete
demining well in advance of the deadline with the support of
international entities. 50 In Peru’s statement to the Committee
for the Strengthening of Cooperation and Assistance in May
2019, Peru thanked Germany and China for their donations of
demining equipment in 2018–19 and thanked Italy, the United
States, Hungary, Norway and the NGO Norwegian People’s
Aid for ongoing discussions on possible cooperation and Chile
for the exchange of information on demining issues. 51
Since the 2014 Maputo Review conference, Peru’s survey and
clearance output has fallen by 78% from a high of 122,926m2
in 2015 to 27,303m2 in 2018. Peru’s land release output was
similar between 2017 and 2018. In Peru’s Updated National
Plan for Demining 2018–24, four speciﬁc goals have been
set within an overarching institutional strategic objective of
the total elimination of anti-personnel mines from Peruvian
territory by 2024. These goals include CONTRAMINAS
formulating new land release policies; developing and
implementing new demining techniques; and strengthening
the capacity of the demining school. 52 All of these goals
have the potential to increase Peru’s land release output if
implemented. Peru has yet to report on any progress against
these goals.
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
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Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2018),
Form F.

23

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F.

24

Ibid.

25

Statement of Peru, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May
2019.

26

Decisions on the request submitted by Peru for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 1 December 2016, para. 15.

2

Remaining AP mine contamination at January 2018 = 396,171m2; Total land
release in 2018 = 27,303m2; Remaining AP mine contamination at end
2018 = 358,867m2 which is a difference of 37,304m2.

3

Article 7 Report (for March 2017 to March 2018), Forms C and F.

4

Statement of Peru, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva,
22 May 2019.

27

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, p. 15.

5

Ibid., Annex I.

28

Revised 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p. 16.

6

Revised 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, pp. 20–21; and
Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018,
p. 15.

29

Revised 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p. 36; and
Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, p. 14.
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Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.

30

8

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 3.

Decisions on the request submitted by Peru for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 1 December 2016, para. d.

9

Supreme Decree No. 113-2002-RE; and Supreme Decree No. 051-2005-RE.

31

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, pp. 10 and 12.

10

Directive No. 001/2009/DIGEDEHUME-SINGE; and Directive No. 006.

32

11

Revised 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p. 18.

Statement of Peru, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May
2019.

12

Ibid., p. 11.

33

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, pp. 10 and 12.

13

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018-2024, May 2018,
p. 11.

34

Ibid., p. 16.

35

2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information provided on
8 September 2017, p. 1.

36

Statement of Peru, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva,
29 November 2018.

14

Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016; and Updated
National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018.

15

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 8.

16

In Peru’s statement on Article 5 implementation in 2018 at the 17th Meeting
of States Parties clearance by DIGEDEHUME was reported at 40,800m2 with
290 mines destroyed while in their Article 7 report clearance was 15,576m2
with 140 mines destroyed. In Peru’s Article 7 report (for the period March
2017 to March 2018) Peru stated that as at March 2018, remaining mine
contamination totalled 426,325m2 across 134 SHAs and, in the same report,
396,171m2 across 124 SHAs. In its statement to the Article 5 Committee in
May 2019 Peru reported that it had 117 mined areas of 411,660m2 remaining
and 7,556 anti-personnel mines to destroy.

17

18

Decisions on the request submitted by Peru for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 1 December 2016, para. g.
Analysis of the request submitted by Peru for an extension of the deadline for
completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article
5 of the Convention, October 2016, para. 22.

19

Decisions on the request submitted by Peru for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 1 December 2016, para. e.

20

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018,
p. 11.

21

Ibid., A slightly different ﬁgure for remaining contamination as of 1 January
2017 was included in Peru’s revised second extension request, dated July
2016 but submitted at the beginning of August 2016: 411,694m2 as compared
with 412,094m2 in the ﬁrst version of the request. See Revised Second Article
5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p. 4.
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Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 11.
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37

Presentation by DIGEDEHUME, Lima, 15 March 2016.

38

Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, pp. 5–6.

39

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, pp. 15–16.

40

Telesur, “Peru: De-mining Helicopter Crashes Near Ecuador Border, Kills 2”,
18 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2XxEJzv.
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Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F.

42

Article 7 Report (for April 2017 to March 2018), Form F.
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Ibid.

44

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F.

45

Ibid.

46

Article 7 Report (for April 2017 to March 2018), Form F.

47

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F.

48

Decisions on the request submitted by Peru for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 1 December 2016, para c.

49

This is based on 48 military deminers working for 160 days each year
and each deminer clearing an average of 10m2 per day. Discussions with
DIGEDEHUME, Lima, 15 March 2016.

50

Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, p. 13.

51

Statement of Peru, Committee for the Strengthening of Cooperation and
Assistance, Geneva, 24 May 2019.
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Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, pp. 14–16.
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SENEGAL

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
0.12
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Non-Technical Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Humanity and Inclusion (HI; formerly Handicap International),
the only international mine action operator in Senegal since
2014, was forced to suspend operations in October 2017 due
to a lack of funding. In February 2019, it resumed operations
in Goudomp department, with new funding secured from the
United States.
Under the European Union (EU) Council Decision in
support of the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Maputo Action Plan, a
“National Stakeholder Dialogue” workshop was held in Dakar
on 29–30 October 2018, with support from the APMBC’s
Implementation Support Unit.

Overall progress in land release remained painstakingly slow
for yet another year in 2018, as Senegal continued to fail to
make signiﬁcant strides towards meeting its international
legal obligations to demine as soon as possible. This failure,
combined with its apparent unwillingness to clear mines
around military bases, raises serious doubt as to Senegal’s
compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Serious obstacles also
remain to be overcome, primarily in regard to ongoing
insecurity which denies access for demining in certain areas
of Casamance and a lack of technical and ﬁnancial resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a
complete and accurate estimate of its remaining mine contamination.

■

Senegal should ensure that suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are recorded on the basis of demonstrable
evidence and with speciﬁc size estimates and the information made public.

■

Senegal should submit its outstanding Article 7 transparency report and ensure subsequent annual updates
are submitted each year prior to the 30 April deadline.

■

The Government of Senegal should make national funding and resources available for demining while
developing and implementing a resource mobilisation strategy to secure longer term funding.
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■

Senegal should prioritise clearance and technical survey in readily accessible areas and where the presence
of mines is reliably attested.

■

The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS) should continue to
improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations.

■

CNAMS should work actively to restore conﬁdence among donors and international operators in its mine
action programme.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

5

Senegal’s reporting of its estimate of remaining mine contamination has been
inconsistent. It also includes over 140 areas which have still to be surveyed and a
number of areas with an unknown size, making it difﬁcult to have much conﬁdence
in the estimate reported.

3

Senegal has shown scant political commitment to meeting its Article 5 obligations with
any urgency in recent years. The failure to demine areas around military installations
raises concerns about its compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) and even the prohibition on use of landmines.

5

CNAMS informed Mine Action Review that 40% of the demining team were women in 2018.

4

Senegal’s reporting has been highly inconsistent in recent years and difﬁcult to make
sense of. It failed to submit an updated Article 7 transparency report in 2019, in violation
of its treaty obligations, and did not ofﬁcially report on progress in land release in 2018.

3

In October 2018, Senegal elaborated a revised timeline to address the remaining areas
of contamination by its 2021 APMBC Article 5 deadline. However, a persistent problem
which has curtailed progress in land release in recent years has remained a lack of
access to certain areas due to ongoing insecurity. In the past, Senegal’s tasking has
been strongly criticised by an international mine action operator.

4

Senegal’s National Mine Action Standards were last reviewed in 2013.

3

Senegal’s progress towards meeting its 2021 Article 5 deadline has been meagre. It
is hopeful, though, that the return of Humanity and Inclusion (HI) and the resumption
of demining operations will prevent further stagnation while a stakeholder dialogue
workshop held in October 2018 might renew interest and commitment to making
progress in mine action.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

3.9

Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

National Commission for the Implementation of the
Ottawa Convention
Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

OTHER ACTORS
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None
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Humanity and Inclusion (HI)

None

STATES PARTIES

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of
the extent of its mine contamination, nearly 20 years after
becoming a state party to the APMBC. In 2018, it continued
to report inconsistent ﬁgures for the amount of conﬁrmed
and suspected contaminated areas remaining, as it has
in previous years. Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp,
Oussouye and Ziguinchor) of Senegal’s total of 45 still
contain conﬁrmed or suspected mined areas. The affected
departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal,
between The Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the
south. A comprehensive claim of 1.2km2 for nationwide mine
contamination does not appear to be based on ﬁrm evidence.1
According to ﬁgures reported by CNAMS, as at end 2018, a
total of almost 0.49km2 remained to be addressed across
37 mined areas with a further 11 other areas of unknown
size. 2 In addition, 144 areas which still remained to be
surveyed (127 areas in Bignona department, 4 in Oussouye,
and 13 in Ziguinchor), along with. 3 It is not possible to
reconcile these ﬁgures with past reported estimates of
remaining contamination and reported progress in land
release. Moreover, according to HI, given the historical

evidence of frequent clashes and rebel bases in the area, the
identiﬁcation of SHAs in north-west Casamance suggests
a high probability that other areas of contamination will
be found as survey progresses further east, nearer to the
northern border. 4
The extent of contamination is better known in the south of
Casamance, where previous survey in the region has identiﬁed
several SHAs, between the border with Guinea-Bissau and the
Casamance river to the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the
west.5 In August 2018, HI informed Mine Action Review that
areas such as north Sindian in Bignona department where
signiﬁcant contamination was suspected were still unsurveyed.
However, for security reasons and a lack of resources, the area
had not been addressed. 6
Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than
30 years of ﬁghting between the armed forces and a
non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces
of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de
Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic ﬁghting with some factions
of the MFDC has continued despite a ceaseﬁre in place
since 2004.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Commission for the Implementation of the
Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action
authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance
are coordinated by the CNAMS. Regional mine action
coordination committees have been established in Kolda,
Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.
The CNAMS is responsible for promoting the national mine
action programme, mobilising resources, coordinating survey
and conducting demining, designing and implementing
a victim assistance programme, accrediting demining
organisations, and monitoring and evaluating activities.7

In June 2018, the CNAMS informed states parties to
the APMBC that it expected approximately €6.5 million
is required to complete clearance of the remaining
contaminated areas. It stated that Senegal contributes
€460,000 annually for the operating costs of the CNAMS, and
€308,000 for mine action activities. 8 CNAMS revised the ﬁgure
reported as needed to complete clearance in October 2018,
down to close to €5.5 million. It claimed that the government
had earmarked more than €1.8 million for mine action in
2019.9 Senegal’s revised October 2017 workplan notes that
a resource mobilisation plan should be included in the
document but it does not contain one.10

GENDER
CNAMS informed Mine Action Review that the national mine action strategy prohibit sexual discrimination and strongly
encourages recruitment of women in demining. Four of ten members of the demining team in the Senegalese national
mine action programme were women in 2018.11

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to HI, CNAMS’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system was upgraded in 2015.12
Senegal’s reporting in recent years has been difﬁcult to follow, and it failed to submit an updated Article 7 transparency report
in 2019 or any ofﬁcial reporting of land release carried out in 2018.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
At the October 2018 stakeholder dialogue workshop, CNAMS
outlined a workplan for completion of survey and clearance
by its 2021 Article 5 deadline. This included non-technical
survey of areas of unknown size and the 144 areas not yet
visited in 2019, and technical survey and clearance of all
remaining areas and any new areas identiﬁed through the
non-technical survey in December 2018–January 2021.13
Speciﬁcally, of the 37 areas with a known size of
contamination totalling just over 491,000m2, in December
2018–April 2019, 12 areas with a size of 265,233m2 in
Goudomp department were planned to be addressed, while
in May–June 2019, six areas with a size of 37,048m2 were
to be addressed in Ziguinchor department along with ﬁve
areas covering 38,020m2 in Bignona department. In January
2020–January 2021, the remaining nine areas with a size
of 77,240m2 will be addressed in Oussouye and Bignona
departments, along with ﬁve areas with a size of 73,554m2
in Ziguinchor department, for a total of 14 areas with a size
of just under 150,800m2. Of the areas of unknown size, eight
areas in Bignona and three areas in Goudomp departments
would, it is claimed, be addressed in October–November
2019 with all remaining areas will be addressed in January
2020–January 2021.14

Previously, Senegal submitted an updated workplan in
accordance with its Article 5 deadline extension request in
May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until
1 March 2021. A revised version was then concluded on
13 October 2017. The workplan lists all known or suspected
contaminated areas and establishes annual targets for the
amount of contamination to be addressed. However, there
are inconsistencies and incompatibilities in its reporting on
contamination and the size of projected annual milestones
for land release. Additionally, Senegal’s extension request
is until March 2021, but the plan does not contain details of
work to be carried out after 2018.
Senegal did not meet the targets set in its 2017 workplan
for 2018, nor those in its most recent Article 7 report
(for calendar year 2017).

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

Senegal does not have national mine action legislation in
place, based on available information.

HI has remained the only international demining operator
in Senegal since 2014. As at October 2017, it had suspended
its demining operations in the country for lack of funding.16
During that year, it employed 26 operational staff, two
national managerial staff, and an expatriate operations
manager.17 Operations resumed in February 2019 thanks
to funding from the United States. In May 2019, however,
ﬁve deminers were kidnapped and then released the same
day, and some of their equipment stolen. Since then, the
authorities have been in negotiations to be able to recover
the equipment and restart clearance.18

Senegal’s national mine action standards were developed
in 2009 and revised in 2013. According to CNAMS, the 2013
revision included standards for accreditation, technical
investigation, minimum mine clearance depth, and the use
of machines and mine detection dogs in demining.15

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Prior to cessation of operations in October 2017, HI deployed
a soil preparation and mechanical mine clearance machine,
the Digger D-3.19
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Senegal did not formally report on progress in land release in 2018. In October 2018, CNAMS reported that since its second
extension request granted in 2016 it had visited 72 of 79 locations, determining that 67 were not contaminated and the
remaining 5 (with a size of 14,670m2) were recorded as SHAs. In addition, 29 areas with a total size of 164,990m2 had been
cleared, with the destruction of 22 mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). 20 It did not disaggregate these ﬁgures by year.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
SURVEY IN 2018
As noted above, Senegal has not ofﬁcially reported any area released or conﬁrmed through survey in 2018. Previously, in
2017, HI reported conﬁrming 16 mined areas with a combined size of 65,393m2: one area in Bignona department with a size
of 1,000m2 and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a size of 64,393m2, all of which were subsequently released through
technical survey and clearance. 21

CLEARANCE IN 2018
Likewise, Senegal has not ofﬁcially reported on any clearance in 2018. In 2017, HI reported releasing a total of 65,400m2
through technical survey and clearance (though it was unable to disaggregate between the two), including one area in Bignona
department with a size of 1,000m2 and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a combined size of 64,393m2. These areas
were released with the destruction of two anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and one item of unexploded ordnance
(UXO). 22 However, CNAMS reported that 18 CHAs with a total size of 106,658m2 were cleared in 2017 in Goudomp department,
Ziguinchor region, with the destruction of three anti-personnel mines. 23

DEMINER SAFETY
In mid-May 2019, demining operations, which had recently restarted thanks to US funding, were again suspended following the
kidnapping of ﬁve deminers by an MFDC faction. This occurred despite an agreement having been obtained to operate in that
zone, according to CNAMS. As noted above, the deminers were all released the same day. 24

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SENEGAL: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
2

Year

Area cleared (m )

2018

0

2017

65,400*

2016

147,650

2015

0

2014

N/R

Total

213,050

*Includes technical survey and clearance

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with
the ﬁve-year extension granted by states parties in 2015),
Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is improbable
that it will not meet this deadline.
In August 2018, HI stated that the likelihood that Senegal would
meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2021 was “more than
low” in view of the remaining situation of more than 1.2km2
of area reported to be contaminated and nearly 144 localities
which had not been surveyed, and without the resources to
do so. HI additionally cited that the CNAMS’ ability to mobilise
resources has been very low in recent years.25
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In June 2018, Senegal informed APMBC states parties that
with the current pace of performance it was unlikely to be
able to meet its clearance objectives of end 2020. 26 In October
2018, CNAMS highlighted a lack of access to certain targeted
areas, the withdrawal of traditional mine action partners, and
deteriorating demining equipment as primary challenges. 27
Senegal has previously claimed that the circumstances
impeding compliance with its international legal obligations
include general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to
demining operations; ongoing concerns over deminer safety;
and a decrease in technical and ﬁnancial resources in
recent years. 28
In fact, since 2013, the apparently wilful lack of land release
and concrete political will to address its mine problem,
and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance
capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulﬁlling its Article
5 obligations. This led to the withdrawal of Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) in 2014 and the loss of ﬁnancial support
from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in
its clearance capacities. CNAMS’ allocation of tasks has also
been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets
to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while
requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying
clearance assets were denied. 29
Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations
would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing
peace talks and would ﬁrst be approved by the MFDC in
meetings with Senegalese ofﬁcials. 30 At the same time,
CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by
authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action
centre. 31 CNMAS has, though, reported that events in The
Gambia had improved the security situation in the north
of Casamance, particularly in the department of Bignona,
allowing signiﬁcant numbers of displaced persons to return.
It expected that the continued evolution of the peace process
would ensure better security conditions and improve access
for mine clearance in planned locations. 32

1

Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management,
CNAMS, 16 September 2019.

2

Ibid.

3

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018, available at:
bit.ly/2TJTY89.

4

Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report
(for 2016), Form D.

There is, though, no explanation in the action plan presented
in Senegal’s second extension request of how peace
negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reﬂection Group on
Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réﬂexion sur la Paix en
Casamance, GRPC) will address the issue of mine clearance.
Another fundamental problem is Senegal’s ongoing lack of a
comprehensive understanding of its mine problem. Concerns
have also been raised about its apparent reluctance to deploy
clearance assets in CHAs, and its continued failure to clear
contaminated areas around existing military bases verges
on use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the
APMBC. According to NPA, there is overwhelming evidence
that the laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic,
while the Senegalese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not
thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance. 33
Previously, in 2015, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing
dialogue between operators and the armed forces in
particular, which could provide the speciﬁc locations of
mined areas. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS
was preventing dialogue between parties, including the
spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a
complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS. 34
However, in August 2017, CNAMS claimed that it has already
demined around all the military bases, with the help of the
army where that was necessary. 35 HI has reported that its
teams cleared 22,162m² in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection
with a former army base in 2015–16, destroying “around”
19 anti-personnel mines. 36 It is not certain that all other
bases have been demined.
Based on present capacity and its poor track record, without
a major change in political will and resources, Senegal will
not meet its Article 5 deadline, or even the Maputo political
declaration 2025 goal.

19

Ibid.

20

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.

21

Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.

22

Ibid.

23

Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.

24

Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019.
Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.

5

Ibid.

25

6

Email from Faly Keita, Coordinator, Casamance Site, HI, 8 August 2018.

26

Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

7

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.

27

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.

8

Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

28

9

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.

Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline extension
submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015,
p. 22.

10

CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021”,
13 October 2017, p. 20.

29

K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it
should?”, Blog post, 2014, at: bit.ly/33M3nRs.

11

Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 16 September 2019.

30

H. Sagna, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations
still deadlocked”, Enquête+, 17 June 2015.

12

Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

31

13

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.

Statement of ICBL, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015;
and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

32

14

Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018.

CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–21”,
April 2017; and CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension
2016–2021”, 13 October 2017, p. 21.

15

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

16

Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2016.

34

17

Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018.

A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, “Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal”,
IRIN, 3 August 2015, at: bit.ly/2THyclz.

18

Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019.

35

Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

36

Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.
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SERBIA

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
0.35
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AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

0.29KM 29
2
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Clearance
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Non-Technical
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Serbia requested and was granted a further four-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 5 deadline until 1 March 2023. The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) continued to demonstrate a willingness to adopt
more efﬁcient land release methodology in instances where technical survey is more appropriate than full clearance. SMAC
also attracted a new international donor in 2018 and another in 2019, putting it back on track to meet its Article 5 deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Serbia should consider using its armed forces for mine clearance or inviting demining non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to help meet its treaty obligations by fulﬁlling its Article 5 obligations by 2023.

■

SMAC should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full clearance, in instances where
survey represents the most efﬁcient means to release part or all of areas suspected or conﬁrmed to contain
anti-personnel mines.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Serbia has remaining suspected hazardous areas, but needs to conduct survey for
physical evidence of mines and conﬁrm or discredit reported contamination, before
conducting full clearance.

7

Serbia has strong national ownership of its mine action programme, which is nationally
funded. It also doubled the amount of national funding towards survey and clearance in
2018 and is actively attracting new donors to help it meet its completion plan.

3

SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine
action data by sex and age. However, it does ensure women and children are consulted
during survey and community liaison activities and there is equal access to employment
for qualiﬁed women and men in survey and clearance.

7

Serbia submits timely, accurate, and comprehensive annual Article 7 reports on Article 5
progress, which are consistent between reporting periods, and provides regular updates
on progress at APMBC meetings.

7

SMAC has a plan in place for completion of Article 5 implementation with planned
annual land release output through to its treaty deadline, subject to funding. Serbia
also produces revised annual workplans based on actual progress.

6

Although SMAC has expressed a preference for full clearance of SHAs over technical
survey, it did reduce land through technical survey in 2017 and 2018, demonstrating a
greater willingness to adopt more efﬁcient land release practices.

7

Serbia has set a target date for completion of Article 5, but meeting it is largely
contingent on securing sufﬁcient funding. Land release output in 2018 was through
both technical survey and clearance, and was an increase on 2017.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

5

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.0

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of
Interior (acts as the national mine action authority)
Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Saturnia d.o.o.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

DOK-International d.o.o., Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH), Belgrade branch

NGOs:
In Demining, Pale, BiH, Belgrade branch
■ Stop Mines, Pale, BiH, Belgrade branch
■

OTHER ACTORS
■
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As at 1 April 2019, eight areas in Bujanovac municipality,
covering more than 1.73km2, were suspected to contain
anti-personnel mines (see Table 1).1 This is a decrease from
the 2.35km2 of mined areas a year earlier, the result of
release through technical survey and clearance.
Bujanovac is the only municipality in Serbia still affected
by mines. According to SMAC, the contamination is from
mines of an unknown origin and type; which have not been
emplaced to follow a pattern; and for which there are no
mineﬁeld records. 2 According to the national authorities,
previous surveys found insufﬁcient evidence for mined
areas to be classiﬁed as conﬁrmed hazardous areas, so
they remain as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). 3
Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided into
two phases. The ﬁrst was a legacy of the armed conﬂicts
associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early
1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01 in
the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-state
armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and
Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is
a result of this later phase. 4 Contamination also exists within
Kosovo (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines report
on Kosovo for further information).

Serbia is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants
(CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), which are
either the result of the 1999 bombing, remain from previous
conﬂicts, or are the result of explosions or ﬁre at military
depots5 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants report on Serbia for further information).
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by village
(at 1 April 2019) 6
Municipality
Bujanovac

Village

SHAs

Area (m2)

Ravno Bučje

1

390,300

Končulj

5

1,181,820

Dobrosin

1

28,000

Turija
Totals

1

131,400

8

1,731,520

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
According to a Government Decree on Protection
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the
national mine action authority (NMAA).7 The NMAA is
responsible for developing standard operating procedures
(SoPs); accrediting demining operators; and supervising
the work of SMAC. 8
SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law
making it responsible for coordinating demining; collecting
and managing mine action information (including casualty
data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to
plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and
monitor operations, ensure implementation of international
standards, and conduct risk education.9 As from 1 January
2014, according to a Government Decree on Protection
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible
for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was
responsible for doing so.10
A new director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian
government in the autumn of 2015,11 and as at 2018, SMAC had a
total of eight staff.12 SMAC reported that, in 2016, restructuring
resulted in a greater proportion of operational posts.13

SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including for survey activities,
development of project tasks for demining and clearance of
contaminated areas, follow-up on implementation of project
tasks, and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining.
Around €150,000 per year is allocated to the work of SMAC
from the national state budget.14 In addition, the unexploded
ordnance (UXO) disposal work of the Sector for Emergency
Situations of the Ministry of Interior is also state funded.15
Since 2015, Serbia has also been allocating national funds for
survey and clearance, with roughly €100,000 allocated per
year.16 In 2018, the Serbian Government allocated double the
amount of national funds for demining operations to €200,000
allocated per year (which were matched with US and Korean
funding and tendered through ITF Enhancing Human Security
(ITF)), and Serbia continues to seek additional international
funding.17 At the request of the national authorities, national
funding was increased to €350,000 for 2019 demining
operations.18 SMAC hopes that national funding, matched
through ITF, will be made available annually throughout the
remainder of its Article 5 extension request period.19

GENDER
SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However,
it does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison activities and there is equal access to
employment for qualiﬁed women and men in survey and clearance operations. Around 10% of those employed in survey and
clearance teams, and also of those in mine action managerial or supervisory positions in Serbia, are women. 20
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SMAC uses its own information management system. Previously, SMAC discussed the possibility of the installation of the
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), 21 but there were no ongoing discussions in that regard as at June 2019.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia
included a costed plan for the completion of demining, with
clear milestones, for 2018–23. 22 In its Article 7 report for 2018,
Serbia set out a slightly updated plan: to release 606,210m2
in 2019; 467,880m2 in 2020; 316,790m2 in 2021; 195,000m2 in
2022; and the remaining 145,640m2 in 2023. 23 Serbia intends
to use non-technical survey, technical survey, manual
clearance, mechanical demining (where applicable), and
mine detection dogs (MDDs, where applicable), to complete
clearance in Serbia before its 2023 Article 5 deadline.24
Progress is, however, contingent on funding and Serbia
has stated that if it cannot secure international support for
demining, its workplan will be directly affected. On the other

hand, if more funds are provided, Serbia maintains it could
implement its workplan more quickly. 25
The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC’s annual workplan,
as well as the annual report on its work. 26 The 2019 workplan
has been adopted by the Serbian government. 27
Serbia prioritises the demining of areas which directly affect
the local population, such as those close to settlements
where local people have abandoned their houses and stopped
cultivating land due to fear of landmines. 28 SMAC also noted
that donors themselves sometimes also inﬂuence the choice
of the areas which will be demined ﬁrst, depending on
availability and amount of their funds. 29

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations in
Serbia are conducted in accordance with the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 30
National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in
the ﬁnal phase of development as at September 2015. 31 In
April 2017, SMAC reported that, along with the relevant
national authorities, it was in the process of establishing a
commission to develop national standards and SoPs to deﬁne
methods and techniques for demining in Serbia. 32 However,
this process has been hindered due to lack of capacity, 33
and as at March 2019, the development of the NMAS was
still “in progress”. 34
Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed
its land release methodology to prioritise full clearance
over technical survey of hazardous areas. 35 This does not
correspond to international best practice, and is an inefﬁcient
use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, the new
director of SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that while
SMAC supports the use of high quality non-technical survey
to identify suspected mined areas, it will fully clear these
areas, rather than using technical survey to more accurately
identify the boundaries of contamination. 36
SMAC’s position on its preferred land release methodology
remains the same, although there is now a willingness to
conduct technical survey in a form “adjusted to the context of
Serbia”, in response to the stated preference of international
donors for technical survey above clearance, where
appropriate. 37
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SMAC’s primary reluctance to using technical survey as a next
step to further delineate conﬁrmed mined area is its lack of
conﬁdence that such survey can effectively identify groups of
unrecorded mines, not planted in speciﬁc patterns.38 According
to SMAC, incidents involving people or animals have occurred
in most of these suspected areas or else mines have been
accidentally detected.39 The reduction of mined area through
technical survey in the municipality of Bujanovac in 2017 and
2018, however, demonstrates SMAC’s greater willingness to
adopt more efﬁcient land release practices.
SMAC has reported that the results of the initial survey
data are analysed and then further non-technical survey is
conducted to assess conditions in the ﬁeld, and to gather
statements by the local population, hunters, foresters,
representatives of Civil Protection, and the police, among
others. Data on mine incidents is another signiﬁcant
indicator. 40 Also, in the context of Serbia, there is reportedly
limited potential to obtain additional information on the
location of mined areas from those who laid the mines
during the conﬂict. 41
Technical survey is employed “to additionally collect
information by technical methods on a suspected area and
in case when the data collected by a non-technical survey
are not sufﬁcient for suspected areas to be declared
hazardous or safe”. 42 Clearance is reported to be conducted
in accordance with the IMAS and to a depth of 20cm. 43
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OPERATORS
SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ
deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to
contain mines, CMR, or other ERW. Clearance is conducted
by commercial companies and NGOs, which are selected
through public tender procedures executed by ITF, supported
by international funding. 44
The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action
operators that is valid for one year. In 2018, 14 companies/
organisations were accredited for demining: seven from
Serbia, four from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), two from
Croatia, and one from Russia. 45
Thirty deminers were deployed for technical survey of mined
areas in 2018; one team (10 deminers) from Saturnia d.o.o.
and two teams (20 deminers) from Stop Mines. 46 A further 30

deminers were deployed for mine clearance in 2018: one team
each (10 deminers) from DOK-International d.o.o., In Demining,
and Stop Mines. 47 This represents an increase in survey and
clearance capacity compared to the previous year.
No non-technical survey was conducted in 2018. 48
The Serbian Armed Forces maintain a capability to survey,
search for, detect, clear and destroy landmines. This
capability includes many types of detection equipment,
mechanical clearance assets, disposal experts, and specialist
search and clearance teams. 49 An explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) department within the Sector for Emergency
Management, in the Ministry of Interior, responds to
call-outs for individual items of ERW, and is also responsible
for demolition of items found by SMAC. 50

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Technical survey and clearance in Serbia is primarily
conducted manually.
MDDs were used in technical survey and clearance
operations in 2018 to release land, 51 but according to Serbia
most of the suspected mined areas are mountainous
with challenging terrain and thick vegetation and are not

appropriate for the use of MDDs or machinery. 52 The fact
that these areas have not been accessed since the end of the
conﬂict (2001), due to suspicion of mines, means that the land
is unmanaged, making it even less accessible. 53
SMAC uses data obtained by unmanned aerial vehicles to
develop and monitor clearance and technical survey projects.54

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 0.62km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 0.29km2 was cleared and 0.33km2 was reduced through technical
survey, during which a total of 29 anti-personnel mines and 1,347 other items of UXO were destroyed. No mined area was
cancelled through non-technical survey.

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, 329,820m2 of mined area was reduced through technical survey, in the villages of Ravno Bučje and Djordjevac, in
Bujanovac municipality, by Saturnia d.o.o. and Stop Mines, during which 14 anti-personnel mines and two other items of UXO
were destroyed (see Table 2). 55 This is an increase on the 275,800m2 reduced through technical survey in 2017. 56 No mined area
was cancelled through non-technical survey in 2018 or in 2017.
Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 2018 57
Municipality

Village

Operator

Bujanovac

Ravno Bučje

Saturnia and Stop Mines

Ravno Bučje

Stop Mines

Djordjevac

Saturnia and Stop Mines

Totals

Area reduced (m2)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

113,600

5

2

71,120

4

0

145,100

5

0

329,820

14

2

AP = Anti-personnel
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, two mined areas were cleared, releasing 293,200m2 and destroying 15 anti-personnel mines and 1,345 items of
other UXO. The mine clearance, in the villages of Dobrosin and Lučane in Bujanovac municipality, was conducted by two
NGOs and a commercial company, all from BiH (see Table 3). 58 This is an increase in clearance output on 2017, when no land
was released clearance. 59
SMAC did not have available data on the number of mines destroyed by the EOD department within the Sector for Emergency
Management during spot tasks in 2018. 60
Table 3: Mine clearance in 201861
Municipality

Village

Operator

Bujanovac

Dobrosin

In Demining, and
DOK-International

Lučane

Stop Mines

Areas cleared

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

1

220,000

9

0

Totals

1

73,200

6

1,345

2

293,200

15

1,345

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SERBIA: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: JUST ON TRACK, DEPENDENT ON FUNDING
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
second extension (for four years) granted by states parties in
2018), Serbia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Serbia is just on
track to meet this deadline, if it can secure required funding.
Furthermore, Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over
Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined
areas under Article 5 of the APMBC. However, Serbia did
not include such areas in either its ﬁrst or second extension
request estimates of remaining contamination or plans for
the extension periods.
Serbia reported facing several challenges in complying with
its Article 5 obligations, including lack of adequate ﬁnancial
resources, and the presence of areas contaminated with
CMR and other ERW. 62 In addition, Serbia reported that the
remaining mine contamination is of unrecorded mined
areas/groups of mines, with mines having been emplaced
with no particular pattern, which has complicated survey
and clearance efforts. Furthermore, climatic conditions
prevent access to some mined areas for parts of the year. 63
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In the last ﬁve years Serbia has cleared a total of almost one
square kilometre of mined area (see Table 4).
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.29

2017

*0

2016

0

2015

0.41

2014

0.27

Total

0.97

*0.28km2 was reduced through technical survey, during which three anti-personnel
mines were destroyed.

Serbia has fallen well behind the clearance plan it set out
in its 2013 Article 5 deadline, and also fell behind on land
release output in its subsequently adjusted workplans in
2015, 2016, and 2017. 64 This was largely due to a lack of
funding, but in a positive development, on top of existing US
funding, Serbia also secured funding from a new donor, the
Republic of Korea, in 2018, and has further secured funding
from another new donor, Japan, in 2019. 65

STATES PARTIES

In its 2018 Article 5 extension request Serbia calculated that
it requires an estimated €2.5 million to complete the release
of all remaining mined areas, of which €900,000 is planned to
come from national budget and around €1.6 million from ITF
and other sources of international funding. 67

In June 2018, during the APMBC intersessional meetings,
Serbia and the Committee on the Enhancement of
Cooperation and Assistance convened an “Individualised
Approach Platform” meeting, to hold a frank discussion
with relevant stakeholders on the current status of Serbia’s
national programme, the needs and challenges in completing
its Article 5 obligations and it commitments net the Maputo
Action Plan. 68
SMAC has pledged to continue to raise awareness of its
need for further funding and will seek funding from state
authorities, public enterprises, and local authorities. 69
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This additional funding is set to put SMAC back on track to
meet its planned land release outputs detailed in its 2018
Article 5 deadline extension request, and updated most
recently, in its Article 7 report for 2018. 66
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SOMALIA

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

1.60KM 297
2

(including 77 destroyed
during spot tasks)

0.03km2 Somalia, 0.41km2 Somaliland,
0.11km2 disputed area

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2

0.89

Clearance

Somaliland

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

1.2
0.03km2 Somalia, 1.49km2 Somaliland,
0.08km2 disputed area

2

1.6
1.4

0.08km2 Somalia,
0.81km2 Somaliland

72.2KM

GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE, AND NO BASELINE EXISTS,
BUT ACTUAL CONTAMINATION LIKELY TO BE FAR LESS

Area of Land Released (km2)

1.6

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

0.55

0.04

Technical
Survey

2017
2018

0.25km2 Somalia,
0.03km2 Somaliland

1.8

1,268m2 Somaliland

KEY DATA

0.28

0.0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The extent of survey of anti-personnel mined areas rose during the year, but clearance fell by more than 60% compared to
2017 and no anti-personnel mines were found (although 45 mines were destroyed in spot tasks). This adds yet another year
to the track-record of limited progress in fulﬁlling Somalia’s Article 5 obligations. In Somaliland, land release fared far better,
with substantial increases in anti-personnel survey and clearance, and more than double the amount of mines destroyed.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Somalia should establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as security
conditions allow.

■

Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations.

■

Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should
be ofﬁcially recognised and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs.

■

Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all
implementing partners.

■

The Federal Government should formally endorse the new National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020.

■

Somalia should develop a mine action resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with
development partners on long-term support.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

4

Considerable effort is needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine
contamination across Somalia. Large swathes of the country have yet to be surveyed
and many areas are inaccessible due to ongoing conﬂict and insecurity. Lack of funding
is also considered a major constraint.

4

More effective management of the mine action programme was achieved through
ongoing capacity development with the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA).
The Somali Government has still to formally recognise SEMA as a government institution
and provide funding for its operations.

5

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2022 includes provisions on
gender and diversity. SEMA has demonstrated a positive orientation to addressing
gender-related issues, in a national context which can present barriers to effective
gender mainstreaming.

5

SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action
database, resulting in improvements in information management. Somalia submitted
its ﬁrst Article 7 transparency report for several years in July 2018; but subsequent
reporting remained of poor quality, lacking in detail and clarity.

6

Operators reported that SEMA’s ability to manage planning and tasking increased in
2018, but external factors such as the security situation continue to prevent access to
certain areas of the country and hampered the deployment of mine action teams.

5

A process to revise Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines was ongoing
in 2018, which was due to be completed in 2019.

4

Land release outputs remained limited in 2018, primarily due to ongoing armed conﬂict,
new security threats, and a lack of resources and operational capacity. No anti-personnel
mines were found during clearance operations, adding yet another year of very minor
progress in fulﬁlling Somalia’s Article 5 obligations. Substantial progress was, however,
made in anti-personnel survey and clearance operations in Somaliland.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.6

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

SEMA
Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of
Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

SEMA federal state consortium
National NGOs

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

The HALO Trust
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Ukroboronservice

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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SOMALIA

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Contamination from mines and ERW exists across
Somalia’s three major regions: south-central Somalia,
including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland,
a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates
autonomously in the north-west. Mines along the border with
Ethiopia, mainly in legacy mineﬁelds, also continued to affect
civilians in south-central Somalia.1

Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2018) 8
Type of contamination
AP/AV
AP
Totals

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78
(also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of
internal conﬂict, Somalia is signiﬁcantly contaminated with
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the
United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines
were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool
and Sanaag. 2

CHAs

SHAs

175

159

28

46

203

205

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine
contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in
Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718
communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines
and/or ERW.9 Other contaminated areas lie along the border
with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.
Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identiﬁed more than
6km2 of mined area.10

A baseline of mine contamination is still lacking in Somalia,
primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy sufﬁcient
survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security
concerns and al-Shabaab control, though operators reported
some progress towards establishing a better understanding
of anti-personnel mine contamination during the year. 3

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at May 2018,
a total of 16 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mineﬁelds
remained to be cleared with a size of just over 8km2, most
of which are barrier mineﬁelds or military base perimeter
mineﬁelds.11

Of greater concern was the drastic shrinking of areas for
mine action operations due to security in 2018. The HALO
Trust reported that, as at March 2018, a large portion of
Hiraan region became too dangerous for operations due to
al-Shabaab attacks. It was forced to refocus operations in
Galmudug state instead. 4

In 2018, The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams
across Somaliland in order to build a more accurate
assessment of the remaining contamination, focusing on
former military camp mineﬁelds along the Ethiopian border.
While the general extent of contamination in Somaliland has
been well established as a result of surveys undertaken by
The HALO Trust over the past 20 years, a combination of
low-density minelaying and lack of ﬁrst-hand information
has meant that new mined areas continue to be found.
Four mineﬁelds were added to the database in 2018, with
a combined size of just over 1.5km2.12

According to Somalia’s Article 7 transparency report, as at
April 2019, a total of 879 contaminated areas (192 conﬁrmed
hazardous areas (CHAs), 511 suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs), and 176 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks)
had been registered in the SEMA national database. Of
this, it reported 38% of recorded contamination was mixed
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination, while a
further 8% was contaminated solely by anti-personnel mines. 5

In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination
was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey
(LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the
Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari,
Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.13

A total of 74 areas were reported as conﬁrmed or suspected
to contain solely anti-personnel mine contamination with a
size of just under 72.2km2 (28 CHAs with a size of just over
12.4km2 and 46 SHAs covering close to 59.8km2). 6 This is a
massive, and unexplained increase on the contamination
Somalia reported in its Article 7 report for 2017 of 21.3km2.7

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and
ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) and mines of an improvised nature by non-state
armed groups, have a serious humanitarian impact. The
extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland
and Somaliland where a range of surveys have been
carried out over the past decade.14

According to Somalia’s Article 7 report for 2018, mine
contamination remaining in Somalia, as recorded in the
national database was as follows.

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at April 2019)15
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total CHA/SHA

Total area (m2)

Galmudug

13

5,810,966

8

2,891

21

5,813,857

Hirshabelle

3

761,727

0

0

3

761,727

South West

State

12

5,837,076

0

0

12

5,837,076

Jubaland

0

0

1

59,776,693

1

59,776,693

Puntland

0

0

37

N/R

37

N/R

28

12,409,769

46

59,779,584

74

72,189,353

Totals
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Somalia also has a signiﬁcant problem contamination from ERW, including what is thought to be very limited contamination
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Somalia for
further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided
into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and
Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine
action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Mine Action
Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence
(formerly, the MCICA, and before that the Somaliland Mine
Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.16
SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its ﬁve
Federal State members: the Puntland State Ofﬁce, Galmudug
State Ofﬁce, Hirshabelle State Ofﬁce, South West State Ofﬁce,
and Jubaland Ofﬁce.17 Under each of the ﬁve members is an
independent consortium of national NGOs implementing mine
action activities.
SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre
for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action
Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.18 SEMA’s aim
was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard
coordination, regulation, and management by December
2015.19 However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not
approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and
progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017
that resulted in a period of government paralysis. 20 Due to
this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received
funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the
expiry of its grant in 2015. 21
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that no
further progress had been made in the Somali Parliament
towards the formal adoption of SEMA’s legislative framework,
though it was hopeful that this could be achieved by the end
of 2019. It reported it did not receive any national funding
or support from the government again in 2018; however, it
also said that efforts were underway to secure government
funding for its operations in 2019. 22
SEMA continued to face external challenges posed by the
security situation. In July 2018, the SEMA ofﬁce at the
Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and
signiﬁcantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of
SEMA’s ofﬁce materials, including computers and documents,
were destroyed.23 UNMAS reported in May 2019 that efforts to
restore the ofﬁce were ongoing with its support. 24
In 2018, with United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID) funding, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
continued its capacity development work with SEMA. NPA
reported that capacity building of SEMA and their national

consortium partners was closely monitored in 2018 by
milestones developed and agreed upon between NPA and
SEMA. Key focus areas were information management
support; support for operational planning, prioritisation,
and tasking of available clearance resources; and increasing
capacity within the senior SEMA management team. 25 UNMAS
reported providing ﬁnancial support to SEMA’s headquarters
and state ofﬁces in 2018. 26
NPA reported seeing positive progress throughout the year,
especially with SEMA taking ownership of its coordination/
tasking role, but also with its capacity to participate in treaty
meetings. In NPA’s view, without support from the Federal
Government at present, capacity development support
remains critical to ensure national ownership of the mine
action programme and a sustainable national capacity in
Somalia. 27
SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine
action implementing partners in November 2018, with a
focus on monitoring of operations. Operators considered this
a major step forward towards improving the cooperation,
consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the
clearance operators within Somalia.28

PUNTLAND
The SEMA Puntland State Ofﬁce, formerly known as PMAC,
was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme
(UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional
government, the Puntland State Ofﬁce has coordinated mine
action with local and international partners, including Danish
Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).29
It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and
destroying explosive ordnance.30

SOMALILAND
As part of a larger process of government reform in early
2018, the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC), which
was responsible for coordinating and managing demining
in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed
the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority
(MCICA), and underwent a change of line ministry from the
Ofﬁce of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence. 31 It was
renamed the Mine Action Department in January 2019. 32
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GENDER
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for
the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s
National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender
equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its
programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National
Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action
programme must reﬂect gender objectives and ensure
that the speciﬁc needs of women, girls, boys, and men are
taken into account, including through delivery of genderequality programming, and insistence on the adoption of a
gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing
partners. It also recognises the importance of conducting
context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify
important gender and diversity issues, such as clan afﬁliation,
movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to
participation for different gender and age groups. 33
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that
it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy
or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was
“unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender
balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment
opportunities for qualiﬁed men and women. 34
SEMA also reported that within the federal state national
mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on
gender and gender balance in survey and community liaison
teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected
groups, including women and children. It conﬁrmed that data
collection was disaggregated by sex and age, and gender
taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking
of survey and clearance activities. 35
NPA reported that the gender balance within its programme
staff increased in 2018, up from 16% female and 84% male
staff in January, to 23% female and 77% male staff by
December, and with a 50/50 gender balance within its senior
management team. NPA provided three trainings on gender
mainstreaming and sexual harassment for SEMA staff and
consortium partners from each of the federal states. The
results were surprisingly positive, with open and frank

discussions during the trainings, particularly within SEMA’s
and NPA’s management teams. 36
The HALO Trust reported that in its operations in Somalia in
2018, 13% of operations staff were female, and that two out
of ﬁfteen management staff were women. It conﬁrmed that
across its operations, survey and mine risk education (MRE)
teams regularly liaised with different community groups, with
a focus for certain MRE efforts on children. It reported that
all MRE teams and most of its EOD teams had at least one
woman, who could effectively reach out to women in local
communities to ensure their voices were heard. 37
The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that while
gender was a priority focus for survey activities to ensure
that a clear and holistic understanding of contamination
is gained through reaching men, women, girls, and boys,
gender was not a consideration in prioritisation of tasks
(see Planning and tasking section below).
In its operations in Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported
that of the 38 women employed by HALO in 2018, 18 (47%)
were employed in operational roles in survey and clearance
teams, and 6 (16%) were employed in managerial/supervisory
level positions. The HALO Trust noted, however, that in
the Somaliland programme, there had been a historical
preference towards recruiting men, prompted in part by
local cultural and religious norms. Efforts to introduce
female demining sections began in 2007 in the face of some
initial difﬁculties, not least in convincing women themselves
that demining was a suitable career option given cultural
norms and expectations. As the Somaliland programme has
decreased in size since 2014, and no new demining sections
have been hired, HALO reported it was challenging to redress
this balance at a late stage in the programme’s lifespan. 38
The HALO Trust additionally reported that, following a visit
from the Geneva-based Gender in Mine Action Programme
(GMAP) in 2017, HALO made improvements to its reporting
mechanisms for sexual abuse, exploitation, and harassment,
and appointed a female member of national staff as Point of
Contact for gender issues in Somaliland in 2018.39

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was
fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and
capacity-building from NPA. 40 NPA reported that IMSMA
operators within SEMA were carrying out data veriﬁcation
and entry. Reporting forms were standardised throughout
the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all
operators were using the same reporting forms. 41
Somalia’s national mine action strategic plan places
considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in
information management. 42 According to the Plan, a speciﬁc
national mine action standard on information management
was developed in 2018. 43 In May 2019, SEMA informed
Mine Action Review that a process to verify the historical
data contained in the UNMAS database was ongoing, with
assistance from NPA. This will help SEMA to develop a list
of priorities for clearance in its workplan for 2020. 44
NPA and HALO Trust both noted improvements in SEMA’s
information management capacity in 2018. HALO would welcome
a process for regular review of the IMSMA database and data
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sharing with implementing partners, to ensure staff are not
put at risk if new mineﬁelds are identiﬁed. NPA pledged to
continue capacity development support for SEMA on information
management through 2020, where after SEMA information
management staff are expected to fully manage the database
independently, barring any signiﬁcant staff turnover. 45
In July 2018, SEMA submitted its ﬁrst APMBC Article 7
transparency report for several years covering calendar year
2017, reﬂecting improvements in its information management
and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts
to engage with the APMBC community. However, subsequent
reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on the
size of and progress to address remaining contamination, and
with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting.
The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in
Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The
HALO Trust reported that regular checks of the database
for accuracy of recording were carried out in 2018. 46
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Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020,
developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international
operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions
in late 2017, was awaiting ﬁnal approval by the Somali Minister
of Internal Security throughout 2018. A review of the ﬁnal draft
of the document was scheduled for June 2019.47
The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the next
three-year period. The strategy’s ﬁve goals, identiﬁed by
SEMA, are as follows:
■
■
■
■
■

To enhance SEMA’s ability to lead and enable effective and
efﬁcient mine action
To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly
national mine action capacity
To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and
better respond to, their mine action needs
To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and
other explosive threats.

In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the ﬁve-year
“Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management
for 2018–2022”, ﬁrst developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and
the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was ofﬁcially
launched in Geneva. It claims to be a plan to “make Somalia
mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic and does not contain
any detail as to the amount of contamination remaining to
be addressed, nor targets for completion. 48 This view is not,
however, shared by UNMAS. 49
SEMA is developing a mine action workplan for 2020, in
cooperation with the SEMA state ofﬁces, which would be
ofﬁcially presented as Somalia’s ﬁrst annual workplan during
the treaty meetings in 2019. 50
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that no strategic
mine action plan was in place in 2018, though a series
of meetings with the mine action authority and other
stakeholders were held in preparation for transition of
the mine action programme to national ownership and the
development of a mine action strategic plan in 2019. 51

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS
developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs)
for Somalia in 2012–13.52 In May 2019, SEMA reported that a
review of the NMAS had been carried out in 2018 but that nothing
was changed, though a chapter on information management was
added.53 Final approval of the revisions was expected by mid
2019, following consultations with all mine action stakeholders.54
The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and
technical training to perform quality assurance (QA) checks
in 2018, and that consequently it carried out internal QA.
It noted that SEMA staff had expressed interest in QA and
was receiving training from NPA to build a national external
QA capacity. 55
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust conﬁrmed that the Mine Action
Department continued to conduct formal QA reviews in 2018,
with support from HALO. 56

OPERATORS
In 2018, two international NGOs conducted clearance
operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and
NPA, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance
company, Ukroboronservice. 57
While The HALO Trust’s mine clearance programme in
Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, in the ﬁrst half of 2015,
the organisation opened a new programme in south-central
Somalia. At the start of 2018, The HALO Trust had 12 manual
mine clearance teams deployed for clearance of anti-personnel
mines in Somalia. In March, the operations of eight teams
were suspended for security reasons, and the remaining four
were sent to a battle area clearance (BAC) task, which was
still ongoing in May 2019. HALO also deployed four weapon
and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams, which were primarily
occupied with EOD call-outs during the year.58
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust employed 434 demining/
operational personnel and 3 mechanical assets in 2018.

In addition to demining staff, it reported employing a
further 117 support staff and 95 temporary staff from local
communities in Somaliland during 2018. 59
NPA continued mine clearance throughout the year within the
disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with two
manual mine clearance teams and one survey/MRE team. It is
the only international operator accepted to work in the disputed
area by the different local clans. In addition, throughout the
ﬁrst quarter of the year, ﬁve survey/MRE teams were deployed
across all ﬁve federal states of South-Central Somalia, until the
completion of a UK DFID grant at the end of March.60
NPA reported that a new ﬁeld ofﬁce was established within
the capital of Puntland to accommodate the arrival and
in-country training of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and
the capacity development of SEMA state personnel and
consortium partners from Puntland and Galmudug states,
as well as forward ﬁeld support for planned survey and
clearance and police EOD activities in 2019. 61
UNMAS continued to contract Ukroboronservice to carry out
mine action activities in support of the African Union Mission in
Somalia’s (AMISOM) security priorities in 2018 through its four
mobile multi-task teams conducting ERW clearance across four
of Somalia’s federal states, with the exception of Puntland; 56
community liaison ofﬁcers to deliver risk education and liaison
activities; and two 18-strong manual clearance teams. During the
year, the number of manual clearance teams increased from two
to six, all of which were deployed along the border with Ethiopia
in Bakool and Hiran regions from September 2018.62 In response
to a request received from a local authority, one clearance team
relocated to Galgadud in August 2019 in coordination with the
Galmudug Mine Action Centre (SEMA Galmudug).63

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Only manual clearance of mines was conducted in Somalia in
2018. In Somaliland, both manual clearance and mechanical
demining was carried out, with the deployment of machines
by The HALO Trust.
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Close to 2.43km2 of anti-personnel mined area was released in total across Somalia and Somaliland in 2018: almost 1.6km2
through mine clearance and close to 0.55km2 reduced through technical survey, and 0.28km2 through cancellation through
non-technical survey. A total of 220 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 148 items of UXO were destroyed as a
result. A further 77 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in spot tasks. A total of just under 1.85km2 of mine contamination
was conﬁrmed during the year. 64

SURVEY IN 2018
As reported above, no comprehensive overview of SHAs
exists in Somalia, and as at the end of 2018, no nationwide
survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security
situation and a lack of resources. 65
In 2018, The HALO Trust and NPA cancelled a combined total
of nearly 0.28m2 through non-technical survey and reduced
a further 0.55m2 through technical survey in Somalia and
Somaliland. 66 Of this, the majority of survey output occurred
in Somaliland (just over 435,000m2 (29,000m2 through
non-technical survey and 406,000m2 through technical
survey), while just over 274,700m2 was released in Somalia
(248,700m2 through non-technical survey and 26,000m2
through technical survey), along with an additional 113,600m2
reduced in the disputed area between Somaliland and
Puntland. 67
This is an overall increase from 2017, when the two operators
reported cancelling a total of just under 1,300m2 through
non-technical survey and reducing just under 42,000m2
through technical survey in Somalia and Somaliland. 68
The HALO Trust reported that survey was not its primary
activity in 2018 as most of its resources were deployed on
BAC tasks and EOD call-outs. It cancelled a total of 248,795m2
in Hirshabelle state in Somalia and just over 29,000m2 in
Somaliland, along with identifying one previously unrecorded
area of anti-personnel mine contamination with a size of just
over 305,400m2 in Somalia. 69

NPA reported that non-technical survey activities were carried
out through the ﬁrst quarter of 2018 in all federal states of
Somalia, as part of joint NPA and federal consortium partner
projects.70 A total of 2,810,095m2 of area was conﬁrmed but
no area was cancelled. NPA completed survey in the disputed
area between Somaliland and Puntland during the year, with
the release of just over 113,600m2 through technical survey.71
It did not record any additional mined areas containing
anti-personnel mines, only anti-vehicle mines.72
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2018 73
Area

Operator

Hirshabelle (Somalia)

HALO

248,795

Toghdeer (Somaliland)

HALO

29,054

Total

Area cancelled (m²)

277,849

Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018 74
Area reduced (m2)

Area

Operator

Sool/Sanaag
(disputed area)

NPA

113,637

Hirshabelle (Somalia)

HALO

25,942

Toghdeer (Somaliland)

HALO

Total

406,022
545,601

CLEARANCE IN 2018
A combined total of just under 1.6km2 was released
through clearance in Somalia, Somaliland, and the disputed
area between Somaliland and Puntland in 2018, with the
destruction of 220 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines,
and 148 items of UXO. The great majority of this occurred
in Somaliland, where a total of just under 1.49km2 was
cleared and 219 anti-personnel mines destroyed; while in
Somalia a total of 0.03km2 was reported cleared, however
no anti-personnel mines were found. An additional 0.08km2
was cleared in the disputed area between Somaliland and
Puntland, with one anti-personnel mine destroyed.75
This compared with 2017, when just over 0.9km2 of antipersonnel contaminated area was cleared in total in Somalia
and Somaliland.76 Of this, 0.08km2 was cleared in Somalia
with the destruction of 4 anti-personnel mines, while
0.81km2 was cleared in Somaliland, with 87 anti-personnel
mines destroyed.77
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In 2018, The HALO Trust reported conducting three months
of manual mine clearance before switching its clearance
teams to a high priority BAC task for the remainder of the
year. As such, its clearance outputs for mined areas in
Somalia in 2018 were signiﬁcantly lower than in 2017. It
reported that 15 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD
spot tasks in Somalia during the year.78 A further 45
anti-personnel mines were destroyed by Ukroboronservice
in spot tasks during 2018.79
In Somaliland, clearance of anti-personnel mined areas by The
HALO Trust rose signiﬁcantly from just over 0.75km2 in 2017
to nearly 1.46km2 in 2018, with an increase in anti-personnel
mines destroyed from 87 in 2017 to 219 in 2018. A total of 17
additional anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot
tasks in Somaliland in 2018.80 An additional 1.5km2 of mined
area was also conﬁrmed during the year. 81
NPA reported clearing two areas with a size of 80,464m2
in the disputed territory between Somaliland and Puntland
in 2018, with the destruction of 1 anti-personnel mine,
1 anti-vehicle mine, and 81 items of UXO. 82
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Areas
cleared

Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

NPA

2

80,464

1

1

81

Hirshabelle (Somalia)

HALO

*2

28,038

0

0

5

Awdal (Somaliland)

HALO

0

127,836

76

0

0

Maroodi Jeex (Somaliland)

HALO

3

295,210

34

0

44

Toghdeer (Somaliland)

HALO

2

1,066,527

109

3

18

9

1,598,075

220

4

148

Region

Operator

Sool/Sanaag (disputed area)

Totals
* HALO reported one area was not yet completed in 2018

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18
Year

2

Area cleared (km )

2018

1.60

2017

0.89

2016

1.14

2015

1.64

2014

2.20

Total

7.47

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October
2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.
According to operators, without signiﬁcant improvements
in the security environment and signiﬁcant amounts of
funding, there is no possibility that Somalia will meet its
2022 deadline. The full extent of contamination remains
unknown, and survey is far from complete with large areas
not yet surveyed due to lack of safe access. Active conﬂict
continued to stymie progress, severely limiting ﬁeld access
for operators in 2018 and requiring constant adaptation to
volatile situations. Adding to this instability, the government
had still yet to ofﬁcially recognise SEMA in its role as the
national mine action centre. 84
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust had hoped to complete
clearance of the last known and accessible mined area in
Somaliland by mid 2019. 85
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

50

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

2017
2018

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,
(ESTIMATED)

15KM

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

2.08KM 1,166
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

45

(including 3 destroyed
during spot tasks)

43.06

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5

1.71

2.08

Clearance

0.67

0.02

Technical
Survey

2.04

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The number of areas suspected or conﬁrmed to contain
anti-personnel mines in South Sudan dropped dramatically,
by nearly 50km2, from just under 80km2 at the end of 2017,
to just under 30km2 at the end of 2018. Improvements in
the security situation which enabled greater freedom of
movement for mine action teams, coupled with a focus on
targeted re-survey and database review of large recorded
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), led to the signiﬁcant
cancellation of a number of hazards that were for some time
thought to be either inﬂated or just inaccurate. Clearance of

anti-personnel mined area also rose during 2018, along with a
considerable increase in the number of anti-personnel mines
found and destroyed.
While South Sudan has determined it will not meet its July
2021 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5
deadline, and will request an additional extension for a period
of ﬁve years, as a result of the progress made in 2018, it is now
far more able to accurately present the size of the remaining
challenge and the resources and time required to address it.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

South Sudan should set concrete and realistic annual targets for completing survey and clearance of
anti-personnel mines in its forthcoming Article 5 deadline extension request.

■

South Sudan should strive to plan, where possible, for mine action operations to support peace and
stabilization efforts.

■

Efforts should continue to ensure accurate recording and reporting by operators of data according to
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.

■

South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development
partners on long-term support for mine action.

■

South Sudan should increase its ﬁnancial support for mine action operations as well as to the National Mine
Action Authority (NMAA).

■

The mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) should be changed to include support for capacity
development of the national mine action programme.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

The understanding of remaining contamination in South Sudan improved signiﬁcantly
in 2018, with more than 53km2 of land released, primarily as a result of re-survey and
database review. The task remaining became far more achievable, with estimated
contamination at end 2018 at 29.8km2, down from nearly 80km2 the previous year.

4

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) continued to face serious ﬁnancial and
technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively in
2018. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was responsible for much of the
mine action programme’s functioning, including database management, accreditation,
tasking, and quality management.

6

South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a section on
gender, as does South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs).
These include a focus on ensuring gender-balanced survey teams and gender- and
age-sensitive data collection and community outreach.

7

A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was carried out in 2018, along with re-survey of
recorded suspected and conﬁrmed hazardous areas thought to be exaggerated or
erroneously recorded. These activities resulted in signiﬁcant gains in the understanding
of mine contamination.

6

South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with
support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD),
was ofﬁcially launched in September 2018. Improvements in the security situation
enabled an increase in access for mine action operations in a number of previously
inaccessible areas.

7

According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South Sudan are subject to constant
review by UNMAS and the NMAA. In 2018, the NTSGs were amended in regard to
storage and transport of explosives and the conduct of explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) operations.

7

While South Sudan will not meet its current Article 5 deadline of 2021, its remarkable
progress in land release output and obtaining a more realistic picture of remaining
contamination in 2018 place it in a much better situation as it prepares its second
Article 5 extension request, with a much more achievable problem to tackle.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE

Performance Commentary

7

(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.5

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

■
■
■
■

DanChurchAid (DCA)
Danish Demining Group (DDG)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
MECHEM
The Development Initiative (TDI)

OTHER ACTORS
■
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UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines, as well as explosive remnants of war
(ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR). The
weapons were used during nearly 50 years of Sudanese
civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the
independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two
years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan,
heavy ﬁghting erupted in the capital city, Juba, in December
2013, initiating new armed conﬂict across the country.

According to UNMAS, at end 2018, South Sudan had a
combined total of 147 areas conﬁrmed and suspected to
contain anti-personnel mines covering a total area of
almost 29.8km2 (see Table 2).1 This is a massive decrease
from the end of 2017, when a total of 220 areas containing
anti-personnel mines were reported with a total size of
nearly 80km2. 2
Nine of South Sudan’s (formerly ten) states contain mined
areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated,
followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to
UNMAS. Of the remaining anti-personnel mine contamination,
less than 3.3km2 is conﬁrmed hazardous area (CHA), while
26.5km2 of SHA is thought to be mined (see Table 2). 3

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018) 4
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Anti-personnel mines

69

3,276,155

78

26,505,130

Anti-vehicle mines

32

1,339,612

31

1,765,906

101

4,615,767

109

28,271,036

Type of contamination

Totals
CHAs = Conﬁrmed hazardous areas

Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2018) 5
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs and CHAs

Total area (m2)

Central Equatoria

38

1,189,016

37

443,736

75

1,632,752

Eastern Equatoria

State

16

546,654

11

92,836

27

639,490

Jonglei

9

1,112,036

15

20,680,535

24

21,792,571

Lakes

0

0

1

2,500

1

2,500

North Bahr El Ghazal

1

37,500

0

0

1

37,500

Upper Nile

3

93,761

4

4,684,713

7

4,778,474

Warrap

0

0

1

40,000

1

40,000

West Bahr El Ghazal

1

201,738

1

0

2

201,738

Western Equatoria

1

95,450

8

560,810

9

656,260

69

3,276,155

78

26,505,130

147

29,781,285

Totals

While signiﬁcant progress was made in 2018 to more
accurately deﬁne the extent of contamination remaining, its
full extent is not known, as additional mined areas continue
to be identiﬁed. Ongoing conﬂict continues to result in
new unexploded ordnance (UXO), particularly in Greater
Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Insecurity
continues to greatly limit access to many areas of the
country, severely impeding efforts to conﬁrm or address
contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region. 6
In 2017, UNMAS reported that a review of the national
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database led to the conclusion that many existing hazards
may have been over-reported in size. UNMAS consequently
initiated a process of targeted re-survey during the year
aimed at better deﬁning the estimated size of SHAs. The
results of the re-survey were not ﬁnalised as of writing, but
UNMAS reported that ongoing survey in Upper Nile state,

previously reported as the most heavily contaminated in
terms of the size of area recorded, has revealed remarkably
little contamination. Current projections of the number of
mineﬁelds and cluster strikes remaining to be addressed are
thought to be highly accurate, but markedly less reliable are
estimates of their sizes as well as the type of contamination.
In the Equatoria region, the NMAA reported that while
the peace agreement signed in September 2018 had
brought a cessation in violence across the majority of the
country, ﬁghting continued in the region as at May 2019,
which prevented access to determine the full extent of
contamination or clearance in the region. However, the
NMAA reported that of all hazards remaining in the database,
the three largest recorded areas accounted for more than
10km2, and it was conﬁdent that more survey work will
yield continued signiﬁcant reduction in the contamination
to be addressed.7
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At the same time, new areas of anti-personnel mine
contamination continued to be added to the database in 2018.
A total of close to 3.2km2 was added, including over 1.1km2
of recorded contaminated area which was re-classiﬁed as
anti-personnel contamination from other types of recorded
hazardous area in a database review; just over 600,000m2
of previously unknown anti-personnel mined area identiﬁed
through survey; and a further nearly 1.5km2 of area was
added to the size of a number of recorded anti-personnel
mined areas already existing in the database. 8
While previously undiscovered areas of anti-personnel
mine contamination continued to be found in 2018, Mine
Action Review is not aware of any conﬁrmed new use of

anti-personnel mines in the renewed conﬂict that erupted
in 2013. In July 2019, UNMAS stated that no new use of
anti-personnel mines, including of an improvised nature,
was recorded in 2018.9
Previously, dating back to 2015, there were allegations of
use of anti-personnel mines by South Sudanese government
forces in an area around Nassir, Upper Nile state.10 In June
2018, South Sudan informed states parties to the APMBC
that in November 2017, a four-person investigation team
travelled to Nassir to investigate the March 2015 allegation.
The investigation team found no evidence of landmines being
laid in the vicinity of Nassir, on or around the alleged date
in 2015.11

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – since renamed
the NMAA – was established by presidential decree in 2006
to act as the national agency for planning, coordination,
and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.12 There is no
national mine action legislation in South Sudan.13
In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS
with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening
the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has
been overseeing mine action across the country through its
main ofﬁce in Juba, and sub-ofﬁces in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal,
and Wau. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action
organisations, drafting national mine action standards,
establishing a quality management system, managing the
national database, and tasking operators.14
While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume
full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to
UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious ﬁnancial and
technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action
operations effectively in 2018. It requires substantial resources
and capacity building assistance if it is to operate effectively.15

UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to
support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.16
In May 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2155, adopted
in response to the conﬂict that broke out in December 2013,
effectively ended the mission’s mandate to support capacity
development of government institutions. In 2018, UNMAS
reported that reversing this change in the mission mandate
to support the capacity building of government institutions
would greatly enhance UNMAS’ ability to support the NMAA.17
In 2018, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs
of NMAA staff salaries and its sub-ofﬁces across the
country. It did not, however, provide any funding for the
conduct of survey or clearance.18 UNMAS has reported that
the Government of South Sudan is only able to provide
minimal funding and support to all national institutions,
including the NMAA. It has raised concerns over resource
mobilisation in the face of overwhelming donor fatigue and
frustration due to the ongoing conﬂict, which continues to
exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. Mine action, which is a
critical enabler for humanitarian assistance, has not been
prioritised by donors, who have been increasingly unwilling
to support government institutions until a peace agreement
is implemented.19
Positively, UNMAS reported that as part of South Sudan’s
preparations to request an extension to its APMBC Article
5 deadline, a centrally-led effort to mobilise additional
resources for mine action was underway in 2019. 20

GENDER
South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for
2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how
different gender and age groups are affected by mines and
ERW and have speciﬁc and varying needs and priorities.
Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine
action planning and operations in South Sudan are also
incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection
of data disaggregated by sex and age. 21 UNMAS reported
that the programme was also implementing the UN
Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, monitored by a gender
focal point. 22
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South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines
(NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison
teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs
of beneﬁciaries, and to address the speciﬁc risks faced by
women and girls.23 All teams are reportedly gender balanced
in composition and trained to be inclusive, for example by
ensuring outreach through non-technical survey and risk
education is done separately for different age and gender
groups, and taking local cultural practices into consideration.24

STATES PARTIES

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that, in 2018, a basic
demining training course was offered to 20 interested
women with no previous demining experience, in an effort
to increase the number of potentially qualiﬁed women
applicants for operational demining positions. It reported
that, since the training, 16 of the women had been hired for
MAG operational teams. As at April 2019, MAG stated that
all of its seven clearance teams included women deminers,
including a number of women previously employed as
cooks or community liaison ofﬁcers who had participated
in the demining training course and were subsequently
offered operational positions. 27 MAG reported that during
2018, it continually hired women as deminers as openings
became available, and by April 2019 one third of its deminers
employed were female. 28

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s IMSMA database was carried out in 2018, along with re-survey of
recorded SHAs and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. These activities resulted in signiﬁcant gains
in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the
database disaggregates mined areas, CMR, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks. 29

PLANNING AND TASKING
South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and
funded by Japan, was ofﬁcially launched in September 2018. 30
According to UNMAS, the strategy has three strategic goals
with related targets:31
Strategic Goal 1: Advocacy and communication of South
Sudan’s mine/ERW problem continues through national
and international awareness-raising and adoption and
implementation of international conventions to facilitate a
mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.
Strategic Goal 2: The size of the mine/ERW contamination
area is clariﬁed and conﬁrmed and the problem is addressed
through appropriate survey and clearance methods, ensuring
safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.

Strategic Goal 3: Safe behaviour is promoted among women,
girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and
promote safe livelihood activities.
According to UNMAS, the operational focus for 2019–2020
would be on further clarifying the contamination remaining
in the database, with re-survey of hazards that are thought
to be exaggerated in size. Clearance will continue across the
country, wherever it is safe to do so. 32 UNMAS also reported
that it was working with the NMAA to develop plans for a
national capacity that will be responsible for the clearance of
residual contamination. This will be the responsibility of the
Government of South Sudan. 33

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South
Sudan are subject to constant review by UNMAS and the
NMAA. In 2018, the NTSGs were amended with respect to
the storage and transport of explosives and the conduct
of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. 34 UNMAS
also noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to
conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with
quality control (QC) sampling of 10% of each area cleared.
UNMAS conducted additional external QA through visits to
each clearance task in 2018, as well as upon the completion
of a clearance task. 35

In May 2019, the NMAA reported that as a result of years
of ﬁghting and insecurity, most mine action teams in South
Sudan had been reconﬁgured to be small and mobile, able to
react to rapidly changing security access, which has greatly
reduced the extent of demining. 36 As a result, the teams
are not properly scaled to undertake area clearance in the
most efﬁcient manner. The NMAA said that existing capacity
would need to be reconﬁgured into fewer but larger demining
teams, which will require additional support, as well as peace
and stability to enable deployment on larger area tasks. 37
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At the same time, UNMAS reported that task prioritisation
in 2018 was predominantly dependent on security
considerations and that resources were concentrated on
tasks within limited geographical areas rather than on the
basis of gender needs. 25 It claimed there was equal access
in employment opportunities for qualiﬁed men and women
in survey and clearance teams across the organisations
operating in South Sudan, but reported that 16% of staff in
operational roles such as deminers and community liaison
ofﬁcers were women, while women accounted for 11% of all
staff in managerial or supervisory positions across the ﬁve
operators conducting mine action operations in South Sudan
in 2018. 26

OPERATORS

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2018, UNMAS reported that mine action operating capacity
remained on a par with that deployed in 2017, with almost
1,000 persons working in the sector. Operators included three
international demining non-governmental organisations (MAG,
DanChurchAid (DCA), and Danish Demining Group (DDG)), and
three commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management
(G4S), MECHEM, and The Development Initiative (TDI)).38

According to UNMAS, a range of mine action operational tools
were in use in 2018, including two MineWolf 240 machines, a
MineWolf 330, Bozena, and PT300 machine, and eight mine
detection dogs. 40

MAG reported beginning operations in 2018 with seven
clearance teams, which reduced to six at the end of the
year. It deployed one dedicated team for mechanicallyassisted mineﬁeld clearance, as well as number of EOD spot
tasks, and four MTTs with the capacity to conduct manual
or mechanically assisted clearance, depending on tasking
orders. Of the ﬁve teams, one was deployed on tasks which
included anti-personnel mined areas during the year. 39

DEMINER SAFETY
According to UNMAS, there were no accidents during mine
clearance in 2018. However, one accident occurred during
EOD activities, when a female national staff member was
killed and another national staff member injured. The incident
was investigated by a joint team comprised of the NMAA,
UNMAS, and a third-party clearance operator. The incident
led to the withdrawal of MECHEM’s accreditation to work in
South Sudan. UNMAS reported that lessons learned were
shared with all operators in the country. 41

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
South Sudan has reported a total release of all forms of
hazardous area of more than 45.1km2 in 2018: 2.08km2 released
through clearance, 0.02km2 reduced through technical survey,
and 43.06km2 cancelled through non-technical survey, with
the destruction of 1,163 anti-personnel mines.42 A additional
three anti-personnel mines were destroyed during spot
tasks. A further 7.4km2 cancelled during a desk review of
database records and just under 0.5km2 re-classiﬁed from
anti-personnel mine contamination to other types of
hazardous area. 43

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, there was a remarkable twentyfold increase in
survey output compared with 2017, with 43km2 cancelled
through non-technical survey and a further 20,000m2 reduced
through technical survey. 44 This compared to just over 2km2
released through survey in 2017, all by cancellation. 45
The increase in survey output was due in part to a
rapprochement between the principal warring parties that
culminated on 12 September 2018 with the signing of the
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution on the Conﬂict in
South Sudan. This led to greater freedom of movement for
mine action teams and enabled them to access some reported
hazards in previously hard to reach areas. This increased
access, coupled with a focus on re-survey from all operators
as well as a thorough desk review of all reported hazards by
UNMAS, resulted in the cancellation of a signiﬁcant number of
hazards that it stated had for some time had been suspected
of being either inﬂated or incorrect. 46

As noted in table 4, the desk review of the database led to a
number of tasks being cancelled or re-classiﬁed in 2018, with
a total of 65 areas with a size of just over 7.4km2 cancelled
outright and a further 16 areas with a size of just under
0.5km2 re-classiﬁed from anti-personnel mine contamination
to other types of hazardous area. 47
Table 3: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 201848
State

Operator

Central Equatoria

G4S

57,182

Central Equatoria

TDI

124,486

Eastern Equatoria

TDI

143,588

Jonglei

G4S

8,115,945

Lakes

G4S

21,000

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

TDI

59,686

Unity

G4S

80

Upper Nile

MAG

34,471,616

Upper Nile

G4S

3,063

Western Bahr El Ghazal

G4S

65,500

Total

43,062,146

Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 201849
Area reduced (m2)

State

Operator

Central Equatoria

MAG

14,922

Jonglei

TDI

1,426

Total
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Area cancelled (m²)

16,348
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of 15 mined areas covering nearly 2.1km2 were
released through clearance in 2018, with the destruction of
1,163 anti-personnel mines, 71 anti-vehicle mines, and 553
items of UXO (see Table 5). 50 This is a sizeable increase from
2017, when a total of 20 areas with a size of just over 1.7km2
were cleared, with the destruction of 734 anti-personnel
mines, 42 anti-vehicle mines, and 34,600 items of UXO. 51
UNMAS reported that the increase in clearance in 2018 was
in large part a reﬂection of increased security in the country. 52

An additional three anti-personnel mines were destroyed
in EOD spot tasks by TDI and G4S during the year. 53 UNMAS
also reported that in 2018 a total of six areas suspected to
contain anti-personnel mine contamination with a total size
of just over 67,000m2 were cleared, which were not found to
contain any mines, although four items of UXO were found
and destroyed. 54

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2018 55
Areas
cleared

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

762,617

132

70

298

1,227,678

906

0

250

8,162

42

0

0

1

29,314

67

0

5

0

4,845

16

0

0

35,276

0

0

0

State

Operator

Central Equatoria

G4S

7

Central Equatoria

MAG

3

Eastern Equatoria

TDI

1

Jonglei

G4S

Jonglei

TDI

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

TDI

2

Unity

TDI

Totals

Area cleared
(m²)

1

8,000

0

1

0

15

2,075,892

1,163

71

553

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM

Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
2

Year

Area cleared (km )

2018

2.08

2017

1.71

2016

2.65

2015

5.10

2014

2.72

Total

14.26

In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined
areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan will not meet
this deadline.

In 2020, South Sudan intends to submit an extension request
asking for an additional ﬁve years to complete its Article
5 obligations. According to UNMAS and the NMAA, this is
believed to be an adequate to clear all known contaminated
area in the country, and that given the appropriate support
and the necessary security conditions, the clearance of both
mines and CMRs could be completed by 2026. 56
However, serious obstacles to completion remain the poor
security situation that still prevails in some parts of the
country, a lack of stable humanitarian access to certain
areas, the continued discovery of previously unrecorded
contamination, and a lack of certainty over sustained funding.
The focus for 2019–20 will be on further clarifying the extent
of contamination remaining, with re-survey of areas thought
to be exaggerated in size. Clearance will continue across the
country, wherever it is safe to do so. 57
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,
(ESTIMATED)

10KM

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

3.46KM 31,622
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

4.0

2017
2018

3.5

3.46
3.25

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.54
1.3

1.0

0.96
0.5

(including 299 destroyed
during spot tasks)

0.01

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Sri Lanka ofﬁcially became a state party to the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 1 June
2018, becoming the 163rd country to adhere. While its Article
5 deadline is 1 June 2028, Sri Lanka has set a far more
ambitious goal to complete mine clearance on its territory
by the end of 2020.
While initially optimistic that Sri Lanka was on track to meet
this goal, at the end of 2018, The HALO Trust and Mines

Advisory Group (MAG), the two international demining
operators in Sri Lanka, reported that with existing capacity
and funding levels, Sri Lanka is unlikely to complete
clearance by the end of 2020. However, with relatively small
extra funding, Sri Lanka’s mine action operators could
expand their capacity and operational output, making the
end-2020 goal a possibility. Even if Sri Lanka is unable to
meet the end-2020 goal, Sri Lanka should still complete
clearance far in advance of its APMBC deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Sri Lanka should clarify the total estimate of remaining mine contamination.

■

Greater efforts should be placed on information management and ensuring that the database is up to date
and that survey and clearance reports are sent to the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) and entered into
the national database in a timely fashion.

■

Any changes in capacity or funding requirements that will impede completion of mine clearance should be
reported as a matter of priority.

■

Greater resources should be allocated to develop long-term national capacity, in particular the NMAC and
the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units and national mine action operators.

■

Increased interaction between the NMAC and mine action operators would enhance the efﬁciency of the
national mine action programme.

■

Sri Lanka should develop plans for the management of contamination found after Article 5 completion.
Strategies for the vocational retraining of deminers should be put in place.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

A district-by-district re-survey in 2015–17 resulted in the cancellation of 42.4km2,
providing far greater clarity on the extent of conﬁrmed contamination remaining.
However, Sri Lanka’s ofﬁcial reporting of the estimate of contamination in its Article
7 transparency reports contain discrepancies and are inﬂated estimates based on
projections for survey and reduction and outstanding survey and clearance reports
not accounted for in the national database.

8

Sri Lanka’s national mine action programme is fully nationally owned, with considerable
committed funding from the national government and signiﬁcant contribution from the
Armed Forces in the dedicated demining units.

8

Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020 contains a section on gender and
diversity as cross-cutting themes for all mine action. It reﬂects awareness of the cultural
context of gendered employment in mine action speciﬁc to Sri Lanka, with a focus on
women’s empowerment.

6

As required under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Sri Lanka has
submitted an initial Article 7 report and a subsequent annual updated report. While
progress can be seen in information management, data reporting between operators and
the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) continued to reﬂect a number of disparities and
inconsistencies, which are also apparent in the Article 7 reports.

8

Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, developed with the support of the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining Centre, elaborates the national
planning and tasking criteria, which are strongly centred around resettlement and urgent
livelihood priorities for displaced civilians.

7

Ongoing revisions to Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards took place in 2017
and in 2018, in a reportedly extensive review process. They were not yet made public.
Improvements to land release methodology and corresponding increases in efﬁciency
were reported by operators in 2018.

7

Sri Lanka is well on track to meet its Article 5 clearance deadline of June 2028 and has
set a highly ambitious goal of completing clearance of all mines and explosive remnants
of war (ERW) by end 2020. It did not, however, meet its national mine action strategy
target for land release in 2018.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

8

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

7.4

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

Ministry of National Policies, Economic Affairs,
Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern Development,
Vocational Training, Skills Development and Youth Affairs
National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH) and subcontractor SHARP
Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)

STATES PARTIES

According to Sri Lanka’s NMAC, as at 30 April 2019, 271 mined areas were believed to contain anti-personnel mines covering
a total of just over 22.4km2 with a further nine suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) that may contain anti-personnel mines
covering just under 1.6km2, for a total of 280 areas with a size of close to 24km2.1
However, NMAC also reported that a total of nearly 5.1km2 of clearance was not reﬂected in these Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database ﬁgures, along with a further 209,600m2 expected to be cancelled and over 2.5km2
expected to be reduced through technical survey. On this basis, NMAC reported that the actual estimate of remaining
contamination was closer to 16.4km2. 2
Sri Lanka was once extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Most remaining contamination
is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conﬂict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Much progress in land release has occurred in the last decade however, with estimates of
total contamination falling sharply: from 506km2 at the end of 2010, to 98km2 at the end of 2012, to nearly 68.4km2 in 2015,
and down to close to 16.4km2 as at April 2019. The Northern province is still by far the most affected, as set out in Table 1. 3
Table 1: Mined area and ERW contamination (at end 2018) 4
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs and CHAs

Total area (m2)

Jaffna

16

1,635,450

1

182,783

17

1,818,233

Kilinochchi

77

9,541,362

0

0

77

9,541,362

Mullaitivu

94

7,911,557

5

649,220

99

8,560,777

Vavuniya

18

1,303,850

1

667,057

19

1,970,907

Province

District

Northern

Mannar

53

1,626,788

2

76,177

55

1,702,965

258

22,019,007

9

1,575,237

267

23,594,244

Trincomalee

7

170,922

0

0

7

170,922

Ampara

1

12,686

0

0

1

12,686

Subtotals
Eastern

Batticaloa
Subtotals
North Central
Subtotals
Totals

Anuradhapura

1

8,294

0

0

1

8,294

9

191,902

0

0

9

191,902

4

216,524

0

0

4

216,524

4

216,524

0

0

4

216,524

271

22,427,433

9

1,575,237

280

24,002,670

While the progress achieved in land release in the past
decade is remarkable, NMAC reported that just over a further
2.4km2 of newly conﬁrmed hazardous area was added to
the database in 2018 as a result of mine action operations
in 2018. 5 Operators reported continuing to conﬁrm new
hazardous areas during demining operations, with MAG alone
conﬁrming 40 new hazardous areas with a size of nearly
0.7km2 in four districts during the year. 6
MAG informed Mine Action Review that the CHA reported in
Batticaloa district was identiﬁed after clearance of the district
was completed in 2017.7
In total, in April 2019, Sri Lanka reported that since demining
operations began in 2002, Sri Lanka has been able to declare
4,616 areas totalling over 1,280km2 free from the threat of
mines, with the destruction of more than 737,000 antipersonnel mines and over 1,400,000 other explosive items,
including anti-vehicle mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). 8
Non-technical survey which began in June 2015 was completed
in February 2017, with cancellation of 42km2 of SHA, reducing
total contamination from more than 68km2 to close to 26km2.9
In another milestone achievement, Batticaloa district in
Eastern province was declared free of the threat of mines in
June 2017, the ﬁrst of Sri Lanka’s mine-affected provinces to
do so.10 As at August 2019, clearance of two other districts,
Puttalam, Polonnaruwa, was also reportedly complete.

Most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka’s ﬁve
northern districts. Both sides made extensive use of mines,
including belts of P4 Mk I and Mk II blast anti-personnel
mines laid by the SLA, and long defensive lines with a
mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid
by the LTTE.11 Indian Peacekeeping Forces also used mines
during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.12
The SLA used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines,
with all use said to have been recorded.13 Operators have
encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including
anti-personnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms.
Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser
extent, anti-vehicle mines, were also used by the LTTE, along
with a number of forms of improvised devices to act as
fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically
initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to
detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.14
Aside from mines, Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a
wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs,
artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, hand-held
anti-tank projectiles, and riﬂe and hand grenades. Large
caches of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) also exist,
particularly in the north.15 These are being cleared at the
same time as the remaining mineﬁelds.16
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu
Religious Affairs became the lead agency for mine action
in 2015 as chair of the interministerial National Steering
Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA). In 2019, the Ministry’s
name had changed to the Ministry of National Policies,
Economic Affairs, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern
Development, Vocational Training, Skills Development, and
Youth Affairs. The Ministry’s Secretary serves as the Director
of the NMAC. The NMAC has responsibilities for priority
setting, information management, quality assurance (QA)
and quality control (QC), coordination with demining
organisations and cooperation partners, and establishing
policy and standards.17

Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality
managed by a Regional Mine Action Ofﬁce (RMAO) in
Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering
Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired
by government agents heading district authorities.18
The Government of Sri Lanka created a national budget
line for mine action in 2015.19 According to Sri Lanka’s
initial Article 7 transparency report, the government of Sri
Lanka has committed 758,534,964 rupees (approx. US$4.45
million) each year in 2018–20 to cover the operational
costs of the SLA Humanitarian Demining Units and the
Navy Humanitarian Demining Unit’s survey and clearance
activities, with an additional 20 million rupees (US$118,497)
a year to cover the administrative costs of the NMAC. 20

GENDER
Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2016–20
contains a speciﬁc section on gender and diversity, which
it emphasises are cross-cutting issues for the planning,
implementation, and monitoring of all mine action initiatives.
The strategy pledges to ensure that all mine action
activities, from survey and clearance to victim assistance,
are conducted in a targeted manner to ensure the equal
participation of all age and gender groups, and that all
data is collected is disaggregated by sex and age. It further
recognises that mine action in Sri Lanka should be tied to the
implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda
and Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality and
the empowerment of women, noting that the safe-guarding
of non-discriminatory employment opportunities and the
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women
has been a particularly successful aspect of Sri Lanka’s
national mine action programme. 21
In 2019, Ms. Sasi Jalatheepan was appointed Deputy Director
of the NMAC, promoted from within the government Ministry
which oversees the NMAC. She is the ﬁrst woman to hold this
position in Sri Lanka.
National operator DASH considers gender equality and
employment of women important to its programme, with
25% of its staff Sri Lankan female employees, 80% of whom
are widows, single mothers, and/or breadwinners for their
families. Together with its subcontractor, SHARP, both have
sought to progressively increase the number of women
employed in operational positions, recognising the positive
impact employment has on women and their families’
well-being. 22
International operators The HALO Trust and MAG conﬁrmed
that each organisation has gender policies in place, with a
focus on achieving equal access to employment, genderbalanced survey and clearance teams, gender-focused
community liaison outreach, disaggregated data collection,
and a gender focus to be employed during pre- and postclearance assessments. 23 Both organisations reported
increasing efforts to encourage women to apply for
operational, as well as managerial positions, and positive
trends in the increasing number of women employed in
their respective programmes as a result. 24

208 Clearing the Mines 2019

The HALO Trust reported that more than 40% of its staff
in Sri Lanka were women and that it was making special
efforts to employ women war widows and women who
are the sole breadwinners of their families. It reported its
deployment structure was designed to allow demining teams
to be deployed daily from bases in Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and
Jeyapuram, in order to allow female staff to return to their
homes at the end of each working day, rather than being
based in remote camps for lengthy periods of time. This
ensured that women who had dependants at home were
able to provide for their families while maintaining their
daily home lives. HALO Trust also reported speciﬁc efforts
to encourage women’s employment through advertising
maternity leave policies. 25
MAG reported actively encouraging women to take up
traditionally male-oriented roles within its programme,
including operationally as deminers, mechanical operators,
site supervisors, or team leaders. It stated that overcoming
barriers which inhibited participation by women, girls, people
with disabilities, ethnic minorities, and other marginalised
groups was an essential focus for its programme operations
in order to ensure that programme delivery is inclusive,
both in terms of internal staff composition and external
programme outreach. As such, it reported that internal
training and awareness-raising ensures that staff working
with communities recognise the importance of gender and
diversity and have an understanding of tools and approaches
to enable inclusive participation. 26

STATES PARTIES

Sri Lanka’s national IMSMA database has undergone
substantial and continuing improvements since the
installation of an updated version in 2015 and a subsequent
process of data entry and ground veriﬁcation. 27 Since that
time, operators have reported that signiﬁcant efforts have
been exerted by all stakeholders to correct erroneous data
entered into the IMSMA database and to update it on the basis
of re-survey, leading to a more accurate representation of
remaining contamination. 28
In 2019, The HALO Trust reported it was submitting reports
every two weeks to NMAC and that a review of IMSMA data
was usually held on a quarterly basis. 29 It reported that a
number of training sessions were held in 2018, including
a follow-up Geographic Information System (GIS) training
delivered by HALO Trust staff for NMAC, the RMAO, and the
SLA Humanitarian Demining Units, with a focus on developing
new skills using Esri ArcGIS online software for the creation
of maps and operational dashboards. It had budgeted for

further information management capacity development
initiatives in 2019, with a focus on recording and display of
clearance data during ongoing tasks and training in the use of
a prediction tool, developed by HALO, to assist the NMAC with
end-state planning. 30
MAG reported that the number of meetings held to update
the IMSMA database increased in 2018, with weekly
meetings frequently held with the RMAO to ensure that
database entries and newly identiﬁed SHAs were recorded
accurately. A transition to the use of IMSMA Core software
with assistance from the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is also planned for 2020. 31
In compliance with its APMBC obligations, Sri Lanka submitted
an initial Article 7 transparency report, which appears to cover
the period from 2002 up until August 2018, and a subsequent
annual updated report with information current as at April
2019.32 Both reports reﬂect considerable progress in the quality
of reporting, although challenges remain.

PLANNING AND TASKING
At the request of the NMAC, Sri Lanka’s National Mine
Action Strategy for 2016–20 was reviewed in April 2018 in
a multi-stakeholder workshop facilitated by the GICHD, and
in consultation with operators and the SLA. The reviewed
strategy was ofﬁcially re-launched at an event in Colombo
in March 2019, attended by representatives of all mine
action stakeholders, government ofﬁcials, civil society, and
international donor governments.
As stated, the strategy sets the goal of clearing all mines by
end 2020, and contains the following strategic objectives:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

The remaining mine/ERW problem is addressed using
the most appropriate methodologies and tools.
Mine/ERW safe behaviour among women, girls, boys
and men is promoted.
The needs of mine/ ERW victims are determined and
met and victims are integrated into the society.
Sri Lanka complies with its international convention
obligations.
Long-term residual contamination is effectively
managed with appropriate and sustainable
national capacities.
Sri Lanka mine action sector can access good
quality information for its strategic and operational
decision-making.33

The strategy commits the government of Sri Lanka to
ensure that relevant plans are in place to ensure effective
management of residual contamination. 37 It sets out
that the NMAC will lead efforts to plan for a transitional
phase, a process which will involve the SLA, relevant
government ministries, and civil society, noting that postcompletion roles and responsibilities for management of
residual contamination must be clariﬁed, transparent, and
communicated to all relevant stakeholders. It also commits
the government and mine action operators to develop
strategies for the demobilisation of deminers as completion
approaches, in order to enable them vocational training and
other employment prospects. 38
Sri Lanka’s mine action programme has a well-developed
prioritisation system. The primary priority is the clearance
of land for resettlement of displaced persons, where it
is essential that areas used for livelihoods are cleared
simultaneously. According to the NMAC, despite marking
of contaminated areas and sustained risk education,
returnees are likely to enter contaminated areas, especially
agricultural areas, to meet their basic livelihood needs. As
such, socio-economic pressures and livelihood activities are
vital considerations in the prioritisation process in relation to
resettlement plans. 39

The initial strategy set a target of the release of 6.5km2 of
contamination by clearance and technical survey per year.34
This target increased however to 9km2 released through
clearance and technical survey per year in the revised version
of the strategy published in September 2018 (but only ﬁnalised
in 2019).35 The revised strategy states that “completion
of clearance at the end of 2020 will only be possible if
considerably more funding is made available, allowing all
ﬁve operators to expand to their maximum capacity”.36
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

There is no national mine action legislation in Sri Lanka,
based on available information. According to The HALO
Trust and MAG, a review of Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action
Standards (NMAS) was carried out in May 2017 with the input
of all demining operators, and support from the GICHD. Input
on suggested changes was subsequently provided by all
stakeholders in the second quarter of 2018 and a follow-up
workshop was held in April 2018, facilitated by the GICHD, to
discuss proposed revisions. As at August 2018, however, the
subsequent expected revised version of the NMAS had yet to
be made public and the previous version remained in place. 40

In 2018, demining continued to be conducted by the SLA;
a national NGO, DASH and its subcontractor national
organisation SHARP; and the two international NGOs,
The HALO Trust and MAG.

The HALO Trust reported increased land release output
in 2018 due to a number of improvements in methodology
and standing operating procedures (SoPs). HALO Trust said
these included more deminers carrying out raking, which
HALO Trust referred to as “REDS” or “Rapid Excavation and
Detection System”, and a corresponding decrease in the
number of deminers using full manual excavation. The REDS
method, HALO stated, had a higher clearance rate of nine
to twelve square metres per deminer per day, compared to
seven to nine square metres per deminer doing full manual
excavation methods. 41
The number of teams using the REDS method increased
from 16 at the start of the year to 25 by December 2018.
Improvements to the REDS methodology were also made
during the year, expanding the technique’s application from
a 1.2-metre-wide demining lane to a 3-metre-wide lane. The
rationale for the change was that a deminer working over
a wide lane would result in more efﬁcient use of time and
energy, and, as such, the increase to 3-metre-wide lanes was
expanded to all REDS teams in June, following trials carried
out in May. 42
The HALO Trust also reported an increase in mechanical
clearance outputs from 2017 to 2018 following research and
development in ground preparation and spatial management.
It reported a 70% increase in mechanical clearance rates
where a PrimeTech 300D tiller and “earth bunds” to facilitate
simultaneous deployment of machines and manual demining
are used. 43 The tiller is a remote-controlled armoured
machine, designed to withstand any detonations. The
PrimeTech tills (ploughs) the soil ﬁrst, then an excavation
machine moves the tilled soil into a cleared area where it
is spread out for manual inspection by raking. Tilled soil
can be excavated and manually inspected much faster than
non-tilled soil. 44
According to the NMAC, external QA and QC were conducted
in 2018 as in previous years. 45 The HALO Trust and MAG
conﬁrmed that NMAC continued QA/QC in 2018, with
completed areas sampled during post-clearance inspection
prior to handover to local communities. 46 Final QA checks
of post-clearance inspection had been occurring within one
month of HALO Trust’s submission of completion reports, the
organisation said, and approval of mineﬁeld execution plans
often occurred within the same day of submission. 47
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The HALO Trust reported that, on average, HALO employed
683 operations personnel per month in 2018, a slight
increase from 654 operations personnel per month in 2017. 48
With predicted increased donor funding, HALO planned to
recruit and deploy an additional eight manual teams and ﬁve
mechanical teams in 2019, resulting in a workforce of more
than 800 staff.
MAG’s capacity increased in 2018 to 18 manual clearance
teams, up from 15 in 2017, and nine mechanical teams,
an addition of one from the previous year, as a result of
increased funding. Highly encouragingly, MAG reported
that it was increasing its capacity from 18 manual clearance
teams to 36 in 2019 as a result of increased funding, and that,
as a consequence, its capacity was set to double in a very
short time. 49
According to the NMAC, in 2018, the SLA’s demining unit
deployed a total of 380 personnel in demining operations,
which was a slight decrease from the 418 employed in 2017.
DASH’s demining personnel remained at 365 in 2018, but with
a decrease in the number of demining staff deployed by its
subcontractor, SHARP, which fell by more than half to 50. 50

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, The HALO Trust reported that as at December 2018, a
total of nine mechanical assets were deployed in operations,
including ﬁve front-end loaders, one tracked Caterpillar, one
JCB excavator, one Prime Tech tiller, and one Beach Tech
machine. This increase in capacity compared to previous
years was enabled by greater donor funding and more use
of machines to clear mine lines in the Muhamalai mineﬁeld.
The HALO Trust planned to purchase several additional
mechanical assets during 2019. 51
According to the NMAC, the SLA reportedly deployed seven
mechanical assets and eleven mine detection dogs in 2018. 52
MAG reported deploying nine mechanical teams, including
excavators, mini-excavators, and front-end loaders for
vegetation clearance and ground preparation to facilitate
clearance. 53

DEMINER SAFETY
According to NMAC, a total of six persons were involved in
demining accidents in 2018: four injured in separate incidents
in Trincomalee, Kilinochchi, and Jaffna districts, and two
deminers killed in an incident in Mullaitivu district. NMAC
informed Mine Action Review that as per Sri Lanka’s National
Mine Action Standards, investigations were conducted shortly
after each incident and lessons learned were shared as part
of awareness raising efforts by NMAC with the organisations
concerned. 54

STATES PARTIES

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of nearly 4.8km2 of anti-personnel mined area was reported released in 2018: more than 3.46km2 through clearance,
reduction of nearly 1.3km2 through technical survey, and close to 0.01km2 cancelled through non-technical survey. 55

SURVEY IN 2018
A total of 1.3km2 was reportedly released through survey
in 2018: 7,590m2 cancelled through non-technical survey in
2018, along with almost 1.3km2 reduced through technical
survey. 56 This compared with 2017, when a total of close to
2.5km2 was released through survey (0.96km2 cancelled and
1.54km2 reduced). 57

clean minelaying patterns were more likely to occur, thereby
increasing opportunities for reduction through technical
survey. 61 HALO Trust also reported identifying and surveying
nine new tasks in 2018 with a total size of 193,776m2. 62 MAG
also reported identifying 40 CHAs in 2018, with a total size of
743,695m2 in Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya. 63

According to the NMAC, a continued decrease in survey
output was a result of the re-survey which was completed in
early 2017. As a result, there were no area tasks cancelled
through survey in 2018, and partial cancellations within tasks
rarely happened during the year, it said.58 MAG reported that a
greater accuracy in deﬁning new SHAs through non-technical
survey also contributed to lesser cancellation and area
reduction during the year.59 The HALO Trust did not report any
cancellation through non-technical survey in 2018. Three tasks
were identiﬁed for cancellation but due to restricted access
caused by ﬂooding, cancellation was postponed until 2019.60

MAG reported a decrease in the amount of area reduced
through technical survey in 2018, as the clearance to
technical survey ratio shifted from 45:55 to 60:40 during
the year. Additionally, the programme worked predominantly
on newer, more accurate SHAs identiﬁed in the re-survey
in 2017. 64

The HALO Trust also reported that a small increase in
area reduced through technical survey in 2018 of just over
72,100m2 was due to the nature of the tasks worked on in
2018, which included more SLA tasks where distinct and

Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 201865
Province

Operator

Mannar

MAG

Trincomalee

MAG

Total

Area cancelled (m²)
6,359
1,231
7,590

Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 2018 66
District

Operator

Anuradhapura

Sri Lanka Army

Jaffna

Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony

Kilinochchi

Area reduced (m²)
45,025
2,440

HALO Trust

205,467

Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony

129,417

HALO Trust

44,163

SHARP

67,260

Mannar

MAG

411,294

Mullaitivu

Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony

100,473

HALO Trust

116,410

Sri Lanka Army

30,929

Puttalam

Sri Lanka Army

Trincomalee

MAG
Sri Lanka Army

Vavuniya
Total

11,006

MAG

Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony

472
54,373
2,780
74,761
1,296,270
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SRI LANKA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

CLEARANCE IN 2018
More than 3.46km2 of mined area was reportedly cleared in 2018, with a total of 31,323 anti-personnel mines, and 85
anti-vehicle mines destroyed. 67 This compared with 2017, when more than 3.2km2 of mined area was reportedly cleared. 68
Table 4: Mine clearance in 201869
Areas
cleared

Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO destroyed

Sri Lanka Army

1

13,530

72

0

0

Sri Lanka Army

1

26,037

3

0

3

District

Operator

Ampara
Anuradhapura
Jaffna

Kilinochchi

DASH

1

22,165

987

0

10

HALO Trust

7

89,729

145

1

168

Sri Lanka Army

2

45,558

72

0

276

DASH

11

280,809

2,198

41

927

HALO Trust

14

1,506,703

9,138

31

2,214

5

215,934

3,432

12

1,570

SHARP

4

90,384

2,052

0

51

Mannar

Sri Lanka Army
MAG

31

519,916

2,458

0

152

Mullaitivu

DASH

11

108,855

4,672

0

3,342

HALO Trust

4

117,202

191

0

7

MAG

6

80,099

769

0

4

Sri Lanka Army

5

137,809

1,938

0

75

Polonnaruwa

Sri Lanka Army

1

5,825

2

0

0

Puttalam

Sri Lanka Army

1

17,761

815

0

0

Trincomalee

MAG

8

113,103

600

0

9

Sri Lanka Army

1

27,123

1,441

0

2

DASH

3

45,972

338

0

16

117

3,464,514

31,323

85

8,826

Vavuniya
Totals

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

The HALO Trust reported an increase of just over 410,400m2
of anti-personnel mine clearance in 2018 compared with
the previous year, which it attributed to an increase in
the average number of teams deployed, from 61 to 65,
with an increase in donor funding, along with a number of
improvements in land release methodology and standard
operating procedures that resulted in increased efﬁciency
(see section on land release methodology above).70 The
number of anti-personnel mines destroyed by HALO Trust
during clearance also increased signiﬁcantly, from nearly
6,600 in 2017 to almost 9,500 in 2018.71

212 Clearing the Mines 2019

MAG also reported increased clearance output in 2018, by
a smaller margin of just over 80,400m2, which it said was
due to the introduction of an additional mechanical asset
for ground preparation and vegetation removal and three
additional mine action teams. The number of anti-personnel
mines MAG reported clearing more than doubled, however,
from just over 1,700 in 2017 to over 3,800 in 2018.72
In addition, the HALO Trust reported 299 anti-personnel
mines were destroyed during explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) spot tasks in 2018, along with 2 anti-vehicle mines,
and 69 items of UXO.73

STATES PARTIES

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SRI LANKA: 1 JUNE 2018
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH

Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
2

Year

Area cleared (km )

2018

3.46

2017

3.25

2016

2.35

2015

3.52

2014

3.75

Total

16.33

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Sri Lanka is required to
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
1 June 2028. It should complete clearance far in advance of
this deadline, at the latest by the end of 2021.

The HALO Trust reported that, in coordination with NMAC
and its RMAO, all accessible mineﬁelds were expected to be
cleared in Jaffna district by the end of 2019, a highly signiﬁcant
achievement given the level of contamination. The HALO Trust
stated that while it did not have permission as at August 2019
to conduct clearance inside the High Security Zone, it was
continuing to pursue a collaboration with the SLA to support
further handover of cleared areas to local communities. At
the same time, it was continuing to focus operations on the
Muhamalai mineﬁeld, along with other tasks in southern
Kilinochchi district and northern Mullaitivu district.77
It also reported that with an expected increase in donor
funding, HALO can complete its allocated clearance tasks by
the end of 2020. However, it noted that HALO will likely need
to absorb tasks from other organisations to compensate
for shortfalls and that key discussions on this issue will be
required across the mine action sector.78

The HALO Trust and MAG have both reported that meeting
the end-2020 goal is an ambitious target which will require
additional funding and capacity.74 While there were a number
of positive developments towards this goal during the year,
a signiﬁcant set-back was that the anticipated increase in
capacity of the SLA demining units did not materialise in
2018 as was hoped. NMAC additionally also continued to be
under-resourced.75

MAG cautioned that its community liaison teams alone had
conﬁrmed an additional 21 hazardous areas with a size of
over 486,900m2 in the ﬁrst seven months of 2019, in addition
to what was identiﬁed in 2018. As a result, MAG’s teams
would need to work at a fully increased capacity until 2021
to meet the current allocations, it said. If funding support
is stepped up, however, the timeframe could be reduced.
Without this increase, reaching the 2020 national goal will
not be likely, MAG said.79

MAG had hoped to complete clearance of all remaining tasks
in Trincomalee by mid-2018, enabling the Government of
Sri Lanka to declare Sri Lanka’s second mine-affected district
after Batticaloa as free of mines. However, it reported that
nine CHAs with a total size of over 182,000m2 had been newly
identiﬁed in Trincomalee in 2018–19, and that as at August 2019,
clearance was ongoing and expected to continue into 2020.76

At the same time, the re-launch of the National Mine Action
Strategy in March 2019 and the government of Sri Lanka’s
renewed commitment to becoming mine free by 2020,
has attracted new attention from the international donor
community and operators reported receiving increased
funding in 2019. 80
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SUDAN

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM,
(ESTIMATED)

10KM

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

2
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2

Area of Land Released (km2)
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Clearance
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0.0

Non-Technical
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In November 2018, Sudan was granted a four-year extension
to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5
deadline of 1 April 2019, setting a new deadline for completion
of clearance by 1 April 2023. While the extension request is of
good quality and sets concrete annual targets and projections
for survey and clearance to reach completion by 2023, Sudan
did not meet its land release targets in 2017–18. In 2018, mine
clearance output increased slightly, though with a decrease
in the number of anti-personnel mines destroyed.

Positively, Sudan reported improvements during the year in the
security situation in both Blue Nile and South Kordofan states,
the two most heavily contaminated regions in Sudan. Sudan’s
ability to meet its extended deadline will be highly dependent on
security and access to these areas, as well as on resources.
On 4 April 2018, Kassala state was declared free of mines
and explosive remnants of war (ERW), making all three of
Sudan’s eastern states free of contamination, following the
completion of clearance of Red Sea and Gadaref states. These
achievements are the result of 12 years of clearance efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Sudan should regularly update states parties to the APMBC on access to, and progress in clearance in Blue
Nile and South Kordofan states, and update its workplan and extension request targets accordingly.

■

Sudan should clarify its plans for demining in Western Kordofan state, which lack detail and consistency in
its March 2018 extension request, along with efforts to address remaining contamination in Abyei.

■

Sudan should produce two updated workplans, the ﬁrst by 30 April 2020, with revised estimates of
contamination and budgetary requirements, in accordance with the terms of Sudan’s latest extension.

■

Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.

■

Sudan should update states parties on progress in implementing the resource-mobilisation strategy in its
latest extension request, including how it intends to ﬁll the considerable funding gap it has identiﬁed.
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■

Sudan should continue its efforts to encourage international operators to return, which could signiﬁcantly
boost mine action capacity and output.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

7

Sudan has a good understanding of contamination, although the vast majority of
recorded contamination is suspected hazardous area, which likely will result in signiﬁcant
cancellation or reduction through survey. A major exception, however, are the states of
South Kordofan and Blue Nile, where insecurity has prevented access in recent years and
contamination is expected to be high.

7

Sudan’s national mine action programme is entirely nationally owned. It beneﬁts from
experienced national mine action centre staff, as well as from experienced national mine
action operators. The government has notably provided consistent funding for mine
action at US$2million per year.

6

Gender is said to be mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23
and in the national mine action standards, with an emphasis on gender-balanced survey
teams and the employment of women. At the same time, Sudan acknowledges difﬁculties
in employing women in operational roles due to local customs and traditions.

8

Sudan’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software is being
upgraded to the New Generation version, with assistance from the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Signiﬁcant efforts to correct errors in the
database were made during the year, including ongoing efforts to incorporate data from
Abyei. Sudan’s increased transparency in reporting and communication, with the aim of
facilitating international cooperation and assistance, is evident.

7

A new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 has been ﬁnalised and is awaiting
endorsement. Sudan’s Article 5 deadline extension request is realistic, achievable,
and contains clear targets and resources required to reach completion. However, the
security situation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan has prevented the deployment of
mine action teams to heavily contaminated areas. Access to these states increases as
security improves.

7

A review of Sudan’s National Mine Action Standards was completed and the revised
standards were awaiting endorsement as at May 2019.

6

Sudan did not meet its Article 5 extension request targets for 2018; however, the
forthcoming revised national mine action strategic plan will set new annual milestones
for survey and clearance. The primary factors which will determine Sudan’s ability
to comply with its Article 5 deadline are security and access to Blue Nile and South
Kordofan states and a funding gap of an estimated $58 million.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.8

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)
JASMAR for Human Security
Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FDPO)
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■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

At the end of 2018, Sudan had a total of 94 areas suspected
or conﬁrmed to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a
total of just over 18.9km2. According to the Sudanese National
Mine Action Centre (NMAC), of this total, 52 areas with a
size of nearly 2.4km2 are conﬁrmed contamination, while
anti-personnel mine contamination is suspected in a further
42 areas with a total size of just over 16.5km2.1 An additional
29 areas covering nearly 5km2 are suspected to contain only
anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 1. 2
According to NMAC, during clearance operations in 2018,
three areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines with
a total size of 10,400m2 were ‘closed’, while six new areas
with a size of 557,798m2 were registered, of which three
areas with a size of 362,245m2 were ‘closed’ while three
areas with a size of 195,553m2 remained opened. It was also
discovered that two areas thought to be contaminated with
UXO contained anti-personnel mines and were reclassiﬁed.
NMAC stated that the difference between contamination
remaining at the end of 2017 and that at the end of 2018 was
185,153m2 which was a difference in the size of contamination
remaining, not the number of areas to be addressed.
This is a slight increase in the overall size of contamination
recorded as at the end of 2017, when Sudan had 94 mined
areas covering a total of just over 18.7km2. 3 An additional
27 areas were suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines,
with a total size of nearly 5km2. 4
Sudan’s mine and ERW contamination results from
decades-long conﬂict since the country’s independence in
1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and
other explosive ordnance were used heavily by all parties
to the conﬂicts, resulted in widespread contamination
that has claimed thousands of victims. 5 In January 2005,
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ostensibly
ended the civil war, ultimately leading to the independence
of the south in July 2011. However, since South Sudan’s
independence, conﬂicts have again broken out in Blue Nile
and South Kordofan states as well as in the Abyei region,
leading to new contamination from UXO.

At the end of 2018, of Sudan’s mine- and ERW-affected
states, three contained anti-personnel mines: Blue Nile,
South Kordofan, and Western Kordofan. Blue Nile and South
Kordofan were believed to be the most heavily contaminated,
as set out in Table 2. 6 According to NMAC, a total of 557,798m2
of anti-personnel mine contamination was added to the
database in 2018.7 No mines have been reported in Darfur,
where the main threat is from UXO. 8
Kassala state was declared free of mines on 4 April 2018,
joining Red Sea state which declared completion in May 2017,
and Gadaref state, which was declared free of mines and ERW
in May 2016.9 On 4 April 2019, another milestone was reached
with the declaration of Abu Karshola town in South Kordofan
state, once heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, free of
known contamination, a positive indication of increasing access
and improvements in the security situation.10
A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09
covering Blue Nile, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South
Kordofan states. Since then, “ad hoc” reports of additional
mined and ERW-contaminated areas have been registered as
“dangerous areas” in the national database. This has caused
the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand signiﬁcantly,
including by encompassing areas not originally surveyed.11
As at April 2019, a total of 3,582 hazardous areas had been
registered in the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) database since 2002, of which 3,376 were
reported to have been released through various clearance
methods, leaving a total of 206 hazardous areas with a size
of just over 26.1km2 to be addressed.12
In 2018, the extent of mine and ERW contamination in the
border area of Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan
remained not fully known due to ongoing restrictions
on access.13

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018)14
Type of contamination
Anti-personnel mines
Anti-vehicle mines
Totals

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

52

2,402,260

42

16,516,788

0

0

29

5,000,082

52

2,402,260

71

21,518,870

CHAs = Conﬁrmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2018)15
State
Blue Nile
South Kordofan
Western Kordofan
Totals

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

4

219,663

5

841,683

9

1,061,346

48

2,182,597

34

15,653,114

82

17,835,711

0

0

3

21,991

3

21,991

52

2,402,260

42

16,516,788

94

18,919,048
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NEW CONTAMINATION
NMAC reported that there were no reports of the use of
anti-personnel mines, including of an improvised nature,
in 2018.16

EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
Sudan also has a signiﬁcant problem with ERW, including
very limited contamination from cluster munition remnants,
primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war
that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005
and South Sudan’s independence in July 2011 (see Mine
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report
on Sudan for further information). While no mines have
been found in Darfur, ERW in Darfur includes unexploded
air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar shells,
and grenades.17

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and
NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. Upon the
independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership
of national mine action with responsibility for coordinating all
mine clearance, including accreditation and certiﬁcation of
clearance agencies. After starting an emergency programme
in 2002, in 2015 the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) resumed
a lead role in supporting UN mine action efforts in Sudan and
provided assistance and technical support to NMAC following
an invitation from the Sudanese Government.18
In 2017, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
continued to monitor the activities of the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA) in Abyei, which it has done since the 2011 outbreak
of heavy conﬂict in the area.19 As UNISFA does not have a
mandate to conduct mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN
Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes the
identiﬁcation and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized
Border Zone as well as Abyei, and facilitating access by
assessing and clearing priority areas and routes. 20
In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, UNMAS works
under the name of the Ordnance Disposal Ofﬁce (ODO) in
direct support of UNAMID priorities. 21 UN Security Council
Resolution 2429 (2018) calls for the gradual withdrawal of

UNAMID by 2020. As such, UNMAS reported that some of
ODO’s responsibilities in Darfur were being handed over to
UNMAS Sudan, and that it was to take over ODO’s role in ERW
clearance, risk education, and victim assistance as of 2019 in
North, South, East, and West Darfur states, while ODO would
focus its responsibilities in the area of Jabal Marrah. 22
In 2018, the Government of Sudan contributed US$2 million
to the running costs of NMAC and for demining activities. 23 It
has consistently funded the national mine action programme
at this level for the past three years, doubling its funding for
mine action from $1 million in 2015, and up from almost $0.5
million in 2014.24 NMAC expected to receive the same funding
in 2019. 25
In its extension request, Sudan projects $75.5 million is
required to complete clearance by 2023, of which $14 million
is expected to be provided by the government. At the same
time, it reports Sudan is facing a funding gap of $58 million
to meet the 2023 deadline. 26 The request outlines a resource
mobilisation strategy, which includes identifying new donors,
including Gulf States, emerging economies receptive to
becoming “donor” governments, and “non-conventional”
partners such as philanthropists, private individuals and
foundations, and commercial companies and corresponding
funding modalities and mechanisms. 27

GENDER
In 2019, NMAC reported that gender is mainstreamed in the
national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 and in the
national mine action standards. It stated that under those
standards, all survey and community liaison teams are to be
gender balanced, and that women and children are consulted
during survey and community liaison activities. It said
that gender is also taken into account in the prioritisation,
planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities, as
per the national mine action standards. 28
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NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for
employment in the national programme, whether at the ofﬁce
level or in the ﬁeld. Positively, it reported that almost 40% of
NMAC staff employed at the managerial or supervisory levels
are women. However, it noted that there were few women
employed in operational roles in the survey and clearance
teams due to “local customs and traditions”. 29
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In May 2019, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that it
was using both the IMSMA legacy version in parallel with
the newer version, IMSMA-NG. 30 In 2018, NMAC began a
process of upgrading the IMSMA software to the newer
New Generation version, with assistance from the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
Signiﬁcant efforts to correct errors in the database were also

undertaken. 31 The database does not contain information on
the disputed Abyei area. 32 However, UNMAS informed Mine
Action Review in June 2019 that UNISFA was working with
NMAC on database sharing and had co-located an IMSMA
ofﬁcer within the NMAC ofﬁce in Khartoum to help share
historical data, while it was also providing NMAC a monthly
report on activities in Abyei. 33

PLANNING AND TASKING
In March 2018, Sudan submitted a request for an extension
of its APMBC Article 5 clearance deadline for a period of
four years to 1 April 2023. The request contains a detailed
workplan with annual survey and clearance projections on a
state-by-state basis (see Article 5 Compliance section).

In May 2019, NMAC reported that a new national mine action
strategic plan for 2019–23 had been ﬁnalised and was
waiting approval. The plan aims at fulﬁlling Sudan’s APMBC
obligations, and was developed in coordination with the GICHD
to replace its previous national mine action strategy for
2016–19.34 NMAC stated that detailed annual workplans had
been developed for each year under the new strategic plan.35

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s National
Mine Action Standards (NMAS), reportedly ongoing since
2015, had been completed and the revised standards were
awaiting endorsement. 36
NMAC conﬁrmed that in 2018, QA and quality control activities
were carried out according to the NMAS. 37

(FPDO). In 2018, NMAC reported that a total of 22 mine
action teams were operational (7 manual clearance teams,
11 multi-task teams, 3 mine detection dog teams, and 1
route veriﬁcation and clearance team). It reported that the
deployment of additional teams was made possible in newly
accessible areas in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. 38
In Darfur, in 2018, clearance operations continued to be
conducted by commercial operator Dynasafe (DML) and
NUMAD. 39

OPERATORS
In 2018, no international non-governmental organisation
(NGO) was conducting demining operations in Sudan. National
demining operators are JASMAR for Human Security,
National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD),
and the Friends for Peace and Development Organization

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
As noted above, demining is carried out primarily using
manual clearance, as well as through the use of mine
detection dog teams.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Sudan’s Article 5 deadline extension request is to clear all mined areas and ERW-contaminated areas by 1 April 2023. Towards
this goal, overall land release rose dramatically in 2018, to a total of nearly 17.4km2 mine and battle area released, up from
just under 3.9km2 released in total in 2017. 40 Of this, just over 1km2 of mined area was released through technical survey and
clearance. No cancellation was reported in 2018.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
SURVEY IN 2018

CLEARANCE IN 2018
2

A total of just over 21,000m was reduced through technical
survey in 2018. No areas were reported released through
cancellation, and a total of just under 558,000m2 was
conﬁrmed. This is a signiﬁcant decrease in output from
2017, when nearly 335,000m2 was released through survey,
including close to 260,000m2 reduced through technical
survey, just under 75,000m2 cancelled through non-technical
survey, and six areas with a size of 157,000m2 conﬁrmed
as mined. 41

According to NMAC, nearly 980,000m2 was released
through clearance in 2018, almost all by NUMAD, as in the
previous year. This was an increase from 2017, when just
over 707,330m2 was released through clearance. 42 A total of
689,898m2 was cleared manually and a further 289,550m2 by
MDD teams in 2018. 43
Despite the increase in clearance output in square metres,
only 31 anti-personnel mines and 13 anti-vehicle mines were
destroyed during mine clearance in 2018.
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Table 3: Mine clearance in 201844
State

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

0

0

0

0

NUMAD
Blue Nile

South Kordofan

Kassala

JASMAR

0

5,140

0

1

FPDO

0

4,140

0

1

NUMAD

1

722,963

0

0

JASMAR

2

45,529

23

0

FPDO

0

4,242

0

1

NUMAD

5

197,434

8

10

8

979,448

31

13

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM

Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.98

2017

0.71

2016

1.04

2015

0.42

2014

2.47

Total

5.62

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
four-year extension granted by states parties in 2018), Sudan
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 April 2023.
In March 2018, Sudan submitted a request for a four-year
extension of its Article 5 deadline to 1 April 2023. The
extension request was notably thorough, generally of good
quality, and includes a workplan with annual targets for
completion and a revised number of areas in each state it
plans to address with a total planned release of 53 CHAs with
a size of 26.4km2 and 171 SHAs with a size of 22km2. 45 The
request does, however, contain some discrepancies in the
total amounts of survey and clearance output projections,
which require additional clariﬁcation. 46
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According to the extension request, when full access is
available, a detailed and updated workplan for clearance
of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states for 2019–23 will be
produced. NMAC expects that non-technical survey in both
states can then be completed in six months. 47 The request
contains detailed projections for Blue Nile state of eight
areas with a total size of just over 1km2 to be addressed in
2018–20 and 127 areas with a size of just over 23.3km2 to
be addressed in South Kordofan from 2017–23. The request
does not, though, provide any details on plans for clearance
of Western Kordofan state, noting only that three SHAs with
a total size of 21,991m2 remain to be addressed, offering
conﬂicting information as to when this will occur. 48 It also
does not contain information on how contamination in Abyei
will be cleared.
The workplan foresees a considerable increase in land
release output, from a total of 8km2 in 2017–18 to 23.4km2
in 2018–19. Sudan was asked by the Article 5 Committee at
the Intersessional Meetings in June 2018 to provide updates
on the reason for the sharp increase and corresponding
efforts to increase capacity to meet this increase in output. 49
Concerns were also raised that under the plan for 2019–23,
close to 90% of SHAs remaining will be released through
survey, and that this percentage is higher than any survey
outputs in 2012–16 (averaging close to 74%). 50

STATES PARTIES

SUDAN

Overall, the primary concern with Sudan’s ability to meet its
Article 5 extension request deadline remains that it is heavily
dependent upon improved security in the heavily affected
states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. A further signiﬁcant
factor which continues to impede Sudan’s progress is a lack
of clearance capacity formerly provided by international
demining operators. Sudan has made numerous requests for
technical and logistical support and appeals for the return of
international operators’ support.
In November 2018, Sudan reported that as a result of
enhanced cooperation, both nationally and internationally,
in particular stemming from a meeting on Sudan of the
APMBC’s Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and
Assistance’s “individualised approach” initiative in 2017, a
number of positive developments had resulted. This initiative,
Sudan reported, alongside nationally convened mine action
events and donor ﬁeld visits to mine-affected areas, had
resulted in an increase in earmarked funds to the mine action
programme, with some US$7.1 million in new funding for
mine action pledged by the governments of Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. 51

Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 1 May 2019; and
Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.

22

UNMAS, “2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan”.

23

Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 1 May 2019.
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TAJIKISTAN

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2020
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

0.7

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

(ESTIMATED)

5KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

0.59KM 5,013
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

MEDIUM,

0.6

2017
2018

0.62
0.59

0.5

0.48
0.4

0.40
0.3

0.26

0.2

0.16

0.1

(including 15 destroyed
during spot tasks)

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)
began elaborating what may be Tajikistan’s ﬁnal Article 5
extension request, with assistance from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). Tajikistan is requesting a
ﬁnal extension of its deadline to 31 December 2025, but the
forecast that this will be enough time to complete clearance
is based on a signiﬁcant expansion in capacity, which has not
yet been secured.
Tajikistan also approved a national gender strategy in mine
action for 2018–22 in October 2018, elaborated with support

from the Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP, now a
programme of the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)).
The ﬁrst ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements
were signed between the two countries, including one on
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek
border where mines remain. Any survey of the border will
require agreement and cooperation between both nations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Tajikistan should seek to expand its demining capacity in order to survey its 41 suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) as soon as possible, in order to more accurately determine the extent of mine contamination.

■

Tajikistan should commit to provide regular updates to Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
states parties on progress in implementing Article 5 during the extension period.

■

Tajikistan should consider expanding the humanitarian demining capacity of the Tajik Armed Forces,
as well as further exploring the potential to train and deploy Tajik Border Guard forces, to help it meet its
Article 5 obligations.

■

Tajikistan should report more accurately and consistently on land release data, in a manner consistent with
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
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Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan’s baseline of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination is not yet an
accurate assessment. Forty-one SHAs have yet to be surveyed, and many conﬁrmed
hazardous areas (CHAs) require further survey to more accurately locate and delineate
the actual mineﬁeld. The extent of mined area on the Uzbek border also has still to be
accurately determined.

7

Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, including the contribution
of Ministry of Defence (MoD) clearance teams. There is political will and an enabling
environment for Article 5 implementation.

7

A national gender strategy in mine action for 2018–22, elaborated with support from
GMAP, was approved in October 2018. Mine Action data is disaggregated by sex and age,
and women and children consulted during community liaison.

6

TNMAC is in the process of installing Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) Core, with support from the GICHD.

7

Tajikistan has a National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020, and is
developing a strategic workplan for implementation of Article 5, in line with the deadline
extension it is requesting to the end of 2025. The GICHD has worked with TNMAC and
UNDP to develop PriSMA (the Priority Setting Tool for Mine Action).

7

Tajikistan has appropriate national mine action standards in place, and deploys
evidence-based land release methodology. It currently lacks sufﬁcient survey capacity,
but is slowly developing this.

6

Tajikistan cleared nearly 0.6km2 of mined area in 2018. This is less than it had planned
to clear, and is substantially less than the average 1.3km2 of clearance per annum
foreseen in its deadline extension request. In order to meet planned targets and have
any chance of meeting its Article 5 obligations by 2025, Tajikistan must secure funding
for additional capacity.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

5

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.3

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Commission for the Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

OTHER ACTORS
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

TNMAC
Ministry of Defence (MoD), Humanitarian Demining
Company (HDC)
Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

■
■
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE)
Tajik Border Guard Forces
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The overall baseline contamination at the end of 2018 is
an increase compared to the end of 2017, which it stood at
7.46km2 of CHA and almost 1.35km2 of SHA. 2 This is largely
due to 3.25km2 of legacy SHA on the Tajik-Uzbek border being
added to the baseline of mined area. However, even taking
this into account, the difference in ﬁgures between mined
area as at the end of 2017 and 2018, cannot be satisfactorily
explained or reconciled.

Tajikistan is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent,
explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition
remnants, as a result of past conﬂicts (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report
on Tajikistan for further information).
At the end of 2018, Tajikistan had 12.1km2 of mined area:
just over 7.9km2 of mine contamination across 154 conﬁrmed
hazardous areas (CHAs) and almost 4.2km2 across 95 SHAs,
as set out in Table 1.1 The mined areas are located in
four provinces.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2018) 3

CHA

SHA

Province

District

Nos.

Area (m )

Nos.

Area (m2)

Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region

Darvoz

8

1,169,600

2

20,000

Vanj

6

908,119

0

0

Shugnan

3

56,000

0

0

Ishkoshi

0

0

1

5,000

17

2,133,719

3

25,000

Farkhor

6

96,800

1

8,000

Hamadoni

3

80,772

6

177,000

24

1,600,585

13

204,000

Subtotals
Khatlon

Panj
Jayhun

8

135,636

11

307,000

91

3,659,698

4

140,000

Kabodiyon

1

0

0

0

Shahri

1

30,000

0

0

Shamsiddin Shohin

Khovaling
Subtotals
Sughd Region (Uzbek border)

Asht

120,000

1

30,000

5,723,491

36

866,000

0

0

11

610,000

0

0

5

535,000

Isfara

0

0

20

1,105,000

Konibodom

0

0

3

165,000

Panjakent

0

0

13

715,000

Shahriston

0

0

2

120,000

0

0

54

3,250,000

Sangvor

Subtotals
Totals
Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of
different conﬂicts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan
was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with
Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and
the Central Region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a
result of the 1992–97 civil war. 4
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2
136

Ayni

Subtotals
Central Region

2

1

50,000

2

50,000

1

50,000

2

50,000

154

7,907,210

95

4,191,000

A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation
for Mine Action (FSD) estimated that mine and ERW
contamination extended over 50km2. 5 Tajikistan subsequently
alleged that lack of experience among the initial survey
teams, the absence of mineﬁeld records and other important
information, and inadequate equipment led to that ﬁrst impact
survey generating unreliable results. As a result, the sizes of
SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly
recorded. 6 While most mineﬁeld maps/records are of good
quality, some do not reﬂect the reality on the ground and as
such the records have to be veriﬁed and validated through
survey and data analysis.7

STATES PARTIES

Depending on the weather, land release operations in the
Khatlon region of the border usually start in February/March;
the GBAO part of the border only becomes accessible from
May until October; and the Central Region from June until
September.10
Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border
is limited and based on non-technical survey conducted
in 2011–15 by FSD and a needs assessment survey by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15.
However, the FSD non-technical survey did not cover the
whole of the Tajik-Uzbek border, only Sughd province, and
it was not comprehensive, being mainly based on incident
forms as the boundary line was not accessible to survey
teams. Records lack detail on the exact location where mine
incidents occurred.11
While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their
1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, certain areas have not yet been delineated
and therefore the exact location of mined areas is not
known. Most of the mined areas are thought to be in
disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek border which have
not been accessible, and for which evaluation and analysis
of information is not yet complete.12 Most of the mines are
believed to be on Uzbek territory,13 but there is a possibility
that some mines may have been displaced downhill into
Tajikistan due to landslides or ﬂooding.14 The 3.25km2 of SHA
on the border with Uzbekistan, included in Tajikistan’s 2019
extension request,15 is a rough estimate and the actual extent
of any anti-personnel mined area on Tajik territory along this
border will only be more accurately established once both
countries permit survey and have delimited the border.
The ﬁrst ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements
were signed between the two countries, including one on
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek
border.16 Any demining operations will require agreement
and cooperation between the two nations; as at July 2019, the
Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) was in negotiation
with the Uzbek MoFA regarding survey of the Tajik-Uzbek
border.17

In September 2013, records of 110 (subsequently corrected
to 107) previously unrecorded and unsurveyed mineﬁelds
were made public for the ﬁrst time, with security constraints
said to have prevented survey activities in the past.18 All
are located in the provinces of Khatlon and the GBAO along
the border with Afghanistan.19 Non-technical survey of the
mineﬁelds began in 2014. 20 As at May 2019, 41 unsurveyed
SHAs (corresponding to 30 mineﬁeld records) were said to
remain. 21 TNMAC plans to complete survey of the remaining
unsurveyed mineﬁelds by 2023. 22 While none of the
unsurveyed areas is considered completely inaccessible for
the survey (or for subsequent clearance), 23 serious challenges
have been reported during survey in accessing the mined
areas in mountainous terrain and with one mined area
blocking access to a number of others. 24
Furthermore, many surveyed mineﬁeld records/CHAs do
not accurately reﬂect the reality in the ﬁeld, as signiﬁcant
time has passed since the mineﬁeld records were made and
the landscape may have changed in the meantime. Further
technical survey/re-survey is therefore required to more
accurately locate and delineate the actual mine contamination.
According to Tajikistan, the total size of un-surveyed area is
estimated to be 941,000m2 (with approximately 11,685 mines)
and the total area planned for re-survey is 2,770,557m2.
Survey and re-survey of these areas will be conducted
by Union of Sapers of Tajikistan (UST) and Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA). Tajikistan acknowledges the urgency
and importance of establishing a clear baseline of antipersonnel mine contamination as soon as possible and in
August 2019 TNMAC announced that a survey working group
will be established with expert representatives from all key
stakeholders and implementing partners, under the guidance
and direction of TNMAC. The group will help plan and
prioritise survey tasks. 25
With the introduction of an arrangement for medical
evacuation by helicopter, in collaboration with the Armed
Forces, there are no longer any mined areas deemed to be
“inaccessible”. 26 There are, however, mined areas on two
islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of
which is 538,500m2 in size and the other 30,000m2, which
are said to be “non-executable” at the present time. The
islands were created by a change in the ﬂow of the river,
and it is possible that the river may again change its path
and re-connect the islands with the Tajik river bank in
the future. 27

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Commission for the Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the ﬁrst deputy of the
Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from
relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan’s national mine
action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action
in the government’s socio-economic development policies. 28

In June 2003, the Government of Tajikistan and UNDP
established the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) with
a view to it becoming a nationally owned programme in the
short term, 29 though this did not happen until more than ten
years later. TMAC was made responsible for coordinating and
monitoring all mine action activities. 30 Since then, TMAC has
acted as the secretariat for the CIIHL to which it reports. 31
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Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and
the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along
the Afghan border (reported to contain 60,357 anti-personnel
mines), in the Central Region, and along the Uzbek border. 8
Shamsiddin Shohin district (formerly known as Shuroobod
district) in Khatlon province is the most heavily mined
district. Mines were laid in and around military positions on
hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered
remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in
and out by helicopter as there are no established roads or
tracks to access the mineﬁelds for survey or clearance.9

On 3 January 2014, TNMAC was established by government
decree to replace TMAC. 32 While transition to national
ownership is considered to have been successful, UNDP’s
Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP)
project has continued to support the building of sustainable
national structures and TNMAC’s technical capacity. 33 In 2018,
UNDP helped TNMAC to elaborate Tajikistan’s plan for Article
5 completion. UNDP plans to transfer assets, knowledge,
and expertise directly to TNMAC 34 with UNDP support due to
decrease in 2019. 35 In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament adopted a
Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers all aspects
of mine action. 36
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a signiﬁcant role in
Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by conducting
demining directly. 37 The Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe Programme Ofﬁce in Dushanbe (OSCE
POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multi-year plan,
entitled “Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan
Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023”. 38

An agreement on cooperation between the Governments of
Tajikistan and Afghanistan was signed in 2014, since when
TNMAC has coordinated with the UN Mine Action Centre for
Afghanistan (UNMACCA) and Afghanistan’s Department of
Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) on land release approaches,
NMAS, exchange visits, cross-border projects, victim
assistance, and risk education. 39 Since 2017, this also includes
collaboration on quality management (QM). 40
In 2018, the Government of Tajikistan supported TNMAC
coordination activities with funding of US$53,933. 41 In
addition, the Tajik government contributes ﬁve MoD demining
teams (500,000 Tajik Somoni), and provides support for the
joint projects of TNMAC and UNDP, and OSCE POiD. 42 In total,
$480,000 is allocated annually from Tajikistan’s state budget
as in-kind contributions. 43

GENDER
In September 2017, experts from the Geneva Mine Action
Programme (GMAP, now a programme of the GICHD)
prepared and submitted to TNMAC a draft of a national
gender strategy in mine action for 2018–22. The strategy was
approved by TNMAC in October 2018. 44 Gender in Tajikistan
is also addressed by a number of laws and documents,
including the national development strategy through to
2030, approved by the parliament on 1 December 2016. 45
TNMAC reported that women and children are consulted
during survey and community liaison activities. As at July
2019, community liaison/non-technical survey teams were
not yet gender balanced, but TNMAC plans to diversify survey
teams to help reach a wider audience and more sources of
information. Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by
sex and age. 46
Women account for around 20% of survey and clearance
teams in Tajikistan, and around 25% of managerial/
supervisory level positions. 47 According to its 2019 Article
5 extension request, Tajikistan aims to double its demining
capacity, subject to funding. 48 Such an increase to operational
capacity will present an opportunity to build on the lessons
learned from ﬁelding female and mixed teams, and to improve
the gender balance for deminers in line with Tajikistan’s
Gender and Diversity Mine Action Strategy.
The MoD’s Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) does
not currently have a gender policy or implementation plan.
However, the HDC does consult with all groups, including
women and children, during survey and community liaison
activities. While there is equal access to employment for
qualiﬁed women and men in the HDC survey and clearance
teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions,
in practice women do not apply for these positions and as at
August 2019, no women were employed by the HDC. 49
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The HDC deploys conscript soldiers as deminers, with regular
MoD personnel overseeing operations. In Tajikistan, military
service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women.
However, while there are no formal obstacles for women
undertaking military service, very few currently choose to do
so, which also helps explain the absence of women serving in
the HDC. The OSCE Programme Ofﬁce in Dushanbe regularly
emphasises the importance of including women in all aspects
of the work and especially as ofﬁcers and in managerial
positions. 50 TNMAC has acknowledged that it will be a
challenge to achieve gender balance as those who currently
serve in the military are predominantly male. However it will
discuss and prioritise identifying key positions that can be
ﬁlled by female candidates, such as paramedics and/or QA/
QC ofﬁcers, in addition to seeking to increase female civilian
capacity in coordination with other implementing partners. 51
NPA has a gender and diversity policy which is integrated
into NPA’s Tajikistan project proposals and operations, and
gender mainstreaming is a mandatory part of its training
activities in Tajikistan. NPA ensures that all groups are
included during community consultation activities, and has a
gender balanced community liaison team to help ensure this.
NPA disaggregates mine action data by sex and age. 52
NPA makes an effort to try to employ a gender balanced
workforces to the extent that is possible in Tajikistan context,
and has men and women employed in key positions. Of NPA’s
operational staff, 22% are women; and 36% of management/
supervisory staff. 53
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In 2016, Tajikistan updated its national mine action database
to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
version 6.0. 54 TNMAC is now installing IMSMA Core, with
support from the GICHD, 55 and expected it to become fully
operational in the course of 2019. 56
Data in the national information management system are
accessible to clearance operators, and data collection forms
enable collation of necessary data. 57 Tajikistan submits

annual Article 7 transparency reports and delivers updates
on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC
intersessional meetings and meetings of states parties.
However, TNMAC should aim to improve its land release
terminology and methodology, to make it more consistent
with the IMAS, and refer to the amount of mined area
cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through
technical survey.

PLANNING AND TASKING
The previous national mine action strategic plan for 2010–15
expired at the end of 2015. 58 A new National Strategy on
Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020 was approved by
government decree No. 91 on 25 February 2017. 59
The national strategy is, however, very general, and while
it includes a “plan”, which lists the various overarching
activities to implement the strategy, it lacks detail on
prioritisation of clearance tasks, timelines, or capacities
for survey and clearance operations. 60
In September 2018, a group was created to prepare
Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request, which
included representatives from the Executive Ofﬁce of the
President of Tajikistan, multiple ministries, and the Committee
for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.61 UNDP also
supported the preparation of the extension request.
The annual projections in Tajikistan’s 2019 Article 5 extension
request are, however, simplistic, based on average clearance
rates, without more detailed analysis of the remaining mined
areas. Tajikistan’s extension request projections also assume
an increased clearance capacity that Tajikistan has not yet
secured.

TNMAC plans to reach an average annual clearance target
of more than 1.3km2 in order to release nearly 8.85km² of
remaining mined area (excluding the Uzbek border) by 2025. 62
In its operational workplan for 2019, planned clearance
output was 1,369,429m2, 63 signiﬁcantly greater than the
0.59km2 cleared in 2018.
The GICHD is working with TNMAC and UNDP to develop
a prioritisation system and tool for Tajikistan, which will
identify distinct criteria and indicators for the separate
regions. 64 A pilot of PriSMA (the Priority Setting Tool for
Mine Action) was conducted from July to September 2017, 65
and a second version was subsequently developed and
piloted. 66 TNMAC prepared its latest operations plan based
on PriSMA and Tajik Border Forces recommendations, using
a district-by-district approach based on the following criteria:
■
■

■

mined areas with economic and infrastructure impact;
the number of unsurveyed mineﬁeld records in each
district (those with a larger number of mineﬁelds records
will be considered a priority for the deployment of nontechnical survey teams and those with a smaller number
can be surveyed by clearance teams during demining
operations); and
the number of mined areas in each district (a smaller
number of mineﬁelds will be considered a priority to
deploy clearance teams to release the whole district).67

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Tajikistan’s revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS)
were approved by decree on 1 April 2017. 68
In 2017, TNMAC further developed its new approach to
survey, known as “non-technical survey with technical
intervention”. In addition to standard non-technical survey,
survey teams are also using technical assets to conﬁrm and
locate actual evidence of mines and unexploded ordnance
(UXO). This methodology helps improve the efﬁciency of
survey operations, by conﬁrming areas as mined and more
accurately determining the location of mined areas. 69 It
is especially useful, as mineﬁeld records are sometimes
incomplete or inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and
grid numbering or lack of landmarks/reference points, and
there are often few local people to ask about evidence of
mines or accidents as people have moved away because of
the contamination. This can result in inﬂated polygons. In
addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides,
rock falls, or ﬂooding.70

Since early October 2017, the UST has been conducting nontechnical survey with technical survey intervention, in line
with the new land release methodology in Tajikistan.71 Prior to
this, UST was only conducting non-technical survey. The use
of technical interventions is expected to improve operational
efﬁciency, but it will also slow down the rate of survey by
UST of the remaining unsurveyed mineﬁelds.72
While in many instances the suspected mined area is
cancelled or reduced through survey, there are also
instances when survey reveals the size of the mined area
as being larger than indicated on the mineﬁeld records. This
can be due to a number of factors, such as windy conditions
at the time when helicopter-dropped mines were deployed
which leads to greater dispersal of the mines; the height of
the helicopter above the ground at the time of deployment
(in time of hostilities, the distance of the helicopter from the
ground is signiﬁcantly increased, resulting in wider dispersal
of the mines); and mountainous terrain.73
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OPERATORS
In 2018, operational capacity included ﬁve military
multi-purpose manual teams (four from the MoD HDC and
one from the Committee of Emergency and Civil Defence)
totalling 64 personnel; four multi-purpose manual Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) teams (for clearance and technical
survey), totalling 33 demining personnel;74 and two UST
non-technical survey teams (totalling 11 personnel).75
Following the signature of an MoU with the OSCE POiD
in 2009, the MoD established the HDC.76 Since TMAC’s
nationalisation, the HDC has acted as a contractor for TNMAC,
and OSCE POiD funds the HDC through TNMAC.77 The MoD
provides ﬁve teams to the HDC as part of its commitment
to assist TNMAC meet Tajikistan’s Article 5 obligations. The
HDC’s de-mining activities are conducted using conscript
soldiers as deminers, with regularly employed MoD ofﬁcers
managing operations and the clearance sites. In 2018, three
of the ﬁve MoD teams were supported by OSCE POiD uniﬁed
budget (from participating states) and two by the United
States Department of State via the OSCE POiD. In 2019, OSCE
continued to three teams from the uniﬁed budget as before
and the two teams that were funded by United States through
OSCE in 2018 are now funded directly by United States
Department of State to TNMAC after successful capacity
building and as part of a transition to national ownership
and sustainability.78
According to the MoD, more deminers could be trained
and deployed if additional funding were available. Military
deminers are reportedly less expensive than deminers of
international NGOs, and have the additional advantage of
having security access to survey and clear mined areas in
the vicinity of military bases and other areas which may
be inaccessible to other implementing partners due to
security restrictions.79
In its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request, Tajikistan
set out its hope to double the clearance capacity currently
provided by the MoD and NPA. The government of Tajikistan
would pay the salaries of the ﬁve additional MoD teams,
but Tajikistan still needs to secure international funding for
equipment and running costs for these teams. 80
The OSCE POiD has been supporting mine action since
2003. The OSCE POiD’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: to
support the development of national demining capacity; and
to foster regional cooperation in border management and
security. 81 The OSCE POiD supported the HDC via the UST,
which it contracted to provide project management and
administrative support to the Ministry of Defence’s HDC in
2010–13. 82

UST, a national not-for-proﬁt organisation, is accredited to
conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim
assistance. In 2017, UST received additional accreditation
to conduct non-technical survey with technical survey
intervention, but it is not accredited to conduct clearance. 83
While some staff positions at UST are permanent, such as the
Operations Manager, deminers are recruited annually for the
operations period from Spring until October, based on UST’s
annual survey plan. 84 In 2018, two UST teams (four surveyors
per team) conducted non-technical survey in the Shamsiddin
Shohin district of the Khatlon region. 85 The capacity of the
two UST survey teams was due to increase slightly, to six
surveyors per team in 2019. 86
In late 2018, NPA established a technical advisor position,
focused more on supporting national capacities (including
TNMAC and the survey capacity of UST). NPA has proposed
establishing a survey working group to meet at least monthly
and be active during the 2019 demining season, bringing
relevant stakeholders together. In August 2019, Tajikistan
reported that it planned to establish the survey working
group. 87
Technical survey is conducted as standard during NPA
clearance tasks. NPA did not have a dedicated survey team
in 2018, and non-technical survey conducted in 2018, at the
request of TNMAC, was conducted by NPA’s technical advisor,
task supervisor, and supported with medical staff. NPA hopes
to be able to transition into conducting more survey activities
in coordination with TNMAC in order to be able to better
deﬁne the remaining levels of contamination. As such, NPA
trained and deployed its ﬁrst survey team in April 2019 and
planned to add a second survey team in February 2020, to
conduct non-technical survey and targeted technical survey
to support TNMAC with resurvey of CHAs and potentially with
the survey of unsurveyed mined areas. 88 The survey team is a
multi-task team and so can also be deployed to support NPA’s
clearance teams, when it is not deployed for survey. 89
Tajikistan’s 2019 extension request references the role of the
Tajik Border Guard Forces in providing security for demining
operations on the Tajik-Afghan border and says TNMAC
planned to involve Tajik Border Guard Forces in demining
on the Tajik-Afghan border.90 There is currently a small pilot
project in which NPA has trained two border guard ofﬁcers
who have been seconded to work with NPA’s civilian capacity
during the 2019 demining season.91 This could be further
expanded, if the political will is there and funding is available.
Since the Border Guard Forces are also responsible for
granting permission to access the contaminated areas along
the Tajik/Afghan border, increased cooperation on demining
may help to overcome previous security restrictions on
access to these areas.92

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Neither mine detection dogs (MDDs) nor machines were
used operationally in 2018. The MDD programme ended in
early 2015 due to the very limited number of tasks suitable
for dogs. Consequently, 18 MDDs were handed over to the
Ministry of Interior and to the Border Forces.93
The MoD has one demining machine, which is not currently
deployed.94 Tajikistan recognises that there are still
potentially mined areas where mechanical assets can
usefully be deployed (15–20% from total remaining areas in
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the lowlands), though this would require additional ﬁnancial
support.95 Many of the western districts of the Tajik-Afghan
border, which are currently not accessible because of
security restrictions, contain mined areas on ﬂat terrain,
which could be suitable for mechanical demining.96 In August
2018, TNMAC announced that it had recently established a
Technical Working Group focused on operational efﬁciency
and quality assurance, and that one of the ﬁrst tasks of the
working group will be to conduct a feasibility study on the
reactivation of mechanical assets in Tajikistan.97
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Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 2018102

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 1.12km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of
which 0.6km2 was cleared, over 0.2km2 was reduced through
technical survey, and nearly 0.4km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey.98

Operator

Province

District

Area cancelled (m²)

UST

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

366,000

NPA

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

34,634

Total

SURVEY IN 2018

400,634

2

In 2018, a total of 0.4km was cancelled through non-technical
survey by NPA and UST in Khatlon province (see Table 2),
and a further 0.23km2 was reduced through technical
survey by the MoD and NPA in Khatlon and GBAO provinces
(see Table 3).99 This was a slight decrease on the 0.48km2
cancelled in 2017, but an increase compared to the 0.16km2
reduced in 2017. 100

Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018103

Also in 2018, two mineﬁelds of 865,000m2 were conﬁrmed by
TNMAC, and three mineﬁelds that make up 146,000m2 were
conﬁrmed by NPA.101

Area reduced (m2)

Operator

Province

District

MOD

Khatlon

Sh.Shoin

NPA

Khatlon

Sh.Shoin

92,777

Khovaling

54,469

Darvos

25,625

GBAO

83,100

Total

255,971

CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, the MoD/HDC and NPA cleared nearly 0.6km2 across
9 mined areas (including suspended areas not yet completed
as at the end of 2018), destroying 4,998 anti-personnel mines
and 136 items of UXO (see Table 4).104 This is a very slight
decrease on the 0.62km2 cleared in 2017.

An additional 15 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during
spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2018.105
Anti-personnel mines were found in all clearance tasks in
2018, with the exception of a mineﬁeld in Khavalong district,
Khatlon province tasked to NPA for clearance. However, while
no mines were found, there was strong evidence of the past
presence of mines, with discoveries of mine fragments and
demolition craters.106

Table 4: Mine clearance by operator in 2018*107
Operator

Province

District

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

NPA

GBAO

Darvos

1

22,622

11

2

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

1

12,522

214

29

MoD

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

1

8,210

488

0

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

1

20,143

2

5

Khatlon

Khovaling

1

12,699

0

0

Khatlon

Khovaling

1

54,658

7

0

GBAO

Darvos

1

16,270

64

0

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

1

423,439

4,210

100

Khatlon

Sh. Shohin

1

22,650

2

0

9

593,213

4,998

136

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel
* Clearance includes suspended area not yet completed as at end 2018.
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TAJIKISTAN

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TAJIKISTAN: 1 APRIL 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2010
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5-YEAR, 9-MONTH EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with
the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2009),
Tajikistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020. Tajikistan
will not meet this deadline and has requested a second
extension of its Article 5 deadline to 31 December 2025.
However, Tajikistan’s extension request is very optimistic
and calculated on the assumption of substantially increased
capacity (ﬁve additional MoD teams and two additional NPA
teams), for which Tajikistan has yet to secure funding, but
which are planned to be operational from 2020. Based on
current capacity and land release output, Tajikistan is not on
track to complete Article 5 clearance obligations by the end
of 2025, and may even be hard pushed to complete by 2030.
Tajikistan has faced a number of challenges in Article 5
implementation, including a reduction in demining capacity;
insecurity along its border with Afghanistan and lack of
permission to conduct demining in some of the Western
districts; inaccessibility and/or operational difﬁculty of some
mined areas; and the very poor quality of some mineﬁeld
records, mostly from the civil war in the Central Region.108 In
addition, since its ﬁrst extension request in 2009, Tajikistan
identiﬁed 107 previously unrecorded and unsurveyed SHAs,
which also set it behind target.
Tajikistan’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request includes
plans to address the SHAs and CHAs in the provinces of
Khatlon and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region
(GBAO) along the Afghan border and in the Central Region,
but not the 3.25km2 of SHA on the Uzbek border which
Tajikistan says will be addressed only once a political
agreement has been made.109 As at July 2019, the Tajik MoFA
was in negotiation with the Uzbek MoFA regarding survey of
the Tajik-Uzbek border.110
The annual land release milestones in Tajikistan’s Article
5 extension request are 1,388,819m2 (2020), 1,218,722m2
(2021), 1,284,655m2 (2022), 1,277,666m2 (2023), 1,138,919m2
(2024) and 1,170,000m2 (2025). However, Tajikistan needs
an additional US$12.4 million in total, to enable it to double
capacity in order to reach these targets and complete by the
end of 2025.111
TNMAC plans to hold strategy workshops in 2019, convening
relevant mine action stakeholders together to develop a
workplan for implementation of the 2020–25 extension
request period, including resource mobilisation.112
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In total during the last ﬁve years, Tajikistan has cleared
just over 2.6km2 of mined area (see Table 3). Progress
was hampered in 2015 and 2016 due to restricted access
for clearance in the Afghanistan border region because
of heightened security.113 In a very positive development,
clearance was permitted in parts of the Tajik-Afghan
border in 2017 and continued in 2018, including Shamsiddin
Shohin district, which is one of the most mined districts
in Tajikistan.114
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
(2014–18)115
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.59

2017

0.62

2016

0.50

2015

0.25

2014

0.65

Total

2.61

Tajikistan had expected to release 30 mineﬁelds) in 2018
(26 in Khatlon district, 3 in GBAO, and 1 in the Central Region,
totalling over 1.9km2;116 an estimate which it subsequently
reduced to 1.5km2 across 20 mineﬁelds,117 but Tajikistan’s
actual clearance output in 2018 was less than half this
estimated output.
Tajikistan’s baseline of remaining anti-personnel mine
contamination is not yet an accurate assessment, which
makes elaboration of accurate clearance projections and
timelines for Article 5 completion difﬁcult. TNMAC estimates
that it will complete survey of the 41 unsurveyed mineﬁeld
records by 2023.118 Many of these unsurveyed mineﬁelds
are extremely hard to access, with UST’s survey teams
sometimes having to walk for more than three hours each
way in mountainous terrain, to access the survey area,
leaving only a few hours each day for survey activities.119
Some mountainous areas only permit 40 operational days
per year.120

STATES PARTIES

TAJIKISTAN

In addition to challenges posed by the remoteness and
challenging terrain of the mined areas and the short demining
window in some regions, the volatility of the security
situation on the Afghan Border is also a potential challenge.121
Tajikistan’s 2019 extension request tacitly assumes that all
districts along the Tajik-Afghan border will be accessible,
from the perspective of security, for clearance. To date, this
has not been the case for many of the heavily mined western
districts of the Tajik-Afghan border. Access to these mined
areas is a prerequisite for Tajikistan’s Article 5 completion.
In May 2019, during the APMBC intersessional meetings,
Tajikistan convened an “Individualised Approach Platform”
meeting, with support from the Implementation Support
Unity (ISU). The meetings allowed TNMAC to outline its
current work and to present the challenges and opportunities
faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations.122
Tajikistan has reported that it requires continued
international assistance to increase demining capacity and
fulﬁl its Article 5 obligations, including the need to modernise
the capacity of its mine clearance teams.123 Tajikistan requires
a total of US$36 million to fulﬁl its Article 5 obligations up to
2025.124 Without this funding, Tajikistan will not meet the 2025
Maputo aspiration for completion of mine clearance.
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 OCTOBER 2023
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

35

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

(ESTIMATED)

30

20KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

0.53KM 7,413
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

HEAVY,

2017
2018

28.97
26.8

25

20

15

10

5

2.27

(including 21 destroyed
during spot tasks)

0.43

0.53

Clearance

3.75

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Thailand’s mine action programme continues to improve.
Although land release output only rose by almost 0.8km2
from 2017 to 2018, Thailand expected to reach its target of
120km2 for 2019. While this target is ambitious, improvements
to land release methodology, along with increased survey
capacity and the mine action budget, means that, as at July
2019, Thailand was on track to meet this ﬁgure for the year.

The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) is working to
resolve challenges in staff and skill retention and to sustain
the necessary national funding needed for extra capacity
and equipment. Access to mined areas subject to successful
border demarcation remains an issue and Thailand will not be
able to meet its clearance deadlines without resolving this.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Thailand should report anti-personnel mine contamination classiﬁed into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
and conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

■

Thailand should agree a task with Cambodia to complete its pilot border clearance project by the end of 2019.

■

Thailand should elaborate a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Thailand is currently conducting non-technical survey on all suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs), which is due to be concluded by October 2020 and expects actual anti-personnel
mine contamination to be around 90km2.

7

Rotation of personnel and limited funding have been challenges for TMAC. In 2018, staff
stayed in post providing continuity while plans are put in place to resolve stafﬁng issues.
The budget for 2018 was much lower than foreseen in the 2017 extension request, but
there was a marked increase in the budget for 2019.

4

While TMAC has had a female chief of unit in the past, much more could be done
to achieve gender parity within the organisation. Women are mainly employed in
administrative roles within TMAC and due to military regulations cannot work in the
demining teams. However, this policy does not apply to civilian operators.

7

TMAC made improvements to its information management in 2018 with the introduction
of the Arc GIS Online, which will allow demining units to submit information online and
TMAC to verify progress and make corrections.

8

Thailand met its land release targets for 2018 as set out in the plan for 2017–23 in its
2017 extension request. As at April 2019, this plan had been replaced by the “Five-Year
Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 2023”. Thailand was on
track as of writing to meet its targets for 2019.

8

TMAC revised two national standards in 2018 – on worksite planning and cancellation
of SHAs – in support of its move towards a comprehensive toolbox of land release
methodologies. Thailand is increasing non-technical survey capacity to focus on
cancelling much of the overestimated SHAs in its database.

7

Land release output was on a par with 2017 with a dramatic rise in output expected in
2019. Thailand’s land release targets are ambitious and will require sustained funding,
extra capacity and border demarcation where there are mined areas.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

7

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
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(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

7.0

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC)
Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU) 1-4 and HTMAC
Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA)
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■

None
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As at December 2018, Thailand estimated that it had 360km2
of outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination in 254
SHAs across ten provinces, a reduction of 31km2 from 2017
(see Table 1). In 2018, 0.94km2 of additional anti-personnel
mined area was discovered in Sa Kaeo, Trat, Surin and Yala.1
Since 2016, TMAC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
have been working on a pilot project re-surveying the
overestimated SHAs. Taking into account the results of the
pilot project, TMAC has forecasted that up to 80% of existing
SHAs can be cancelled or reduced through survey so will be
focusing their efforts in 2019–20 on cancelling land through
non-technical survey before moving on to technical survey
and full clearance in 2021–23. 2 NPA estimates that actual
contamination is at 10–15% of the total. 3 In its “Five-Year
Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October
2023” (hereafter, Five-Year Plan), Thailand projected that
of the outstanding 360km2 of contamination, 269km2 will be
cancelled through non-technical survey and nearly 91km2 of
CHA will remain for technical survey and clearance. 4

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province
(at end 2018) 6
SHAs

Area (m2)

4

25,615,188

Region

Province

North

Chiang Mai

1

28,530,520

North-east

Ubon Ratchathani

58

101,227,784

Si Sa Ket

43

73,383,526

Surin

26

27,299,749

Buri-Ram

15

19,483,928

Sa Kaeo

20

7,696,798

Phitsanulok

East

South
Totals

Chanthaburi

21

3,936,224

Trat

65

69,654,131

1

3,173,520

254

360,001,368

Chumphon

Thailand is affected by mines as well as by explosive
remnants of war (ERW), the result of conﬂicts on its borders
with Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao
PDR), Malaysia, and Myanmar. The majority of outstanding
contamination is located in seven eastern and north-eastern
provinces bordering Cambodia, with the rest in Chiang Mai
and Chumphon, bordering Myanmar, and in Pitsanuloke, on
the border with Lao PDR. 5

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Thailand created the National Committee for Humanitarian
Mine Action (NMAC) in 2000, chaired by the prime minister
and with responsibility for overseeing the national mine
action programme. Since 2008, NMAC did not convene until
it was reconstituted in May 2017, still with the prime minister
as chairman. The engagement of national leadership in
the Committee was seen as important in facilitating policy
direction and progress on issues affecting national security,
notably regarding cooperation with neighbouring countries
on clearing border areas.7
NMAC is currently tasked with creating policy guidance and
mobilising resources from all sectors to support mine action
to be able to complete clearance in the allotted timeframe. 8 In
reality, however, NMAC has no operational or strategic power
and is purely procedural.9
TMAC was established in 1999 under the Royal Thai Armed
Forces Headquarters to coordinate, monitor, and conduct
mine/ERW survey and clearance, risk education, and victim
assistance throughout Thailand.10 While the roles and
responsibilities within the sector are clear and coherent
TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and, as a
military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel at
all levels.11 Lieutenant-General Sittipol Nimnuan took over
as TMAC’s director in October 2017, the eleventh director
since TMAC was created in 2000 and the seventh in the last
eight years. In order to maintain continuity, TMAC has made
a request with the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters
that personnel working within TMAC remain in post for at
least two years rather than be rotated out on an annual
basis. TMAC also requested that personnel working in the
Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAUs) either have the

required training and qualiﬁcations before they assume the
role or that personnel remain in post for no less than two
years. TMAC aims to have a 60:40 ratio of old personnel to
new for the purposes of continuity and to retain knowledge.12
While the roles and responsibilities within TMAC are clear
and coherent there have been some challenges with the
command structure of the HMAUs. With the exception
of one of the HMAUs, HTMAC, personnel come from the
Division-Level Force of the Royal Thai Army and the Royal
Thai Navy which means that they report to both TMAC and
their respective divisions.13 TMAC has worked to educate the
HMAUs, high ranking generals, and the Supreme Commander
on the importance of mine action.14
Thailand and TMAC are said to be very accommodating to
operators. They have given their full support to ensure that
NPA has the required approvals and ofﬁcial documents
necessary to operate. However, strong and strict regulations
on who can handle explosives in Thailand together with
restrictive rules and deﬁnitions on most demining equipment
being regarded as military equipment hampers the possibility
for civilian entities to become clearance operators.15
In 2018, TMAC received a budget of about THB70 million a
year (approx. US$2.1 million), much lower than the THB177
million (approx. US$5.8 million) budgeted in Thailand’s
2017 Article 5 deadline extension request.16 In 2019, TMAC’s
budget was greatly increased to THB248 million (approx. $7.5
million) and TMAC stated in its Five-Year Plan that for the
“foreseeable future” budget will not be a problem.17 TMAC will
also be seeking additional funds to procure new equipment
and repair of existing equipment, amounting to THB23 million
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(approx. $746,000) through to 2022.18 In September 2019,
TMAC was due to ﬁnalise the budget for October 2019 to
October 2021 and was planning to request funds for more
personnel and equipment. This budget will be determined
by need and will be adjusted dependent on results of the
re-survey.19

Thailand indicated in both its 2017 extension request and
its Five-Year Plan that it would welcome international
assistance for capacity building and support for survey,
equipment, technical capacity, and the development of
new technologies. 20

GENDER
TMAC has stated that it will attempt to diversify where
applicable as the male and female ratio is dependent on who
volunteers for assignment to TMAC. In 2018, 27.5% of staff
at TMAC were women, though they were mainly occupying
administrative positions. In the past, women have been in
leadership positions, with one woman acting as Chief of
Special Affairs in 2012–13, and three women assuming head
of section positions for mine risk education, victim assistance,
and training at various points. 21 There are no women working
within the HMAUs as the Thai military does not allow women
to perform combat duties and the roles are restricted to
combat personnel. 22
During non-technical survey, the Thai Civilian Deminer
Association (TDA) speaks to both men and women and
employs both male and female local informants as part

of its teams. There is equal access to employment for
qualiﬁed women and men in TDA survey and clearance
teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions.
Currently, women make up 15% of operational roles, which
was due to increase to 30% in 2019. Approximately 55% of
managerial level/supervisory positions are held by women. 23
NPA has an organisational gender and diversity policy and
all NPA survey teams are gender balanced. NPA encourages
TMAC and the HMAUs to become gender balanced. When
NPA conducts non-technical survey or community liaison
activities, all local people are invited to participate, including
women and children. Of 11 operational staff, 4 are women
(36%), while three of ﬁve managers (60%) are women, as are
two of four supervisors (50%). 24

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TMAC established a data centre to process land release, risk
education, and quality management data. It manages the
central database using Excel and Geographic Information
System (GIS) mapping. This information supports TMAC
senior management in decision-making and operational
planning. 25 The ArcGIS Online is being used as part of a
support package provided by the Department of Survey of
the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The ArcGIS assists TMAC and
the HMAUs in data collection and dissemination, and mapping
of SHAs and CHAs. 26 HMAUs will start to submit information
to TMAC via an online system which allows for the veriﬁcation
of progress in the ﬁeld and rectiﬁcation of any issues. In 2018,
TMAC organised training on the newly established system for
20 HMAU staff. 27
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According to NPA and TDA, data in Thailand is accurate, up
to date, and reliable, with data in the national information
management system accessible to clearance organisations
and data collection forms that are consistent and enable the
collection of the necessary data. 28
Thailand submits timely and accurate Article 7 reports.
Thailand was requested by the Sixteenth Meeting of State
Parties to provide an updated workplan to the Committee
on Article 5 Implementation by 30 April 2019. 29 The Five-Year
Plan provides details on remaining challenges, outstanding
mine contamination, and prioritisation and land release
outputs for each area. 30 In previous years, Thailand had
issues disaggregating data but its latest Article 7 report
disaggregates survey and clearance data by province and
by non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
According to Thailand’s Five-Year Plan in the ﬁrst two years, from November 2018–October 2020, non-technical survey was
prioritised in all outstanding SHAs with the expected cancellation of more than 269km2. The second phase, from November
2020 to October 2023, will focus on technical survey and clearance of CHAs. It is expected that over 90km2 of land will be
cleared during this phase. Thailand is also operating under the assumption that the border demarcation issues will be
resolved through bilateral cooperation, allowing the HMAUs to access these areas. 31
Table 2: Planned land release from Five-Year Plan 2019−202332
Region
North

North-east

2019 (m2)

2020 (m2)

2021 (m2)

Pitsanulok

9,510,170

9,510,170

9,510,180

LF

LF

Chiang Mai

1,103,526

0

0

9,308,072

15,203,590

15,587,142

0

3,896,786

LF

LF

Province

Buri Ram
Surin

East

2023 (m2)

0

21,839,800

5,459,949

LF

LF

Si Sa Ket

39,495,981

19,210,841

0

14,676,704

LF

Ubon
Ratchathani

21,364,937

59,617,291

0

0

20,245,556

Chanthaburi

3,562,113

374,111

LF

LF

LF

Sa Kaeo

1,724,472

1,695,254

1,669,773

1,490,174

1,117,125

26,912,587

34,354,161

3,107,481

3,005,862

2,274,040

1,586,760

1,586,760

LF

LF

LF

120,847,688

148,188,388

23,644,169

28,480,812

38,840,311

Trat
South

2022 (m2)

Chumphon

Totals
LF = Landmine Free

In Thailand’s Second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in August 2017, the completion of clearance was split
into two phases, see Table 3. The ﬁrst phase was from January 2017 to November 2018, with planned release of 63.8km2 of
suspected contamination, leaving 358.8km2 to be tackled in the requested ﬁve-year extension period. 33 Thailand released
30.98km2 in 2017 (target 34.74km2) and 31.75km2 (target 29.05km2) in 2018, totalling 62.73km2 over the two-year period,
which was just over 1km2 short of the target. 34
Table 3: Extension request 2017−23: land release targets (km2) 35
2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

34.74

29.05

72.12

72.06

73.23

74.54

66.86

In 2019, according to the Five-Year Plan, TMAC planned
to release nearly 121km2 across 93 SHAs by focusing on
non-technical survey. 36 From 1 November 2018 to 30 April
2019, Thailand released nearly 72km2, of which just over
70.3km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, 1.5km2
was reduced through technical survey, and 39,080m2 was
cleared. 37 TMAC claimed to be on track to meet its 2019 land
release targets as of writing, citing improved understanding
of the land release methodology from the HMAUs, who have
adopted a more dynamic planning process, and increased
capacity from NPA and TDA. 38

Thailand is prioritising the north-eastern region, the most
heavily contaminated area of the country where 61% of SHAs
are located, but is also taking into account resource limitation
and access issues in certain areas. Thailand is prioritising
clearance according to the following ﬁve criteria (in order of
importance): development potential; the access needs of the
local community; proximity to the local population; terrain and
environmental challenges; and border and security concerns.39

mineactionreview.org 237

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
TMAC drafted its ﬁrst national mine action standards (NMAS)
with NPA’s support in 2010, formally adopting them in June
2012, the year Thailand adopted the land release process. 40
Since then, the NMAS have undergone revisions in 2015 and
2018 in support of Thailand’s shift towards using the full
toolbox of land release methodologies rather than solely
relying on technical survey and full clearance. 41 In 2018,
TMAC revised the NMAS on worksite planning and released
a new NMAS on the “Cancellation of SHAs by Evidence Based
Survey”, which has made it easier to cancel previously
inﬂated, largely uncontaminated SHAs. 42 TMAC personnel
have also been undergoing training on non-technical survey
to improve speed and efﬁciency. The initial results have
been promising with the release of three provinces in 2018:
Uttaradit bordering Lao PDR, Tak bordering Myanmar, and
Yala bordering Malaysia. 43
TMAC plans to revise its NMAS annually to keep them
up-to-date and compliant with international mine action
standards (IMAS) and in support of the Five-Year Plan. As at
April 2019, TMAC’s NMAS were undergoing major revisions
to ensure their functionality. 44 TMAC says it considers input
from operators and IMAS guidelines when revising the
NMAS, ensuring there is a proper consultation process with
input gathered at the beginning of every ﬁscal year (usually
late October to early November). 45 The standing operating
procedures (SoPs) will then be adjusted accordingly to
the NMAS. 46

OPERATORS
All clearance in Thailand is conducted by the military due
to regulations on who can handle explosives and operate
demining equipment. There are ﬁve HMAUs, supervised
by TMAC with personnel from the Royal Thai Army and
Royal Thai Navy, which carry out survey and clearance
operations. In addition, there is one national operator, TDA,
and an international operator, NPA, which carry out survey
in support of the HMAUs. 47 There may be changes to the
regulations in the coming years due to the complications and
related security concerns for military personnel entering
the border areas. Once the TMAC/Cambodian Mine Action
Centre (CMAC) border pilot project is completed, there is a
possibility that civilian deminers will take part in clearance
operations. 48 As at August 2019, TMAC is looking into easing
the regulations so that operators can conduct EOD. 49

In 2018, TMAC deployed 24 non-technical survey personnel
across 2 units, 104 technical survey personnel across 4 units,
22 clearance/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel
across 5 units, and 11 mine detection dogs (MDDs) and 22
handlers across 5 units. 50 In 2018, there was an increase in
the number of non-technical survey personnel compared
to 2017 as TMAC is building capacity in preparation for an
increase in non-technical survey operations in 2019 and
2020. A sharp increase in non-technical survey personnel
is expected in 2019. TMAC plans to make a request for more
armed forces personnel, who have already received the
relevant training, in order to complete the re-survey by
October 2020. 51 The numbers of technical survey personnel
were similar from 2017 to 2018, with a slight decrease is
expected in 2019. The number of clearance/EOD personnel
will remain the same from 2017 to 2019. 52
In 2018, TDA deployed 19 ﬁeld staff supporting HMAU 3 by
conducting non-technical and technical survey. There was no
change in capacity from 2017 but in 2019, due to an increase
in Japanese funding, the number of ﬁeld staff will increase
and TDA will focus on expanding its “SIMA”, its survey to
identify mined areas comprised of non-technical survey,
technical survey, and clearance of EOD spot tasks, which is
focusing on technical survey capacity. 53
NPA has supported TMAC operations since 2011, conducting
land release through non-technical and technical survey.
In 2018, NPA deployed 11 non-technical survey personnel
supporting HMAU 2 and 3. This was no change in capacity
from 2017, but in 2019 NPA was deploying one more
non-technical survey team, increasing from three teams
to four. One of these teams will support MDD operations
in 2019 before being deployed for technical survey. 54

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
All the HMAUs use MDDs during technical survey and
veriﬁcation. One of the HMAU units also uses a Medium
MineWolf and Mini MineWolf for clearance when conditions
permit. These machines have been lent to TMAC by the
Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program
of the United States Department of Defence. 55 In 2018, NPA
began to pilot the use of MDDs during technical survey with
initial results reported to be promising. 56 TDA is planning to
do research on bee mine detection. 57

DEMINER SAFETY
In 2018, in two separate incidents Cambodian soldiers
requested TMAC deminers and TDA personnel to cease
operations due to ongoing border demarcation, underscoring
the potential for delays in the progress of border clearance. 58
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THAILAND

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Thailand released a total of almost 31.8km2 in 2018, of which 0.5km2 was cleared, nearly 2.3km2 was reduced through
technical survey and almost 29km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.
In addition, 94,296m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination was found and added to the database
in 2018. 59

SURVEY IN 2018
A total of more than 31.2km2 was released through survey in
2018 a slight increase from the 30.5km2 released in 2017.

Table 4: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 201864

In 2018, almost 29km2 was cancelled through non-technical
survey, an 8% increase from the 26.8km2 cancelled in 2017
(see Table 4). TMAC’s focus on non-technical survey began in
November 2018, so a much greater increase in non-technical
survey output was expected for 2019. 60 The increase in
non-technical survey output for NPA in 2018 is attributed
to NPA teams gaining experience and an improved working
relationship between NPA and HMAUs 2 and 3 in the areas of
NPA operations. 61 TDA reported that its non-technical survey
outputs were signiﬁcantly greater in 2018 than 2017. 62

Province

Operator

Tak

HMAU 4

366,772

Uttaradit

HMAU 4

3,345,061

Si Sa Ket

NPA+HMAU 3

Ubon Ratchathani

HMAU 3

In 2018, nearly 2.27km2 was reduced through technical
survey, a 39% decrease from the 3.75km2 reduced in 2017.
TMAC attributed this to the shift in focus away from technical
survey and towards non-technical survey. 63 Minimal technical
survey output was expected for 2019.

Area cancelled (m²)

10,416,942
1,646,971

Surin

TDA+HMAU 3

Sa Kaeo

HMAU 1

1,328,000

773,681

Trat

HMAU 2

2,225,983

Trat

NPA+HMAU2

8,278,069

Yala

HTMAC

590,275

Total

28,971,754

Table 5: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 201865
Province

Area reduced (m2)

Operator

Si Sa Ket

HMAU 3

274,426

Ubon Ratchathani

HMAU 3

910,810

Surin

TDA+HMAU 3

839,266

Sa Kaeo

HMAU 1

181,618

Trat

HMAU 2

59,190

Total

2,265,310

CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of 0.5km2 was cleared by four HMAU units in 2018. 66 This is a small increase from the 0.4km2 cleared in 2017.
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201867
Province

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Si Sa Ket

HMAU 3

4

54,986

567

0

51

Ubon Ratchathani

HMAU 3

5

169,740

2,791

681

92

Surin

HMAU 3

2

283,487

3,717

228

66

Sa Kaeo

HMAU 1

4

3,552

137

0

0

Trat

HMAU 2

2

17,137

180

0

29

17

528,902

7,392

909

238

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

In 2018, three HMAU units destroyed 21 anti-personnel mines and 139 items of UXO during EOD spot tasks. 68
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THAILAND: 1 MAY 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (9-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 NOVEMBER 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 OCTOBER 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

528,902

2017

427,983

2016

394,238

2015

2,047,662

69

2014

228,911

Total

3,627,696

Thailand has made signiﬁcant improvements to its mine
action programme since the 2014 Maputo Review Conference
moving away from an over reliance on clearance to the use
of the full range of land release methodologies demonstrated
in its Five-Year Plan. Thailand plans to cancel more than
269km2 through non-technical survey from November 2018
to October 2020 before moving on to technical survey and
clearance of the remaining 90km2 over the following three
years. While this is a positive step these land release targets
are ambitious. In 2014–18, cancellation through non-technical
survey totalled 129km2, while reduction through technical
survey released a further 18.3km2. During the same period,
clearance released only 3.6km2. Land release therefore
averaged just 31.5km2 per year. NPA and TDA both believe
that ﬁve years to complete clearance is too ambitious as
Thailand will not only need more resources but will have
to resolve the border demarcation issues which currently
prevent access to certain mined areas.70
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Thailand was on track as of writing to meet its land release
targets for 2019 but has set itself an even bigger target for
2020 and will need to further enhance the capacity of the
HMAUs and operators. To achieve this TMAC, has identiﬁed
areas for improvement, such as by increasing the number of
survey teams and improving skills through training; obtaining
the necessary demining equipment including exploring
new technologies for survey and clearance; and increasing
cooperation with neighbouring countries.71 For 2021 to 2023,
TMAC has planned to release on average 30km2 of mined
area per year through technical survey and clearance, which
will be a huge increase from its current output. In 2018, TMAC
released just 2.8km2 through technical survey and clearance.
The high proportion of remaining contamination located in
border areas that are the subject of decades-old demarcation
disputes or which are difﬁcult to access due to insecurity
is a major challenge for Thailand.72 Areas to be demarcated
(ADs) have been divided into two categories: areas that can
be accessed immediately and more complicated areas where
access will need to be negotiated. In border areas with Lao
PDR, 96% of the land boundary has been demarcated and
there are no security concerns, while the border areas with
Cambodia are still subject to the demarcation process.73
Improved relations between Thailand and Cambodia have
opened the way for increased contacts with Cambodia
on border cooperation. The Thailand–Cambodia General
Border Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Defence from both countries, has agreed that
TMAC and CMAC can cooperate to conduct demining along
the Thai-Cambodian border.74 In September 2018, TMAC and
CMAC met and agreed to ﬁnd a task for a pilot project, a small
area that could be cleared within a month as a symbolic
demonstration of two sides working together. As at April
2019, the task had yet to be decided but TMAC hoped to
complete the pilot project by the end of the year.75
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Turkey’s mine action programme continued to make progress in 2018, releasing signiﬁcantly more mined area than in previous
years. This included demining on its Eastern border with Iran as part of the European Union (EU) Eastern Border Mine Clearance
Project, managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); survey and clearance by Turkish armed forces
demining personnel on the Syrian border, in support of the project to build a Border Security Surveillance System; and clearance
of a former military base in the non-border region.
The Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) continued to strengthen its structure and capacity during the year, through recruitment
and training of personnel, and enhanced coordination with other state institutions. It received support for capacity building from
UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). An Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) database, created during 2017, became operational at the start of the 2018 demining season.
Turkey continued to expand its national military demining capacity in 2018 with approval being granted for ﬁve armed forces
demining companies.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

TURMAC should approve and publish its national strategic mine action plan for 2019–21 as soon as possible.

■

Turkey should move forward, without delay, to expand survey and clearance of its non-border areas;
continue and expand systematic survey and clearance on the Syria border; and start survey and clearance
of its south-eastern/Iraqi border.

■

TURMAC should provide additional details of ongoing survey of eastern border areas, as well as conﬁrming
how and when it will address the huge contamination in this region that is not speciﬁed in the workplan it
included in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2015.

■

Turkey should comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by including all victim-activated
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the deﬁnition of an anti-personnel mine in its clearance under
Article 5 of the APMBC and its reporting under Article 7.
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Turkey should minimise the turnover of personnel at senior management level within TURMAC.

■

Turkey should report on any survey or clearance of mined areas under its control in Northern Cyprus, or
planned land release, in order to meet all of its APMBC Article 5 obligations.

■

Turkey should heed the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s renewed call for access to all remaining mined
areas inside and outside the buffer zone on Cyprus.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Performance Commentary

6

Turkey has a good understanding of the extent of CHA contamination, and the number of
mines contained in the CHAs, but it has yet to qualify the amount of SHA contamination.

6

TURMAC, which is entirely nationally funded, is now fully operational, with ongoing
capacity development support from UNDP and the GICHD. However, TURMAC reports
solely to the Ministry of Defence and suffers from a high level of turnaround in senior
level positions, including the directorship.

4

TURMAC is making efforts to take gender considerations into account in its mine action
programme, including having mixed community and survey teams. However, while
women make up 40% of TURMAC non-operations staff, regulations of the armed forces
prevent women from serving in military demining units. Civilian operators are, however,
encouraged to deploy female personnel.

7

IMSMA, which become operational in Turkey from the start of the 2018 demining season,
is being used by both military demining teams and for Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine
Clearance Project. Turkey submits comprehensive, accurate, and timely annual Article 7
transparency reports.

5

TURMAC has yet to adopt and make public the draft national strategic mine action plan
for 2019–21. The workplan published by Turkey in 2015 only includes plans for a relatively
small proportion of Turkey’s overall mined area.

7

With support from UNDP and the GICHD, Turkey elaborated national mine action
standards, which were issued in 2019.

7

Turkey increased its clearance output in 2018, and also cancelled a signiﬁcant amount of
mined area on the Syrian border. Furthermore, Turkey approved expansion of its armed
forces demining units in 2018, to become fully operational in 2019.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.2

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Ministry of Defence
Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Denel MECHEM
RPS-Explosive Engineering Services
(QA and QC of the EU project)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Altay (national sub-contractor under MECHEM)

OTHER ACTORS

■

Turkish Armed Forces

■
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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■

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Turkey is contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, as well as command-detonated IEDs. There is more than
157km2 of conﬁrmed mined area across 3,020 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as summarised in Table 1. A further 701
areas are suspected to be mined, but the area they cover and the number of mines that may lie within them remain to be
qualiﬁed,1 therefore the total contaminated area is likely to be larger, but according to Turkey not signiﬁcantly so. 2
This is a reduction in the size of baseline contamination compared to the end of 2017, when more than 164km2 of mine
contamination was reported across 3,061 CHAs, 3 the result of land release in 2018. The suspected mined area at the end
of 2018 was unchanged from a year earlier.
According to TURMAC, the suspected mined areas are “relatively small”, their location and perimeters are mostly known,
and some of them are believed to be mapping duplications or mistakes. TURMAC is planning to conduct non-technical survey
of all mined areas in 2020, with a budget of €2.1 million. 4
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

AP mines
in CHAs

AV mines
in CHAs

SHAs

Area (m2)

Syrian border

1,294

133,970,046

412,027

194,635

84

N/K

Iraqi border

596

2,862,835

79,017

0

373

N/K

Iranian border*

423

16,566,718

150,714

0

38

N/K

42

1,097,077

20,275

0

0

0

Armenian border
Non-border areas
Totals

665

2,830,422

34,410

0

206

N/K

3,020

157,327,098

696,443

194,635

701

N/K

SHA = Suspected hazardous area AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle N/K = Not known
* A section of mined area also intersects with the Azerbaijan border.

The great majority of anti-personnel mines in Turkey are
found along its borders. The mines were laid in 1955–59 all
along the border with Syria, as well as on some sections
of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–95, 5 and
also with Azerbaijan. 6 According to Turkey, its western
borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with
Georgia, are mine-free.7 Mines were also laid around military
installations within the country. 8

The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well
as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according
to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist
activities and the presence of unconﬁrmed mined areas.
In addition, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border
than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as
a result of wildﬁres.11

Government forces emplaced landmines around military
bases during the 1984–99 conﬂict with the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the
south-east of the country. According to Turkey, these mines
were marked, fenced, and have been progressively cleared
since 1998.9 In addition to mines laid by Turkish security
forces, non-state armed groups have also emplaced mines
and IEDs, rendering clearance more challenging.10

NORTHERN CYPRUS
Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March
2014. In 2013, states parties granted Turkey an eight-year
extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in
Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for
clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus12
(see the report on Cyprus in this work for further
information). This puts into question its compliance with
Article 5 of the APMBC.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action
Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January 2015,
entering into force on 3 February 2015. The law deﬁnes the
modalities and identiﬁes the functions, jurisdictions, and
responsibilities of the NMAC, which has responsibility for
the clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO)
to humanitarian standards in Turkey.13 The law entitles the
Turkish mine action centre (now known as TURMAC), which
was established under the Ministry of National Defence, to
elaborate policies for clearance; to plan and steer related
activities and monitor their implementation; and to carry out
the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic
and foreign institutions.14
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TURMAC was established on 3 February 2015,15 with a
director appointed in August of that year.16 The director
of TURMAC reports directly to the Undersecretary of the
Ministry of National Defence.17
TURMAC is now fully operational but there has been a high
level of turnaround in senior level positions, including the
directorship, which negatively affects the management of the
national mine action programme. Colonel Mehmet Zeki Eren
was appointed as the Director of TURMAC in June 2018, but left
his post in November after being appointed to a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. Colonel Mesut Ekren,
Chief of TURMAC’s Quality Management Department, served
as acting Director,18 and in July 2019 a new Director, Colonel
Yıldırım Özerkan, was appointed by presidential decree.19

STATES PARTIES

TURMAC is entirely funded by national funding, 24 as are the
Turkish Armed Forces demining units. 25 Turkey reported
investing around 50 million Turkish Lira (approx. US$8.6
million) to procure new equipment to establish additional
demining companies, and pledged that support for personnel,
training, deployment, maintenance of equipment and other
costs will be increased. 26
In addition, Turkey reported providing some €10 million
(approx. US$11.4 million) to the Eastern Borders Mine
Clearance Project, which is implemented by UNDP and funded
by the EU and the UN. 27

GENDER
According to TURMAC, the importance of gender diversity
is included in Turkey’s (draft) national mine action strategy
while its national standards closely follow the international
mine action standards (IMAS) on gender. Survey and
community liaison teams include female personnel to
facilitate access and participation by all groups, including
women and children. Gender is not, however, taken into
consideration in strategic planning and prioritisation.28

Women are reported to have equal access to survey and
QA/QC positions and make up 40% of TURMAC personnel
in non-operations positions, including holding the position
of department chiefs within TURMAC. However, due to the
regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces, no women are in
the military demining units. However, civilian contractors
are encouraged and advised to deploy female personnel. 29

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since TURMAC’s establishment in 2015, UNDP and the GICHD
have supported it to establish a functioning information
management (IM) system, IMSMA. 30 IMSMA was established
in 201731 and has been fully operational since the beginning of
the demining season in 2018. Personnel from both TURMAC
and the military have been trained on IMSMA, and it has been
used by the military demining teams and in Phase 2 of the
Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project since the beginning
of 2018. 32

Prior to the creation of the IMSMA database, UNDP
maintained a project database to record all operational
data related to Phase 1 of the Eastern Border Mine
Clearance Project. 33
Turkey has been submitting comprehensive, accurate, and
timely annual Article 7 transparency reports.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Turkey has still to publish a national mine action strategy,
despite national authorities assertions for several years that
a multi-year strategic mine action plan had been drafted and
was expected to be adopted shortly. 34 Signiﬁcant changes
in governmental regulations, legislation, processes, and
structures in Turkey have delayed approval of the draft
national strategic mine action plan for 2019–21, which as at
July 2019 was waiting approval by the MoD. 35 The three-year
plan reportedly covers national capacity development, survey
and clearance of mined areas, the provision of mine risk
education, and assistance to mine victims. 36

To date, prioritisation of clearance appears to have been
inﬂuenced more by where permission is granted for
operations and for which funding can be secured than by
humanitarian impact. For example, areas currently being
cleared as part of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance
Project will remain as restricted areas (due to their location)
even after completion of mine clearance. TURMAC has
claimed that survey and clearance for the EU Eastern Border
Project, are conducted geographically from north to south
in order to improve cost, time, and labour efﬁciency; but that
clearance of other areas was prioritised according to impact. 39

There is a workplan in place for 2019. MECHEM are planned
to clear around 0.5km2, under the Eastern Border Mine
Clearance Project. 37 The military demining teams task plan
was as follows:

According to the draft national mine action plan, demining is
prioritised according to: 40

■
■
■
■
■
■

Doğubeyazıt (Eastern Border) 4 teams (gendarmerie)
Ardahan Göle (non border) 2 teams
Syrian Border in Hatay (8 teams) Kilis (4 teams)
Hakkari (4 teams
Diyarbakır (2 teams)
Şırnak (2 teams).38

■

National political priorities
Border management system
Socio-economic projects
Requests from citizens

■

Non-border areas and military heavy weapons ranges.

■
■
■
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TURMAC’s capacity-development efforts are being
implemented in partnership with UNDP and the GICHD, as
well as national partners. 20 A needs assessment by UNDP and
the GICHD in October 2016 highlighted several capacity gaps
in TURMAC. 21 Responding to the ﬁndings of the assessment,
Turkey subsequently claimed signiﬁcant progress in
improving the structure of TURMAC, taking steps to better
coordinate with other state institutions, and conducting
recruitment of qualiﬁed personnel and intensive training to
strengthen capacity. 22 TURMAC organised various trainings
in 2018 to improve the capacity of its own personnel and that
of the Military Demining Unit. 23

SYRIAN BORDER
Mined areas of the Syrian border are estimated to account
for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining
mined area in the country. Ofﬁcials observed it is also the
easiest border to clear because the terrain is ﬂat and there
has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors
such as land erosion. 41 Mineﬁelds in this region are clearly
mapped, marked, fenced, and reported to be well known to
the local population. 42
According to its 2013 Article 5 extension request, Turkey had
expected to complete clearance of mines along the Syria
border by the end of 2019, 43 but clearance efforts were delayed
due to the armed conﬂict in Syria. 44 However, construction
of the Border Security Surveillance System along Turkey’s
border with Syria, which was completed in June 2018, is

supposed to allow the demining of the Syrian border to begin. 45
During the construction of the Border Security Surveillance
System, which consists of a 837km-long modular concrete
wall and impoundment (supported by a fence), as well as
roads, and surveillance system, military demining teams were
deployed to clear mines to enable operations to proceed in
safety. 46 Demining efforts in support of the construction of
the surveillance system also included survey and clearance
of areas suspected or conﬁrmed to contain mines of an
improvised nature and other explosive devices deployed by
non-state armed groups. 47 Planned clearance on the Syrian
border (i.e. not part of clearance to support construction of the
Border Surveillance System), began in early 2018, focusing on
the provinces of Hatay and Kilis.48

EASTERN BORDERS
Turkey’s 2013 Article 5 extension request set out plans
for clearance of its eastern borders, beginning with the
Armenian border and continuing southwards to the borders
with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. 49 It was forecast that 13.5km2
would be cleared in Phase 1 of the project and 2.4km2 in
Phase 2, as part of an EU project envisaged to start by the
end of 2014. 50
The two-phase EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance project
is being carried out under the supervision of the Turkish
authorities in a joint project with UNDP. 51 Under the project,
UNDP is managing the demining and assuring quality while
also supporting capacity development of TURMAC. 52 The
demining tender for the project was awarded to Denel
MECHEM (MECHEM), as part of a consortium in which national
operators would be subcontracted by MECHEM. 53 Clearance
operations for Phase 1 of the project began in June 2016, and

were completed by the end of 2017. 54 A total of almost 3.3km2
of mined area was released (0.64km2 cleared, under 0.1km2
reduced, and almost 2.6km2 cancelled) with 25,667 mines
were destroyed in 2016 and 2017. 55 This was signiﬁcantly less
than the 13.5km2 that Turkey forecast would be cleared under
Phase 1 in its 2013 Article 5 extension request.
Phase 2 of the project commenced behind schedule in June
2018, due to serious organisational issues in MECHEM in South
Africa, which resulted in a change of senior management.
MECHEM Turkey had to wait for these changes in order to sign
the contract and start 2018 operations. In addition, personal
protective equipment visors had to be changed, which also
resulted in a delay to operations.56 A one-year extension to
the project was approved, with Phase 2 now expected to be
completed at the end of 2019.57

SOUTH-EASTERN/IRAQI BORDER
In 2017, Turkey had planned for survey of suspected mined
area in Sirnak Province (in parts of the province bordering
Iraq) in 2018 and of conﬁrmed mined area in this province
in 2019; and of suspected mined area in Hakkari Province
in 2019. 58 However, no mention of any survey in this region
was made in Turkey’s latest Article 7 transparency report
(for 2018). 59
Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totalling just over 2.86km2,
with the destruction of 79,017 anti-personnel mines, was

scheduled to start after Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine
Clearance Project is completed. 60
TURMAC reported that the Syrian border was prioritised
instead, to help the installation of the border management
system and to reduce the ﬂow of refugees through the border.
According to TURMAC, under the EU project, €2.1 million
will be allocated to non-technical survey across Turkey from
national budget in 2020. 61

NON-BORDER AREAS
Non-border areas account for less than 2% of all
contaminated areas in Turkey. In its 2013 Article 5 deadline
extension request, Turkey reported that partial clearance in
non-border areas would be conducted by the Turkish armed
forces until the establishment of an operational NMAA and
mine action centre and a subsequent tendering process. It
was expected that clearance would be conducted in 2015–22.
In 2015, Turkey estimated that all 873 mined areas in nonborder areas would be cleared by 2021, amounting to total
clearance of 3.1km2, with the destruction of 34,410 antipersonnel mines. 62
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In this region, Turkey prioritises mine clearance based on
areas used for military operations; areas with low or no risk
of terrorist threat; and areas where the local population may
beneﬁt from agriculture and livestock. 63
Due to ongoing capacity development efforts and
prioritisation of clearance for the construction of the wall and
customs area on the Syrian border, no clearance took place in
non-border areas in 2016 or 2017. 64 However, a small amount
of clearance was conducted in 2018 at a former military range
(see the “Land release output and Article 5 compliance”
section below for details).

STATES PARTIES

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
UNDP and the GICHD assisted TURMAC to formulate new national mine action standards based upon the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) and the provisional standards elaborated for the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project. 65
In April 2017, a set of national mine action standards were sent to the National Standards Institute of Turkey for approval. 66
In February 2019, 44 national mine action standards, including on land release policy, were issued. 67
As at July 2019, TURMAC’s SoPs had been completed and were available on its webpage. The SoPs of the military demining
units and MECHEM have been in use since 2017. 68

OPERATORS
In 2018, mine clearance operations in Turkey were conducted
by MECHEM, with Altay as a subcontractor, under the Eastern
Border Mine Clearance Project; and by the Turkish Armed
forces along the Syria border, to support construction of the
Border Security Surveillance System and at a military base in
a non-border area. 69
MECHEM, a South African company, was awarded the
tender for mine clearance under the EU Eastern Border
Mine Clearance Project.70 In 2018, MECHEM deployed 30
MDD teams, 11 clearance teams (approx. 100 deminers),
and 1 Minewolf machine for Phase 2 of the EU project.71
RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, a United Kingdombased company, was contracted for quality assurance (QA)
and quality control (QC).72 TURMAC also has oversight of
operations on site.73 During 2018 operations, all deminers
and team leaders of MECHEM and QA/QC personnel of RPS
Explosive Engineering Services, were Turkish nationals.74
In 2019, MECHEM was no longer sub-contracting to Altay, and
was instead employing Turkish nationals directly.75 As at July

2019, MECHEM was deploying 15 MDD teams, 6 clearance
teams (approx. 60 deminers), and 1 Minewolf machine.76
Military demining companies were accredited for manual
demining in 2017.77 Turkey is in the process of signiﬁcantly
expanding the number of military demining units, with
approval for ﬁve new demining companies granted in 2018.
Three of the ﬁve new demining companies (equivalent to
twelve 9-person demining teams) were established in June
2018 and have been accredited for manual demining.78 As at
July 2019, procurement of equipment had been completed
for two companies (eight demining teams), which were
accredited in 2019 and tasked to several locations. The
remaining companies were expected to become operational
in 2020.79
As at July 2019, a total of 26 military demining teams
operational: 20 from the army and 6 from the gendarmerie. 80
The quality management of military demining troops is
conducted by TURMAC personnel. 81

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Both MECHEM and Turkish army demining teams conduct mechanical as well as manual demining, and also use MDDs.

DEMINING SAFETY
There was one demining accident in October 2018, during which a Gendarmerie deminer suffered injuries to his hands whilst
removing a DM-11 anti-personnel mine. The incident was investigated and was found to be due to a mistake by the deminder,
while removing the detonator. Demining operators were informed about the issue and additional trainings were conducted. 82

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
According to its Article 7 report for 2018, more than 2km2 of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 22,220 antipersonnel mines. However, TURMAC subsequently advised Mine Action Review that the 2.08km2 reported as clearance in 2018
in its Article 7 report unintentionally included 35,168m2 reduced through technical survey and 864,316m2 cancelled through
non-technical survey. Therefore the correct clearance ﬁgure for 2018 is 1.18km2. 83
In addition, according to Turkey’s Article 7 report, a further 4.7km2 of mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey. 84
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

SURVEY IN 2018
Nearly 5.54km2 of mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey in 2018: 864,316m2 cancelled through non-technical
survey, but mistakenly reported as clearance (see above) and a further 4,672,000m2 on the Syrian Border. 85 This is seemingly
a decrease from the 7.5km2 reported cancelled through non-technical survey the previous year, though the ﬁgure for 2017
includes land released for 2016 as well as 2017. 86
Non-technical survey in 2018 was conducted by TURMAC in the Hatay Region of the Syrian border and revealed that suspected
areas had been used as agricultural land for many decades and the area had been free of mines. Consequently, approximately
4,672,000 m2 of land was cancelled. 87
As previously mentioned, TURMAC advised that the 2.08km2 reported as clearance in 2018 in Turkey’s Article 7 report, included
over 0.03km2 reduced through technical survey. This compared to 0.08km2 the previous year (which included land released for
both 2016 and 2017).

CLEARANCE IN 2018
In its Article 7 report for 2018, Turkey reported clearance of 2.1km2 of mined area: more than 1.4km2 on the eastern border
with Iran, almost 0.4km2 on the Syrian border, and almost 0.3km2 in non-border areas (see Table 2). 88 However, TURMAC
subsequently informed Mine Action Review that the 2.1km2 reported as cleared in its Article 7 report, mistakenly included
35,168m2 reduced through technical survey and 864,316m2 cancelled through non-technical survey, therefore putting correct
clearance for 2018 at 1,183,986m2. 89
Furthermore, there is under-reporting of the area cleared on the Syrian border, as no area/m2 value was attributed to
1,015 anti-personnel mines destroyed during armed forces clearance to support safe construction of the Border Security
Surveillance System. This is reportedly because TURMAC does not consider that this clearance has undergone quality control,
despite the fact the cleared land is largely built over as part of the construction.90
This is a signiﬁcant increase in clearance output compared to the 0.82km2 of mined area released through clearance the
previous year, especially given that the 0.82km2 reported in 2017 included clearance for both 2016 and 2017.91
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2018 92
Region

Operator

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Iran border

MECHEM

1,161,278

15,989

0

0

Army Demining Units

246,380

5,141

0

0

Syria border

Army Demining Units

398,385*

1,090

14

0

Non-border areas

Army Demining Units

277,427

0

0

665

2,083,470*

22,220

14

665

Totals

*TURMAC subsequently conﬁrmed to Mine Action Review that of the 2,083,470m2 reported as cleared in 2018, 35,168m2 was reduced through technical survey and
864,316m2 cancelled through non-technical survey. Furthermore, no square metre output (only the number of mines destroyed) is reported for clearance along the Syria
Border in support of the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System. The area reported on the Syria border is clearance in the Karkamiş and Elbeyli regions
on the border, during which 75 mines were found and destroyed. AV = Anti-vehicle

On the Iranian border, a total of 1,407,658m2 of mined area was
cleared in 2018, with the destruction of 21,130 anti-personnel
mines. Of this 1,161,278m2 was cleared under the contract with
MECHEM, with destruction of 15,989 anti-personnel mines.
This was part of Phase 2 of EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance
Project that began in June 2018. A further 246,380m2 was
cleared by military demining units of the gendarmerie in Iğdir
and Doğubeyazit provinces.93
On the Syrian border, a total of 1,090 anti-personnel mines
and 14 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in 2018, by
Turkish army demining units.94 Clearance along the border
was primarily as part of demining in support of the Border
Security Surveillance System, as well as four demining teams
that cleared 398,385m2 of mined area in the Karkamiş and
Elbeyli regions on the border, during which 75 mines were
found and destroyed,95 with the land handed to relevant
authorities for use as customs areas.96
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In non-border areas, 277,427m2 of mined area was cleared
by Turkish army demining units at a former military range
in Muş (Malazgirt) province and handed over to the relevant
authorities. During clearance, 665 items of UXO were found
and destroyed, but no anti-personnel mines.97
In addition, Military Engineer/Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) teams conducted counter-IED operations in non-border
areas within the scope of national security operations. A
number of IEDs emplaced by terrorist organisations were
found and destroyed, but are not reﬂected in Turkey’s
reporting under the APMBC.98 Turkey has not speciﬁed if, or
how many, of the IEDs destroyed, are victim-activated IEDs that
meet the deﬁnition of an anti-personnel mine and therefore fall
under Turkey’s APMBC Article 5 and 7 obligations.
No mine clearance was conducted in 2018 along Turkey’s
borders with Armenia or Iraq.99

STATES PARTIES

TURKEY

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TURKEY: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2013),
Turkey is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey will not
meet this deadline.
Turkey’s original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014 and
in March 2013 Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year
extension to its deadline until 2022 to complete clearance of
all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe
was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and
clearance activities on the ground.100 Turkey also revealed in
its 2013 extension request that since 1998 it had only cleared
a total of 1.15km2 of mined area, close to three-quarters of
which took place in one year (2011), with destruction of 760
anti-personnel mines and 974 anti-vehicle mines. In addition,
military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe
movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.101
Since the Third Review Conference in Maputo in 2014, Turkey
has made signiﬁcant progress in putting in place the systems
and processes required to implement Article 5. The adoption
in January 2015 of a mine action law, and the subsequent
establishment of TURMAC were very positive developments
and are central to Turkey’s national ownership of its mine
action programme. With capacity development support
from UNDP and the GICHD, TURMAC has made steady
process towards becoming fully operational and assuming
management and coordination of mine action in Turkey.
Initiating clearance along its eastern borders in June
2016, as part of the EU Project, funded by the EU (75% of
funding), Turkey (24%), and the UN (1%), was also a welcome
development.102 Phase 1 of the project was completed by the
end of 2017, and Phase 2, which commenced in June 2018,
was expected to be completed by the end of 2019. As at July
2019, Turkey reported that funding had been secured for
Phase 3 of the project, but the “procedures will continue”
until 2020. TURMAC reported that the EU will dedicate €18.5
million for clearance and Turkey will contribute €2.2 million
for non-technical survey.103 The non-technical survey planned
for 2020 will help give TURMAC a better idea of a predicted
date for completion.104
Completion of the Border Security Surveillance System along
all of Turkey’s border with Syria should allow survey and
clearance to ﬁnally take place all along the border. This is
signiﬁcant, as mined areas on the Syrian border, which are
mapped, account for two thirds of the mines and more than
85% of the remaining CHA in the country.
In the ﬁve-year period since 2014, Turkey has cleared
only some 3.2km2 of mined area, albeit with 2018 seeing a
signiﬁcant increase compared to previous years (see Table 3).

Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

1.18

2017

*0.82

2016

0.12

2015

0

2014

0.16

Total

2.28

*Also included previously unreported clearance output relating to 2016.

Challenges in Article 5 implementation, as identiﬁed
by TURMAC, include funding, difﬁcult terrain, weather
conditions limiting the demining window each year, and
challenges posed by the sensitive security situation in
certain provinces.105 By far the main obstacle, though, has
been lack of political will in Turkey to fulﬁl its international
legal obligations under the APMBC. Indeed, despite a marked
increase in clearance output in 2018, Turkey’s total mine
clearance to date still only amounts to a tiny fraction of its
overall mine contamination, and more than 15 years after
becoming a state party to the APMBC, Turkey has only made
marginal progress in addressing mine contamination. Based
on the current rate of clearance, Turkey will not complete
implementation of Article 5 by its deadline in 2022 and is
also not on track to complete by 2025, as per the APMBC
Maputo+15 political declaration.
That said, Turkey is planning commence systematic survey
and clearance of the Syrian border, and to dramatically
upscale non-technical survey. Turkey announced in May
2019 that it plans to conduct non-technical survey on 20km2
of mined area in 2019, which would represent a dramatic
increase in survey.106
Turkey’s updated workplan for Article 5 implementation,
submitted in March 2015, only included plans to address
a small portion (10%) of total mine contamination, and it is
unclear how and when the remaining contamination will be
addressed. It is therefore essential that TURMAC approves and
publishes the national strategic mine action plan for 2019–21,
without further delay, as this also reportedly includes plans
for survey of SHA and CHA in the south-eastern/Iraqi border,
the Syrian border, and non-border areas.107
Turkey should also report on plans for clearance of mined
areas under its control in Northern Cyprus, in order to meet
all of its APMBC Article 5 obligations.
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Ukraine sought and was granted a ﬁve-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5
deadline, bringing it back into compliance with the Convention. Reports continue that all parties to the conﬂict, including the
national government forces, continue to use anti-personnel mines. While some survey and clearance did take place in 2018,
the full extent of demining operations is not known as Ukraine has not reported with any detail. With the adoption of national
mine action legislation, Ukraine is in a position to establish a properly functioning mine action programme.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Ukraine should cease all use of landmines.

■

Ukraine should formally establish a national mine action authority and a functioning national mine action centre to
manage clearance of anti-personnel mines.

■

Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has
effective access.

■

Ukraine should elaborate a national strategic plan for mine action.

■

Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR) and
other explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised
database for planning purposes.

■

Ukraine should consult with mine action stakeholders and elaborate standardised national criteria for the
prioritisation of anti-personnel mine clearance.

■

Ukraine should establish a quality management system for demining operations.

■

Ukraine should elaborate a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action.

■

Ukraine should revise its recently adopted legislation, which imposes liability for released land directly on the
clearance operator for a period of 10 years, rather than on the national authorities that have taken the decision
to release it.
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Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Exact extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Ukraine is not known and while
some survey is being conducted it is not being systematically reported. Reports of new
anti-personnel mine use persist.

5

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to have organisational control of mine action
operations. The adoption of mine action legislation in late 2018 allows both a national
mine action authority and a national mine action centre to be set up. The Ukrainian
government and international donors are funding clearance of explosive remnants of
war (ERW) and mines.

2

Ukraine does not have a gender policy for mine action and does not report on whether
gender is mainstreamed within its programmes.

4

There are two mine action databases in Ukraine which a national mine action centre
should consolidate into a national mine action information system. An online map has
been published by the MoD with mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination.
Ukraine submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2018 but does not report
in a manner consistent with the international mine action standards (IMAS).

3

There is no national strategic plan for mine action or standardised criteria for prioritising
tasks in Ukraine. In May 2019, Ukraine submitted its annual action plan with a list of
planned activities.

5

National mine action standards were elaborated in 2018 but were still awaiting formal
adoption by the government as of July 2019. External quality management is being introduced
with the ﬁrst handover of cleared land by international operators taking place in 2019.

5

Ukraine is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline. The Ukrainian government does not
exercise effective control in all mined areas of the country, impeding access for demining.
Clearance is restricted in areas on the government side due to the ongoing conﬂict and
mines continue to be emplaced in zones of conﬂict.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE

Performance Commentary

3

(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.0

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre
Ministry of Defence (MoD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■

State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
Security Service
State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
State Border Service
Demining Team of Ukraine
Demining Solutions

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

The HALO Trust
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Not active in demining
in 2018
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) – Operations
suspended in 2019

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
Mine Action Sub-cluster chaired by United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP)
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UKRAINE

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mined area in Ukraine is not
known. The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed
to be inside the 15km buffer zone on either side of the Line
of Contact between the warring parties within the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, but access to this area for survey and
clearance operations is severely limited.1 In 2017, Ukraine
estimated, highly improbably, that total contamination
by mines and ERW could extend over 7,000km2. 2 The
Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) accepted that this is a
“rough” estimate. 3 In its statement at the May 2019 APMBC
Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine estimated, also improbably,
that more than 8% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have
been contaminated by anti-personnel mines. 4 Ukraine cannot
reliably estimate the overall extent of mine contamination
until surveys have been completed. 5
In its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report, covering
actions in 2018, Ukraine noted that technical survey had been
conducted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the
Popasnyansky district, Lugansk region and in the Slavic and
Volnovansky districts, Donetsk region but no anti-personnel
mines were found. Ukraine also reported that NGOs also
conducted non-technical survey in the Limansky district of
the Donetsk region. 6 Since The HALO Trust began operations
in Ukraine, it has conﬁrmed 6.6km2 as anti-personnel mined
area. In 2018, The HALO Trust identiﬁed 24 new mined
areas with a total surface area of 1.4km2.7 The Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project
Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) suggests that the national mine
action centre, due to be established in 2019, initially focus on
non-technical survey outside the 15km buffer zone in order to
better deﬁne the scale of the problem. Areas within the buffer
zone will continue to be under the jurisdiction of the MoD and
not within the direct remit of the national mine action centre. 8
Ukraine is contaminated by anti-personnel mines as a result
of the ongoing conﬂict which broke out in 2014. In the ﬁrst
half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian
government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the
Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Firm evidence exists
that mines have been used in the resultant armed conﬂicts,9
including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature
and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until
an effective cessation of hostilities. Prior to the current
conﬂicts, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination
of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy
ﬁghting between German and Soviet forces in the Second
World War, but also from combat in the First World War.

MoD engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the
mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the
location and extent of any mine threat is not known.
Ukraine is also contaminated with CMR, the extent of which
is not known, and by considerable quantities of other ERW
used during the current conﬂict (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Ukraine
for further information).

NEW CONTAMINATION
Over the last few years, the OSCE’s Special Monitoring
Mission (SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the
use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.10 A December
2017 report from the Ofﬁce of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16
August to 15 September 2017, stated that: “The parties to
the conﬂict continued the practice of placement of IEDs and
anti-personnel mines in populated areas and near objects
of civilian infrastructure.”11 In 2018, the OHCHR called on
all parties involved in hostilities to “cease the use of
victim-activated devices”.12
At the May 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine
claimed that it had not used, and is not planning to use,
anti-personnel mines since it acceded to the APMBC in June
2006 but accused Russia of having used anti-personnel
mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine these
mines have been planted by Russia-backed illegal armed
groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Russia has
also emplaced mines on the administrative border between
Crimea and the rest of Ukraine’s territory.13 Ukraine stated
that illegal armed groups had used different types of mines,
including those banned by the APMBC and which Ukraine
does not possess. The mines which Ukraine alleged have
been used by the opposition groups include PMN-1, PMN-2,
PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.14
In the past, Ukraine has reiterated that its armed forces
are authorised to use MON-series and OZM-72 mines only
in command-detonated mode (through electrical initiation),
which is not prohibited under the APMBC. According to
Ukraine, all mines planted in command-detonated mode are
recorded and secured, and access to the area is restricted.15
In 2019, Ukraine reported that there were six registered
cases of the use of PMN-2 mines, which had been supplied by
Russia to these illegal armed groups. Eight members of the
Ukrainian armed forces were wounded by these devices.16

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
All areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region,
including humanitarian demining operations, are currently
planned, coordinated, and controlled by the MoD.17 Several
other ministries are also involved in the sector, including
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which sits the State
Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU); the Security
Services; the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories
and Internally Displaced Persons; the State Special Transport
Services (STSS) of the MoD; the National Police; and the State
Border Service.18
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The MoD has organisational control of operations while
SESU is generally responsible for conducting clearance.
It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre”
in 2015 in Kiev. The centre’s remit includes coordination of
SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and
non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control (QC)
of SESU units, information management, and handover
of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as
risk education.19
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The HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group (DDG) reported
that they have actively participated in roundtables and public
hearings on mine action legislation, organised by the MoD,
the OSCE PCU, and the Verkhovna Rada (VR), the Ukrainian
Parliament, Defence and Security Committee. During these
meetings, The HALO Trust and DDG supported the adoption
of national legislation and shared best practices and lessons
learned from other countries. 21

Once the mine action law is fully implemented, this should
provide the mechanisms for government bodies to assist
operators with visas and importation of equipment: issues
that are currently handled by the operators themselves. 22 In
2018, The HALO Trust faced challenges, which it overcame,
importing armoured machinery that was classed as military
equipment and, as such, could not be imported by a civilian
organisation without the support of an executive branch
of government. 23
National funding is provided for clearance of mines and
ERW. 24 Ukraine also receives support from foreign partners
(OSCE and NATO) for demining equipment. 25
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) has been working with the OSCE PCU to help
foster mine action institutions, including legislation. 26 The
OSCE PCU, has received funding until October 2020 to
support Ukraine in establishing the NMAA and the NMAC
and adopting national standards (now that the mine action
legislation has been passed). 27 DDG is focusing on working
with SESU to equip, train, and support their survey and
clearance capacities as the mine action sector evolves and
national standards come into force. 28 In 2018, The HALO Trust
organised or facilitated training courses and workshops
for both state bodies and international operators in
non-technical survey, land release, quality management,
EOD, and geographic information systems (GIS). 29

GENDER
As at July 2019, no information had been provided on whether
there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan
for mine action in Ukraine.
DDG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation
plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women
and children, are consulted during survey and community
liaison activities. However, DDG acknowledges its survey and
community and liaison teams are not gender balanced, with
only 15% of operational roles being ﬁlled by women, although
38% of its managerial/supervisory positions are occupied
by women. 30

The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey
and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting
women for clearance roles in 2017, employing the ﬁrst female
deminers in Ukraine. As at May 2019, 15% of operational
survey and clearance staff were female while more than
half of managerial/supervisory staff were women. 31

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There are two functioning Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases, one managed by SESU
and the other by the MoD, which collects and analyses
contamination and land release data from national operators
and NGOs. 32 The databases are claimed to be complementary,
as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and
operational purpose. 33 It will be the task of NMAC to create
a central national IMSMA database. 34 An online map has
been published by the MoD, with technical support from
The HALO Trust, with areas of anti-personnel mine and UXO
contamination surveyed by DDG, FSD, The HALO Trust, and
a commercial company, Demining Solutions. 35

Ukraine submits Article 7 transparency reports in a timely
manner but does not report on its progress in a manner
consistent with the international mine action standards
(IMAS). According to its Article 7 obligation, Ukraine should
report on “the types and quantities of all anti-personnel
mines destroyed after … entry into force ... in accordance
with Articles 4 and 5” but no survey or clearance data was
provided in its latest Article 7 report. In 2018, Ukraine
ﬁnally submitted, and was granted, a ﬁve-year extension to
its APMBC Article 5 deadline. Prior to the submission of its
extension request, Ukraine had been in serious violation of
the APMBC by not submitting a request following the new
use of anti-personnel mines during the ongoing conﬂict.
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Ukraine’s national mine action legislation was adopted by
parliament on 6 December 2018 and signed into law by the
President on 22 January 2019. It establishes a framework
for humanitarian demining, divides responsibilities among
state institutions, and envisages the creation of a mine
action authority and mine action centre. Members of the
national mine action authority (NMAA) will be appointed
by the Cabinet of Ministers. A national mine action centre
(NMAC) will be responsible for survey and clearance outside
the contact line and buffer zone, and once staffed, will
prepare a strategic mine action plan. The MoD will maintain
responsibility for demining of the contact line and buffer
zone. According to the OSCE PCU, the NMAA and NMAC
would be in place by the end of 2019, following presidential
and parliamentary elections in September. 20

PLANNING AND TASKING
In May 2019, Ukraine submitted its “Annual Action Plan for
humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk and
Luhansk” for 2019, as requested by the APMBC Seventeenth
Meeting of States Parties. 36 Annually, the MoD produces an
operational plan for all operators, based on information
provided by national agencies and international operators
working in Ukraine. 37 Planned activities for 2019 included
development of information management systems for mine
action, the creation of an EOD call-out response, improvement
in quality management processes, as well as non-technical
survey, technical survey, and clearance of populated areas,
transport routes, and infrastructure. 38 In the plan, Ukraine
also stated that the MoD intends to publish information on its
website every six months that details newly identiﬁed SHAs,
the progress of demining activities and the handover
of cleared land. 39

Following a 2015 order from the Prime Minister of Ukraine,
the Department of Environmental Protection and Mine
Action developed a draft order for the Cabinet of Ministers
to approve the State Programme for Mine Action in Ukraine
for 2017–2021. However, this was put on hold pending the
approval and implementation of mine action legislation. As
at July 2019, there was no national strategic plan for mine
action in Ukraine.
There are currently no standardised criteria at national level
for task prioritisation. 40 Until the NMAC is established, all
tasking of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its
annual action plan. 41 Local government have been helping
the MoD prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria. 42

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards (NMAS) were ﬁnalised by the
MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from
key stakeholders. 43 The NMAS were published in April 2019
but, in accordance with the new mine action law, are awaiting
formal adoption by the government before they can become
operational. 44 In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved
Resolution 372 on “Regulations on marking mine and ERW
hazards”, which are said to follow the provisions in the IMAS. 45
In May 2018, the GICHD, at the request of the OSCE PCU,
aided a review of the national standards and also planned
in-country training on standards quality management, and
non-technical survey. These activities will be implemented in
2019–20, depending on the progress in establishing the NMAA
and NMAC, in accordance with the new law. GICHD will also
be working with Ukrainian training centres, in standardising
their demining and survey training packages. 46

OPERATORS
The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units
that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW.
This includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, which conducts clearance through SESU and
also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the
Security Service; the State Special Transport Service, which is
responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State
Border Service, which conducts demining in areas under its
control on land and in the sea. 47 As at June 2018, the Ukrainian
authorities were deploying 55 demining teams (totalling 259
personnel), of which 37 teams were deployed by the MoD. 48
Three international demining organisations – DDG, FSD, and
The HALO Trust – are operating in Ukraine. 49 DDG did not
conduct any survey or clearance of mined areas in 2018.
FSD suspended operations in 2019 due to lack of funding,
however, they are actively looking for opportunities to extend
their programme. 50
In addition, the Ukrainian organisations, Demining Team of
Ukraine and Demining Solutions are active in demining in
eastern Ukraine. 51
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As at June 2018, The HALO Trust had 244 staff of whom
218 were engaged in survey, mine clearance, or battle area
clearance (BAC). By September 2018, this had increased
to a total of 360 staff. 52 All HALO Trust teams are trained
and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all
expected threats in the conﬂict zone, as non-technical survey
has yet to determine the proportion of different types of
hazard. 53 HALO Trust expected the expansion of its operations
to continue, as at June 2019, it had 418 staff including 25
manual and 2 mechanical clearance teams, ﬁve survey teams
and two mechanical support teams. 54
In 2018, DDG deployed four non-technical survey and ﬁve
technical survey personnel along with 28 clearance personnel
for BAC tasks. DDG expected to expand both its survey and
clearance capacity in 2019.55 FSD conducted training for
additional non-technical survey personnel in 2018.56
It has been claimed that Emercom, Russia’s state agency for
emergencies, has planned to begin clearance in areas under
the control of separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.57
Currently operators conduct their own quality management
but it is expected that the formal development of external
quality management will take place in 2019 following the
adoption of the mine action law. 58 In August 2019, HALO
Ukraine handed over its ﬁrst 11 cleared areas to local
administrations in Luhansk oblast after successfully
passing an external quality inspection by the MOD’s
Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.59

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed its ﬁrst mechanical
clearance asset, the ﬁrst operator in Ukraine to do so. 60 As
at June 2019, HALO deployed three mechanical clearance
assets, two armoured front end loaders and one armoured
excavator. 61
DDG plans to use drones to create high-resolution maps for
their tasks but, as at June 2019, the mechanism for acquiring
permission to ﬂy was not yet in place. 62 DDG does not use any
mechanical assets. 63
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

CLEARANCE IN 2018

Ukraine did not report its clearance output for 2018. In its
latest Article 7 report Ukraine stated that mine clearance
work is underway by NGOs in Stanicho-Lugansk district,
Lugansk region and Bakhmutsky district, Donetsk region
but did not provide any clearance data. Of the international
operators, The HALO Trust cleared 391,819m2 and destroyed
ﬁve anti-personnel mines. The HALO Trust also identiﬁed
24 new anti-personnel mined areas with a total surface
area of 1.4km2.

In 2018, the HALO Trust cleared 391,819m2, destroying in
the process ﬁve anti-personnel mines. This is an increase
from 2017 when the HALO Trust cleared 220,887m2, also
destroying ﬁve anti-personnel mines. According to HALO
Trust, some conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are being
cleared that prove not to contain anti-personnel mines. There
have been incidents of local people removing the mines
themselves, particularly in the case of above-ground threats
such as directional fragmentation mines and tripwire-initiated
hand grenades (which function as anti-personnel mines). 64

Table 1: Mine clearance in 201865
Areas
cleared

Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Stanychno Luhanskyi/Krasna Talivka

9

241,271

3

40

1

Lymanskyi/Ozerne

2

57,348

0

0

8

Bakhmutskyi/Kodema

1

2,780

1

0

2

Bakhmutskyi/Novoluhanske

3

16,527

0

0

18

District/village

Lymanskyi/Kryva Luka

1

7,938

0

0

1

Slovianskyi/Andriivka

2

19,680

0

0

3

Stanychno-Luhanskyi/Shyrokyi

2

27,259

0

0

1

Volnovaskyi/Volnovakha

1

19,016

1

0

1

21

391,819

5

40

35

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition, the HALO Trust destroyed three anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks in 2018. 66

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UKRAINE: 1 JUNE 2006
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2018

391,819

2017

220,887

2016

52,887

2015

N/R

2014

N/R

Total

665,593

N/R = Not Reported

The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily
contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer
zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is
severely limited on the government side, and there is no
access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled by
the government. 67
Ukraine submitted and was granted its Article 5 extension
request in 2018 bringing it back to compliance with Article
5 of the APMBC. However, Ukraine provided very little
information on outstanding mine contamination or the
outputs from ongoing survey and clearance activities making
it very difﬁcult to know the true extent of mine contamination
in Ukraine or track progress in survey and clearance
efforts. Within government-controlled areas, there is limited
demining close to the contact line as mined areas are deemed
to serve a tactical purpose and will not be demined until
there is total de-escalation of the conﬂict.
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Clearance data is not available from areas outside of
government control although it is understood that
pro-Russian rebels are conducting some clearance
operations. 68 While Russia is not a state party or signatory
to the APMBC it has obligations under international human
rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by
virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person
under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it
exercises effective control.
The long-awaited adoption of national mine action legislation
at the end of 2018 is a positive step forward for Ukraine.
This provides the framework for humanitarian demining in
Ukraine and should lead to the establishment of the NMAA
and the NMAC, the implementation of national standards, and
development of a national strategy with concrete milestones
in place for survey and clearance outside of the buffer zone
in Ukraine. However, the MoD will continue to be responsible
for demining within the buffer zone and it is difﬁcult to see
how Ukraine will achieve completion of anti-personnel mine
clearance during an ongoing conﬂict when there are reports
that both sides are continuing to emplace mines.

258 Clearing the Mines 2019

STATES PARTIES

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine,
5 July 2018.

31

Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 24 May 2017 and
16 May 2019.

2

“Measures to ensure compliance”, presentation by Col. Viktor Kuzmin, Deputy
Chief, Engineer Troops, Armed Forces of Ukraine, provided to the APMBC
Implementation Support Unit at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva,
9 June 2017, at: bit.ly/2Zk2MUj.

32

Emails from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, MoD, 21 October 2016 and 27 June
2017; Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017; and Inna Cruz, Information
Management Advisor, GICHD, 5 July 2018.

33

Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017.

3

Interview with Maksym Komisarov, Chief of Mine Action Department, Ministry
of Defence, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

34

Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.

35

Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May and
31 May 2019.

36

Decisions on the request submitted by Ukraine for an extension of the
deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance
with Article 5 of the APMBC, 17MSP, 30 November 2018.

37

Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018.

38

Annual Action Plan for humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk
and Luhansk, 6 May 2019.

39

Ibid.

40

Emails from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019; and Yuri Shahramanyan,
HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.

41

Analysis of the request submitted by Ukraine for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 22 November 2018,

42

Interviews with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva,
20 May 2016; and Maksym Komisarov, MoD, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

43

Emails from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko
Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 25 September 2018; and interview with Miljenko
Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.

44

Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 31 May 2019.

45

Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 13 June 2019; and Ministry for
Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, “Danger!
Mines! Cabinet Of Ministers Of Ukraine Approved Regulations of Marking Mine
And ERW Hazards, Developed By MTOT”, 4 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2IO6vCA.

46

Email from Armen Harutyunyan, Advisor Land Release and Operational
Efﬁciency, GICHD, 21 June 2019.

47

Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in
Geneva, 26 June 2015; email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 23 June 2015;
“Mine Action in Ukraine”, Side-event presentation by Lt.-Col. Yevhenii
Zubarevskyi, MoD, Geneva, 17 February 2016; and Article 7 Report (for 2018),
Form F.

4

Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,
22 May 2019.

5

“Mine Action in Ukraine”, Side-event presentation by Lt.-Col. Yevhenii
Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence (MoD), at the 19th International Meeting,
Geneva, 17 February 2016; and Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings,
Geneva, 19 May 2016.

6

Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.

7

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019,

8

Interview with Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.

9

Human Rights Watch, “Landmines in Ukraine: Technical Brieﬁng Note”,
6 April 2015, at: bit.ly/2ym1k80; Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern
Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities”, at: bit.
ly/2Zh8uGA; “Mineﬁelds Kill 261, Wound 479”, Kyiv Post, 21 January 2016, at:
bit.ly/32WRBmE; and “Ukraine’s desperate attempt to defuse landmines – as
more are planted”, The Guardian, 4 April 2016, at: bit.ly/2YezSbP.

10

See: “Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine”,
at: bit.ly/2K4IFms.

11

OHCHR, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to
15 September 2017”, December 2017, p. 5.

12

OHCHR, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to
15 May 2018”, June 2018, p. 29.

13

Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,
22 May 2019.

14

Government of Ukraine, “Measures to ensure compliance”, Geneva, 9 June
2017; Statement of Ukraine on Article 5, APMBC 15th Meeting of States
Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Preliminary observations of the
committee on cooperative compliance, “Ukraine”, Intersessional Meetings,
Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

15

Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance,
“Ukraine”, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

16

Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,
22 May 2019.

48

Interview with Maksym Komisarov, MoD, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

17

Email from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, MoD, 27 June 2017.

49

Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F.

18

Ibid.; and emails from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016; and
Gianluca Maspoli, Country Focal Point for Ukraine, GICHD, 20 June 2017
and 5 July 2018.

50

FSD Ukraine, Facebook post, 12 August 2019, at: bit.ly/2kVg1vJ

51

Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017; “Tightening with the
process of mine clearance in the East of Ukraine can lead to a new crisis”,
military-informant, 25 July 2016, at: bit.ly/2Qf1jeg; and “Presentation of the
Demining team of Ukraine”, SD Crisis, 26 April 2017, at: bit.ly/2wb6DG7.

52

Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 29 June and
25 September 2018.

53

Emails from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 18 May 2016; and Yuri
Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 24 May 2017.

54

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine,19 June 2019.

55

Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019.

56

Email from Anthony Connell, FSD Ukraine, 15 June 2018.

57

Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for
humanitarian mine action activities”.

58

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.

59

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 15 August 2019.

60

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 17 May 2019.

61

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 19 June 2019.

62

Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 11 June 2019.

63

Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019.

GICHD, “Conference on Ukraine’s current security, humanitarian demining and
ERW challenges”, News release, Geneva, 24 April 2015.

64

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.

65

Ibid.

“Mine Action Activities”, Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba,
Head of Mission, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, at the 19th
International Meeting, 17 February 2016; and interview with Miljenko Vahtaric,
OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.

66

Ibid.

67

Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 24 May 2017; and Henry Leach,
Head of Programme, DDG Ukraine, 29 May 2017.

68

Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and
interview, 18 February 2015.

19

20

Ibid.; National Security and Defence Council and the SESU, “Humanitarian
demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges”, Side event, APMBC 14th
Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and National Defence
and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Operations UNIFIER”; and “Humanitarian
mine and UXO clearing of the territory of Ukraine conducted by the State
Emergency Service of Ukraine”, Side-event presentation by Col. Oleh
Bondar, SESU, Geneva, 17 February 2016; and email from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii
Zubarevskyi, MoD, 17 June 2016.
OSCE, “Ukrainian parliament adopts legal framework for mine action, with
OSCE advice provided”, 10 December 2018, at: bit.ly/2QdTaqo; interview with
Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019; and email, 13 June 2019.

21

Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019; and
Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 25 September 2018.

22

Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019.

23

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.

24

Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in
Geneva, 26 June 2015.

25
26
27

Statement of Ukraine, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Protocol V Meeting of Experts, Geneva, April 2015.

28

Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 25 September and 1 October 2018.

29

Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.

30

Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019.

mineactionreview.org 259

UKRAINE

1

UNITED
KINGDOM

CLEARING
THE MINES
2019

(FALKLAND ISLANDS)

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
1.6

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

(ESTIMATED)

6.1KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

1.48KM 588
2

2017
2018

1.48

1.4

Area of Land Released (km2)

MEDIUM,

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

1.2

1.0

1.05

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

Clearance and
Technical Survey

0.0

Non-Technical Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the United Kingdom requested and was granted a further ﬁve-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline until 1 March 2024. The United Kingdom again made good progress in 2018, releasing
nearly 1.5km2 of mined area on the Falkland Islands,1 in addition to conducting technical survey of the eight mined areas that
will remain as at the end of the current phase of demining in March 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

In both its reporting and planning, the United Kingdom should disaggregate data on the extent of mined area
released (or planned for future release) through type of survey and through clearance.

■

The United Kingdom should update APMBC states parties on the results of technical survey of the remaining
eight mined areas in Yorke Bay and on the planned timeline for contracting and completing clearance of this
ﬁnal phase of demining.
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Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

The United Kingdom has established a reasonably accurate baseline of remaining
anti-personnel mine contamination, though past assessments, based on the best
information at the time, have tended to overstate the extent of the problem.

9

There is strong national ownership of mine action on the Falkland Islands, with oversight
from a National Mine Action Authority and a Demining Project Ofﬁce, and 100% national
funding for all survey and clearance. The United Kingdom is now making good progress
in implementing its obligations under APMBC Article 5.

6

Good gender policies and procedures are in place to cover mine action in the Falkland
Islands, including at the level of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce (FCO), the
National Mine Action Authority, the land release contractor (currently SafeLane Global),
and the Demining Project Ofﬁce (currently Fenix Insight). While one third of management
positions in SafeLane Global in the Falkland Islands are held by women, none of the
survey or clearance personnel is female. This is despite equal employment opportunities.

6

The United Kingdom has a well-functioning information management system in place, to
record and monitor progress in land release operations on the Islands. However, land
released through technical survey is not disaggregated from release through clearance
in the United Kingdom’s reporting.

8

The United Kingdom has a clear workplan in place to address remaining mined areas on
the Islands, as well as measures in place to address residual risk, post completion.

6

The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but survey
and clearance operations on the Islands are said to meet or exceed the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). While the land release methodology could potentially be viewed
as overly risk-adverse, based on full clearance of 11 uncontaminated areas, despite the
conduct of technical survey prior to clearance, the United Kingdom maintains clearance
was necessary for full assurance and to ensure all reasonable effort, given the lack of
mineﬁeld records.

8

The United Kingdom released nearly 1.5km2 of mined area in 2018 and conducted
technical survey of the eight mined areas which will remain as at the end of the current
phase of demining in March 2020. The United Kingdom has committed to fulﬁl its Article 5
obligations by March 2024.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

7

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

7.1

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

National Mine Action Authority (chaired by the United
Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce (FCO) and
comprising representatives from the Ministry of Defence,
the Falkland Islands government, and a strategic advisor)
Fenix Insight (current Demining Project Ofﬁce)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

SafeLane Global (formally Dynasafe BACTEC, and current
land release contractor)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The only mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the
United Kingdom are on the Falkland Islands in the South
Atlantic, the result of armed conﬂict with Argentina in 1982. 2
As at the end of Phase 5(a) of clearance, in March 2018, only
35 mined areas remained to be cleared, totalling over 6.1km2. 3
As at the end of December 2018, contamination had been
reduced to 22 mined areas, totalling 3.9km2 (see Table 1). 4
The United Kingdom has a fully funded programme in place
(Phase (b) clearance) to reduce contamination by 31 March
2020, to only eight remaining mined areas in Yorke Bay,
totalling 0.16km2. 5
Table 1: Contamination by province (at end 2018) 6
Mined areas

Area (m2)

Fox Bay

6

2,017,912

Port Howard

1

1,021,979

Darwin and Goose Green

0

0

Murrell Peninsula

5

582,287

Stanley Area 2

2

89,861

Stanley Area 3

0

0

Yorke Bay

8

205,800

22

3,917,839

Area

Totals

Some clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s
immediately following the Falklands conﬂict, during which
1,855 mines were removed and destroyed from mined areas.7
However, between the date the United Kingdom became a
state party to the APMBC (1 March 1999) and the submission
of its ﬁrst Article 5 deadline extension request in 2008, no
clearance took place. 8
In its 2008 Article 5 extension request, the United Kingdom
reported that 117 mined areas remained over an estimated
total area of 13km2, and containing some 20,000 anti-personnel
and anti-vehicle mines.9 On the basis of additional information

obtained during demining operations, the estimate for the
total contaminated area was increased to 13.5km2.10 The total
number of mined areas was subsequently revised upwards,
from 117 to 122, as the earlier feasibility study had combined
a small number of separately numbered mined areas.11
During the ﬁrst four phases of clearance (from October 2009
to March 2016), 35 mined areas were released, totalling
just over 2km2, with the destruction of 4,083 anti-personnel
mines, 927 anti-vehicle mines, and 74 items of unexploded
ordnance (UXO), including 21 submunitions. A further 52
mined areas, totalling over 2km2 were cleared during Phase
5(a) clearance (from November 2016 to March 2018, with
operations stood down for the Austral winter), during which
a further 4,223 anti-personnel mines, 245 anti-vehicle mines,
and 43 items of UXO were cleared.12
Phase 5(b) began in April 2018 and was expected to conclude
at the end of March 2020.13 At the end of this Phase, it is
expected that only eight mined areas will remain, covering
an estimated 163,460m2, all located in Yorke Bay.14
There are two further areas, Don Carlos Bay and Beatrice
Cove, which have never been considered as mined, and
which were not included in the 122 mined areas established
in the feasibility study in 2007, but which are located behind
the long Murrell Peninsula fence. This area has been out of
bounds to all persons on the Islands since 1982, so it has not
been possible to check whether these two areas were mined.
If these two areas are found to require clearance, they will
be added to the list of mined areas, and the United Kingdom
expects they could be cleared within the ﬁve-year extension
period.15 Two further tasks, BAC 1, which was suspected to
contain booby-traps based on anecdotal evidence, and BAC 2,
a building suspected of being booby trapped, were completed
in December 2018.16
The United Kingdom has reported that no civilian has ever
been killed or injured by mines on the islands.17 Over the
years, very few civilians have deliberately or inadvertently
entered a mineﬁeld. It is a criminal offence on the Falkland
Islands to enter a mineﬁeld.18

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in
2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the
Falkland Islands. The NMAA is chaired by United Kingdom
Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce (FCO) and comprises
representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland
Islands government, and a strategic advisor. It meets “as
required” (at least once every six months), and the land
release contractor (SafeLane Global; formerly, Dynasafe
BACTEC) and the Demining Project Ofﬁce (currently Fenix
Insight), are invited “where appropriate”.19

262 Clearing the Mines 2019

In addition, there is a Suspect Hazardous Area Land
Release Committee (SHALARC), which is a body based in
the Falkland Islands, composed of a range of local ofﬁcials
and a representative of the United Kingdom military.
SHALARC provides a forum for the contractors to discuss
issues of concern or interest to the committee, and includes
explanation of the land release process, including when land
has been released for public use. 20
Survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands are
entirely funded by the UK Government. 21
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The NMAA requires SafeLane Global and Fenix Insight
to meet contractual conditions to prevent unlawful
discrimination either directly or indirectly on protected
characteristics such as race, colour, ethnic or national origin,
disability, sex or sexual orientation, religion or belief, or age.
The provisions also set out that the Contractor shall adhere
to the current relevant codes of practice or recommendations
published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 22
Fenix Insight has an organisational gender policy which it
applies to its demining, though there is limited opportunity
to pursue it on the Falklands given the deployed “team” is
composed of only one (male) person. SafeLane Global has an
equal opportunities policy and selects employees based on
qualiﬁcation and experience, without gender restrictions. Of
management level positions employed by SafeLane Global in
the Falkland Islands, one is occupied by a woman, but none of
the survey or clearance staff is female. 23

In 2018, the UK Government wrote to suppliers setting out
safeguarding policies and procedures in light of sexual
exploitation and abuse in the aid sector, which raised
questions regarding the ethical behaviour of organisations
being funded by UK taxpayers’ money and the safeguarding
of the communities across the world that it is intended
to support. The contractors working to deliver the UK’s
Falkland Islands Demining Programme were contacted as
part of this wider engagement. 24
Women are involved in key positions at the FCO: Senior
Responsible Ofﬁcer, Deputy Senior Responsible Ofﬁcer, and
Project Manager. 25

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The information management system is managed at two
levels. The Strategic Advisor maintains the public statement
of progress through a “Cumulative Totals” spreadsheet (as
demonstrated in the attached annex to the United Kingdom’s
2018 Article 5 deadline extension request). This forms the
basis of the declarations to the APMBC Meetings of States
Parties. Also, the Demining Project Ofﬁce and the Land Release
Contractor use an operational-level planning and information
management tool which guides the work and ultimately leads
to the Handover Certiﬁcate at the conclusion of each task.26

Historically, the United Kingdom has not collated data on area
cancelled and on area reduced, 27 and does not disaggregate
land released through technical survey from land released
through clearance in its reporting. 28
The United Kingdom submits annual Article 7 transparency
reports and reports on its progress in Article 5
implementation at the APMBC intersessional meetings and
meetings of states parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING
At present, the United Kingdom is undertaking the ﬁfth
phase of demining operations in the Falkland Islands. The
government has committed to spend more than £27 million
on this phase (2016–20), which aims to release 79 mined
areas covering an estimated total of just under 10.86km2. 29
Phase 5(a) commenced in November 2016 and concluded
in March 2018. 30 During this phase operators cleared more
mined areas for which there were no mineﬁeld records than
previously. The prior technical survey included cutting lanes
into suspected mineﬁelds in order to establish the position of
any remaining mines. 31 Following the conclusion of Phase 5(a),
the United Kingdom believes it has a more accurate picture
of the remaining mine clearance challenge, which has helped
inform its strategic planning and the drafting of its second
Article 5 deadline extension request, which was submitted
on 29 March 2018 for consideration by states parties to
the APMBC. 32
The current stage of demining, Phase 5(b), which began
in April 2018, is due to conclude on schedule by the end of
March 2020. 33 At the end of this Phase, it is expected that
only eight mined areas will remain, covering an estimated
163,460m2, and located in the environmentally sensitive
beach and sand dune area known as Yorke Bay. 34 As part of
Phase 5(b), technical survey of these eight mined areas has
been completed, enabling the United Kingdom to plan, cost,
and contract the ﬁnal phase of demining operations. 35

To date, the United Kingdom has prioritised clearance of
areas closest to settlements and civilian infrastructure,
resulting in release of areas closest to Port Stanley and the
roads leading in and out of the Islands’ capital. In early 2016,
the Ministry of Defence and the FCO commissioned the United
Kingdom’s Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory to
carry out a study to help prioritise clearance of the remaining
mineﬁelds in a Phase 5 of demining. The resultant priority list
formed the basis of the UK Government’s invitation to tender
for the contract for Phase 5 demining. 36
The land release contract sets out a task list (the workplan),
which must be completed within the two-year window (1 April
2018 to 31 March 2020). 37 The Demining Project Ofﬁce (Fenix
Insight) monitors the Land Release Contractor (now SafeLane
Global) to ensure that it completes the task list according to
the contract standards and completion date. Fenix Insight
reports regularly to the FCO, and both Fenix Insight and
SafeLane Global report to the National Mine Action Authority
on progress made against timescales. 38
Full and accessible records of all survey and clearance
undertaken will be retained by national authorities in the
Falkland Islands and the United Kingdom. The enduring
UK military presence on the Falkland Islands includes an
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team from the Royal Air
Force Armament Engineering Flight. They hold responsibility
for EOD activity on the Falkland Islands. The team will deal
with residual explosive threats, post Article 5 completion. 39
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine
action standards, but survey and clearance operations on
the Falkland Islands are reported to meet or exceed the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), by adapting IMAS
to meet the speciﬁcs of the situation on the Falkland Islands. 40
Each project’s Statement of Requirement contains the
standards speciﬁc to the tasks being addressed. 41 Applicable
environmental standards are agreed on in coordination with
the Falkland Islands Government Environmental Planning
Department to minimise damage to the fragile environment
and to aid remediation. 42

However, it is possible that the land release methodology
adopted in the Falkland Islands might be overly risk adverse,
based on the fact that eleven mined areas in 2018 were
technically surveyed, but were then fully cleared, and found
to contain no anti-personnel mines. According to the United
Kingdom, full clearance was undertaken of these areas
(which were included in the original 122 fenced and marked
areas) for “full assurance”, because of the lack of mineﬁeld
records, and to ensure all reasonable effort was taken. 43

OPERATORS
The Land Release Contractor in the Falkland Islands is
selected by international competitive tender prior to each
phase, as required by the European Union. SafeLane Global
(formerly Dynasafe BACTEC), was awarded the land release
contract for the current ﬁfth phase of demining operations
in the Falkland Islands, as for the previous four phases. 44
Capacity for Phase 5 operations was increased from previous
phases, with a total of 108 personnel. Mechanical equipment
includes one anti-vehicle mine machine, three anti-personnel
mine machines, and two armoured excavators, in addition to
the required transportation equipment. 45
The Demining Project Ofﬁce, which implements the policies
of the NMAA and monitors the land release operations on
the Falkland Islands, is also awarded through competitive

tender. Fenix Insight has been awarded responsibility for the
Demining Project Ofﬁce for all ﬁve stages of demining so far. 46
The United Kingdom has noted that the Falkland Islands has
limited capacity in terms of accommodation and medical/
aerial casevac facilities. Current stafﬁng levels have reached
the maximum that can be safely deployed on the Islands, but
work was claimed to be progressing “very well” with the
current capacity. 47
SafeLane Global undertakes its own internal Quality
Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC). Fenix Insight
monitors this quality management and can also conduct
its external QA and QC. 48 The size of the sampled areas at
each task is decided by the quality contractor based on the
guidance set out in IMAS 09.20. 49

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In addition to manual survey and clearance, mechanical
assets are also deployed extensively as part of land release
operations on the Falkland Islands. 50 Flails and tillers are to
aid technical survey while excavators, bulldozers, dumper
trucks, and sand-sifting machines are deployed on sandy
areas such as Yorke Bay. All mechanically prepared ground
is subsequently processed by deminers using visual search,
detector search, raking, or full manual excavation drills. 51

Drones have been used for reconnaissance over large areas
not accessible behind mineﬁeld fences and for aerial mapping.
Use of drones to overﬂy suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
helps to identify mine “dump” locations, row markers, and
other evidence that might have otherwise taken a manual team
several days to locate. The United Kingdom deems the use of
drones to be an excellent addition to the demining toolbox.52

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

SURVEY IN 2018

In 2018, a total of 1.48km2 of mined area, across 24 SHAs,
was released through clearance and technical survey in
2018, with the destruction of 588 anti-personnel mines,
31 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO. No mined area
was cancelled through non-technical survey.

In 2018, technical survey was conducted as part of land
release operations, but no data was reported on the amount
of mined area reduced through survey, which is instead
included in reported clearance output (see Tables 2 and
3 overleaf).

In addition, technical survey was conducted in 2018 on the
remaining areas, including at Yorke Bay and the Murrell
Peninsular, but no results had been made available as at
May 2019.

In addition, a major focus in 2018 was on conducting technical
survey on the remaining areas, including at Yorke Bay and
the Murrell Peninsular (including Don Carlos Bay), 53 to enable
the United Kingdom to plan for the ﬁnal phase of clearance.
As at May 2019, no results of the technical survey had been
made public. 54
No areas were cancelled through non-technical survey
in 2018. 55
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In 2018, of total of over 1.48km2 of mined area was released
through clearance (0.58km2 during Phase 5(a) and 0.9km2
during Phase 5(b)) with the destruction of 588 anti-personnel
mines, 56 31 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO. This
comprised nearly 0.58km2 cleared between January and
March, as part of Phase 5a of land release operations
(see Table 2);57 and a further 0.9km2 cleared between April
to December 2018, as part of Phase 5b of land release
operations (see Table 3). 58

Clearance Phase 5(b)
Phase 5(b) of clearance operations (April 2018 to March
2020), which began on schedule in April 2018, is planned to
cover more than 5.95km2 of mined area. 59
Between April and December 2018, 0.9km2 of mined area was
cleared, with the destruction of 249 anti-personnel mines and
12 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 3). 60

Table 2: Mine clearance Phase 5(a) (November 2016 to March 2018)61
Areas
released

Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Time period

Geographic area

November to December 2016

Stanley Area 2 and 3

7

426,346

1,314

19

1

January to December 2017
(including three month stand
down during Austral winter)

Darwin and Goose
Green, Stanley Area
2, 3, and 4

34

1,050,080

2,557

207

17

January to March 2018

11

577,474

352

19

26

Totals

52

2,053,900

4,223

245

44

Areas
released

Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Table 3: Mine clearance Phase 5(b) (April 2018 to December 2018)
Time period

Geographic area

April to December 2018

Cluster 3

1

14,844

28

11

0

Cluster 2

12

887,653

221

1

0

13

902,497

249

12

0

Totals

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
second extension (of ﬁve years) granted by states parties
in 2018), the United Kingdom is required to destroy all
anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or
control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2024.
The United Kingdom stated in April 2019 that it is strongly
committed to meeting this deadline. 62

The overwhelming majority of clearance activity (Phase 5)
already has funding allocated and contracts in place, and is on
schedule to complete by 31 March 2020, notwithstanding the
general risks to timelines posed to all mine clearance in the
Falkland Islands, such as poor weather forcing stand-downs.63
Phase 5(a) of survey and clearance operations ﬁnished as
scheduled at the end of March 2018 and Phase 5(b) began
immediately afterwards in April 2018.
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The United Kingdom expects that eight remaining mined
areas, covering an estimated 163,460m2, will remain
upon completion of Phase 5(b) in March 2020. The eight
mined areas in question are all located in Yorke Bay, an
environmentally sensitive beach and sand dune area, which
is also the most challenging of mined areas. 64 According to
the United Kingdom, “It is possible that the work can be
completed in a single further year, but that cannot be certain
at this stage… Rather than request a three year extension
which may prove insufﬁcient, thus necessitating a further
extension request, the UK requests a ﬁve year extension
until 1 March 2024”. 65
The United Kingdom “retains the strong intention that the
clearance of Yorke Bay will be possible within the ﬁve-year
extension request”. 66 It does, however, cite two risk factors
to the realisation of the plan. The ﬁrst is a risk that, at
Yorke Bay, some mines may have been displaced by sand
movement and that technical survey cannot identify the
bounds of that movement, which may lead to lengthier and
more expensive clearance. Second, there could be a delay
in securing further funding, which “will be weighed against
competing priorities and subject to approval at senior levels”.
This in turn could lead to a situation requiring demobilisation,
and remobilisation of demining capacity, or retendering, after
Phase 5, which would be timely and costly: hence the request
to an extended deadline to 2024. 67
In its 2018 extension request, the United Kingdom reported
that “further funding will be sought once the cost of covering
Yorke Bay is known based upon the results of technical
survey conducted during the extension request period in
Phase 5.”68 As at April 2019, technical survey of the eight
mined areas in Yorke Bay had been completed as part
of Phase 5(b). According to the United Kingdom, ofﬁcials
and contractors are working through the operational and
commercial processes, and the national authorities planned
to share further information with States Parties once
available. 69 The eight mined areas in Yorke Bay pose the
greatest challenges to date and demining is expected to be
complex due to the challenges of the sandy environment.70
The United Kingdom conducted an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) in 2017, which was discussed with the
Falkland Islands Government. The EIA identiﬁed two
particular issues: a) the penguins on the islands; and b) the
area at Yorke Bay, which will be addressed in such a way as
to ensure impact to the existing environment is limited to the
minimum practically possible.71
Most of the remaining mined areas are said to be in extremely
remote locations, exposed to adverse weather conditions
that enforce an annual three-month stand-down in the
winter months.72 The United Kingdom has also reported the
following additional challenges to clearance in the Islands:
incomplete Argentine mineﬁeld records; concerns about the
environmental impact of demining; and limits on the capacity
of the Falkland Islands to provide certain facilities for
demining, such as accommodation for deminers and medical
facilities, including for the evacuation of any casualties.73 The
United Kingdom reports that these factors are becoming
increasingly signiﬁcant as it tackles the more technically
challenging and environmentally sensitive mineﬁelds in
Phase 5 of demining. To address these considerations the
United Kingdom increased its funding commitment for
Phase 5.74
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Demining on the Falkland Islands is conducted in phases,
which cut across calendar years, though, based on the year
in which demining tasks were completed, a total of over
4km2 of mined area has been cleared in the last ﬁve years
(see Table 4).
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)*

2018

1.48

2017

1.05

2016

0.94

2015

0.59

2014

0

Total

4.06

* Based on the year in which clearance was completed

The United Kingdom government funds all mine-clearance
operations in the Islands.75 The ﬁrst four stages of demining
(2009 to March 2016) cost £11 million (approx. US$14.5
million).76 The United Kingdom government has committed
to spend more than £27 million (approx. US$35.5 million at
current exchange rates) on Phase 5 through to March 2020.
As at April 2019, the United Kingdom was to develop and
costing a clearance plan for the release of the eight mined
areas that will remain as at March 2020.77
The United Kingdom has committed to providing updated
information on progress and next steps at subsequent
meetings of the APMBC and in its treaty reporting.78
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There is a sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas with
Argentina, which claims jurisdiction over the Malvinas. Argentina has been
granted an extension to its APMBC Article 5 clearance deadline until 2020.
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020
THREE-YEAR INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 MARCH 2023

KEY DATA
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Intensive conﬂict continued between the Saudi Arabia-led Gulf coalition supporting the Aden-based internationally recognised
government and Houthi rebels controlling Sana’a and much of the north. Houthi forces reportedly laid signiﬁcant numbers of
mines, including those of an improvised nature during 2018 and 2019. Yemen submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request,
seeking three years beyond March 2020 to determine the extent of contamination, after which it will submit a further request
setting out a strategy for survey and clearance. Five SafeLane international staff died in a single incident in January 2019
while transporting mines and seven other deminers were killed in a detonation at a storage area holding mines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW) in May 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should strengthen coordination between its operations in
government-controlled and Houthi-controlled areas to ensure consistent application of national standards in
management and operations.

■

YEMAC should conduct a nationwide survey to generate a baseline of mine contamination.

■

In the absence of a long-term plan, YEMAC should draw up an annual workplan for deployment of available
assets on priority regions and tasks.

■

YEMAC should update national standards and expand them to cover survey and clearance of mines of an
improvised nature.

■

Yemen should facilitate access and deployment by international mine action operators to achieve a rapid
expansion of capacity, raise standards, and accelerate survey and clearance.

■

YEMAC should drastically improve data collection and reporting to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) transparency obligations providing comprehensive reports on the location, scope,
and results of mine action operations, including disaggregated data detailing release of mined land through
survey and clearance and items destroyed.
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■

YEMAC should address the causes of the high level of fatalities among deminers in the course of operations in
2018 and 2019.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) reports the level of contamination
as unknown. Contamination data included hundreds of square kilometres of suspected
mined areas before the onset of conﬂict in 2015 which has resulted in signiﬁcant but
unknown amounts of additional contamination, including from mines of an improvised
nature. YEMAC is seeking to develop a new baseline of contamination by March 2023.

3

YEMAC is wholly dependent on international donor support. Conﬂict has undermined
nationwide management of mine action, leaving YEMAC with two programmes, one for
areas controlled by the Aden-based government and the second for areas controlled by
Houthi forces controlling Sana’a, with little ability to coordinate between them.

3

The demands of Yemen’s mine action emergency have eclipsed the issue of gender, which
is not mentioned in Yemen’s Article 5 extension request. UNDP support to YEMAC seeks
to integrate gender mainstreaming into YEMAC data collection.

3

YEMAC said its mine action database was no longer ﬁt for purpose. No information was
available to operators on areas surveyed or cleared and the sparse operating results
available did not disaggregate clearance of mines from clearance of explosive remnants
of war (ERW).

5

Yemen does not have a national strategy or plan, but continued operations on an
emergency basis focused on life-saving interventions.

4

Yemen had national standards that YEMAC said were out of date. It also complained that
its equipment is obsolete and levels of deminer training were inadequate, particularly for
dealing with mines of an improvised nature.

5

YEMAC clearance of area and items appears to have fallen in 2018 but lack of
comprehensive data disaggregating mine clearance from clearance of ERW prevents
a clear determination of outputs.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT

Performance Commentary

4

(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

4.0

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

YEMAC
Yemen Army Engineers

■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
SafeLane/Dynasafe
The HALO Trust (since 2019)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (due to start in 2019)

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
YEMAC states that “the level of contamination and the
subsequent impact by AP mines in Yemen is not known.”1
A Landmine Impact Survey in 2000 found mine contamination
in 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates resulting from conﬂicts in
1962–69 and 1970–83, as well as mines laid in border areas
between North and South Yemen before they uniﬁed in 1990,
and mines from successive conﬂicts that erupted since
1994. Operators have also encountered large quantities of
abandoned explosive ordnance, including some stockpiles
of mines. The continuing conﬂict that ﬂared in March 2015
has “changed the extent and complexity of contamination
dramatically.”2

Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request
submitted in 2014 identiﬁed 107 conﬁrmed mineﬁelds
covering a total of 8.1km2 but also an additional 438
suspected hazardous areas covering 338km2. By 2017,
YEMAC said it had 569 suspected mined areas affecting
323.5km2. 3 YEMAC believed a signiﬁcant proportion of this
might be released or reduced through survey. However,
Yemen’s continuing conﬂict has largely halted survey of
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and resulted in the
addition of new contamination by mines, including mines of
an improvised nature, preventing a determination of the
extent and the recontamination of previously cleared areas. 4

NEW CONTAMINATION
Houthi ofﬁcials have acknowledged using landmines5
and Houthi forces reportedly laid mines in at least six
governorates in 2016. 6 Since 2017, Houthi and associated
forces have laid large numbers of anti-personnel mines and
anti-vehicle mines, including mines of an improvised nature,
in particular along Yemen’s west coast, in a bid to stall the
advance of pro-government Yemeni and Saudi coalition
forces towards the strategic port town of Hodeida. Some
anti-vehicle mines were reportedly modiﬁed to detonate with
the weight of a person,7 making them anti-personnel mines
falling within the APMBC.
Current conﬂicts have also resulted in increased
contamination from mines of an improvised nature, such as
devices initiated by a pressure plate or crushed necklace,
as well as from improvised devices activated remotely or by
photo-electric cells. Mines of an improvised nature as well
as other improvised devices have been produced in Yemen
“on an industrial scale” and laid along roads, inside buildings,
and built into house walls, posing a serious hazard to
displaced families returning to their property. 8

Independent investigators have documented three types
of mine of an improvised nature used by Houthi forces on
Yemen’s west coast that are identical to, or closely resemble,
conventional mines. They include a Claymore-type mine almost
identical to a Chinese-made directional mine (Type 150-A GLD),
a larger directional mine similar to an Iranian-made mine
(M18A2), and an anti-vehicle mine similar to Russian-made
TM46 mines. Some of the mines of an improvised nature have
serial numbers, indicating mass production.9 The UN reported
the appearance of improvised sea mines in the Red Sea since
2017. These were probably deployed by Houthi forces and pose
an obvious threat to shipping.10
A panel of international experts reported to the UN Human
Rights Council in August 2019 that it had conﬁrmed civilian
casualties caused by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines
emplaced by Houthi ﬁghters in Aden, Hudayda, Lahej, and
Taiz governorates.11

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Yemen’s inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee
(NMAC), which formulated national mine action policy,
was reported in 2019 to have disbanded leaving YEMAC as
regulator and implementing agency with responsibility for
setting policy, planning and coordinating mine action, and
as the sole national operator.12
YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as a
national mine action agency. Since conﬂict ﬂared between the
internationally-recognized government, based in the south, and
the Houthi movement controlling much of the north, YEMAC
has in practice split into two, centred round a headquarters
in Aden running operations in government controlled areas
and the Sana’a ofﬁce running operations in the north. YEMAC
said its Aden headquarters issued quarterly task orders and
maintained records of the work conducted.
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YEMAC is supported by Regional Executive Mine Action
Branches (REMABs) in Aden, set up in 1999; al-Mukalla
(Hadramout governorate), which opened in March 2004; and
Saada (April 2016).13 The extent to which they are operational
is not clear. In 2019, YEMAC planned to open new ofﬁces in
Taiz to support operations around Hodeida and in Marib for
operations in al-Jawf governorate.14
YEMAC planned to open a coordination centre in 2019 to
separate its management and operational functions, a
development which it expected would accelerate clearance.
Among its responsibilities, the coordination ofﬁce would be
responsible for accrediting operators. As at May 2019, YEMAC
was identifying premises for the coordination ofﬁce and
expected to have it operational before the end of the year.15

STATES PARTIES

one in Aden. In 2019, UNDP planned to recruit up to eight
additional international staff and three or more national staff
to strengthen the programme capacity.16
Yemen’s mine action is funded by international donors.
UNDP estimated total funding required for Phase V at $39.9
million. Funding received in 2018 amounted to a little over
$9 million in 2018, approximately the same level as in 2017.17
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Fund agreed with
Dynasafe Middle East Project Management in 2018 to ﬁnance
a US$40 million demining project.18

GENDER
Mine action plans and priorities set out in Yemen’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request make no reference to gender.
UNDP reported placing emphasis on mainstreaming gender principles into plans aiming for equal participation as beneﬁciaries,
employees, and decision-makers in mine action. This included ensuring survey information is collected by organisations
representing women and girls as well as men and boys; that data collected is disaggregated by gender and age; and that risk
education materials address the risks associated with all gender roles.19

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
YEMAC maintains an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but its Article 5 deadline extension
request described it as “outdated” and “not usable.”20 UNDP observed that the system, although outdated, was becoming more
reliable. In 2019, it added an international information management specialist to its Aden-based staff. 21

PLANNING AND TASKING
Yemen does not have a strategic plan or annual workplans for tackling mines, improvised devices, or any ERW. Mine action in
2018 continued to be conducted on an emergency basis. The priority set out in Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request
in 2019 was to conduct nationwide survey to generate a baseline of contamination that would provide a basis for long-term
planning. YEMAC reportedly intended to assign its planned coordination ofﬁce the task of drawing up a new planning system. 22

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

Yemen has national mine action standards which were based
on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when
they were drawn up in 2007, but they have not been updated.
YEMAC said they are out of date and that its deminers do
not apply standing operating procedures (SoPs) based on
the standards consistently. YEMAC has also said efﬁciency
was lowered by its deminers’ lack of training, particularly
for coping with mines of an improvised nature, and by old or
obsolete equipment. 23

YEMAC is the main operator, with about 900 deminers at
the start of 2019, one half of them managed by YEMAC
headquarters in the south and the other half by YEMAC’s
Sana’a ofﬁce. 25

YEMAC had an unspeciﬁed number of quality assurance (QA)
teams that it said conduct regular ﬁeld visits and sampling of
cleared land but it said QA/quality control (QC) had become
“disjointed” as SoPs were not always followed and there was
no systematic collection of QA/QC reports. 24

SafeLane/Dynasafe operated with 304 staff and 32 demining
teams. By early 2019, SafeLane reported the project
employed 19 internationals, while national staff were mainly
seconded from YEMAC. It expected the number of personnel
to rise to around 400 in 2019. 26
Danish Demining Group (DDG) had a staff of 16 by the end
of 2018, including two internationals and ﬁve national staff
in Aden; six national staff in Mokha, Taiz; and three other
national staff in Ataq, Shabwah. Activities have focused on
risk education but a three-person non-technical survey team
started working in Taiz from November 2018. 27

mineactionreview.org 271

YEMEN

The United Nations supported mine action in Yemen from
1999 to 2003 through a programme implemented by the
UN Ofﬁce for Project Services (UNOPS). From 2003, the
programme came under full national management. The UN
Development Programme (UNDP) deployed an international
adviser to YEMAC at the end of 2014 to support planning
and programme management. In 2018, its international
staff included a chief technical adviser and a planning and
reporting specialist in Sana’a and a technical advisor based
in Aden. National staff included two posts in Sana’a and

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was due to start a two-year
programme supporting YEMAC’s mine detection dog (MDD)
programme in the last quarter of 2018 but after delays
obtaining the necessary visas was expected to start work
in 2019. The project calls for NPA to provide training for
mine dog instructors, veterinarians, ﬁeld supervisors, and
three MDD groups to improve operational efﬁciency and
expertise in survey and land release. It was also due to
boost YEMAC’s existing MDD capacity of 15 active dogs and 5
puppies and to look at improving its dog breeding capacity. 28
An NPA assessment mission visited Aden in June 2019 but
as at August 2019, delays in issuing visas prevented it from
deploying staff full time. NPA had selected 12 MDDs for the
programme but they remained at NPA’s Global Training
Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 29
YEMAC was preparing for increasing its engagement with
international operators. HALO Trust received approval to
operate in Yemen in May 2019 and opened an ofﬁce in Aden
in June. It planned to run courses on explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) and survey for YEMAC and to have teams
mentored by HALO Trust international staff deployed in the
ﬁeld in the last quarter of 2019. YEMAC was also in discussion
with the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) on the
possibilities of establishing a presence in Yemen.30

DEMINER SAFETY
YEMAC sustained heavy casualties in the course of clearing
mines and improvised devices, reporting 14 deaths in 2018. 33
Disaggregated data on casualties and devices causing them
was not available. A YEMAC deminer was also reportedly
shot dead by a sniper in Taiz. 34
SafeLane/Dynasafe sustained 12 fatalities in the ﬁrst half
of 2019. Five international staff were killed in January 2019.
KSrelief said they died in an accidental explosion as they
were transporting mines from the project headquarters
to a remote location for demolition. 35 SafeLane said later
that ordnance in the truck contributed to the scale of the
explosion but initial detonation was caused by an improvised
explosive device (IED) placed under the passenger seat of
their vehicle. 36 YEMAC said two government investigations
into the incident found no evidence that SafeLane had been
targeted by any armed group. 37 Six SafeLane deminers were
killed in April in an explosion in a depot holding mines and
ERW for destruction in the port city of Mokha. A seventh
operator died of his injuries a day later. The nationality of
those killed was not reported. 38

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
YEMAC conducted manual mine clearance in 2018 with limited
support from mine detection dogs, focusing on emergency
clearance of high-impact spot tasks rather than large area
clearance, giving priority to civilian and social infrastructure.31
YEMAC said land release through survey had decreased but
was “sometimes used in speciﬁc cases.” Through greater
engagement with international operators, YEMAC planned to
build up capacity for survey and increase the possibilities for
land release by means other than manual clearance.32

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Yemen’s progress towards compliance with the APMBC continued to be overshadowed by the conﬂict between the
internationally recognised government, backed by the Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi forces controlling the capital which
added new contamination and obstructed clearance. YEMAC has a clear position that the humanitarian imperative to
mitigate the immediate threat to civilians posed by all types of explosive threats takes precedence over deadlines set
under the APMBC. 39

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
YEMAC was able to conduct ﬁeld operations in 81 districts of 16 governorates in 2018 and UNDP reported it released a total
of 6,661,954m2 through clearance, but this included all types of explosive items and only a small amount of mined area. 40 Mine
Action Review has conservatively estimated clearance in 2018 to be of 0.1km2. YEMAC was previously experienced mainly in
clearing legacy mineﬁelds but these have become a low priority since the upsurge in conﬂict in 2015 when it increasingly had
to tackle mines of an improvised nature and a wide range of ERW.
UNDP attributed the fall-off in productivity in 2018 to a number of factors, including stricter regulations on counting ERW;
a minor cash ﬂow issue in the second quarter of the year; and the transfer of staff from YEMAC to the Dynasafe/SafeLane
operation funded by Saudi Arabia. 41

SURVEY IN 2018
No data were available on land released through survey. UNDP said YEMAC conducted desk assessments, non-technical
survey, and technical survey on a total area of over 825,000m2 in nine different governorates. 42
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YEMAC did not release mine clearance results for 2018 but its Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2019 reported
that in 2016–18 it cleared a total of 646,455m2 of mined area, and destroyed 14,021 anti-personnel mines, of which 1,576 were
destroyed in 2017 and 988 in 2018. 43 The high number reported destroyed in 2016 is believed to have included large numbers of
mines found in warehouses and stockpiles. 44 UNDP recorded clearance by YEMAC in 2018 of 680 anti-personnel mines together
with 8,047 anti-vehicle mines, 1,163 IEDs, and 106,019 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). 45
Table 1: YEMAC clearance in 201846

YEMAC

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines

AV mines

UXO

IED

6,661,954

680

8,047

106,019

1,163

Dynasafe/SafeLane did not report to YEMAC but separately reported clearing 2,523,500m2 in 10 governorates in 2018, more
than half of it in Taiz governorate, and destroying 1,011 anti-personnel mines.
Table 2: Dynasafe/SafeLane clearance operations 201847

Dynasafe/SafeLane

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines

AV mines

UXO

IED

2,523,500

1,011

27,314

21,980

2,793

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR YEMEN: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2020
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (3-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW

Systematic mine clearance in Yemen has largely stalled in
the past ﬁve years due to the upsurge in conﬂict in 2015 and
a persistent shortage of funding and other resources. YEMAC
reported total mine clearance of only 0.65km2 for 2016−18.
YEMAC was able to carry out emergency operations in 16 of
Yemen’s 21 governorates in 2018 but clearance in the last
three years has mostly targeted UXO and improvised devices.
The data in Table 3 below should be treated with caution.

Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

*0.1

2017

*1.00

2016

*3.00

2015

0

2014

0.34

Total

4.44

* Mine Action Review estimates
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ZIMBABWE

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

7

2017
2018

6.65

MEDIUM,
(NATIONAL ESTIMATE)

13KM

2

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

2.1KM

2

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

Area of Land Released (km2)

6

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

5

4

3

2.8
2

2.1

1.8

1.7
1

22,139
(including 126 destroyed during spot tasks)

0.69

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Zimbabwe remained on track to meet its end-2025 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 mine clearance
deadline, exceeding its annual target for land release in 2018. The primary challenges facing Zimbabwe’s mine action
programme are chieﬂy ﬁnancial. Major survey operations have been completed, and remaining mine contamination, while
extensive, is well quantiﬁed and deﬁned. The national mine action programme is well managed and coordinated by the
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), with clear strategic direction, annual targets, and transparent budget forecasts in its
National Mine Action Strategy and revised Article 5 workplan, which were ofﬁcially launched in March 2018 and in April 2019,
respectively. The main challenge is to ensure sufﬁcient ﬁnancial support to enable Zimbabwe to expand mine action capacity
and achieve completion by its end-2025 deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Zimbabwe should meet the revised annual mine clearance targets published in April 2019 and continue
implementing its National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25.

■

Zimbabwe should expand its use of integrated demining methodologies ﬁrst introduced in 2017, including
mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs), and ofﬁcially incorporate their use into the national mine
action standards.

■

Increased resources should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast-growing national
mine action programme.

■

The Government of Zimbabwe should help ZIMAC to procure additional resources to enable its relocation to
outside restricted-access military facilities.

■

ZIMAC should increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding in order to meet its 2025
clearance completion deadline. Greater linkages between mine action and national development, along with
enhanced cooperation among government ministries, would assist this endeavour.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2018)

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination. Nationwide
non-technical survey was completed in 2016 leaving only conﬁrmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) remain to be addressed. Considerable further release through survey is expected.

8

Zimbabwe’s mine action programme is entirely nationally owned, with a consistent
amount of government support. The sum of US$500,000 has been provided by the
government annually for the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) and the National Mine
Clearance Unit (NMCU) since 2010, while the army contributes to the demining unit and
staff salaries. The mine action programme is well managed by ZIMAC, with a high degree
of consultation and collaboration with operators.

6

The importance of gender is acknowledged in the National Mine Action Strategy.
The National Mine Action Standards do not contain a speciﬁc standard on gender
mainstreaming, though they do refer to the importance of gender, for example in the
deployment of mixed community liaison teams. ZIMAC is considering developing an
internal gender and diversity policy.

8

Improvements in information management continued to be evident in 2018, with ZIMAC
fully transitioning to the use of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),
with assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD). ZIMAC’s National Mine Action Strategy, subsequent revised Article 5 workplan,
and Article 7 report for 2018 all continued to demonstrate consistently accurate and
detailed reporting, which was once a weak point for the national mine action programme.

8

Zimbabwe’s ﬁrst ever National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25 was ofﬁcially launched
by the government in March 2018 following two years of support from the GICHD. The
Strategy, and a subsequent revised workplan published in 2019, accompany Zimbabwe’s
Article 5 extension through to 2025, and present a realistic estimate of remaining
contamination and annual milestones for land release, identifying the resources, time,
and funding needed to complete clearance.

8

Zimbabwe made signiﬁcant strides to increase efﬁciency of land release, with better use
of mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDD) in 2018. Further efforts were made
to reﬁne clearance methodology for ploughshare mine belts. With ongoing improvements
in land release and increasing capacity, and the nature of Zimbabwe’s densely laid
mineﬁelds, operators continue to clear tens of thousands of anti-personnel mines
annually with among the world’s highest number of mines per square metre.

8

A total of nearly 9.4km2 of land was released in 2018, notably surpassing Zimbabwe’s
2018 target for land release under its National Mine Action Strategy and revised Article
5 extension workplan, and a sizeable increase on land release in 2017. With limited
additional funding and capacity, Zimbabwe can meet its Article 5 deadline of end 2025,
which will be a considerable achievement for one of the world’s most heavily mined
countries in a particularly challenging political and economic context.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP &
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
& REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Performance Commentary

8

7.8

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Unit
(NMCU)

■

OTHER ACTORS
■
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APOPO (not operational as at August 2019)
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)

STATES PARTIES

At the end of 2018, Zimbabwe reported a total of just over
52.6km2 of conﬁrmed mined area remaining (see Table 1).1
This is a decrease from the nearly 62km2 reported as at the
end of 2017. 2 According to the operators, this is a “very well
deﬁned” understanding of the problem. 3 In fact, as ZIMAC
explained to Mine Action Review in October 2019, of the total
conﬁrmed mined area, only about one quarter (some 13km2)
is thought to be actually contaminated with considerable area
between mine lines that can be released through survey. 4

mines were laid in very dense belts (on average 2,500 mines
per kilometre of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire”, with
up to 5,500 mines per kilometre in some places. Over time,
this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In
response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare”
directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel
mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire. 6 Anti-vehicle
mines were used extensively by armed groups but most were
detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.7

Zimbabwe’s mine contamination, the overwhelming majority
of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the
laying of mineﬁelds in the late 1970s during a conﬂict of
decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980,
Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along
its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland
mineﬁeld laid by the Rhodesian Army. 5 Initially, anti-personnel

All areas remaining to be addressed are CHAs and no
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remain in Zimbabwe
following the completion of signiﬁcant re-survey in 2016. 8
While this remained the case in 2018, according to ZIMAC,
a total of close to 295,700m2 was added to the total estimate
of contamination due to expansion of existing CHAs during
pre-clearance re-surveys.9

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2018)10
Area of CHA (m2)

Location
Manicaland (Rusitu to Muzite Mission and Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill)

11,912,371

Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Rwenya)

11,391,037

Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazowe)

9,750,767

Matabeleland North (Lusulu)

56,000

Masvingo (Crooks Corner to Sango Border Post)

19,527,360

Total

52,637,535

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine
action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within
the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination
centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated
to report to NAMAAZ.11
As at August 2019, ZIMAC’s ofﬁce remained located inside of a
military cantonment, which limited civilian access. Zimbabwe
has pledged to relocate the ZIMAC ofﬁce many times, once
the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.12
According to ZIMAC’s most recent 2019 projections, a
total of close to US$130 million is required to meet its
extended Article 5 deadline by 2025, with, on average,
close to US$16.2 million per year.13 ZIMAC conﬁrmed that in
2018, the Government of Zimbabwe provided US$500,000
towards the operational and administrative costs of both
the National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) and ZIMAC. The
salaries and allowances and transport expenses of staff
were covered by the army. ZIMAC informed Mine Action
Review that the economic downturn in 2018 was likely to
limit the government’s potential to increase any funding
for mine action; though it expected existing funding levels
to be maintained.14 According to ZIMAC, the Government of

Zimbabwe has committed US$500,000 to the NMCU and for
the operational costs of ZIMAC every year since 2010.15
As part of its focus for 2019, ZIMAC reported comprehensive
resource mobilisation efforts will include building
parliamentary awareness of the national mine action
programme and encouraging greater engagement from
relevant government ministries with a role to play in mine
action, including the Ministry of Health and Child Care and
the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare.16
With assistance from the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ZIMAC developed a
Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy in 2018,
which was ﬁnalised in the ﬁrst half of 2019. As at August
2019, the Strategy had received government approval and
was awaiting an ofﬁcial launch. ZIMAC informed Mine Action
Review that top priorities for which it hoped to procure
additional resources included funding for a planned national
mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victim survey,
website hosting, relocating the ofﬁce outside of the military
cantonment, equipping the NMCU better, and additional
funding for the international demining operators to expand.17
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GENDER
Zimbabwe’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025
includes reference to the importance of addressing gender
and diversity considerations.18 While there is not a speciﬁc
standard on gender mainstreaming in the National Mine
Action Standards (NMAS), reference to gender is contained
within the standards, such as NMAS 07 (Management of
Demining Operations) which requires that “special efforts
should be made to ensure gender balance and diversity of
background for Community Liaison Ofﬁcers”.19
In July 2019, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that while
at present, ZIMAC did not have a separate internal gender
and diversity policy in place, the issue had been discussed
and efforts will be made to develop one. ZIMAC conﬁrmed
that all community groups are routinely consulted in survey
and community liaison activities, with efforts undertaken
to ensure that all age and gender groups are consulted.
Survey and community liaison teams are gender-balanced
and also make use of school teachers and children to further
their outreach. All mine action data is also collected on a
disaggregated basis by sex and age.20
ZIMAC reported that gender is taken into account during the
planning and prioritisation of mineﬁelds for clearance, such as
consideration of the risks taken usually by women and girls to
cross mineﬁelds to fetch water and that of men and boys who
often heard cattle or plough near to mined areas.21 However,
given the nature of the mineﬁelds, which are essentially one
long and continuous line, operational access constraints often
dictate clearance priorities as much as other factors.22 At
the same time, according to The HALO Trust, post-clearance

surveys reﬂect the gendered impact of clearance, such as
women and children who often are reportedly the major
beneﬁciaries of clearance, as they are responsible for more
than 80% of water collection, with clearance providing safer
and more direct access to water sources.23
According to ZIMAC, women are speciﬁcally encouraged
to apply for operational positions in job advertisements,
and 30% of operational roles in the national mine action
programme were held by women in 2018, while 35% of
managerial roles were held by women. Yet ZIMAC stated
that this fell short of “required” levels, and noted that
Zimbabwean women were somewhat reluctant to work
in mine action. More effort is to be placed on raising
awareness among women and ensuring equal opportunities
to employment, regardless of gender. The NMCU, however,
had the lowest level of female employment, with less than
5% women members. This was due to the fact that the NMCU
staff are recruited from the corps of military engineers,
where very few women are engaged. 24
International operators conﬁrmed that each organisation had
gender policies in place for their programme staff, with a focus
on achieving equal access to employment, gender-balanced
survey and clearance teams, gender-focused community liaison
outreach, disaggregated data collection, and a gender focus to
be employed during pre- and post-clearance assessments.25
All operational organisations reported increasing efforts
to encourage women to apply for operational, as well as
managerial positions, and positive trends in the increasing
number of women employed in programmes as a result.26

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Over the past few years, ZIMAC’s information management
capabilities have increased signiﬁcantly, with clear evidence
of improvement in the quality and accuracy of its reporting,
including in its most recent Article 5 deadline extension
request, which established an accurate picture of remaining
contamination and set, for the ﬁrst time, a date for the
completion of mine clearance. ZIMAC’s National Mine Action
Strategy, subsequent revised Article 5 workplan, and
most recent Article 7 report all continued to demonstrate
consistently good quality reporting, something which was
once a weak point for the national mine action programme.
In 2018, ZIMAC fully transitioned to the use of the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
A GICHD information management advisor convened a
workshop in the start of 2018 to ensure that the IMSMA
database was accurate and that ZIMAC personnel were able
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to retrieve all the information it contained. ZIMAC noted that
workshops, trainings, and international expert support for
information management had produced signiﬁcant results
and remained important to ensure the ZIMAC database is up
to date and accurate. 27
Operators likewise conﬁrmed that using IMSMA in 2018
had improved the quality of data management. 28 Quarterly
meetings with ZIMAC and all operators also enhanced
coordination and communication. 29 The HALO Trust
highlighted that monthly meetings with ZIMAC were also
held to cross-reference data, which it said was extremely
positive. 30 ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that work was
ongoing in 2019 to import data on mine and ERW victims led
by the ZIMAC IMSMA focal point. 31

STATES PARTIES

Zimbabwe’s ﬁrst ever national mine action strategy, National
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, developed by ZIMAC
with support from the GICHD and input from government
ministries, the NMCU, and international mine action
organisations, was ofﬁcially launched on 9 March 2018 by
the Vice President and Minister of Defence and War Veterans
Affairs in a public event. 32 The strategic plan complements
Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline extension request, approved
in December 2017, for a period of eight years, until the
end of 2025. Operators have lauded the Strategy for its
comprehensiveness and its realistic outlook on delivery,
which it is hoped will encourage donor funding in its clarity
on the resources and efforts needed to make the 2025
deadline a feasible achievement. 33
In April 2019, Zimbabwe published an updated workplan
to support compliance with its Article 5 deadline of 31
December 2025. The workplan was based on revised

estimates of remaining contamination and, accounting
for progress during 2018, updated annual targets for the
remainder of the extension period. These included 8.2km2 to
be addressed in 2019; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2020; 8.1km2
to be addressed in 2021; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2022;
8.3km2 to be addressed in 2023; 6.9km2 to be addressed in
2024; and the remaining 4.6km2 to be addressed in 2025. 34
Two strategy workshops and one information management
workshop were convened by ZIMAC, supported and facilitated
by the GICHD, with all operators invited to participate. On
the matter of potential “residual” contamination that might
be found after completion of major clearance operations,
ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that plans are in place.
It will fall to ZIMAC, the NMCU, and the army engineers, who
are stationed in all provinces, to deal with any new explosive
devices discovered. 35

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

There is no national legislation speciﬁc to mine action
in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ NMCU and, since 2013,
The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in
Zimbabwe. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) became operational
in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited in 2017, was
yet to commence operations as at August 2019. 43

In July 2019, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that following
the successful pilot projects to introduce the use of MDDs and
mechanical assets by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and The
HALO Trust, revisions to the national mine action standards in
these areas were underway, in consultation with operators,
and would be completed during the year.36 Expanded use of
mechanical and MDD methodologies with other operators was
also being explored.37
During 2018, operators and ZIMAC continued to work
together on reﬁning clearance techniques on ploughshare
mine belts in order to focus narrowly on individual mine rows
and maximise area reduction between the rows. An ongoing
challenge for operators and ZIMAC continued to be the search
for technical solutions to decrease the time spent on “missing
mine drills” when gaps in the mine pattern are found. 38
The HALO Trust reported that its dual-sensor Handheld
Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) detectors were
adding signiﬁcant value in efﬁciency, with up to 16,000 rapid
excavations being conducted per month, saving the equivalent
of three additional mine clearance teams per month.39
Regarding quality management, ZIMAC quality assurance
(QA) monitors were present on site at operations on a daily
basis during 2018. 40 An independent quality control (QC) team
was regularly sent to conduct QC by sampling a minimum
of 10% of completed tasks. 41 Operators conﬁrmed that the
ZIMAC QA/QC process was rigorous, with well trained and
experienced staff. The HALO Trust noted that the combination
of a separate sampling team and a highly accessible
monitoring team worked especially well, with the former
providing thorough external oversight and the latter helping
teams to work through any problems. 42

According to ZIMAC, the total deminers deployed by the
NMCU rose by 12 in 2018, from 135 in 2017 to 147 in 2018,
with additional deminers employed to start re-survey of
the Lusulu mineﬁeld to verify the size of contamination
prior to clearance. 44
NPA reported that as a result of lost funding at the end of
2017, the number of manual clearance teams deployed was
reduced from seven to three; however, capacity was later
increased to ﬁve manual clearance teams from September
2018 when additional funding was secured. 45
In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed 25 manual demining teams
and 2 mechanical teams to conduct combined clearance and
technical survey. In addition, one community outreach team
was also deployed to conduct risk education and community
liaison. A total of 375 people were employed as part of
HALO’s operations during the year. 46
At the start of 2018, MAG deployed one manual clearance
team, which increased to three teams during the year with
additional funding, for a total of 35 deminers and requisite
ﬁeld and support staff. 47
Despite its accreditation to start mine action operations in
2017, as at August 2019, APOPO still had not managed to
secure the funding required to start operations. APOPO
reported it is tasked to survey and clear a 7km2 area along
the course of a 37km-long stretch of mineﬁeld along the
border with Mozambique. The mineﬁeld begins in Chiredzi
district, Masvingo province, in south-eastern Zimbabwe, in
a conservation area just outside Gonarezhou national park
in an area known as the Sengwe Wildlife Corridor. In July
2019, APOPO informed Mine Action Review that its priorities
were to secure funding for one or more manual teams to be
deployed by late 2019. 48
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OPERATIONAL TOOLS

DEMINING SAFETY

While the majority of clearance in Zimbabwe continued to
be manual in 2018, mechanical assets and MDDs were being
actively integrated into the national mine action programme.
As at end 2018, however, the use of MDDs was limited to
technical survey and clearance of soil with a high metallic
content and the use of mechanical assets limited to clearance
of areas with deeply buried mines and also areas with a high
metallic content. 49

The HALO Trust reported that a demining accident occurred
during clearance of a dense R2M2 mineﬁeld after a deminer
excavated a signal in an unauthorised manner, initiating
an R2M2 mine, resulting in the loss of two ﬁngers. The
incident was investigated by a team comprising HALO Trust
personnel, ZIMAC, and an external consultant and ﬁndings
were shared with ZIMAC for wider distribution in the mine
action sector. 51

MAG did not deploy any mechanical assets or MDDs in 2018,
but reported that discussions with ZIMAC were ongoing in
2019 to explore their potential use in future operations. 50

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of nearly 9.4km2 of land was released in 2018, with close to 8.7km2 of mined area released through clearance and
technical survey and just under 0.7km2 cancelled through non-technical survey. 52 Notably, this surpassed Zimbabwe’s
2018 target for land release of 7.16km2 under its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 and mine action workplan. 53

SURVEY IN 2018
Just over 7.3km2 of land was released through survey in
2018: nearly 0.7km2 was cancelled through non-technical
survey while close to 6.6km2 was reduced through technical
survey. 54 In 2017, nearly 4.6km2 of land was released through
survey (just under 1.8km2 cancelled and 2.8km2 reduced). 55
Since the cancellation of huge amounts of land during survey
in 2014–16, no new signiﬁcant survey has been undertaken or
required. According to ZIMAC, the few areas of cancellation in
2018 were the result of pre-clearance re-survey of a number
of polygons carried out to conﬁrm previous data of surveyed
areas or where stretches of polygons were found not to
contain mines. 56
Positively, area reduced through technical survey more than
doubled in 2018, due to an increase in area reduced by the
NMCU as they moved further down the Mwenezi to Sango
Border Post mineﬁeld and the perimeter fencing of the area
and corresponding polygon widened but the three mine rows
maintained the same width, enabling greater area reduction
between the mine rows and perimeter fencing. 57 The
comprehensive use of MDDs by NPA in technical survey also
proved effective, resulting in larger outputs of land reduced. 58
ZIMAC reported that the NMCU likewise had high reduction
output through technical survey due to distinct mine lines
within a well-marked mineﬁeld in its areas of operations. 59

Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 201860
Area

Area cancelled
(m²)

Rushinga

HALO Trust

Gozi

MAG

16,932

Muzite to Rusitu

NPA

354,985

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

NPA

Total

125,533

196,073
693,523

Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 201861
Area reduced
(m2)

Area

Operator

Musengezi to Mazowe

HALO Trust

947,617

Mazowe to Rwenya

MAG

274,828

Mwenezi to Sango
Border Post

NMCU

Rusitu to Muzite

NPA

672,756

Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill

NPA

766,621

Total
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Operator

3,984,435

6,646,257

STATES PARTIES

Clearance of anti-personnel mined area increased in 2018
to 2.1km2 up from 1.7km2 cleared in 2017. The number of
anti-personnel mines destroyed fell, however, from nearly
30,500 in 2017 to just over 22,000 in 2018. This was primarily
caused by a sharp decrease in the number of anti-personnel
mines destroyed by NPA during the year, which fell from
nearly 13,500 in 2017 to just over 600 in 2018. According to
NPA, this signiﬁcant decrease was due to the fact that the

sectors of mineﬁeld it was working on in 2018 contained only
one mine row, while in 2017 its teams were deployed to parts
of the mineﬁeld that contained six mine rows at a time. 62
In addition, a total of 126 anti-personnel mines were
destroyed during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot
tasks in 2018: 95 anti-personnel mines destroyed by The
HALO Trust, 25 anti-personnel mines destroyed by NPA,
and 6 mines destroyed by MAG. 63

Table 4: Mine clearance in 201864
Area

Operator

Musengezi to Mazowe

HALO Trust

Mazowe to Rwenya

MAG

Mwenezi

NMCU

Rusitu

NPA

311,351

8

Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill

NPA

232,605

597

2,112,430

22,013

Totals

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

1,245,435

19,137

130,208

211

192,831

2,060

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ZIMBABWE: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST TO THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINES (COMBINED 5-YEAR, 10 MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (8-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH

Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
2

Year

Area cleared (km )

2018

2.11

2017

1.66

2016

1.67

2015

0.71

2014

0.49

Total

6.64

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required
to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
31 December 2025. It is broadly on track to meet this deadline.

ZIMAC conﬁrmed in July 2019 that the 31 December 2025
deadline is achievable, provided that some additional funding
is secured. The revised targets for land release in 2019 were
on track to be met, with some organisations surpassing their
targets. This, it is hoped, will offset the fact that APOPO has
yet to start operations or fulﬁl any of its land release targets.
ZIMAC was optimistic that, with the approval and ofﬁcial
launch of the Communications and Resource Mobilisation
Strategy in 2019, the additional funding required to meet the
2025 deadline will be secured. 65
All international mine action operators were in agreement
that based on existing capacity alone, it will be challenging
for Zimbabwe to meet its 2025 target, but optimistically also
concurred that, with relatively small additions in funding
and capacity, it is still possible. 66 This is hard to sustain if
the current estimate of mined area is robust. With less than
seven years to go and some 50km2 to release, this would
require massive increases in clearance productivity.
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The HALO Trust emphasised that the more teams that can
be put on the ground now will save additional costs and
expenditure on equipment needed in the future. It also
reiterated that if Mozambique could be persuaded to release
the demining equipment it was holding, three and a half
years after declaring itself mine free, the equipment could be
transferred across the border and would be a great help to
demining efforts in Zimbabwe. 67
MAG echoed these concerns about funding, emphasising that
the challenges presented by the internal economic situation
and external funding perceptions were considerable. The
chronic failings of the national economy have led to continuing
shortages of basic goods, lengthy fuel queues, inconsistent
supplies, and inﬂation levels at nearly 200%. These economic
limitations, combined with changes in currency regulations
and the rising cost of fuel, is putting a strain on already ﬁnite
funding sources for all operators, it said. 68
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A further concern as noted above, the revised workplan
and budget also include projections for APOPO as an
implementing partner, and, as at August 2019, as they were
yet to be operational, other operators will either need to
increase their land release output or Zimbabwe risks falling
short of its targets.
At the same time, there are many, clearly positive aspects of
Zimbabwe’s mine action programme, such as having a strong,
nationally-owned mine action centre led by experienced
and dedicated staff members; a realistic estimate of the
remaining problem and national mine action strategy; and a
collaborative working environment in which operators can
quickly ramp up capacity and output, putting additional funds
immediately to use towards an achievable goal.

STATES PARTIES
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Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC,
31 July 2019.

33

Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.

34

Article 7 Report (for 2018), p. 36.

2

Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

35

Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.

3

Email from Sam Fricker, Programme Manager, HALO Zimbabwe,
18 September 2019.

36

Ibid.

37

Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019.

38

Emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski,
MAG, 1 August 2019.

39

Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.

40

Ibid.; and emails from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019; and
Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 15 July 2019.

41

Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 12 June 2018.
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Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.
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Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and
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44

Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019; and Article 7
Report (for 2018), p. 37.

1

4

Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 October 2019.

5

2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 1; and
email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.

6

HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, accessed 10 February 2014;
2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary; and Analysis
of Zimbabwe’s 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the
President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties
mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

7

HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, undated but accessed
10 February 2014.

8

Article 7 report (for 2017), Form D.

9

Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.

10
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further divided into smaller areas, which by end 2018 included 171 (ongoing
and open) areas recorded in the IMSMA database. As noted by the Article 5
Committee, there is a “minor discrepancy in Zimbabwe’s report in which Form
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ARMENIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Armenia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Armenia has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination, including in military restricted zones.

■

Armenia should mobilise the necessary resources to ﬁnish mine clearance and set a deadline for the
completion of operations.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Armenia had more than 5.7km2 of conﬁrmed mined area and a further 3.8km2 of suspected mined area,
as set out in Table 1. The mined areas contained anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, or a combination of both, as well
as unexploded ordnance (UXO).1 Of 96 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs), 56 contain anti-personnel mines, totalling just
over 2.9km2. Three of the six suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), totalling just over 0.1km2, may also be contaminated by
anti-personnel mines. 2 Territory seized from Azerbaijan during the conﬂict is believed to be signiﬁcantly contaminated by
mines and ERW, including unexploded submunitions.3 However, the precise extent of contamination in those districts
is unknown.
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018) 4
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

AP mines

42

2,192,049

3

105,500

AV mines

40

2,807,879

3

3,728,442

AP and AV mines

11

706,046

0

0

2

12,769

0

0

Type of contamination

AP mines and UXO
AP and AV mines and UXO
Totals

1

4,842

0

0

96

5,723,585

6

3,833,942

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Four of Armenia’s eleven provinces still contain mined areas. Three are contaminated with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines, while the fourth – Vayots Dzor – is contaminated solely with anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 2.5 The difference in
total mine contamination between the end of 2017 and end of 2018 cannot be explained or reconciled by the total area released
during the intervening 12 months.
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CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

AP mines

3

584,022

2

105,123

AV mines

5

2,428,128

3

3,728,442

AP mines

33

1,440,476

1

377

AV mines

22

296,696

0

0

AP and AV mines

8

676,617

0

0

AP mines and UXO

2

12,769

0

0

AP and AV mines and UXO

1

4,842

0

0

AP mines

6

167,551

0

0

AV mines

Province

Type of contamination

Gegharqunik

Syunik

Tavush

Vayots Dzor
Totals

10

15,603

0

0

AP and AV mines

3

29,429

0

0

AV mines

3

67,452

0

0

96

5,723,585

6

3,833,942

A Landmine Impact Survey was conducted in Armenia in
2005, followed by partial survey of 17 sites by The HALO
Trust in 2012, and then again, in 2012–13, by the Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). FSD found 17 SHAs
estimated to cover 26km2 and 114 CHAs that covered 21km2 in
four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas,
totalling 1.8km2, contained only UXO and not mines.7 In 2018,
the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE)
stated that it planned to conduct non-technical survey in
Gegharkunik province but that the military-restricted zones
continued to be off limits for survey and clearance. 8

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination
in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conﬂict
with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, in which both sides used mines.
The heaviest contamination is along the borders and
confrontation lines with Azerbaijan, including the area in and
around Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories controlled
by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces. Armenia’s
border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the
border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era, is still
contaminated.9 While non-technical survey in 2012–13 by the
FSD did not ﬁnd evidence of mines outside the buffer zones in
Ararat province, which borders Turkey, certain areas on that
border remain unsurveyed because they are controlled by
Russian border troops.10

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in
2011 as a civilian, non-commercial state body responsible
for conducting survey and clearance and identifying
contaminated areas. In 2013, the CHDE was made Armenia’s
national mine action centre.11 The CHDE can negotiate with
international demining organisations, accept international
funding, sign contracts, and receive international
assistance.12 The CHDE has an advisory board, composed of
representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Emergency
Situations, Territorial Administration, Education, and Justice.13
In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE
began developing national mine action legislation. The CHDE
began drafting the law in 201514 with the support of the OSCE
ofﬁce in Yerevan.15 As at April 2019, the CHDE expected to
submit the draft mine action law to the new Parliament of
Armenia for discussion before the end of the year following
which it will need to receive government approval and be
adopted by parliament.16

In 2018, the Armenian government allocated AMD212 million
(approx. US$433,000) to cover the costs of the CHDE. No
separate funding was provided for survey and/or clearance
operations. In 2019, the government allocated AMD339 million
(approx. $691,000) of which AMD110 million was for survey
and clearance operations. Armenia does not receive any
donor funding for mine action.17
The CHDE receives capacity development support from the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). CHDE staff have been trained in land release, risk
education, and information management.18
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Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2018) 6

GENDER
The CHDE does not have a gender policy and implementation plan but has reported that gender has been mainstreamed in
Armenia’s draft national mine action strategy. During community liaison activities, all groups affected by mine contamination
are consulted, including women and children. The CHDE is said to offer equal employment opportunities for both men and
women. Two the department heads within the CHDE are female and out of a total of 47 employees 15 are women (32%),
most of whom occupy senior or specialist roles. However, there are no women working in the survey or clearance teams.19

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
With FSD’s support, the CHDE set up and manages the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database. 20 In 2018, the CHDE had planned to install IMSMA Core but this was deferred to 2019. 21

PLANNING AND TASKING
The draft National Strategic Plan on Mine Action was
approved by the Armenian government in 2018 and it
was expected that it would be adopted in 2019. The main
objectives of the draft Plan are to address, as a priority,
anti-personnel mines in CHAs that have a humanitarian
impact, increasing community safety in support of the
achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. 22

Priority for clearance is based on CHDE criteria. Priority is
given ﬁrst to contaminated areas that are up to 1km away
from a population centre, then to those near agricultural land,
and ﬁnally to contaminated areas that negatively affect the
environment. These are mostly located in the mountains. To
optimise efﬁcient deployment of resources, clearance plans
are typically drawn up on a community-by-community basis. 23

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, the CHDE developed
the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS)
and submitted them for government approval. The NMAS
were approved by the government in April 2014. 24 In 2018,
amendments were made to the NMAS for mine risk education,
accreditation of demining organisations, and mine detection
dogs (MDDs). According to CHDE, reviews of the NMAS are
conducted following the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) and international best practice. 25

All demining in Armenia is conducted by the Armenian
Peacekeeping Engineering Brigade (PKEB) and the CHDE.
In 2018, the PKEB deployed three teams of seven clearance
personnel. In addition, the CHDE deployed one technical
survey team. In 2019, both technical survey and clearance
capacity were planned to be increased. 28

The CHDE will further develop its standing operating
procedures (SoPs) once the draft law on mine action has
been adopted. 26 SoPs on manual mine clearance and battle
area clearance (BAC) have already been elaborated. 27

Quality management is conducted in accordance with IMAS and
the NMAS. Quality assurance (QA) is conducted by dedicated
ofﬁcers who make regular ﬁeld visits to inspect cleared land.29
Quality control (QC) is conducted once clearance of the land
has been completed, but prior to handover.30

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Six MDDs were introduced in Armenia but failed their
accreditation in 2017 and were returned so could not be
involved in demining operations as planned. 31 As at April 2019,
there were no plans to bring back MDDs to Armenia although
the CHDE is open to discuss the possibility of involving MDDs
in its operations in the future. 32
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled or reduced
through survey in 2018. A total of 46,881m2 of ERWcontaminated area was reduced in the Chambarak locality
in Gegharkunik province.
2

In 2018, a total of 9,237m of anti-personnel mined area was
cleared from Davit Bek CHA in the Kapan locality in Syunik
province. During clearance, only one anti-personnel mine
was found. In addition, in 2018, the CHDE implemented the
following clearance activities: clearance of 3,128m2 of antivehicle mined area in Tegh in Syunik province and clearance
of 6,676m2 of ERW in Kornidzor in Syunik province.
No target date has been set for the completion of mine
clearance in Armenia, due to the uncertainty over future
capacity and funding. 33 Moreover, over the past ﬁve years,
demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates
paltry, as Table 3 illustrates. In 2018, very little demining
took place. Armenia claims that challenges in its mine and
ERW clearance include the low level of contamination and
the random distribution of mines. 34

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014–18
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

*0.01

2017

0

2016

0.02

2015

0.07

2014

0.04

Total

*0.14

* Area rounded up.

Operational capacity was expected to increase in 2019 with
clearance continuing of the Davit Bek CHA. This is near a
highway directly affecting people’s safety and will be used
for pasture once clearance is completed. 35 Going forward
Armenia will struggle to complete clearance without a
signiﬁcant increase in funding and capacity.
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AZERBAIJAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Azerbaijan has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Azerbaijan should complete the countrywide re-survey of anti-personnel mine contamination.

■

Azerbaijan should ensure that clearance is only conducted in areas where there is ﬁrm evidence
of contamination.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of contamination from anti-personnel
mines in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently
occupy a signiﬁcant area of the country where considerable
contamination exists. The Azerbaijan National Agency for
Mine Action (ANAMA) has suggested that contamination in
areas occupied by Armenia may cover between 350km2 and
830km2, and contain between 50,000 and 100,000 mines.1

As at the end of 2018, Azerbaijan estimated that it had 14
anti-personnel mined areas covering a total of more than
1.6km2 (see Table 2). Before this latest estimate, the previous
assessment of anti-personnel mine contamination provided
by ANAMA was 69.9km2 in 2015. 3

At the end of 2018, Azerbaijan reported 33 mined areas in
regions under its control totalling 4.1km2 (see Table 1). A more
precise estimate of contamination will only be known after
completion of a countrywide re-survey but as at April 2019,
no such survey was planned. In 2018, however, an additional
98,887m2 of mined area was added to the database.2
Table 1: Mined area by type (at end 2018) 4
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs that may contain mines

Area (m2)

6

1,142,486

7

503,000

Anti-vehicle mines

10

1,302,960

9

1,195,720

Totals

17

2,445,446

16

1,698,720

Contamination
Anti-personnel mines

CHAs = Conﬁrmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)
Region

CHAs

Area(m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Jabrayil

1

98,887

2

250,000

Fizuli

3

815,462

2

85,000

Khojavend

1

226,500

0

50,000

Garadagh

1

1,637

1

48,000

Aghdam

0

0

1

70,000

Aghjabedi

0

0

1

0

Totals

6

1,142,486

7

503,000
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Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, as well as parts of Aghdam,
Fizuli, and Tartar, are under the control of Armenian forces,
and are suspected to contain both mines and unexploded
ordnance (UXO). 5
Azerbaijan is also suspected to be contaminated with cluster
munition remnants and other ERW: both UXO and abandoned
explosive ordnance (AXO), the extent of which is not
known (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants 2019 report on Azerbaijan for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
ANAMA, the de facto national mine action authority and
mine action centre, is tasked with planning, coordinating,
managing, and monitoring mine action in the country. It
also conducts demining operations, along with two national
operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and
the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF). No commercial
company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan. 6
UNDP provides capacity development to ANAMA and will
continue to do so until 2020. The ﬁve main project activities
are: maximising the socio-economic impact of clearance;
supporting the institutional capacity of ANAMA for mine/
UXO clearance according to international and national mine
action standards; promoting ANAMA as an international mine
action centre; procurement and upgrading of equipment;

and introducing a gender-sensitive approach to mine action
to Azerbaijan.7 According to ANAMA, as at end April 2019,
project outputs included improvements to ANAMA’s regional
structure, enhanced international training services, better
training equipment, and support for the training centre. 8
As at April 2019, Azerbaijan was still in the process of
adopting a national mine action law, with draft legislation
under review by the Cabinet of Ministers.9 Once adopted,
it will regulate mine action in Azerbaijan, governing issues
such as licensing, accreditation, quality assurance (QA), and
tender procedures.10
The Azerbaijani government funds 90% of ANAMA’s operating
costs and 90% of all survey and clearance activities in
Azerbaijan.11

GENDER
ANAMA does not have a gender policy. There are no women working in any operational roles in survey and clearance in
Azerbaijan. However, women do participate in mine risk education sessions and are consulted during survey.12
One of the goals of the UNDP-ANAMA capacity strengthening project is to introduce a gender-sensitive approach to mine action
to Azerbaijan.13 This is deﬁned as delivering train the trainer sessions to mine action staff on a gender-sensitive approach to
working with affected populations and the development of an accompanying training manual. No information on progress
towards this goal has been provided by ANAMA or UNDP.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
ANAMA uses an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and is working with the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to upgrade this to the latest IMSMA Core during 2019–20.14

PLANNING AND TASKING
The existing mine action strategy was for 2013–18.15 Its main
aims were said to be to continue mine and ERW clearance in
support of government development projects and to provide
safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.16
The strategy expired at the end of 2018 and has not yet
been replaced.

ANAMA had annual workplans for both 2018 and 2019. In
2019, ANAMA was intending to continue mine clearance in
Aghdam and Aghjabedi, Fizuli, Heybet, Jabrayil, and Terter
regions. In the absence of a new multi year strategic plan,
tasks are prioritised according to the state development
plan and instructions from the government.18

ANAMA is integrated into the State Social and Economic
Development programme and mine action is reported to be
an integral part of the new state socio-economic development
plan developed for 2019–22.17
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Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in
Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conﬂict
with Armenia – which saw landmines laid by both sides –
and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The
most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders
and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh (see
the report on Nagorno-Karabakh in this report for further
information). The adjoining districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil,

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

Azerbaijan has its own National Mine Action Standards
(NMAS), which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently
revised in 2003, 2004, and 2010 in accordance with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and best
practice.19 No major modiﬁcations to the standards were
made in 2018. 20

In 2018, ANAMA employed 613 operational and administrative
staff across six regional centres (including the Regional Mine
Action Resource and Training Centre).22
The Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division
continued its quality management (QM)-related activities
during 2018. There were both quality assurance (QA) and
quality control (QC) sampling inspections. QA and QC were
carried out on both ANAMA’s operations and the operations
by the two national NGOs. 23

ANAMA also has standing operating procedures (SoPs)
in place, which were reviewed in 2018. 21

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mechanical assets are used
to support reduction through technical survey and manual
clearance operations. 24 In 2018, Azerbaijan had 48 MDDs and
6 machines.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled or reduced through survey in 2018. 25
In 2018, a total of 353,258m2 of mined area was cleared, as set out in Table 3. In Aghdam and Aghjabedi only two anti-personnel
mines were found in clearance of 1,500m2 and 10,000m2, respectively. In Jabrayil, no anti-personnel mines were found during
clearance but only ten items of UXO. This is a marked decrease from clearance in 2017 when 7.69km2 was cleared (or 4km2 if
you exclude cleared areas with no anti-personnel mine contamination). In addition, two anti-personnel mines were found and
destroyed during EOD spot tasks.
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2018 26
Areas
cleared

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

ANAMA

3

238,396

25

1

2

RA

0

1,500

1

0

0

Aghjabedi

RA

0

10,000

1

0

0

Garadagh

ANAMA

1

4,475

2

0

150

Jabrayil

ANAMA

1

98,887

0

0

10

5

353,258

29

1

162

Region

Operator

Fizuli
Aghdam

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7
transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not submitted
an Article 7 report in the last nine years. Over the last ﬁve
years, 11.47km2 of mined area has been cleared in Azerbaijan.
Mine clearance output fell dramatically in 2018 after a large
increase in 2017 (see Table 4). Accuracy of reporting of
contamination, survey and clearance data continues to be an
issue in Azerbaijan as does effectiveness and efﬁciency of
land release methodology with many areas being cleared
that prove to have little or no mine contamination. As at
April 2019, no target date had been set for the completion
of anti-personnel mine clearance in Azerbaijan.

Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.35

2017

*4.00

2016

0.83

2015

1.49

2014

4.80

Total

11.47

* A further 3.7km2 was cleared but was found not to contain mines.
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STATES NOT PARTY

AZERBAIJAN

1

ANAMA “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018”, p. 5.

14

Email from Maria Gurova, Programme Ofﬁcer, GICHD, 22 August 2019.

2

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Ofﬁcer, ANAMA, 2 April 2019.

15

3

Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Ofﬁcer, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

Email from Parviz Gidayev, Planning & Development Manager, ANAMA, 20
May 2015; and ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017”,
p. 10.

16

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA 2 May 2018.

17

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 April 2019.

18

Ibid.

19

Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

20

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 April 2019.

4

Ibid.

5

ANAMA “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018”, p. 5.

6

Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Ofﬁcer, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

7

UNDP, “Review & Recommendation to Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine
Action (ANAMA) in Support of its Transformation into International Centre
for Demining assessment 2018”, 17 July 2018.

8

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 April 2019.

21

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

22

ANAMA, 2018 report, undated.

10

Email from Parviz Gidayev, ANAMA, 20 May 2015; and ANAMA, “Azerbaijan
National Agency for Mine Action 2014”.

23

Ibid.

24

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 April 2019.

11

Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 April 2019.

25

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

13

UNDP, “Review & Recommendation to Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine
Action (ANAMA) in Support of its Transformation into International Centre
for Demining assessment 2018”, 17 July 2018.
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CHINA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, China has obligations under international human rights law
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL
MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of mine contamination remaining in China is
not known. In the 1990s, the United States reported that
China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the
Russian Federation, and Vietnam.1 China’s military estimated
that around two million mines of a wide variety of types
were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone. 2 China has
not reported on mine contamination along its borders with
Russia and India or on operations to clear them.
China conducted clearance operations along its border
with Vietnam between 1992 and 1999, 3 between 2005 and
2009, 4 and between 2015 and 2018. 5 In 2009, China said it
had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its
border with Vietnam and that this “represents the completion
of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s
territory.”6 This was followed by a statement in 2011 when
a Foreign Ministry ofﬁcial reported that China maintains
a small number of mineﬁelds “for national defence”.7 Two
months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China
said that large-scale demining activities had “on the whole
eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories”. 8 At
the Maputo Review Conference in 2014, China said it had
“basically eradicated landmines on its own territory”.9
Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three
‘campaigns’ in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region. The ﬁrst was in 1992–94 and the second
in 1997–99.10 However, these two campaigns did not deal with
mineﬁelds located in disputed areas of the border, where

1

US Department of State, “Hidden Killers 1994”, Washington, DC, September
1998, p. 18, and Table A-1.

2

“Landmine sweeping on Sino-Vietnam border nearly completed”, Xinhua,
31 December 2008, at: on.china.cn/31F8D7u.

3

Ministry of Defence, “Post-war Demining Operations in China”, December
1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, there were said to be more than
560 mineﬁelds covering a total area of more than 300km2.

500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km2. After a technical
survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance
campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan
province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed
clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km2.11
In early November 2015, however, China embarked on a
further demining operation along the border with Vietnam.12
In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report
submitted in March 2017, China reported that in November
2015–February 2017, the Chinese army cleared 18.4km2 of
mineﬁelds on the Yunnan border.13

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any
mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) as a military activity.

LAND RELEASE
Media accounts reported that mine clearance resumed in
November 2017 in the Yunnan border area and in the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region.14 Clearance was reportedly
completed in November 2018, with 2,300 explosive items
found and destroyed across 1.5km2 in Guangxi province.15
In Yunnan province an estimated 200,000 explosive items
were found and destroyed in over 50km2 of mined area
between November 2015 and November 2018.16

9

Statement of China, Third APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

10

“Landmine sweeping on Sino-Vietnam border nearly completed”, Xinhua,
31 December 2008.

11

Statement of China, Second APMBC Review Conference, Cartagena,
4 December 2009.

12

P. Scally, “Huge land mine clearance underway in Wenshan, Honghe”,
Blog post, Gokunming, 5 November 2015, at: bit.ly/2OWbdVe.

13

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B.
Unofﬁcial translation.

14

“Land mine removal resumes on border”, China Daily, 29 November 2017,
at: bit.ly/2ZXUwtr; and “China’s Guangxi completes de-mining mission along
Sino-Vietnam border”, China Daily, 26 November 2018, at: bit.ly/33xCdNT.

4

Interview with Shen Jian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 1 April 2008; and
Huizi and Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the
Sino-Vietnam border”, Xinhua, 31 December 2008.

5

“Yunnan completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnamese border”,
Xinhua, 16 November 2018, at: bit.ly/2yYXXnL.

6

Statement of China, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.

15

7

Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011.

“China’s Guangxi completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnam border”,
China Daily, 26 November 2018, at: bit.ly/33xCdNT.

16

8

Statement of China, APMBC 11th Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh,
29 November 2011.

“Yunnan completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnamese border”,
Xinhua, 16 November 2018, at: bit.ly/2yYXXnL.

294 Clearing the Mines 2019

STATES NOT PARTY

CUBA
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Cuba has obligations under international human rights law
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years. Cuban authorities maintain mineﬁelds around the United
States (US) naval base at Guantánamo in the south-east of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard
to guaranteeing a responsible use of anti-personnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national
security.”1 According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing mineﬁelds are duly “marked, fenced and
guarded” in accordance with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts. 2
According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month”, 3 but it has not been
possible to independently conﬁrm this claim. In February 2018, a ﬁre broke out in the 17-mile strip of land separating the
Guantánamo base from Cuban territory which reportedly detonated 1,000 landmines and burned 1,700 acres over three days
before being extinguished. 4

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no mine action programme in Cuba.

LAND RELEASE
Cuba has not conducted clearance in its mineﬁelds around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last ten years.

1

Statement by Rebeca Hernández Toledano, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN, “Item 29: Assistance in mine action”, UN General Assembly,
Fourth Committee, New York, 6 November 2007.

2

Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000.

3

“The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting ﬁres that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]…
described a ﬁre that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding….” D. P. Erikson, Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro,
the United States, and the Next Revolution, Bloomsbury, United States, October 2008, pp. 196–97.

4

“U.S. and Cuban forces unite to ﬁght a common foe: wildﬁre at Guantanamo” USA Today, 1 March 2018, at: bit.ly/2KytDH9.
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EGYPT
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Egypt has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination
in Egypt remains unknown and past estimates have been
unreliable. Egypt is contaminated with mines in the Western
Desert, which date from the Second World War, and in the
Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert, which are a legacy of
wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973. Some recent mine
incidents in Sinai may have been caused by mines emplaced
by anti-government jihadist groups.1 It was reported in
August 2016 that Islamic State had been digging up Second
World War-era landmines and re-using them.2
Most of the Western Desert contamination occurred around
the location of Second World War battles that took place
between the Quattara depression and Alamein on the
Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the
city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.
In November 2016, during a ceremony to mark the opening
of a new prosthetic limb centre, the United Kingdom’s
Ambassador to Egypt announced that all the maps of
mineﬁelds laid by British and Allied forces during World War
II had been handed over. 3 According to the head of the military
engineering department, though, the British mineﬁeld maps
were “sketch maps” and most of the mines were buried
randomly. 4 Major General Mahrous Kilani, Head of the General
Secretariat for Mine Clearance, reported that while the mine
maps are an indication of possible mine locations many mines
have been found in areas that are unmarked by the maps. 5
In January 2018, the British MP Daniel Kawczynski
put a written question to the UK Secretary of State for
International Development asking whether her Department
was taking steps to assist with the mapping and disposal
of Second World War mines in the Tobruk and El Alamein
regions. The UK reiterated that maps of mineﬁeld locations
had been provided to the Egyptian authorities and that, since
2006, through multilateral funding along with other donors
(including Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and the United
States), the United Kingdom had funded clearance of 130,446
acres of land around El Alamein. 6
The Egyptian government has claimed that some 17 million
mines remained in the Western Desert and another 5.5
million in Sinai and the Eastern Desert.7 In an April 2009
assessment, though, the United Nations (UN) Mine Action
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Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid
reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby
misrepresenting the problem. 8 In this regard, in October 2017,
it was reported by the European Union (EU)’s ambassador
to Egypt that 2,680km2 of land in the North West Coast was
claimed to still be contaminated.9
In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining
and Development of the North West Coast (Executive
Secretariat) reported to donors that the army had destroyed
2.9 million mines while clearing 38km² in ﬁve areas, leaving
“more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area
of 248km².10 Details of items cleared are not consistent with
other available information.
In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing
and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of
some 105km² in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly
cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of
clearance operations were not reported. Minister of Housing
Tarek Waﬁq was quoted as saying that with completion of the
project one-ﬁfth of the Western Desert had been cleared.11
In August 2016, it was reported that Islamic State had been
harvesting the explosives from Second World War mines
still uncleared in Egypt. According to Ambassador Fathy
el-Shazly, formerly the head of Egypt’s Executive Secretariat
for Mine Clearance, “We’ve had at least 10 reports from the
military of terrorists using old mines. Even now, these things
trouble us in different ways.”12 These ﬁndings were reiterated
in June 2017 at a UN Security Council brieﬁng when Egypt’s
permanent representative to the UN Amr Abdel-Latif Abul
Atta stated that “abandoned mines and explosive remnants of
wars have become a source of access for armed movements
and terrorists to ﬁnd materials for manufacturing improvised
explosive devices”.13 It was reported in January 2018 that
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), which pledged allegiance to
Islamic State in 2014, has been using old mines and caches of
explosives left in Sinai to produce different types of explosive
devices. There were at least ﬁve major attacks by terrorist
groups using such devices in Egypt in 2017.14 This should
serve as a wake-up call to Egypt to pursue mine clearance
with far greater vigour than it has so far done so.

STATES NOT PARTY

In 2018 as in previous years, the mine action programme in
Egypt was not functioning effectively.
A joint project between the Egyptian government and the
UN Development Programme (UNDP) “Support the North
West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme:
Mine Action” was conducted in two phases from 2007 to
2014 and from 2015 to 2017. The project provided for the
creation of an Executive Secretariat for Mine Clearance and
the Development of the North West Coast within the Ministry
of Planning to coordinate implementation of the North West
Coast Development Plan through a partnership consisting
of the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Defence, and
UNDP.15 It was acknowledged in May 2015 by the Director
of the Executive Secretariat that past results had been
“disappointing”.16 It was reported that a total area of 1,096km²
has been “cleared” since 2009 and that there were plans to
establish an eco-oriented city, the “New City of Alamein”.17
Funding was also used for capacity building, establishing a
quality management unit, and supporting the creation of
the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) database.

Clearance was conducted by the Mine Clearance Branch of
the Egyptian Armed Forces Engineering Authority using both
manual and mechanical demining techniques.18 The Executive
Secretariat is said to have procured 461 mine detectors,
355 demining suits and protective helmets, one Casspir
armoured vehicle with the “Mine Lab” detecting device, and
ﬁve Armtrac vehicles.19 In August 2017, it was reported that
negotiations had begun on a third phase of the project to
allocate $5 million to clear the rest of the northern coast and
the Sinai Peninsula. 20
In May 2017, Kuwait granted Egypt an aid package of
almost US$1 million for mine clearance in the North-West
Coast area. 21 In January 2019, Egypt called for renewed
international support for mine clearance, especially around El
Alamein. Parliament member Mohamed el-Ghoul resubmitted
a 2017 motion demanding ﬁnancial compensation from the
countries that laid mines in Egypt, mainly Germany and the
United Kingdom. 22

LAND RELEASE
Egypt has not reported with any credibility on its release of mined areas in recent years and no target date has been set for the
completion of mine clearance.
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“Sinai landmine kills three soldiers”, News24, 9 March 2015, at:
bit.ly/31LTzVp.

12

P. Schwartzstein, “ISIS Is Digging Up Nazi Landmines From World War 2
As Explosives”, Newsweek, 10 August 2016.

2
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10 August 2016, at: bit.ly/2KBMtgz.

13

UN Security Council meeting, UN doc. SC/12866, 13 June 2017, at: bit.
ly/2YSmjPl.
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at: bit.ly/2HbRwCe.
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single incident”, Times of Egypt, 26 February 2018, Unofﬁcial translation at:
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GEORGIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Georgia has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the
Red Bridge border mineﬁeld.

■

Georgia should grant access to The HALO Trust to complete survey and clearance of the remaining
mined areas.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The full extent of mine contamination in Georgia is not known. According to estimates, as set out in Table 1, Georgia more
than 2.3km2 of mined areas across nine mineﬁelds. Contamination comprises both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.
The problem includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri municipality, and Vaziani village, in Gardabani municipality, both of which
are in military zones. Khojali mountain, in Mestia municipality, is on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with Abkhazia,
where the size of mined areas is not known.1
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018) 2
Region

District/
Municipality

Village

Contamination

Mined
areas

Area (m2)

Kvemo Kartli

Marneuli

Kachagani (Red Bridge)

AP and AV mines

1

2,282,852

Kvemo Kartli

Gardabani

Vaziani (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2

AP mines

2

4,275

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Kadoeti

AP mines

1

23,783

Shida Kartli

Kashuri

Osiauri (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Shida Kartli

Gori

Zemo Nikozi

AP mines and UXO

1

3,233

Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti

Mestia

Khojali

AP mines

Totals

1

N/K

8

2,314,143

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle UXO = Unexploded ordnance N/K = Not known

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine
Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009
to January 2010, which identiﬁed eight suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs) and seven conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
in 13 districts, the latter of which totalled more than 4.5km2
in estimated area. 3 Of the 15 SHAs and CHAs in total, ten
contained mines and ﬁve were contaminated with unexploded
ordnance (UXO). 4 Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO
Trust cleared ﬁve of the mineﬁelds that had a humanitarian
impact. 5
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The Red Bridge mineﬁeld is an unfenced 7km-long mineﬁeld
consisting of densely packed lines of anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines at the “Red Bridge” border crossing
between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan
during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, it is Georgia’s largest
mineﬁeld and the last major mineﬁeld not in the vicinity
of a functioning military establishment. As at April 2019,
there had been 88 accidents, 22 involving humans and 66
involving livestock. 6

STATES NOT PARTY

Georgia is believed to be free of cluster munition remnants
(CMR), with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which
is occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian
authorities and international mine action NGOs (see Mine
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019
report on Georgia for further information). 8 Georgia remains
contaminated by other UXO, likely in South Ossetia and also
within Georgia in former ﬁring ranges.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD),
renamed after a reorganisation in January 2019, sits under
the State Military Scientiﬁc Technical Centre, known as
DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).9 The primary
task of the HDCD is to coordinate mine action in Georgia,
including overseeing the national mine action strategy and
quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC), and facilitating
the development and implementation of Georgian National
Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).10
For all mine action-related issues, The HALO Trust
communicates with DELTA.11 The Georgian authorities are
supportive of the granting of visas for international staff
and the importation of demining equipment. HALO Trust
submitted several requests to the MoD seeking access to the
remaining mineﬁelds, the last of which was submitted in April

2018. As at May 2019, HALO Trust had received permission to
begin clearing two of the ﬁve remaining mineﬁelds at Khojali
and Kadoeti, respectively. As at June 2019, permissions for
the remaining three mineﬁelds had not been granted.12
The Georgian government funds the running costs of the
HDCD as well as the Engineering Brigade, which carries out
some battle area clearance (BAC).13
The national authority has received capacity development
support from HALO Trust and the Geneva Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The HALO Trust has
provided training on clearance and survey techniques and, in
2018, donated a mine action vehicle to the HDCD.14 The GICHD
has provided training for HDCD staff on the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database,
IMAS, and ammunition storage.15

GENDER
DELTA and The HALO Trust each have gender and diversity
policies. HALO Trust supports use of mixed-gender teams to
conduct survey, which allows for greater engagement with
women and children.16 If HALO Trust is given permission
to work in the remaining mineﬁelds in Tbilisi Administered
Territories (TAT), community liaison and survey teams will
be mixed gender and inclusive of ethnic minorities.17

There is equal access to employment for qualiﬁed women
and men in survey and clearance teams in Georgia, including
for managerial level/supervisory positions although
proportionately the number of women remains low. In
Abkhazia, The HALO Trust worked with local women’s
organisations during its July 2018 recruitment drive in an
effort to achieve gender parity. As at April 2019, 30% of its
operational and management staff were female.18

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HDCD uses the IMSMA database and, according to The
HALO Trust, the data is accurate. Data archives go back
to 2009 and are regularly updated, based on HALO Trust’s
operations reports and on work by the Engineering Brigade.19
The IMSMA database is administered by a certiﬁed specialist
within the HDCD, trained by the GICHD, who receives regular
refresher training in the latest procedures. 20

The data in the national information management system
is accessible to The HALO Trust. 21 HALO Trust uses its own
IMSMA-compatible data collection forms that DELTA have
approved while the HDCD QA/QC team, also have their
own forms. 22
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Abkhazia was declared mine-impact free in 2011 after 14
years of mine clearance. In 2017, there was an explosion
at a local military ammunition store close to the village of
Primorsky which scattered mines and UXO over a 4.5km2
area.7 There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a
result of the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more
recent 2008 conﬂict with Russia. The HALO Trust has planned
to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date,
has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively
subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both
Georgian authorities and international non-governmental
organisation (NGO) demining operators.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Georgia has a national mine action strategy. Its main aims
and targets are focused on the remaining clearance of antipersonnel mines and other areas contaminated with ERW. 23
The annual workplans for 2018 and 2019 centred on battle
area clearance (BAC) and mineﬁeld clearance within TAT. 24

task clearing abandoned ordnance at Chonto, near the
Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia. The
Abkhazia programme will continue operations at Primorsky
and HALO will also respond to explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) call-outs. 25

In April 2019, due to access not being granted to the
remaining mineﬁelds, The HALO Trust had suspended
all operations in Georgia, apart from one two-month

Georgia is said to have a long-term capacity to address
anti-personnel mine contamination, with plans in place for
dealing with residual risk and liability. 26

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
As at April 2019, Georgian National Mine Action Standards
and National Technical Standards and Guidelines were still
under development. The IMAS and International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines are being translated into Georgian. 27
The HALO Trust has standing operating procedures (SoPs) in
place for all its activities, including survey, mine clearance,
and EOD. No modiﬁcations or enhancements were made to
these SoPs in 2018 or early 2019. 28

Within The HALO Trust, operational staff deployed in 2018
were responsible for both survey and clearance. In TAT,
HALO’s operational staff decreased from 38 in 2017 to 18
in 2018. In 2019, HALO made all operational staff in TAT
redundant. In Abkhazia, the programme began 2018 with 28
staff, which increased to 77 in July to cope with expanded
operations at Primorsky. This was reduced to 35 staff at the
beginning of 2019. 31
In TAT, quality management (QM) is conducted by DELTA.
In Abkhazia, The HALO Trust is responsible for its own QM. 32

OPERATORS

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The HALO Trust, which is the only international operator
working in the country, conducts survey and both BAC and
mine clearance. 29 DELTA retains a small demining and EOD
capacity in TAT. The Engineering Brigade has been carrying
out BAC in Gonio, a former military polygon in the Adjara
region, and also responds to EOD call-outs. The State
Security Service of Georgia also carries out EOD spot tasks.
In Abkhazia, the emergency services (EMERCOM) have a
small EOD capacity, though HALO Trust is generally relied
upon to deal with all items of UXO. 30

In 2018, The HALO Trust had two mechanical assets deployed
in Anaklia region in western Georgia, for UXO clearance. The
Abkhazia programme also has two mechanical assets which
it used for clearance at the Primorsky ammunition store
explosion site. The HALO Trust also uses a drone to collect
aerial footage of a task. 33
Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were used by the Engineering
Brigade during BAC in the Gonio former military polygon,
Adjara region. The State Security Service of Georgia has
several MDD teams which it uses for EOD spot tasks. 34

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
2

A total of 415,604m of mine and ERW contaminated area
was released in 2018, of which 377,846m2 was cleared, and
37,758m2 was reduced through technical survey. A total of
664 mines were destroyed, including those destroyed during
EOD spot tasks.

SURVEY IN 2018
There was no non-technical survey undertaken in 2018. The
HALO Trust reduced 37,758m2 through technical survey in
Anaklia village in Samegrelo-Svaneti region. 35 This is a slight
reduction from the 39,568m2 reduced through technical
survey in 2017.
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, The HALO Trust cleared 389,204m2 and destroyed
556 anti-personnel mines (see Table 2). In TAT, no mines
were found in the areas cleared; only 33 items of UXO. 36 This
is a large increase from the 9,256m2 cleared at the Chognari
mineﬁeld in 2017. The HALO Trust conducted BAC in 2018,
focusing its mine clearance on Abkhazia.

STATES NOT PARTY

Areas
cleared

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO destroyed

Shida Kartli, Dvani

1

102,551

0

0

11

Shida Kartli, Dzevera

1

5,600

0

0

22

Abkhazia, Primorsky

1

269,695

556

4

38,021

Totals

3

377,846

556

4

38,054

Region / Village

In addition, national operators destroyed nine anti-personnel
mines in TAT while The HALO Trust destroyed 99 antipersonnel mines in Abkhazia during EOD spot tasks in 2018.
None of the mines found in Abkhazia had been laid; they were
all either being stored in personal stockpiles or had been
discarded in uninhabited areas. 37
No target date has been set for completion of anti-personnel
mine clearance in Georgia. Georgia has identiﬁed clearance
of the Red Bridge mineﬁeld as one of its key strategic mine
action priorities. 38 Georgia previously reported plans to start
clearance of the Red Bridge mineﬁeld in 2015. 39 Georgian
and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss
demining the mineﬁeld, 40 but only survey was permitted. The
HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and
3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. The
following month, however, the Azerbaijani military demanded
that technical survey operations be halted. 41 Georgia reported
discussing with Azerbaijan during 2018 regarding the
clearance of Red Bridge mineﬁeld. 42 However, as at April 2019
The HALO Trust had not been granted permission to restart
clearance there. 43

1

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 25 April 2018.

2

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.

3

Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and
Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defence, 6 September 2009.

In Abkhazia, the main priority is the clearance of Primorsky,
where an unplanned explosion in 2017 contaminated the
surrounding territory with mines and UXO. In 2018, HALO
received funding from the European Union, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. With adequate funding,
HALO Trust hopes to ﬁnish the clearance of Primorsky
by 2021. 44

22

Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019; and Matthew Walker,
HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

23

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.

24

Ibid and 10 June 2019.; and email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust,
8 April 2019.

4

Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 4 June 2015.

5

The HALO Trust, “Where we work: Georgia”, accessed 11 July 2019, at:
bit.ly/2yTgNwu.

25

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

26

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.

6

Email from Matthew Walker, Programme Ofﬁcer, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

27

Ibid.

7

The HALO Trust, “Where we work: Georgia”, accessed 11 July 2019, at:
bit.ly/2yTgNwu.

28

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

29

Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

8

Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 28 March 2019; and
Matthew Walker, Programme Ofﬁcer, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

30

Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019; and Matthew Walker,
HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

9

Ibid.; Decree 897 issued by the Minister of Defence, 30 December 2010;
and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016 and 10 June 2019;
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10
Report (for 21 March 2017 to 31 March 2018), Form A.

31

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

10
11

32

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.

33

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

34

Ibid.

Email from Michael Montaﬁ, Programme Ofﬁcer, HALO Trust, 21 June 2019.

35

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

13

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March and 10 June 2019.

37

Ibid., and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.

14

Emails from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019; and Oleg Gochashvili,
DELTA, 10 June 2019.

38

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

39

Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May
2009; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili,
DELTA, 3 June 2015.

15

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March and 10 June 2019.

16

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

17

Ibid.

40

Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

18

Ibid.

41

19

Ibid.

Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; Irakli Chitanava,
HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

20

Ibid.

21

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

42

Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.

43

Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.

44

Ibid.
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INDIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, India has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is
not known. Large-scale mine-laying was conducted by
government forces on and near the Line of Control (LoC)
separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the
2001–02 stand-off between the two states. Anti-personnel
and anti-vehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and
pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number
of villages.

Landmine incidents continue to be reported, primarily
involving Indian army personnel, but also civilians. According
to a list compiled from media reports and police sources,
from January to December 2018, 25 military personnel were
injured by anti-personnel mines near the LoC. During the
same period, nine civilians were injured by mines and one
man was killed when he stepped on an anti-personnel mine
near the LoC in the Poonch district. 3

Despite occasional ofﬁcial claims that all the mines laid
were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and
casualties have persisted. A media report in 2013 cited a
government statement that about 20km2 of irrigated land
was still mined in the Akhnoor sector of the LoC alone.1 In
June 2016, India’s NDTV news reported that the Indian army
was demining areas of the LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir,
in order to return land to communities for agricultural use
as it vacated ﬁelds near the border that were reportedly
taken over and mined during the Kargil Conﬂict in 1999 and
Operation Parakaram in 2001. 2

Security forces have also reported extensive use of mines and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Maoist ﬁghters in the
north-eastern states of Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand causing
civilian and military casualties. In July 2018, it was reported
that 15 anti-vehicle mines placed by Maoist rebels were
neutralised by security forces in Garhwa district, Jharkhand
state. 4 However, mine types are usually not speciﬁed and may
include command-detonated explosive devices as well as
mines (i.e. victim-activated explosive devices).5

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after
receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.

LAND RELEASE
There is no publicly available ofﬁcial information on land
release in 2018. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible
for clearing mines placed by non-state armed groups. 6 In July
2017, for instance, according to a media account, the Indian
Army was manually clearing mines in the border districts
of Jammu and Kashmir and was procuring more advanced
demining equipment with a view to improving safety and
decreasing the number of deminer casualties.7 Media reports
have indicated the police also play an active part in clearing
mines and other explosive hazards on an ad hoc basis in
states dealing with insurgency. 8
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India has not reported that any mine clearance has occurred
in its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency reports since
2006.9 In August 2016, India stated that “mines used for
military operations were laid within fenced and marked
perimeters and were cleared after operations”.10

STATES NOT PARTY

INDIA

1

“Heavy rainfall worsening landmine peril for Kashmiri farmers”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 5 November 2013, at: tmsnrt.rs/33xqBun.

2

“Farmers Hope to Return to Fields as Army Clears Landmines on Line of Control”, NDTV, 27 June 2016, at: bit.ly/2Z1AJIl.

3

“Death-traps along the border: Why are Indian landmines killing Indians?”, National Herald, 9 December 2018, at: bit.ly/2N1DZRF; “Elderly Man Dies In Mine Blast Near
LoC In Poonch”, Kashmir Observer, 31 May 2018, at: bit.ly/33vlECc.

4

“Jawans unearth 15 landmines on rebel turf”, The Telegraph India, 6 July 2018, at: bit.ly/33ycUeu.

5

See, e.g., “15 police, driver killed by suspected Maoist landmine in western India”, Daily Sabah, 1 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2yZgobW; “Jharkhand: Six Jaguar Force jawans
killed in Maoist landmine blast”, The Indian Express, 27 June 2018, at: bit.ly/2Z1R6st; “Farmer hurt in blast”, The Telegraph India, 3 May 2018, at: bit.ly/303gBqv; and
“Three killed in landmine blast triggered by Maoists in Chhattisgarh”, Hindustan Times, 19 January 2017, at: bit.ly/301Cvuk.

6

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2006), Form B.

7

“Advanced tech to help soldiers map mineﬁelds”, The Times of India, 10 July 2017, at: bit.ly/2KyoVt7.

8

“IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: Police”, The Indian Express, 24 July 2017, at: bit.ly/2MgNRrb.

9

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019), Form B.

10

Statement of India, “Summary record of 18th Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II”, Geneva, 30 August 2016,
CCW/AP.II/CONF.18/SR.1.
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IRAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Iran should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Iran has obligations under international human rights law
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance
and destruction.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Iran is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines, mainly as a result of the 1980−88 war with Iraq. The
extent of the remaining mined areas is unknown, but mine
contamination is concentrated in ﬁve western provinces
bordering Iraq.
Minister of Defence Hossein Dehghan said in 2014 that the
4,500km2 of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
contamination left by the Iran-Iraq war in the ﬁve western
provinces had been reduced to 280km2.1 In February 2014,
the Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC) reported that the ﬁve
Western provinces had remaining contamination totalling
250km2. 2
According to online media sources, ﬂooding that hit large
parts of Iran in March and April 2019 exposed mines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining in western provinces
of Iran. 3

However, two anti-vehicle mine incidents occurred in early
2014 in the Lut desert spanning central and eastern Iran
where police reportedly placed mines as a measure against
drug trafﬁckers, pointing to contamination outside the ﬁve
most affected provinces. 4 Sources report that security forces
continue to emplace mines in areas close to Iran’s borders
in order to deter cross-border smugglers and inﬁltration
by anti-regime groups. There are also mined areas around
military bases.
A further complication for contamination estimates are
reports of continuing casualties in areas that were supposed
to have been cleared, calling into question to whether mine
clearance has been conducted to international standards.
Iran also has cluster munition remnant contamination (see
Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants
2019 report on Iran for further information).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
IRMAC was established as the national mine action centre
in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee within
the Ministry of Defence. IRMAC is responsible for planning,
data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of
demining operators. It also sets standards, provides training
for clearance operators, concludes contracts with demining
operators, and ensures monitoring of their operations. It
coordinates mine action with the General Staff of the Armed
Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning
Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and
organisations, and handles international relations. 5 Several
IRMAC staff are believed to be serving or former military
personnel, including its Director, while others are civilians
employed by the Ministry of Defence.

IRMAC has a branch in every affected province. Available
demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from
province to province.
In March 2019, Iran hosted a three-day international
roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and
best practices”, attended by representatives from other
states, national and international demining organisations,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The aim of the
roundtable was to share knowledge and experience on mine
action, challenges, and best practices. 6

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
IRMAC actively maintains a national mine action database but it is not known if it is comprehensive.

304 Clearing the Mines 2019

STATES NOT PARTY

IRAN

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS
IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator, with
demining teams and support staff deployed in ﬁve affected
provinces.7 In Kurdistan province, IRMAC is conducting
veriﬁcation, mainly through mechanical clearance. IRMAC
also responds to calls from the local community reporting
landmines or items of UXO. Demining capacity in Kurdistan
province is believed to stand at around 12 personnel, a
downsize compared to previous capacity. 8
Commercial operators include AOM, Immen Sazan Omran
Pars International, Immen Zamin Espadana, and Solh
Afarinan-e Bedoun-e Marz (SABM). Three other companies,
Imen Gostaran Mohit (IGM), Moshaver Omran Iran, and ZPP
International, undertake quality assurance/quality control
(QA/QC).9

Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC),
the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators
conducting clearance of Iran’s oil and gas producing areas
which are concentrated in mine-affected areas of south
western Iran bordering Iraq.10
The Iranian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
assisted demining efforts to support the response to the ﬂash
ﬂooding which affected Iran in March and April 2019.11
International operators are not believed to have been active
in Iran since 2008.
There is no available information on quality management
procedures. In the past, very high levels of casualties were
recorded during demining in Iran.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No data was available on any mine survey or clearance in 2018, as was the case in the previous year.
Iran is believed to have dedicated signiﬁcant resources and effort to clearing mined areas on its territory, but the results
of survey and clearance, and the standards to which clearance has been conducted, have not made publicly available.

1

Ministry of Defence, “Commander Dehghan in the ceremony of World Mine Awareness Day: In Iran 28,000 hectares of land are landmine-contaminated”, 8 April 2014.

2

IRMAC PowerPoint presentation at IRMAC headquarters, Tehran, 9 February 2014.

3

“Unexploded Ordnance Threatening Iranian Lives in Flood-Hit Areas”, IFP News, 5 April 2019, at: bit.ly/33Tsp0K; and “Nationwide Flood Alert In Iran As Emergency
Declared In Oil-Producing Province”, Radio Farda, 31 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2zjb3MJ.

4

“Mine Explosion Killed a Desert Explorer in Birjand”, Islamic Republic News Agency, 4 January 2014; and “Four tourists hit a landmine in Lut: one was killed”, Iranian
Students’ News Agency, 25 March 2014.

5

IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, “Presentation of IRMAC”.

6

“Tehran hosts international roundtable on humanitarian mine action”, Mehr news agency, 12 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z4LslE; and ICRC, “International roundtable on
“humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”, 15 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2QH3cR6.

7

Information provided by mine action expert on condition of anonymity.

8

Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for development without borders, September 2019.

9

Ibid.

10

Information provided by mine action expert on condition of anonymity.

11

Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for development without borders, September 2019.
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ISRAEL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Israel has obligations under international human rights law
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) should consider conducting external quality assurance
and quality control (QA/QC) itself, rather than outsourcing it to commercial companies, which proves costly for
international donors to fund.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of mine contamination in Israel is not known.
Israel reported 41.58km2 of conﬁrmed mined area and a
further 48.51km2 of suspected mined area, as at the end of
2017,1 but did not report the amount of mined area as at the
end of 2018. The combined 90km2 as at end 2017, represents
only the area affected by mines that are not deemed essential
to Israel’s security. The size of other mined areas is not made
public. The total ﬁgure includes 18.38km2 of mined area in
the Jordan Valley (11.84km2 of anti-personnel mined area,
6.19km2 of anti-vehicle mined area, and 0.35km2 of mixed
mined area) and the West Bank 2 (see the report on Palestine
in this work for further information).

Israel’s mine problem dates back to the Second World War.
Subsequently, Israel laid signiﬁcant numbers of mines along
its borders, near military camps and training areas, and
near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military
reported planting new mines to reinforce mineﬁelds and
other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the
Golan Heights. 3
In the Golan Heights the mines laid by Syrian forces remain
largely unknown and areas have been fenced off by the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF). However, according to an online
media report, fencing is not always properly maintained with
warning signs, and civilians occasionally cross into mineﬁelds
looking for edible plants. 4

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2017) 5
CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

AP mines only

201

19.93

5

39.54

AV mines only

29

17.00

8

1.17

2

4.65

9

7.80

232

41.58

22

48.51

Type of contamination

AP and AV mines
Totals

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle CHA = Conﬁrmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A March 2011 law on mineﬁeld clearance established the
INMAA to undertake a “comprehensive programme of mine
clearing projects inside Israel”. 6 The law’s aim was “to create
a normative infrastructure for the clearance of mineﬁelds
that are not essential to national security, and to declare
them as free from landmines with the highest degree of
safety to civilians, in accordance with the international
obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest
period of time possible.”7
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In February 2019, the Director of INMAA reported that new
legislation had been passed, in the form of a regional law,
giving the INMAA responsibility for former military bases
and for addressing abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO),
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and anti-vehicle mines. Prior to
this, the INMAA had only had responsibility for addressing
anti-personnel mines, and for mixed mined areas. 8

STATES NOT PARTY

In 2017, the annual mine action budget for Israel was NIS41.7
million (approx. US$11.5 million), of which NIS27 million was
from the INMAA’s budget and the remaining NIS14.7 million
from additional external funding by various infrastructure
development companies and state authorities.12 The size of
the 2018 budget is not known.

The INMAA manages a “mineﬁeld information bank” that
is open for public queries concerning demining plans
and programmes.11

A number of development projects funded by local electricity,
water, and infrastructure companies and authorities also pay
for mine clearance.13

PLANNING AND TASKING
The INMAA has an approved annual mine clearance plan14 and
a multi-year clearance plan for 2017−20 that plans to focus on
technical survey and clearance in northern Israel (the Golan
Heights) in the spring/summer/autumn, and in southern
Israel (the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain) in the winter,15
executed by civilian local operators.16
In addition, the INMAA continues to oversee HALO Trust
clearance projects in Area C of the West Bank, funded by the
European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, and the United
States (via ITF Enhancing Human Security).17
Furthermore, at the start of 2017, the INMAA began surveying
the Jordan Valley mineﬁelds in the West Bank, using
national budget and operating through Israeli companies.
The INMAA sees signiﬁcant potential for cancellation and
reduction of mined area in the Jordan Valley, and is using

various technologies and scientiﬁc tools to assess mine
drift possibilities. The INMAA has planned to invest around
NIS 900,000 (approximately US$250,000) in this project in
2017–1918 . Progress in non-technical survey continued in 2018.19
The INMAA, “deﬁnes clearance policies, sets the national
priorities and implements them in coordination with
other relevant governmental ministries, the IDF, and local
authorities.”20 Clearance tasks are assigned according
to a classiﬁcation formula laid down by the INMAA, and
prioritisation is set nationally every three years. The criteria
used for the formula are largely based on the risk level and
development potential of the affected areas. 21 The INMAA
has been studying the social and economic impacts of land
released over the last four years, as well as on the potential
impact for future clearance sites. 22

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
National mine action standards, which concern rules and regulations concerning clearance methods, quality management,
legislation, and insurance, are contained on the INMAA website.23

OPERATORS
Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance
as well as QA and QC. In 2017, clearance was contracted to
four national companies: 4M, the Israeli Mine Action Group
(IMAG), Maavarim, and Safeland. In addition, Ecolog conducted
geomorphological and hydrological surveys in 2017, together
with the INMAA, to assist with cancellation of previously
ﬂooded SHAs that could potentially contain mines.24
In 2017, 106 demining personnel and 36 machines were
deployed for clearance operations. 25 The clearance companies
contracted in 2018, and their demining capacity, is not known.
The IDF also conduct mine clearance according to their
own mine action plans “that are executed by their military
methods and techniques”. They have an annual programme
that includes demining, monitoring, and maintenance of
mined area protection. 26 During wintertime, the IDF give

special attention to mineﬁelds that are close to farms,
residential areas, or hiker routes, as mines may be carried
into these areas by ﬂoods. 27
In addition, the INMAA reported that it had secured the
continuation of HALO Trust’s clearance programme in
Area C of the West Bank until the end of 2019. 28 The HALO
Trust works under the auspices of both the INMAA and the
Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC), primarily with funding
from international donors29 (see the report on Palestine in the
current work for further information).
Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA
supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a clearance operator.
Five QA/QC contractors were formally registered for 2018:
4CI Security, Dexagon, Ga-man, Israteam, and Zeev Levanon. 30

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Israel uses several kinds of machines in its mine clearance
operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance.
They are said to include, as and where appropriate, screening
and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters,
and ﬂails/tillers. 31 Some of these operations are conducted by
Israel directly, while others are performed by contractors. 32

Throughout 2018, the INMAA continued to be supported by
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) in developing its animal detection system capacity. 33
A pilot project using mine detection dogs (MDDs) conducted
in 201734 found that dogs would not be a valuable tool. 35
However, after investigating and conducting further research
into animal detection and behaviour, the INMAA planned to
conduct further trials. 36
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The INMAA, which has 10 staff, was established in the
Ministry of Defence, with ministry staff responsible for
planning mine action.9 As a result of the new law, stafﬁng
at the INMAA was expected to expand by at least 50%, but
as at February 2019 it was unclear if the budget would be
increased to enable this to occur.10

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Under CCW Amended Protocol II, Israel reported that the
INMAA had overseen clearance of approximately 1.2km2
in 2018, destroying 1,350 mines and explosive remnants
of war (ERW). In addition, 0.7km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey, 37 in areas south of the Dead Sea. 38
However, no details were provided on what proportion of
1.2km2 cleared and 0.7km2 cancelled was release of mined
area (as opposed to battle area) or whether the area cleared
also included clearance in Palestinian territory in the
West Bank.

In addition, The HALO Trust continued its clearance of
mineﬁelds in Area C of the West Bank in 2018, working under
the auspices of both the INMAA and PMAC, primarily with
international funding (see the report on Palestine in this work
for further information).
Based on the clearance rates of the past few years and the
INMAA’s forecasted clearance rate of 1.5km2 per year, it
will take many years to clear remaining contamination. The
INMAA is seeking additional funding and assistance to speed
up operations. 41

The INMAA typically plans for mine clearance at a targeted
rate of 1.5km2 per year (including in the West Bank), based on
its current budget. 39
IDF demining is implemented independently of the INMAA,
using military methods and techniques. 40 The area cleared or
otherwise released by the IDF is unknown.
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KYRGYZSTAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Kyrgyzstan has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or
control and, if not, report on the extent and location of its remaining mined areas and clearance operations.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though
the precise location and extent of any mined areas is not
known. According to the Minister of Defence, contamination
in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military
between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in
2005.1 It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides
had caused some mines to shift. 2
In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had
also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and
Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports
have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory
around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely
cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004. 3
In October 2017, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, and
his Kyrgyz counterpart, Almazbek Atambaev, signed an
agreement to demarcate some 85% of the countries’ nearly
1,300km-long border and began discussing options for the
36 disputed sectors. 4

Kyrgyzstan has admitted using anti-personnel mines in 1999
and 2000 to prevent inﬁltration across its borders, but has
claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and
destroyed.5 In June 2011, a government ofﬁcial conﬁrmed: “We
do not have any mineﬁelds on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”6
In October 2011, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Defence conducted a mine action
assessment mission. The assessment conﬁrmed that poor
ammunition storage conditions as well as obsolete ammunition
posed a serious threat to human security. Agreement on
cooperation was reached on 25 July 2013, when the ITF signed
a Protocol on Cooperation with the Ministry of Defense of
the Kyrgyz Republic.7 The ITF has reported that in 2014 it
continued to implement activities agreed on in the Protocol on
Cooperation. This includes technical checks on anti-personnel
mines and other ammunition in three storage warehouses,
procurement of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment,
and support for disposal of ammunition surpluses. 8

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme.

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of any survey or clearance of mined areas occurring in 2018.

1

Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defence, 4 April 2011.

2

See, e.g., Y. Yegorov, “Uzbekistan agrees to remove mineﬁelds along its border with Kyrgyzstan”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, Issue 41, 29 June 2004.

3

S. Zhimagulov and O. Borisova, “Kyrgyzstan Tries to Defend Itself from Uzbek Mines”, Navigator (Kazakhstan), 14 March 2003; and “Borders are becoming clear”,
Blog post, at: bit.ly/2z0s7qU.

4

“Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute”, Radio Free Europe, 14 December 2017, at: bit.ly/2yXsrXt.

5

Statement of Kyrgyzstan, Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention), Geneva, 8 May 2006; and Letter
011-14/809 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2010.

6

Letter from Amb. G. Isakova, Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the UN in Geneva, 29 June 2011.

7

ITF, “Kyrgyz Republic”, accessed 10 October 2015, at: bit.ly/31Fwd44.

8

Ibid.
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LAO PDR
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) Lao PDR should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Lao PDR has obligations under international human rights
law to clear landmines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
While by far the greatest contamination in Lao PDR is from
explosive remnants of war (ERW), in particular cluster
munition remnants (CMR) (see the Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants report on Lao PDR for further information), Lao PDR
is also contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines,
but the extent is not known. During the Indochina conﬂict of the
1960s and 1970s, all sides in the war laid anti-personnel mines,
particularly around military installations and patrol bases.
Mined areas also exist in some border regions as a legacy of
disputes or tensions with or within neighbouring countries.1
A Handicap International survey in 1997 found mines in all 15
provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages.2
The remote location of many of these areas means that mines
have little impact and are not a clearance priority. Of 91,468
items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) destroyed by operators
in 2018, only 28 (0.03%) were mines. 3 The National Regulatory
Authority (NRA), however, has stated that anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines were “used in abundance” and observed
that “with a steady expansion of land use “mined areas” will
become areas for growing concern.”4
The NRA reports that “gravel mines” had all degraded
but remaining mine types included United States (US)manufactured M14 anti-personnel blast mines, M16 bounding
fragmentation mines, M18 claymore mines, and M15 and M19
anti-vehicle mines, Soviet or Chinese PMN anti-personnel
blast mines, POMZ fragmentation stake mines, and TM41,
TM46, and TM57 anti-vehicle mines. 5

According to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 12 of Lao PDR’s
17 provinces are believed to contain landmines, but the
details and nature of the contamination are unknown. 6
In July 2019, HALO Trust’s EOD team leader responded to a
call-out in Phalanxai district in Savannakhet province, near
the site of an old US military base, during which a cache of
M-16 mines, a couple of other laid M-16 mines, and a PMN
mine were discovered. Villagers told HALO Trust that there
had been accidents in the immediate area in the 1980s, but
that the PMN had been discovered last year while ploughing
the land and was moved to its current position.7
As at August 2019, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) had
discovered the presence of M-16, M-14, MBV-78A1, and POMZ
anti-personnel landmines in sixteen villages in Houamuang
district, in Houaphanh province, in which it had conducted
non-technical survey. 8 This will have a signiﬁcant impact
on the methodology HI employs and will impede CMR land
release operations. As at March 2019, HI planned to try to
better determine the probable location of landmines to help
reduce the probability of its teams operating in unknown
mined areas. HI also planned to suggest a new standing
operating procedure (SoP) to the NRA for a combined
technical survey/area clearance.9

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active
since mid 2006, has an interministerial board composed of
representatives from government ministries and is chaired by
the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.10 The Prime Minister
of Lao PDR approved a new decree, “On the Organisation and
Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in
Lao PDR”, in February 2018. The decree deﬁnes the position,
role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and the working
principles and methods of the NRA.11
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The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and
international clearance operators and serves as the national
focal point for the sector. This includes overall management
and consideration of policy, planning, projects, and
coordination of land release operations nationwide, as well as
NRA planning and coordination functions at the provincial and
district levels.12 While the NRA has the central role of UXO
Sector coordination, increased coordination and collaboration
between all stakeholders, including line ministries, local
authorities, UXO operators, development partners, and
others are essential for the NRA to fulﬁl its coordination role.13

STATES NOT PARTY

According to the NRA, responsibility for clearance of mined
areas in Lao PDR predominantly falls under the remit of the
Lao armed forces.16

UNDP provides programmatic and technical support to
the NRA and UXO Lao, including with regard to information
sharing and coordination, albeit at a reduced capacity
compared to previous years.17 In 2018, further capacity
development in information management, quality
management, and operations support, was provided
primarily to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA, through
a US-funded grant manager, Janus Global Operations. As part
of its work in 2018, Janus supported UXO Lao with survey
and data analysis and correction as a follow-on to training
they conducted in 2017.18 Effective 31 December 2018, Tetra
Tech replaced Janus as the US-funded grant manager in
Lao PDR.19

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Lao PDR’s national standards make a clear distinction
between UXO clearance (including CMR) and mine clearance,
and for the purposes of the national standards, “UXO does
not include hand laid mines but it may include disposal of
‘one off’ mines located during EOD roving tasks.”20 As such,
the National Standard on UXO clearance only relates to UXO
clearance operations and not to mine clearance operations. 21

these areas will have to be cleared.” 23 However, in practice,
determining whether a mine is part of a bigger mined area
can prove challenging, especially if ﬁeld-based personnel are
not trained to address anti-personnel mine contamination.
Therefore, at the July 2019 technical working group meeting
on clearance, HI proposed an addendum to the standard to
help address this. 24

If a mine is located during UXO clearance, work is immediately
ceased and “the clearance supervisor should then assess the
situation and determine if the mine is a random one or part of
a mined area. If the mine is assessed as being part of a mined
area, work on the site is to cease and the matter reported to
the tasking authority. Details of mined areas are to be reported
by the clearance organisation concerned to the NRA head ofﬁce
and the NRA provincial ofﬁce.”22

The standards also note that, “Some relatively small-scale
mine clearance has been carried out by UXO LAO and
by commercial operators in the past but mine clearance
operations are not regularly carried out as a deliberate
mine action activity in Lao PDR.”25

According to Lao PDR’s national standard on Mine Clearance
Operations, “the systematic locating and clearing of hand
laid mines in known or suspected mined areas … are not
commonly conducted in Lao PDR. However, it is known that
mined areas exist in Lao PDR and at some stage in the future

According to the National Standards, “Mine clearance
operations are considerably more dangerous than UXO area
clearance operations and the requirements and procedures
for mine clearance are more stringent. When mine clearance
operations are necessary they are only to be carried out by
accredited mine clearance organisations with personnel with
the appropriate training and equipment and speciﬁc mine
clearance operating procedures.”26

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No planned or systematic mine clearance was conducted
during 2018, though 28 mines of 91,468 items of UXO were
reported to have been destroyed by operators in 2018,
according to Lao PDR’s transparency reporting under the
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). 27

UXO Lao reported destroying ﬁve anti-personnel mines and
one anti-vehicle mine during its operations in 2018. 28 The
HALO Trust, HI, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA did
not report destroying any mines in 2018. 29
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The Lao Government’s national strategy, “Safe Path Forward
II, 2011–20”, was reviewed in June 2015, when the NRA set a
number of speciﬁc targets for the remaining ﬁve years up to
2020.14 There is a corresponding multi-year workplan 2016–20
for implementation of the Safe Path Forward II strategy,15 but
both Safe Path Forward II and the corresponding workplan
predominantly focus on CMR, and do not include a strategy or
plans for addressing mined areas.
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NRA website, “UXO types: Mines”, undated but accessed 24 July 2019 at: bit.
ly/2XZyvO4.
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8

Email from Julien Kempeneers, Humanitarian Mine Action Coordinator, HI,
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LEBANON
KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In March 2018, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) released its revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which
incorporated signiﬁcant and welcome improvements to its accepted methodology for survey and clearance of anti-personnel
mines. These included, among others, reduction of the required clearance depth from 20cm to 15cm and adjustments to the
fade-out speciﬁcations for clearance in pattern mineﬁelds. Furthermore, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s
Aid (NPA) were tasked to conduct non-technical survey in 2018, which previously had been executed mainly by the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Lebanon should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Lebanon has obligations under international human rights
law to clearance landmines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Wherever possible, non-technical survey and technical survey should be used to more accurately deﬁne
areas of actual mine contamination. This would help to more accurately establish a national baseline of
mine contamination.

■

LMAC should review empirical data from clearance operations on the Blue Line, and, in consultation with
operators and partners, assess whether the required fade-out distance on the Blue Line can be further
reduced to enhance efﬁciency.

■

Where appropriate, LMAC should consider using demining machinery and mine detection dogs (MDDs) as
primary as well as secondary clearance assets.

■

The integration and consolidation of the LMAC and Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) databases and
servers should be completed as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Lebanon had more than 19.6km2 of conﬁrmed
mined area, including the Blue Line, across 1,399 conﬁrmed
hazardous areas (CHAs) (see Table 1).1 This includes 27,197m2 of
conﬁrmed mined area recorded in Jroud Arsal, in the north-east
of Lebanon, which is new contamination resulting from ﬁghting
that spilled over from the Syrian conﬂict.2
At the end of 2017, Lebanon reported a little over 20km2
of conﬁrmed mined area, including the Blue Line, across
1,415 CHAs. 3
Table 1: Mined area by province (at end 2018) 4
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

Al Beqaa

46

967,267

Al Janoub and Al Nabatiyeh
(south Lebanon)

995

7,927,953

Jabal Loubnan
(Mount Lebanon)

307

10,466,303

Al Shimal (north Lebanon)
Totals

51

254,438

1,399

19,615,961

Lebanon is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants
(CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) (see Mine
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019
report on Lebanon for further information).
In addition, “Dangerous Areas” totalling nearly 15km2
are suspected to contain nuisance mines, booby-traps, or
other ERW other than CMR. 5 The “Dangerous Areas” relate
predominantly to rapid response or explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) spot tasks and are often the result of accidents
having been reported to LMAC by the local community, 6 for
which further investigation/survey is required in order to
conﬁrm the type and extent of suspected contamination.7
Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of
earlier civil conﬂict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon
(in 1978 and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended
in May 2000, and there is a small amount of new mine
contamination on the north-east border with Syria, resulting
from spill-over of the Syrian conﬂict onto Lebanese territory
in 2014–17 (see New mine contamination section below). 8
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Mines affect the north and south of the country, and the
Mount Lebanon governorate in the middle, though most are
in the south. The mineﬁelds in north Lebanon and Mount
Lebanon are typically “militia” mineﬁelds (i.e. were laid
without a pattern and for which mineﬁeld records and maps
do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil
war. The mineﬁelds in the south are typically conventional
mineﬁelds, laid in a pattern and where the location of the
mines is identiﬁed on mineﬁeld maps.9

NEW MINE CONTAMINATION
A total of 27,197m2 of new/previously unrecorded conﬁrmed
mined area was recorded through survey by MAG and NPA in
“Jroud Arsal” in the north-east along the border with Syria,
as a result of spill-over in ﬁghting from the Syrian conﬂict
in 2014–17.10 The Lebanese territory in question was fully
regained by the LAF in August 2017 and was assigned to
LMAC for survey and clearance. Contamination also includes
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), CMR, and other ERW.11

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon
Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence.
The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine
action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy
outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the
programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate
the programme on behalf of the LMAA.12

The Mine Action Forum in Lebanon has resulted in better
coordination and greater transparency and enhancements
to land release methodology (enshrined in the revised
NMAS). These measures have all served to strengthen donor
conﬁdence and mobilise additional resources.19 Lebanon
secured an additional 43% of funding for mine action in
2018 compared to the previous year, for both mine- and
CMR-related work. 20

LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the
RMAC-N, based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has
overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa,
under LMAC supervision.13 At the end of 2018, a new regional
centre, RMAC-RB, was established in the north-east of
Lebanon in the village of Ras Baalbek, to oversee the mine
action operations in this region.14 The Director of LMAC is
typically rotated every couple of years, and in recent years
there has been a high turnover of the colonels who have
run the RMAC. Both factors have the potential to negatively
affect the management of the two mine action centres. The
current director of LMAC started in March 2019, replacing his
predecessor who had served as director for two years.15

There is good coordination and collaboration between
LMAC/the RMACs and clearance operators, with the
operators consulted before key decisions are taken. 21
International clearance operators reported that an enabling
environment exists for mine action in Lebanon, with no
obstacles regarding visas for international staff, approval
of MoUs, or the importation of equipment. 22

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel,
funded by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to
LMAC, providing support for capacity building, including
transparency reporting, strategic reviews, Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database entry,
community liaison, and quality assurance (QA). UNDP does
not provide technical assistance on operational decisions.16
However, EU funding for UNDP institutional support to LMAC
was due to ﬁnish at the end of 2019, which will result in a gap
in capacity development.17
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in
close partnership between LMAC and Norway, providing
an informal platform for LMAC to continue dialogue and
collaboration with donors, clearance operators, and partner
organisations, and to discuss priorities and needs in cluster
munition and landmine survey and clearance at the national
level. The forum meets twice a year, with UNDP designated
as the secretariat to follow up and develop progress
reports.18 It is an example of what a “Country Coalition” under
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) could look like,
but in the case of Lebanon it was agreed the forum should be
broadened to include landmines.
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A technical working group (TWG) was established in March
2018, under the auspices of LMAC, following the release of
the revised NMAS. The TWG, which meets quarterly, provides
a useful forum for LMAC/the RMACs to meet collectively
with clearance operators to review and discuss ﬁeld issues,
including implementation of revisions to the NMAS, and
potential ways to improve operational efﬁciencies. 23
As in the previous year, Lebanon reported contributing US$9
million annually in 2018 towards mine action in Lebanon
(for both mine and CMR-related work), to support costs
associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and staff); the
LAF Engineering Regiment companies working in demining;
risk education; and victim assistance. 24
A Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon
(RSHDL) has been established in partnership between
Lebanon and France, with technical mine action support
provided by a French military ofﬁcer, to support the
development of the curriculum on EOD disposal (EOD levels
1, 2, and 3) in compliance with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS). 25 The Regional School became operational
in 2017, enabling civilian and military personnel from Arab
and other countries to beneﬁt from an array of courses and
workshops on demining. 26
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LMAC reported that it has taken several actions to
mainstream gender in its implementation plan, including
through inclusive policies, data disaggregation in risk
education and victim assistance, and participation in courses
at the RSHDL. 27 In August 2019, LMAC reported that it had
appointed a new gender focal point who will help mainstream
gender-sensitive policies and procedures, and monitor their
implementation across the mine action centre. 28 Women
and children are consulted during survey and community
liaison activities. 29 According to LMAC, within the overall
humanitarian clearance operators in Lebanon, approximately
20% of survey and clearance staff are women and 15% of
managerial level/supervisory positions. 30
Lebanon hosted a workshop on gender in mine action at
the RSHDL in July 2018, attended by Iraq, Libya, Palestine,
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, as part of the ARCP. 31
HI, MAG, and NPA all reported having gender policies
in place. 32
HI disaggregates relevant mine action data by sex and age.
HI also ensures that all population groups, including women
and children, are consulted during its survey and community

liaison activities. However, while up to 60% of HI managerial/
supervisory positions are held by women, only 2% of its survey
and clearance staff are women, with one female community
liaison ofﬁcer out of a total of 50 operational personnel.33
MAG reported that it consults women during survey and
community liaison activities; that all its community liaison
teams are mixed; and that its data is disaggregated by sex
and age. Overall, women account for 15% of operational roles
in MAG’s survey and clearance teams in Lebanon, and 30% of
managerial level/supervisory positions. 34
As at April 2019, NPA was in the process of developing an
implementation plan for its organisational gender policy for
Lebanon, with support from the Geneva-based Gender and
Mine Action Programme (GMAP, a programme of the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)),
which was due to be ﬁnalised in 2019. NPA reported that its
survey and community liaison teams are gender balanced,
and 15% of employees in operational roles in NPA’s survey
and clearance team are women; 9% in managerial level/
supervisory positions. NPA disaggregates data by sex
and age. 35

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
IMSMA is used by LMAC and RMAC to record contamination
and land release in Lebanon. As at April 2019, efforts were
underway to integrate RMAC’s information management
database with the LMAC server. 36 As at end 2018, there was a
single IMSMA database and a synchronisation procedure in
place between the two LMAC and RMAC databases, pending
a hardware upgrade to establish a direct connection. 37 Full
harmonisation and consolidation of the servers was expected
to be achieved in the course of 2019, which will facilitate
synchronisation, as IMSMA reports will be sent directly to
LMAC for approval, improving the accuracy and efﬁciency of
the process. The integration will also help better protect data
while decreasing maintenance costs. 38
Furthermore, LMAC is migrating from its current version
of IMSMA (IMSMA New Generation) to IMSMA Core, which it
hopes will help facilitate the production of clearer reports

that can be translated into dashboards for stakeholders,
including donors, to monitor and follow. 39 Migration to IMSMA
Core requires regular IMSMA back-ups and corrections to
data. Migration is forecast to be achieved only in 2020. 40
Some clearance tasks result in a clearance output in excess
of the task size originally recorded in IMSMA, often due to
fade-out. LMAC has reported that the system for database
entry now more accurately reﬂects operational data. 41 Now,
any area cleared in excess of the original task size is no
longer recorded as additional tasks in the database, but
as “productivity”. 42
In 2018, LMAC changed requirements for clearance operators
to report operational data monthly in favour of daily and
weekly reporting instead. According to NPA, this has resulted
in closer and more regular checks of data by LMAC and RMAC
QA ofﬁcers. 43

PLANNING AND TASKING
In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action
plan for 2011–20. 44 The plan called for clearance of all CMR
by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the
Blue Line by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity, but
progress has fallen well short of planning targets, 45 which
will not be met.
A ﬁrst interim review of the strategy was conducted in
January–March 2014 to assess progress towards the 2013
milestone, and to adjust the 2016 and 2020 milestones
accordingly. The review revealed that in 2011–13 mine
clearance was slow and suffered from underfunding (with
consequently fewer operating teams). 46

A second interim assessment, this time for 2014–16, was
undertaken in 2016, but the results were only released in
March 2018. The results similarly highlighted the huge gap
between actual mine clearance output and planned output
(when compared to the original strategic plan). This second
milestone assessment also reﬂected on the achievements,
challenges, and lessons learned, offering recommendations
that reﬂected available resources (ﬁnancial and human), as
well as a qualitative roadmap towards completion. 47
Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had been
said to depend on “political developments”, 48 but the Lebanese
government subsequently took the decision to initiate largerscale, planned clearance on the Blue Line 49 and clearance by
humanitarian demining operators began in November 2016. 50
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LMAC is now preparing a new strategic mine action
strategy, planned by the end of 2019, through which a more
accurate estimate for completion of mine clearance will be
available, taking into consideration the updated NMAS and
new methodologies. LMAC is also developing a long term
clearance plan for each region, with yearly benchmarks. 51
Lebanon has set four levels of priority for its land release.
The ﬁrst is to address infrastructure (e.g. housing, roads,
hospitals, and schools); the second is to address utilities
(e.g. water, electricity, drainage, and telephone lines); the
third is to release agricultural land and grazing areas for
livestock; and the fourth is to release land for other activities
(e.g. nature reserves or areas used by wildlife). 52 In some

instances, task prioritisation is also inﬂuenced by requested
speciﬁcations from donors, for example based on the
geographical location. 53
LMAC selects and assigns tasks for clearance based on the
priorities set according to the initial survey, while updated
information may lead to a change in priority for some areas.
LMAC planned to survey all designated high-priority sites,
to obtain accurate information, before tasking them for
clearance. 54
Clearance operators in Lebanon believe that reprioritisation
is needed, as all of the current tasks fall between priorities 2
and 3, and reprioritisation has not occurred for some time. 55

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Lebanon developed its ﬁrst NMAS in 2010. 56 Over the last
two years, LMAC worked with UNDP and other partners,
under a project funded by the EU, to revise the standards. 57
The aim of the revision has been to enhance efﬁciency by
harmonising national standards with IMAS, as well as to add
new modules not present in the original Standards. 58 LMAC
adopted a consultative and constructive approach to the
revision process. 59 The revised NMAS, formally approved in
March 2018, have a solid focus on land release and evidencebased decision-making, in line with the IMAS, and based on
recommendations and analysis of operational data. Notable
enhancements include reduction of the required clearance
depth from 20cm to 15cm; revision of fadeout speciﬁcations
for pattern mineﬁelds, and enhancements in how rapid
response tasks are addressed and recorded. 60 These changes
should improve the efﬁciency of land release in Lebanon. 61
In March 2018, the new NMAS were presented to
operators during a workshop at the RSHDL, during which
LMAC discussed next steps in operationalising the new
standards. 62 Demining NGOs have updated their standing
operating procedures (SoPs) according to the new NMAS. 63
Furthermore, operators now have an opportunity to discuss
speciﬁc land release considerations with LMAC for assigned
clearance tasks, which arise during the pre-clearance
assessment stage of operations. Such discussions might
result in the reﬁning of the task size or approved land
release speciﬁcations (e.g. use of technical survey, for
all or part of the task, rather than full clearance). 64
Mined areas in pattern mineﬁelds/along the Blue Line
have been reclassiﬁed into high-threat hazardous area
(HTHA) and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). The use of
technical survey, instead of full clearance, is permitted for
some parts of the CHA based on discussion and agreement
between LMAC operations ofﬁcers and clearance operators. 65
Previously, full clearance had been required for 15 metres
from the mine rows, but in the revised NMAS this has been
changed to a required fade-out of ﬁve metres from the
mine rows, and technical survey (with a minimum of 30%
area covered by technical assets, including mechanical
assets) from the edge of the 5-metre fadeout up to the
mineﬁeld fence, for mineﬁelds in which the lanes have not
been disrupted. Following discussions in the TWG, the 30%
technical survey requirement was subsequently reduced to
10%. 66 If there is no fence, 10 metres of technical survey is
required from the edge of the 5-metre fade-out. Fade-out for
anti-vehicle mines has been reduced from 20 metres to 10. 67
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Previously, operators have been required to fully clear the
area between the mine rows and the mineﬁeld fence, plus an
additional two metres outside the fence, with one asset. 68
MAG and NPA also noted that to further enhance efﬁciencies,
fade-out requirements at the Blue Line could be further
assessed based on empirical evidence. Evidence from
clearance operations on the Blue Line to date reveals that no
mines have been found outside of ﬁve metres from the outer
mine row, in mineﬁelds in which the lanes have not been
disturbed. In the operators’ opinion, technical survey beyond
the ﬁve-metre fadeout (up to the mineﬁeld fence or for ten
metres in the absence of a fence) should only be required if
there is sufﬁcient evidence to suggest mines have migrated
from the mine rows. 69 As mentioned above, it has been agreed
that, on the Blue Line, technical survey beyond fade-out can
be reduced to 10%, on a case-by-case basis, targeted to areas
where there were missed mines in the mine rows.70 MAG
believes the ﬁve-metre fade-out could even be reduced to
three metres, or double the distance of the mine row.71
Anti-vehicle mineﬁelds represent another challenge on the
Blue Line because of their proximity to the fence. As at April
2019, LMAC was discussing the best way to render safe the
anti-vehicle mines and move them away, in order to save time
on anti-personnel mine clearance. LMAC and MAG were due to
start various destruction trials in August/September 2019.72
Four new HSTAMIDS detectors were planned to be introduced
for use on Blue Line operations in 2019, which were expected
to increase efﬁciency. A training area prepared by MAG at
the Hammana school, was completed in August 2019 and the
detectors were due to arrive in late 2019 or early 2020.73
Since the release and implementation of the revised NMAS,
national authorities in Lebanon have actively promoted the
use of non-technical survey and technical survey, in order
to deﬁne the presence or absence of an explosive threat.74
This is evidenced by deployment of MAG and NPA teams to
conduct non-technical survey of new contamination in the
north-east region of Lebanon, bordering Syria.75 Prior to 2018,
the only non-technical survey capacity that was permitted
was that of the LAF.76 In 2019, LMAC was discussing with the
NGO operators the option for each to have a non-technical
survey team to re-survey for each new task prior to starting
clearance, in addition to conducting survey of other mined
areas.77 As at August 2019, MAG was deploying ﬁve
non-technical survey teams and NPA was deploying, one
team, while HI had submitted a proposal for two teams.78

STATES NOT PARTY

In 2018, manual mine clearance was conducted by
international operators DanChurchAid (DCA) (one team),
Humanity and Inclusion (HI) (four teams), MAG (nine teams),
NPA (two teams), and by the Engineering Regiment of the
LAF (two teams).79 In addition, four mechanical teams were
operated by the Engineering Regiment of the LAF and one
by MAG; and seven MDD teams operated by the Engineering
Regiment. 80 All LAF engineering companies have two teams
of EOD-qualiﬁed personnel. 81 In addition, UNIFIL also has
sufﬁcient demining capacity to enable it to conduct its
operations on the Blue Line. 82
Non-technical survey capacity in 2018 consisted of 12
personnel from the LAF and 9 from MAG, plus the MAG
and NPA non-technical survey teams deployed to the new
contamination in “Jroud Arsal” in the north-east of the
country along the border with Syria. Technical survey
capacity in 2018 consisted of just one team, at one site, but
clearance teams can also be deployed for technical survey. 83
In 2019, LMAC intends to have speciﬁc plans for technical
survey for all sites which non-technical survey recommends
for reduction. 84
In 2018, DCA deployed only one manual mine clearance
team, as its other team moved to conduct battle area
clearance (BAC). 85
HI deployed four mine clearance teams in north Lebanon
in 2018, totalling 28 deminers, plus supervisors, team
leaders, and support staff. 86 This represents the same
capacity as the previous year. HI’s prioritisation of tasks is
based on proximity to populated area, but mine clearance
operations in north Lebanon and the Mount Lebanon area
are also determined by seasonal factors: clearance of low
altitude mineﬁelds during winter (October to April), and
then clearance tasks above 2,000 metres begin in April and
continue through the summer, depending on snow. 87 Most
of the remaining demining tasks in the area in which HI has
been operating since 2011 are in contaminated cedar forests
at high altitude. 88 According to LMAC, HI has expressed an
interest in deploying a non-technical survey team in 2019. 89
LAMINDA began mine clearance in 2018, having moved two
BAC teams to manual mine clearance instead.90
MAG deployed nine manual clearance teams in 2019 (an
increase of six teams compared to 2017), in addition to
one mechanical team.91 As at August 2019, MAG had seven
multi-task teams operating in the “Jroud Arsal” area in the
north-east along the border with Syria, clearing conventional
and improvised munitions.92
NPA deployed two manual mine clearance teams totalling 18
personnel, including 2 medics, from January to September
2018, with capacity then increasing to 26 personnel from
October 2018.93 In addition, NPA deployed ﬁve non-technical
survey personnel in 2018 in the “Jroud Arsal” area and will
deploy non-technical survey staff in southern Lebanon in
2019.94 NPA clearance capacity in the “Jroud Arsal” increased
to four multi-task teams in June 2019, with the teams
becoming operational from August.95

The 2018 capacity of the Engineering Regiment (for combined
mine and CMR operations) was said to comprise two mine
clearance teams, four mechanical demining teams, and seven
MDD teams.96
UNIFIL was established in 1978 97 to conﬁrm withdrawal of
Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred in
2000); restore international peace and security; and assist
the Government of Lebanon to re-establish its authority in
the area.98 The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams
has been to clear access lanes through mineﬁelds in order
to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does
not conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian
purposes but only to facilitate placement of markers by
clearing three-metre-wide lanes into mined areas,99 and also
to clear mines close to UNIFIL posts or which pose a danger
to UNIFIL patrols. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
continues to engage with UNIFIL regarding the possibility
of UNIFIL re-engaging in humanitarian mine action.100 LMAC
is in ongoing discussions with UNIFIL to discuss an MoU for
cooperation on humanitarian mine clearance.101
In 2018, operational assets were provided by two UNIFIL
Troop Contributing Countries: Cambodia and China.
Operational capacities and capabilities of UNIFIL are
determined by operational need, and capacity as at August
2019 remained the same as the previous year and comprised
ﬁve manual clearance teams, two EOD teams, and one
mechanical team.102
UNMAS carries out conﬁrmatory training with UNIFIL
demining units when they rotate into the country.103

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The LAF uses MDDs for technical survey and as a secondary
asset. The LAF also uses mechanical assets, and in addition,
MAG has a demining machine. In Lebanon, machines are
mostly used as secondary assets to support clearance teams
(e.g. ground preparation, rubble removal etc. or for fadeout);
in areas where manual clearance is difﬁcult; and for technical
survey and LTHA.104 MAG, however, believes that mechanical
assets could also usefully be deployed as a primary asset
in South Lebanon, when the terrain permits.105 In 2017, MAG
was given permission by LMAC to use mechanical assets
for missing mine excavations, which is saving considerable
time.106 Often, however, the terrain is not suitable for MDDs
or machines.

DEMINER SAFETY
There were three demining accidents in 2018. A MAG site
supervisor was injured when an uncontrolled demolition
occurred during demolition of Israeli No. 4 mines.107 An
NPA deminer was injured in June 2018 during clearance
of an Israeli No. 4 mine,108 and in October 2018, an NPA site
supervisor was injured from the explosion of an Israeli No.
4 mine fuze.109 All accidents were investigated internally by
the two respective NGOS, and by the LMAC Board of Inquiry,
typically formed by QA, quality control, and operations
ofﬁcers. Investigation reports are then disseminated to all
stakeholders, including NGOs.110
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of more than 0.4km2 of mined area (i.e. area suspected or conﬁrmed to contain anti-personnel mines) was released in
2018, of which nearly 0.39km2 was cleared, nearly 0.03km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, and a small amount
(7,646m2) was reduced through technical survey. Nearly 0.03km2 of new mined area was added to the database in 2018,
following non-technical survey in Arsal, in the north-east of Lebanon bordering Syria.

SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, 28,633m2 of land classiﬁed as being mineﬁeld (MF),
was cancelled through non-technical survey and 7,646m2 was
reduced by MAG through technical survey.111 This compared
to the 1.2km2 of mined area cancelled through non-technical
survey in 2017 and a decrease on the 99,694m2 reduced
through technical survey.112
A further 2,817,200m2 of “Mined Area” was cancelled in
2018, but strangely, in Lebanon the term “Mined Area” is
used to denote dangerous areas entered into the database
when the ﬁrst impact survey was executed, which were not
accessible, and where the type of hazard was not identiﬁed.
Therefore, these areas are not the same as those suspected
or conﬁrmed to contain anti-personnel mines. According
to LMAC, in 2019, all mined area in the database has been
cancelled because access to all these areas is now possible.113
In addition, the ﬁrst stage of non-technical survey by MAG
and NPA of “Jroud Arsal” in the north-east114 began in July

2018 and was completed in October, with immediate
follow-on clearance.115 The survey resulted in 27,197m2 of
new/previously unrecorded conﬁrmed mined area.116 An
additional 410,329m2 was identiﬁed as containing “IEDs”,117
many of which are also anti-personnel mines of
an improvised nature. NPA conﬁrmed discovering 70
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature during the
survey, including tripwire-activated devices.118
Information for the survey was based on information
available from LAF units present in the area and from locals,
in particular shepherds. There are, however, still areas
where no information is available, and these will constitute
the second phase of survey, which began in March 2019.119
In 2019, the focus for the “Jroud Arsal” operations is technical
survey and clearance, however non-technical survey will be
an ongoing process according to needs and priorities.120

CLEARANCE IN 2018
Lebanon reported clearing just under 0.39km2 of mined area in 2018, destroying in the process 13,074 anti-personnel mines
and 90 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 2).121 Clearance in 2018 was down compared to the 0.51km2 of mined area cleared in 2017.122
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2018123
Operator

Area cleared (m²)

DCA

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

1,003

1

0

0

116,578

2,409

1

133

MAG

68,825

7,242

21

0

NPA

26,675

2,775

0

0

1,735

71

0

0

180,070

576

68

*11,097

394,886

13,074

90

11,230

HI

LAMINDA
LAF
Totals

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle *destroyed during BAC and mine clearance

Table 2 above includes the destruction of 442 anti-personnel
mines during spot tasks in 2018: 408 anti-personnel mines
destroyed by the Engineering Regiment and 34 by the Combat
Engineer companies in the Brigades.124
Furthermore, UNIFIL found and destroyed 2,372 antipersonnel mines during its 2018 operations along the UNIFIL
patrol road, in the far south of Lebanon near the Blue Line.125
HI’s clearance output decreased slightly in 2018, compared
to the previous year, due to having to conduct full excavation
for undetectable anti-personnel mines, and also working in
narrow polygons which restricted deployment of full capacity
due to required safety distances.126
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HI reported that of the 16 tasks it cleared in 2018, 4 were
found not to contain anti-personnel mines, representing
7% of HI’s total clearance output.127 Due to the nature of the
militia mineﬁelds in north Lebanon, there is sometimes a
lack of clearly deﬁned CHAs. Accordingly, in certain areas,
additional non-technical survey and technical survey could
help to more accurately deﬁne areas of actual contamination.
Unfortunately, deployment of MDDs or demining machinery
to help facilitate survey and clearance in north Lebanon is
limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of
the tasks in the region.128
The CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not
include obligatory fade-out distances, which can considerably
increase the overall size of the task.129

STATES NOT PARTY

It has been stated that “While Lebanon is not signatory to
the Ottawa Convention, LMAC works in spirit of the treaty”,130
and that LMAC adheres to its noble causes and tries to work
along with the Maputo Action Plan.131
Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be
completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–20
national strategy, but meeting the target was contingent on
deployment of considerable resources: 125 manual clearance
teams (45 for mineﬁelds excluding the Blue Line and 80 for
the Blue Line), 2 mechanical teams, and 9 two-strong MDD
teams.132 Current mine clearance capacity is far lower. The
second mid-term review, conducted in 2016, and ﬁnally
released in March 2018, conﬁrmed that progress against the
strategy has fallen well behind schedule, and that signiﬁcant
increased capacity would be required to bridge the gap.

Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.39

2017

0.51

2016

0.55

2015

0.92

2014

1.28

Total

3.65

LMAC reported that in addition to a lack of funding, rocky and
forested terrain continued to pose a challenge to demining
operations, in addition to lack of mineﬁeld records for much
of the contamination (especially in the North).133
Lebanon has cleared less than 4km2 of mined area in the last
ﬁve years, as detailed in Table 3. Based on almost 20km2 of
total mined area as at the end of 2018, and average clearance
rates of less than 1km2 per year, it will take many years for
Lebanon to become mine-free. However, progress in land
release is expected to be accelerated by adoption of better
land release procedures in 2018, as enshrined in the revised
NMAS. Crucially, LMAC’s demonstrated commitment to
enhance the use of non-technical and technical survey will
help to cancel or reduce areas more efﬁciently.134
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Libya has obligations under international human rights law
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

All parties to the conﬂict in Libya should ensure that forces loyal to them do not use anti-personnel mines.

■

As soon as political conditions permit, Libya should enact mine action legislation, establish an interministerial
national mine action authority, and adopt a national mine action strategy.

■

Libya should, at the earliest opportunity possible and as soon the security situation permits, conduct a baseline
survey to identify the extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines and begin systematic clearance.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Mine contamination in Libya is a legacy of the Second
World War (mainly in the east and mostly anti-vehicle mine
contamination), as well as subsequent armed conﬂict with
Egypt in 1977 (pattern mineﬁelds mapped, fenced and
marked), and with Chad in 1980−87, which resulted in mines
being laid on Libya’s borders with these two neighbours.1 The
border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected. During
Colonel Muammur Qaddaﬁ’s four decades in power, mines
were emplaced around a number of locations, including
military facilities and key infrastructure.
Mines were used by both the government and the opposition
forces during the 2011 conﬂict leading to Colonel Qaddaﬁ’s
overthrow. According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre
(LibMAC) around 30,000−35,000 mines were laid in ﬁve
regions and cities, including Misrata, but were “largely
cleared” after the downfall of the Gaddaﬁ regime by
volunteers with previous military experience. 2
The only conﬁrmed instance of landmine use by rebels occurred
in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government
elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the
Nafusa Mountains.3 The escalation of conﬂict in Libya in 2014
brought new reports of mine use by armed groups ﬁghting
around Tripoli airport.4 There were also allegations of landmine
use by non-state armed groups between 2016 and 2018.5
Contamination since 2015 is believed to be mainly in Benghazi,
Derna (in the east of Libya), and Sirte.6
Mines of an improvised nature are suspected to have been
laid during 2016 by Islamic State in areas that they controlled,
such as in Sirte.7 In July 2017, the engineering divisions of
Operation Dignity8 continued to clear mines and booby-traps
left by Islamic State ﬁghters from Benghazi, but also warned
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civilians from attempting to return to their homes before
clearance work was ﬁnished.9
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of anti-personnel
mine contamination across Libya, as many suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs) have not been surveyed. As at
February 2017, national contamination data from the LibMAC
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database, reported six conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
four in Sirte and two in Misrata, totalling almost 41.5km2,
contaminated by anti-personnel mines, while a seventh CHA, in
Sirte, of some 7.5km2, was contaminated by anti-vehicle mines.
A massive single SHA, of almost 223km2, was suspected to
contain only anti-vehicle mines.10 It is likely that further survey
will drastically reduce these ﬁgures, but at the same time
many further suspected areas have not been surveyed.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
advocates for survey to help quantify the scale and type
of contamination, but the ongoing security situation poses
major challenges to operationalising the necessary survey.11
According to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
the presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) poses a persistent
threat to the Libyan population and also hinders the safe
return of internally displaced people and restricts access for
humanitarian workers.12
Libya is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants
(CMR) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants 2019 report on Libya for further information),
and ongoing conﬂict has left signiﬁcant quantities of other
explosive remnants of war (ERW) in cities across Libya.13

STATES NOT PARTY

Mine action exists in a fragmented and violent political
context. Following years of armed conﬂict, a new United
Nations-backed “unity” government, the Government of
National Accord, was formally installed in a naval base in
Tripoli in early 2016. It has subsequently faced opposition
from two rival governments and a host of militia forces. In
April 2019, Khalifa Haftar, a military commander based in the
west of the country, launched an offensive to take control of
Tripoli and topple the Government of National Accord. As at
July 2019, the offensive was ongoing, with combat in part of
the city.14

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defense to
coordinate mine action in December 2011.15 As at May 2019, it
was operating under the UN-backed Government of National
Accord. LibMAC’s headquarters are in Tripoli, in the west of
the country, and it also has ofﬁces in Benghazi16 and Misrata.17
The operating costs and salaries for the LibMAC are funded
by the United States Department of State and administered
by ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF).18

GENDER
LibMAC is not thought to have a gender policy for mine action in place.
HI reported that it has a gender policy in place and that it planned to elaborate an implementation plan in 2019.19 It also
reported that it disaggregates data by sex and age. HI’s risk education team, which also conducts community liaison, is gender
balanced. While two of its project managers and two project ofﬁcers are female, HI reported that unfortunately women are not
currently employed in survey and clearance, as it is deemed culturally unacceptable for now. 20

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
LibMAC receives technical support for IMSMA from the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS. In
March 2019, HI reported that LibMAC had recently announced details of a new effort to bring the IMSMA database up to date
and ensure the data are reliable. 21 IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be
consistent and enable collection of necessary data. 22

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy for Libya.
LibMAC does, however, prioritise survey and clearance operations and is responsible for issuing task orders. Prioritisation
is, in part, informed by data collected and reported to LibMAC by operators such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG), during
non-technical survey or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and by reports from the local community. 23 According to an
international clearance operator, LibMAC generally tasks according to geographic area and the nearest available assets. 24

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but National Mine Action Standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English, have
been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the Government of National Accord in
August 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website. 25 According to an international clearance operator, the national
mine action standards are aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 26
HI has updated its standing operating procedures (SoPs) for mine action in Libya in line with the LibMAS.27
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OPERATORS
Mine action operations have been conducted by the army
engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior’s National
Safety Authority (NSA), also known as Civil Defence. 28
The NSA is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.29
These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or
accredited by them, nor do they provide clearance reports
to the Centre.
The deteriorating security situation resulted in the
withdrawal of UNMAS and international mine action
operators from Libya in mid 2014. As at February 2019,
international clearance operators active in Libya included
DanChurchAid (DCA), DDG, HALO Trust, HI, and GCS. 30
National NGO operator, Free Fields Foundation (3F), was
also operational and another national operator, the Libyan
Demining Group (LDG) was in the process of becoming
established as at February 2019. 31 Local organisations, Peace
Organization from Zintan and World Without War (3W) from
Misrata, which had been trained by HI in 2016 and received
accreditation for non-technical survey, 32 subsequently had
their operations suspended for not fully following standards
and in addition, neither organisation had secured funding. 33
UNMAS has been operating from Tunis since November
2014, from where it provides institutional and operational
capacity-building, training, including in EOD, and support and
advice to LibMAC, including in establishing processes for the
accreditation and activities of mine action actors in Libya. 34
Despite the relocation of the programme to Tunisia due to
poor security in 2014, UNMAS Libya continues to coordinate
with national authorities and implementing partners and to
carry out mine action activities and provide technical advice
and advisory support on arms and ammunition management.
The UNMAS Libya Programme is an integral part of UNSMIL. 35
Since 2015, UNMAS has trained more than 70 Civil Defence
operators and military engineers in advanced EOD, 30
ofﬁcers from eastern Libya in non-technical survey, and
provided advanced medical ﬁrst-responder training to 72 EOD
operators from Benghazi and several operators addressing
the threat from explosive ordnance in Sirte. 36 Military
engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are working
with basic tools. 37
DCA is operational in Libya clearing ERW and providing risk
education. Now in its eighth year of working in Libya, DCA has
ofﬁces in Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli38 And is operational in
three areas of Libya: Benghazi; Sabha, in the south-west; and
Tripoli. 39 DDG set up in Benghazi in December 2017 and spent
the ﬁrst quarter of 2018 obtaining accreditation and putting
in place necessary policies and procedures before becoming
operational. DDG hoped to expand non-technical survey and
EOD capacity in Benghazi from the late summer of 2018. In
Sabha, DDG had one non-technical survey team and one EOD
team, which it was managing remotely. Security issues in the
south continue to disrupt mine action operations and prevent
continuous operations. In Tripoli, DDG works through its
national implementing partner, 3F. 3F operates under DDG’s
accreditation and SoPs, and has an operational personnel
of 37, composed in three EOD teams and one non-technical
survey team. 40
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GCS is working in partnership with Libyan NGO, 3F, to clear
ERW from an ammunition storage area on a military airbase
in Misrata. The area comprises 37 bunkers destroyed by
NATO airstrikes in 2011. 41
The HALO Trust has been present in Libya since November
2018, and, as at June 2019, had ofﬁces in Misrata and Sirte,
in addition to a small administrative ofﬁce in Tripoli. The
HALO Trust is working in partnership with DCA in Sirte, with
HALO leading on mechanical clearance and DCA providing
the supporting EOD capacity, along with a joint non-technical
survey team and mine risk education (MRE) team. HALO Trust
and DCA have conducted a socio-economic assessment of
Sirte and a ﬁeld assessment for areas of possible mine and
ERW contamination which potentially require mechanical
clearance. 42
As at June 2019, HALO Trust was in the process of armouring
two machines for mechanical clearance and was set to begin
training of two mechanical teams and one non-technical
survey team. Ongoing conﬂict in Tripoli and delays in
registration prevented HALO from becoming operational in
June, as planned, but it expected to begin clearance activities
over the summer. HALO also planned to begin training of
a further two mechanical teams later in 2019; to introduce
additional technical assets; and to work with LibMAC to
expand operations to other parts of Libya and to conduct
all humanitarian mine action activities, including manual
clearance and battle area clearance (BAC). 43
As at March 2019, HI’s main ofﬁce for Libya was in Tripoli,
with operational ofﬁces in Misrata and Benghazi, and an
administrative base being maintained by HI in Tunis.44 In 2018,
HI deployed six manual clearance personnel in Libya, and
an existing EOD team planned to also conduct non-technical
survey in 2019. 45 As at March 2019, HI was operational in
Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli, but security issues had
temporarily hindered its 2019 operations in Tawerga, in
Misrata, forcing teams to deploy elsewhere. 46 As at March 2019,
HI had no implementing partners in mine action in Libya. 47
A number of other Libyan civil society organisations are also
reported to carry out mine action operations, but they are not
accredited by LibMAC.
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

There were no reports of planned mine clearance during
2018 although several operators engaged in EOD operations.
No mined area was reported to have been released through
survey in 2018 either.

LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation
of mine action operations: the high level of contamination;
ongoing conﬂict and the continued presence of Islamic State;
the difﬁculty in convincing internally displaced persons to
delay their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security
and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD
capacity in Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited
governmental and international support. 48 Security conditions
continued to pose a challenge to mine action in Libya.

SURVEY IN 2018
There were no other known reports of anti-personnel survey
during 2018, although data from LibMAC and some clearance
operators was not made available.

CLEARANCE IN 2018
There were no known reports of anti-personnel clearance
during 2018, although data from LibMAC and some clearance
operators were not made available.

In his February 2018 report on the work of UNSMIL, the UN
Secretary-General stated that explosive ordnance “continue
to pose a signiﬁcant, indiscriminate threat to the civilian
population” and urged UN Member States “to expand their
funding to activities in priority areas equipment”. 49
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MOROCCO
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Morocco should continue to submit voluntary APMBC Article 7 reports. It should clarify in greater detail
the extent of contamination remaining to be addressed and implement and report on progress according to
international standards for land release methodology.

■

Morocco should establish a timeline for completion of clearance of all mined areas on territory under its
jurisdiction or control.

■

Morocco should ensure freedom of access and unhindered movement of all civilian UN Mission for the Referendum
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) staff and take all necessary measures to facilitate the conduct of demining.

■

Morocco is strongly encouraged to provide any mineﬁeld records to other relevant stakeholders to facilitate
survey and clearance of affected areas.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of contamination from mines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW) in the area of Western Sahara
controlled by Morocco, on the west side of the Berm,1 is not
known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that
a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated, 2 although the
threat is undoubtedly signiﬁcant.
Morocco’s contamination is a result of the conﬂict between the
Royal Moroccan Army and Polisario Front forces over Western
Sahara. Morocco has reported having registered and mapped

the mineﬁelds it has laid, and has pledged to clear them as
soon as the conﬂict over Western Sahara is over.3
At the end of 2018, Morocco continued to report 10 localities
as containing mines: Bir Anzarane, Douiek, Gerret Auchfaght,
Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf
Mhkinza. It claims these contain contamination as the result
of “haphazard” mine laying across the south of Morocco by
the Polisario Front in 1975–91. 4

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a
mine action centre. The Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) carries
out demining, which it reports are conducted in collaboration
with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO) observers. 5

In 2018, the RMA continued to receive training from the
United States (US) Marines on demining and explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques, along with continued
support from the National Guard of the US state of Utah
through the State Partnership Programme, and additionally
reported participating in a number of regional mine action
trainings and workshops during the year. 6

GENDER
Morocco is not believed to have a gender policy in place for its demining operations.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Morocco does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action.

PLANNING AND TASKING
It is not known how Morocco plans its demining operations. Operations are carried out in collaboration with MINURSO.
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Morocco appears to use only manual demining techniques, which is not efﬁcient given the size and type of terrain being released.

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation
or standards, but has reported that “normal safety and
environmental protection standards have been followed”
in clearance of mines and ERW.7

OPERATORS
All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted by the RMA.
In 2017, it reported that 16 demining modules and 89
demining detachments were operational and responded to

175 interventions during the year. 8 Morocco did not provide
further detail and did not report on the RMA’s demining
capacity in 2018.

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Previously, in 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000
deminers, though only 400 detectors were at their disposal
at that time.9 This raised serious questions both about the
procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance ﬁgures
being reported.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Morocco has not reported in detail on its release of
mined areas in recent years, nor given any indication of
implementing land release methodology. The ﬁgures it does
provide are not credible and should be taken as an indication
of land released or declared as clear of contamination rather
than land physically cleared.
In a voluntary Article 7 report for 2018, Morocco reported
“clearance” of a total area of 313.4km2, with the destruction
of 232 anti-personnel mines, 18 anti-vehicle mines, and
574 items of ERW.10 This compares to 2017, when Morocco
reported “clearance” of 232km2, with the destruction of 69
anti-personnel mines, 82 anti-vehicle mines, and 595 items
of ERW.11
In his October 2018 report to the UN Security Council, the UN
Secretary-General reported that, since April of that year, the
RMA claimed to have cleared more than 84km2 of land west
of the berm, with the destruction of 344 items, consisting of
268 items of unexploded ordnance, 74 anti-personnel mines,
and 2 anti-vehicle mines.12 Previously, in his April 2018 report,
the UN Secretary-General noted that the RMA had reported
“clearing” nearly 145km2 of land to the west of the Berm
with the destruction of 1,121 items, including 1,008 items of
unexploded ordnance (UXO), as well as 57 anti-vehicle and
56 anti-personnel mines during the period 10 April 2017 to 29
March 2018.13 No further details were provided.

1

The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure
the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls
some three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west
side of the Berm.

2

Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

3

Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.

4

Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. Idiriya is spelled “Jdiriya”
in the 2018 report. From 2015, the area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been
listed as contaminated in earlier years, was no longer included on the list
of mined areas.

5

Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D.

6

Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form H; and AFRICOM, “Humanitarian
Mine Action increases demining capacity in Morocco”, 2 May 2019, at:
bit.ly/2LltXKS.

Morocco has reported that since 1975, as at end April 2019, a
total of 96,704 mines, including 49,316 anti-personnel mines,
and a further 20,132 items of ERW had been destroyed and
a total of almost 5,440km2 was cleared during demining
operations.14
Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following
an increase in the number of incidents. In April 2016,
Morocco was reportedly planning a new effort to clear
mines from the Berm that divides Western Sahara into the
Moroccan-controlled area and the Polisario-controlled area.
The units to be deployed were reportedly those trained by
the US Marines.15
Morocco is not a state party to the APMBC, but nonetheless
has obligations under international human rights law to
clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or
control as soon as possible. Morocco has stated on numerous
occasions its determination to voluntarily comply with the
provisions of the APMBC, including completion of stockpile
destruction of anti-personnel mines and demining. It has
provided annual voluntary Article 7 reports to the APMBC
regularly over the past decade. It has not, however, indicated
when it might complete mine clearance.

7

Voluntary Article 7 Report, (for 2018), Form D.

8

Statement of Morocco, APMBC 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna,
21 December 2017.

9

Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2010.

10

Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.

11

Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form C.

12

“Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western
Sahara”, UN doc. S/2018/889, 3 October 2018, para. 48.

13

“Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western
Sahara”, UN doc. S/2018/277, 29 March 2018, para. 43.

14

Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 24 June 2019.

15

“Morocco to Deploy Highly Qualiﬁed Team to Remove Sahara Landmines”,
Sahara Question, 25 March 2016, at: bit.ly/2Llu9d4.
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MYANMAR
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Myanmar has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

The Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) and armed groups should stop all use of anti-personnel mines.

■

Myanmar should accelerate non-technical survey, authorise international marking of hazardous areas, and
permit accredited operators to conduct clearance and explosive ordnance disposal.

■

Myanmar should establish a national mine action authority to plan and coordinate comprehensive
humanitarian mine action.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conﬂicts
between the Tatmadaw and numerous non-state armed
groups afﬁliated with ethnic minorities. There is no estimate
of the extent of mine contamination but some 55 townships
(out of a total of 325) in 10 states and regions are believed
to suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily
anti-personnel mines. While there is no systematic collection
of landmine casualty data in Myanmar, of the recorded

incidents in recent years, Kachin and Shan States have
among the highest number of landmine casualties, and
numbers are increasing.1
In 2018, MAG identiﬁed 671,244m2 of anti-personnel mined
area across 42 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and
21,126m2 across 9 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs) across
Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states and the Tanintharyi region
(see Table 1). 2

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by township or state (at end 2018) 3
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Bawlakhae/Kayah

0

0

1

16,482

Hpasawng/Kayah

0

0

2

27,065

Hpruso/Kayah

1

14,819

14

28,428

Loikaw/Kayah

0

0

15

19,059

Mese/Kayah

0

0

1

27,028

Kawkareik/Kayin

1

2,400

0

0

Langkho/Shan(South)

0

0

1

500,000

Mongkaung/Shan(South)

0

0

3

51,225

Township/ State

Pekon/Shan(South)

7

3,907

5

1,957

Totals

9

21,126

42

671,244

In 2018, DDG conducted non-technical survey in Kayah state
(in Hpruso and Hpasawng townships) visiting a total of
102 villages. A total of nine CHAs totalling 613,366m² were
identiﬁed in nine contaminated villages. 4
In addition, in 2018, The HALO Trust identiﬁed 163,832m2
across 58 hazardous areas by non-technical survey in
Kayin and Shan States. In 2019, as at August, a further 25
hazardous areas had been identiﬁed covering 550,287m2.
These contaminated areas indicate the presence of both
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). 5
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The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission
on Myanmar established by the United Nations Human
Rights Council reported in September 2018 that “despite
the signing of the Nationwide Ceaseﬁre Agreement in
October 2015, which committed all parties to end the use
of landmines and cooperate on mine-clearance operations,
new landmines continue to be laid.” It cited credible reports
that the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups had laid mines
and observed that “Tatmadaw soldiers lay landmines in
villages they have attacked or after civilians have ﬂed, or on
roads frequently used by civilians. Civilians have also laid
landmines in order to protect their property.”6

STATES NOT PARTY

In September 2019, the Independent International FactFinding Mission on Myanmar reported that Northern
Myanmar is “heavily contaminated with landmines” and that
the parties to the conﬂict, including the Tatmadaw, the KIA,
the SSA-S , and the SSA-N, all continue to lay landmines and
use IEDs. 8

The Tatmadaw uses anti-personnel mines most of which are
produced in state-owned factories.9 Ethnic armed groups
acknowledge use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised
nature as well as a number of anti-vehicle mines, but
unconﬁrmed reports have suggested groups in the
north have also obtained Chinese factory-made Type 72
anti-vehicle mines.10
The violence in Myanmar started after the country’s
independence in 1948. Mined areas are located in areas
of Myanmar adjacent to borders with Bangladesh, China,
and Thailand, and pose a particular threat in northern and
eastern parts of the country.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Myanmar has no functioning national mine action programme.
The government set up a Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC)
under the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2012 with NPA’s
support, but the centre was never fully staffed. The MPC
was dissolved at the end of March 2016 and replaced by a
National Reconciliation and Peace Centre that reports to the
head of government, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.11
The Nationwide Ceaseﬁre Agreement signed in October 2015
included a dedicated article on demining, but as at August 2019,
the government had not formulated a clear direction for mine
action or established a centre to coordinate it.12
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement and
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) co-chair the
Mine Risks Working Group (MRWG), which was set up in
2012 and comprises 10 ministries, 41 international and
national organisations, and four state-level coordination
agencies (in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin and Shahn states).13 In
2018–19, the MRWG was guided by a strategic workplan
whose six main priorities are: inter-ministerial and interagency coordination mechanisms; mine risk education
(MRE); victim assistance; data collection and information
management; advocacy; and land release operations,
including non-technical survey.14 UNICEF hosts quarterly
MRWG meetings at union and state level.15
MAG and NPA both reported that the Government of
Myanmar, including the military, became more engaged
with mine issues at state and union level in 2018.16 There

is a regular and well attended MRE working group, with
active participation from state and union level government
representatives. As at August 2019, the development of a
non-technical survey working group was under discussion.17
The Government of Myanmar drafted a countrywide
internally displaced person (IDP) camp closure strategy,
which has identiﬁed a need for landmine clearance to enable
IDPs to return to their villages of origin. While this strategy
does not provide any further details of how and when such
clearance will take place it has allowed mine action partners
to engage in further discussions about clearance with
key stakeholders such as the Minister for Social Welfare,
Relief and Resettlement. Although further permissions
are still needed from the Ministry of Defence before such
humanitarian clearance can begin, this marks a positive
change in engagement.18
In 2018, operators facilitated workshops and cooperative
visits between government delegates from Myanmar
and neighbouring countries. This included a study tour to
Cambodia in collaboration with the ASEAN Regional Mine
Action Centre (ARMAC) and the Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) where delegates learned
about land release, national standards, Standing Operating
Procedures (SoPs) and information management, as well
as about Cambodia’s experience in adhering to the APMBC.
A similar trip to Thailand was planned for 2019.19

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Myanmar does not have standards and therefore operators have followed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
and their own SoPs.
In 2018, operators successfully advocated for the Government of Myanmar to include physical marking (with warning signs)
of SHAs and CHAs as part of the non-technical survey process. The government now approves marking of polygons on a
case-by-case basis dependent on approval from local authorities. 20 The HALO Trust has since marked two hazardous areas
in Kayin state with the agreement of the authorities and local community. 21
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It was also reported that mines had been laid by the
Tatmadaw soldiers along the border with Bangladesh in the
lead up to and following the “clearance operations” intended
to target ﬂeeing Rohingya civilians and to prevent those who
had already left from returning. In April 2017, it was reported
that the Myanmar and Bangladesh governments had agreed
to remove mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
from the border area. By August, however, the Tatmadaw
was laying mines along the border, not removing them, and
in September Bangladesh made a formal complaint with
Myanmar regarding its use of mines.7

OPERATORS
Six international demining organisations have ofﬁces in
Yangon and some provincial locations: DanChurchAid (DCA),
Danish Demining Group (DDG), The HALO Trust, Humanity and
Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA). Tatmadaw engineers have reportedly
conducted some mine clearance but operations are not
systematic or recorded.
In 2018, MAG deployed a total of 12 community liaison
teams and 44 community liaison staff. MAG also deployed
a Community Liaison Manager, four Community Liaison
Supervisors and three Community Liaison Team Leaders
during 2018. In 2019, this was reduced by two community
liaison teams and one Community Liaison Team Leader.22
DDG employed three international staff and forty-two national
staff in 2018 (four in their Yangon ofﬁce, sixteen in Kayah for
non-technical survey and MRE and twenty-two in Shan and

Kachin for MRE). In 2019, DDG increased capacity in its Kayah
ofﬁce by relocating staff from Yangon and hiring an additional
staff member. 23
In 2018, NPA supported its local civil society partners in the
activities of one non-technical survey team and two MRE/
community liaison teams. In 2019, NPA plans to support the
deployment of three non-technical survey teams with its civil
society partners, which will conduct non-technical survey
and MRE primarily in the south-east of the country where
there are ceaseﬁres in effect. 24
The HALO Trust employed 49 staff in 2018 based between
Yangon, Hpa-An (Kayin), and Lashio (Shan) states, deploying
seven teams to deliver MRE, conduct survey, and assist
victims in Kayin and Shan states. In addition, HALO Trust
operates with two local partners in Shan state, which
increases access to ethnic Kachin and Shan communities. 25

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No land release has occurred in Myanmar as humanitarian
mine action operators are not permitted to conduct clearance
by either the government or ethnic minority authorities.
Operators have conducted risk education and community
liaison activities, which in recent years have included limited
community mapping of hazardous areas in some locations.
Operators were authorised to conduct non-technical survey in
some locations in 2018. They have so far been unable to carry
out surveys across an entire state (province) which would
enable them to determine a baseline level of contamination.
In 2018, MAG submitted a concept note for clearance of a
small number of tasks in Kayah state. The sites selected were
not of military strategic importance and clearance will bring
signiﬁcant beneﬁts for community safety and tourism. During
2019, MAG will continue to push for state and union level
approval for this initiative. MAG has secured permission to
conduct non-technical survey in Thaninthyari and Kayin state,
which began in 2019. 26

DDG continued non-technical survey in 2018 and as well as
identifying CHAs the survey teams also identiﬁed 26 items of
unexploded ordnance (UXO) across 26 villages. In 2019, DDG
was invited by the Kayah Government to seek authorisation
to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) but before any
such authorisation could be granted, the military stopped
the process and asserted their responsibility over EOD.
DDG provided the military with information about all the
dangerous items identiﬁed during the survey process and
encouraged the military to take action to remove and destroy
those items. 27
NPA supported its civil society partners for the activities of
one non-technical survey team in November 2018 in Mon state,
but no CHAs or SHAs were discovered between November
and December 2018. In 2019, NPA was focusing on three
areas of work: national ownership and capacity development,
non-technical survey and MRE with civil society partners, and
emergency response by local and national partners.28
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13

UNICEF, “Landmines and explosive remnants of war threaten children and
communities across Myanmar”, 4 April 2018.

2

Email from Bekim Shala, Country Director, MAG, 16 August 2019.

14

UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, “Myanmar 2019”.

3

Email from Bekim Shala, MAG, 16 August 2019.

15

Email from Bekim Shala, MAG, 16 August 2019.

4

Email from Pascal Simon, Head of Programme, DDG, 20 August 2019.

16

5

Email from Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 3 September
2019.

Emails from Bekim Shala, MAG, 16 August 2019; and Kyaw Lin Htut,
Programme Manager, NPA, 21 August 2019.

17

Ibid.

6

“Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact Finding
Mission on Myanmar”, UN doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 94.

18

Email from Bekim Shala, MAG, 8 September 2019.

19

Emails from Bekim Shala, MAG, 16 August 2019; and Kyaw Lin Htut, NPA,
21 August 2019.

7

Ibid., pp. 285–86.

8

“Detailed ﬁndings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar”, UN doc. A/HRC/42/CRP.5, 16 September 2019, pp. 155–58.

20

Ibid.

21

Email from Geoff Moynan, The HALO Trust, 3 September 2019.

These locally manufactured mines include copies of Russian PMNs (locally
designated MM-2), POMZ fragmentation mines (designated MM-1), and United
States M14s. LTM-76 bounding fragmentation mines based on British or
Indian designs have been found around electrical pylons.

22

Ibid.

23

Email from Pascal Simon, DDG, 21 August 2019.

24

Email from Kyaw Lin Htut, NPA, 21 August 2019.

Information provided by mine action stakeholders on condition of
anonymity, 2018.

25

Email from Geoff Moynan, Programme Manager, 3 September 2019.

26

Email from Bekim Shala, MAG, 16 August 2019.

27

Email from Pascal Simon, DDG, 20 August 2019.

28

Email from Kyaw Lin Htut, NPA, 21 August 2019.

9

10
11

Roger Fasth and Pascal Simon, “Mine Action in Myanmar”, Journal of Mine
Action, Issue 19.2, July 2015.

12

Interviews with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid
(NPA); Greg Crowther, Regional Director, South and South East Asia, Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), in Phnom Penh, 1 May 2017; and emails from Melissa
Andersson, Programme Manager, NPA, Yangon, 27 September 2017; and
Bekim Shala, MAG, 16 August 2019.

330 Clearing the Mines 2019

STATES NOT PARTY

CLEARING
THE MINES
2019

NORTH KOREA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

North Korea should cease all use of anti-personnel mines.

■

North Korea should clear all mines from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as possible.

■

North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, North Korea has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL
MINE CONTAMINATION

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The extent of North Korea’s mine problem is not known.
North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the
DMZ, a 1,000km2 strip of land between the north and south
of the peninsula believed to be one of the most densely
contaminated areas in the world. Mined areas are reported
to be marked and fenced but mines are also believed to have
shifted as a result of ﬂooding and landslides.1 In early 2006,
ofﬁcials commented to the APMBC Implementation Support
Unit (ISU) that North Korea had not laid mines elsewhere in
the country, 2 despite fears that, among others, sections of the
east coast were also mined.

In September 2018, the North Korean and South Korean
Ministers of Defence signed a military agreement, the
Panmunjom declaration, which mandated North Korea, South
Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) to “remove all
mines in the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom
within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018”. 6

Under an agreement on measures to ease tensions, North
and South Korea completed clearance of the Joint Security
Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom in October 2018. Additional
clearance was conducted around Arrowhead Hill (also known
as Hill 281) in Cheolwon, Gangwon Province. 3
In 2016, South Korean ofﬁcials alleged new use of mines by
North Korea near the village of Panmunjom inside the DMZ,
which is jointly administered by North Korea and the United
Nations (UN) Command. South Korea said North Korean
soldiers were observed laying several mines on the North’s
side of the “Bridge of No Return”, which spans the military
demarcation line. 4 North Korean forces were also reported
to have used anti-personnel mines along the DMZ border in
2015 and 2016, apparently to prevent North Korean soldiers
from ﬂeeing to South Korea. 5

North Korea has no functioning mine action programme.

LAND RELEASE
South Korean ofﬁcials conﬁrmed on 22 October 2018 that
clearance of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom by North
and South Korea had been completed.7 They reported North
Korea had cleared 636 mines while South Korea found none. 8
The north also reportedly cleared a 1.3km-long mine belt in
the Arrowhead Hill region.9 No other land release is known to
have occurred.

1

Statement of North Korea, United Nations (UN) General Assembly,
New York, 4 December 1998, UN doc. A/53/pv79, pp. 8–9; Choe Sang-Hun,
“Koreas start clearing landmines at DMZ in effort to ease tensions,”
New York Times, 1 October 2018.

5

“N. Korea lays land mines near border to prevent defection by soldiers:
sources”, Yonhap, 23 August 2016, at: bit.ly/2YaeT90; and “North Korea plants
landmines in DMZ apparently to prevent soldiers ﬂeeing”, Yonhap, 14 June
2015, at: bit.ly/2YYNALZ.

2

Email from Kerry Brinkert, Director, APMBC ISU, 1 February 2006.

6

3

Song Young-moo and No Kwang Chol, Agreement on the Implementation
of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain, National
Committee on North Korea, 19 September 2018, Annex 2, p. 7, at: bit.
ly/2XXbuXd; and “Korean leaders sign agreement for North Korea to take
further steps to denuclearize”, ABC News, 20 September 2018, at: abc7.
ws/2XZM0bq.

Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in
the Military Domain, National Committee on North Korea, 19 September 2018,
Annex 2, p. 7; and “Korean leaders sign agreement for North Korea to take
further steps to denuclearize”, ABC News, 20 September 2018.

7

“Koreas ﬁnish removing land mines from border village”, Associated Press,
22 October 2018, at: bit.ly/2GhPFvn.

8

“Two Koreas Complete Mine Removal in JSA”, KBS World Radio, 19 October
2018, at: bit.ly/2XTl8Kk; “Minister: N. Korea eliminated 636 mines from
Panmunjom area,” Yonhap, 12 November 2018, at: bit.ly/2Nbv2Fc .

9

Powerpoint presentation by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Han Cheol Ki, Side event to the
Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 24 May 2019.

4

“North Korea planting landmines at border with South, claims UN”, The
Independent, 23 August 2016, at: bit.ly/2JTjfIq; and “Bridge of No Return:
Seoul Accused Pyongyang of Planting Landmines on Border”, Sputnik
International, 28 August 2016, at: bit.ly/30xQ0Se.
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PAKISTAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Pakistan has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL
MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Pakistan
is not known. Pakistan remains affected by mines and other
explosive ordnance resulting from the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India, as
well as from more recent and continuing conﬂicts in areas
bordering Afghanistan, including, in particular, the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
In 2018, Pakistan reiterated past statements that it “faces
no problem of uncleared mines”. It again acknowledged that
the army laid mines on its eastern border with India during
an escalation of tensions in 2001–02, but stated those mines
were all cleared and that no mines have since been laid.1
In 2018, Pakistan stated that non-state armed groups
(NSAGs) have employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
including mines during attacks. 2 In fact, according to media
reports across Pakistan in 2018–19, civilian mine casualties
were from mines of an improvised nature laid by NSAGs,
from mines laid by troops along the Line of Control (LoC)
between India and Pakistan, and from mines and other
explosive hazards in South Waziristan (in an area that had
been cleared and declared safe by the military). 3 According
to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), in 2018, of the 1,538
deaths and injuries from explosive violence in Pakistan, 2%
were caused by landmines. 4 In 2017, according to a report
from Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), Pakistan had the world’s highest number of
recorded casualties from anti-vehicle mines, amounting
to 28% of the global total. 5

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme.
Pakistani military engineering units are believed to be
responsible for mine clearance in conﬂict zones, while the
Frontier Constabulary has said it conducts mine clearance in
contaminated areas of Baluchistan, FATA, and other conﬂict
zones in the North-West Frontier Province. 6

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of formal survey or clearance of mined
area in 2018. Pakistan reported a total of 232 attacks causing
casualties due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs, which
include anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, although the
ﬁgures are not disaggregated) “all over the country”.7
According to a media report, on 15 December 2018 an
unnamed senior security ofﬁcial said that 22 demining teams
were being formed by the Pakistani Army to defuse and
remove IEDs and mines in the North Waziristan District of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA. These deminers would
be in addition to the reported 43 teams already working in
the seven former tribal districts. 8
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Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form B; and Statement of Pakistan, 16th Meeting
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See, e.g., “Two tribal elders killed in Orakzai Agency landmine blast”, The
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RUSSIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Russia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Russia has obligations under international human rights law
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine
contamination but Russia is heavily contaminated with mines
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the
Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and
1999–2009), and armed conﬂicts in the Caucasian republics
of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used extensively
in the two major conﬂicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the
extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic
effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact
of the problem.1 In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister
and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr
Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km2 of land and
posed a major obstacle to development. 2 In contrast, Chechen
ofﬁcials and human rights organisations have previously

estimated that 245km2 of land was mined, including 165km2
of farmland and 73km2 of woodland. 3
In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces
reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km2
of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further
20km2 in neighbouring Ingushetia. 4 According to the online
media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in
lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more
mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts. 5
As at 2011, according to UNICEF, 3,132 civilians, including 772
children, had been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines
and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was
conducted by a local non-governmental organisation (NGO)
partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January
2011, due to lack of funding. 6

ALLEGED USE OF MINES IN CRIMEA IN 2014
Reports of mineﬁelds emplaced to demarcate border areas
after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, appear to have
concerned either “phoney mineﬁelds” or areas containing
trip-ﬂares. Trip-ﬂares are not covered by the APMBC.7
On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Harts reported that
“Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in
the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the
mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake
Crimea.”8 The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian
publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent
mineﬁeld laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the
villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson province of
Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in
a ﬁeld and ‘Danger Mines’ warning signs.9 Other photographs,
shared with Human Rights Watch by a photo-journalist,
showed an area near Chongar marked with “Danger Mines”
signs and evidence of stake-mounted, tripwire-initiated ﬂares
in the ground, also known as “signal mines”.10

Members of the local population informed Ukrainian partners
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that
Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson province had
laid mines, but it was not possible to conﬁrm the reports,
including whether any mines laid were anti-personnel or
anti-vehicle.11 On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported
that the Russian military had laid mines around the main
gas line into Crimea, but this allegation has not been
independently veriﬁed.12
At a meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use
of TM-62 anti-vehicle mines and unidentiﬁed anti-personnel
mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea.13 At the same
CCW meeting, Russia denied using anti-personnel mines,
asserting “the Self Defence forces of Crimea, before the
referendum, placed the mineﬁelds with relevant markings,
around Chongar”. Russia said “they placed only signal mines
and put proper signage around the ﬁelds”.14
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia
and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance
is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defence engineers,
demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and
by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its
specialised demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the
“Leader” Centre for Special Tasks).15
Russia reported that its armed forces established an
International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre
serves as a base for specialist training in detection and

clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation
of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine
action centre (MAC) as the term is generally understood
in mine action.16
In 2018, Russia reported that 6,135 military personnel were
involved in clearance operations in 136 demining teams.
Clearance was carried out by the Air and Space Forces, by
the Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Region Military
Forces, by the North Navy Forces, by the Strategic Rocket
Forces and by the Military Engineers.17

LAND RELEASE
In 2018, Russia reported that it cleared 657.8km2 of ERW-contaminated area across the Russian Federation and abroad with
129,818 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) found and destroyed.18
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SOUTH KOREA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Republic of South Korea (South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, South Korea has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. In
particular, South Korea should clear all anti-personnel mines within the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as
possible.

■

South Korea should enact long-awaited legislation permitting mine clearance by accredited civilian demining
organisations.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately
adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among
the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive
mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978,
and in 1988.
In 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines
were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000
mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites
that cover an area of about 3km2 in the northern parts of
Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.1 A
National Defence Committee report in 2010 said that South
Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km2
and some 209 unconﬁrmed mined areas covering almost
98km2. 2 A report presented to a side event at the 2019 APMBC
Intersessional Meetings showed the number of mined areas

as almost unchanged at 1,308 but provided no estimate of the
size of the affected areas. 3
An investigation by the United States (US)-led United Nations
(UN) Command Military Armistice Commission into a 2015
mine incident that wounded two South Korean soldiers
concluded that North Korean soldiers had planted box mines
in the southern half of the DMZ along a known patrol route
used by the South Korean army. Investigators concluded the
mines were recently emplaced, and ruled out the possibility
that these were legacy landmines that had drifted from their
original placements due to rain or shifting soil”. 4 North Korea
rejected the allegation, stating it would make “no sense” for it
to use mines south of the border and that it only used mines
in self-defence. 5

Table 1: Mined area in South Korea6
Total mined areas

DMZ

North of CCL

South of CCL

Rear areas

1,308

786

433

22

67

CCL = Civilian Control Line

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no national mine action authority or mine action
centre in South Korea. Demining is conducted by the South
Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of
the DMZ and CCZ, and has concentrated mostly on demining
military bases in rear areas. In September 2018, it was
reported that the South Korean army had called for the
establishment of an agency dedicated to removing mines
in the DMZ. The agency would be tasked with planning and
executing the removal process.7

cessation of hostilities into the removal of the danger of war
across the peninsula. They also signed an Agreement on
the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration,
which provided for clearance of all mines and other explosive
devices from agreed areas with a view to the joint recovery of
remains of soldiers killed in the Korean War. The agreement
speciﬁed clearance operations would be conducted for four
hours a day in designated times using agreed equipment and
that the perimeter of cleared areas would be marked. 8

South and North Korea agreed in the Panmunjeom
Declaration of April 2018 to transform the DMZ into a peace
zone. Under the Pyongyang Joint Declaration signed in
September 2018 the two countries agreed to expand the

South Korea’s Ministry of Defence submitted a bill to
parliament in 2013 that would allow civilian organisations to
remove mines laid during the Korean War.9 As at September
2019, South Korea’s National Assembly had not passed the bill.
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LAND RELEASE
South Korean army engineers cleared the southern part of
the Joint Security Area of the DMZ in October 2018. The North
informed the South that it had cleared 636 mines; the South
said it did not destroy any.10 South Korean engineers also
cleared areas round Arrowhead Hill in Cheolwon, Gangwon
province to facilitate exhumation of soldiers killed in action
during the war. South Korea said it destroyed 27 mines and
1,479 items of unexploded ordnance.11

Additionally, 635 army engineers cleared 151,738m2 between
March and December 2018, destroying 240 landmines (232
anti-personnel mines and 8 anti-vehicle mines), an increase
on the 102,828m2 cleared and 142 mines destroyed in 2017.12
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SYRIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Syria has obligations under international human rights law
to clear mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Syria should establish a mine action authority and facilitate access for international demining organisations to
facilitate development of a credible humanitarian demining programme.

■

Syria should initiate a programme of mine survey and clearance as soon as possible and take other measures
to reduce the risk to civilians of mines and explosive remnants of war.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Syria is heavily contaminated by mines and mines of an
improvised nature used extensively by parties to the
country’s eight-year old conﬂict. It also has mined areas
left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948.
Landmines, whether commercial or of an improvised
nature, affect all regions and vary according to the armed
groups active there, but contamination appears to be
particularly dense in areas that were occupied by Islamic
State. Continuing hostilities and persistent use of mines have
prevented a determination of the extent of contamination.1
Mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) make up only
part of Syria’s massive contamination by explosive remnants
of war (ERW).
The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along borders
with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012 and Turkish authorities
claimed ﬁve years ago that between 613,000 and 715,000
mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border,
making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces. 2 In
Manbij, close to the Turkish border, heavy casualties from
mines, including those of an improvised nature, occurred
after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State in mid-August
2016 and were still occurring as a result of continuing
conﬂicts in 2019. 3 Islamic State heavily mined the approaches
to Manbij and around the Tishreen dam to the east of it, using
young boys disguised as shepherds to lay the mines, the
United Nations Commission of Inquiry monitoring the conﬂict
in Syria reported in March 2017. 4

Further south in Hama and Homs governorates,
open-source reports of mine casualties, although
unconﬁrmed, are suggestive of signiﬁcant contamination
left by all sides during years of conﬂict.7 The Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights said that between 24 February
and 17 March 2019 it documented the death of 44 people
in mine and IED explosions in Homs, Hama and Deir Ezzour.
It also documented casualties from mines, including those of
an improvised nature, around towns in the southern province
of Dara. 8
From Raqqa, former capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic
State caliphate, to Hassakeh governorate in the north-east,
and south to Deir ez-Zor and Barghuz (the last remaining
Islamic State stronghold overrun in May 2019), retreating
Islamic State forces left massive contamination by mines
of an improvised nature and other improvised devices that
have taken a heavy toll on civilians returning in their wake.
Medical non-governmental organisation (NGO) Médecins
sans Frontières reported that the number of victims of mines
and other explosive devices it treated in north-east Syria
doubled between November 2017 and March 2018. Half of
them were children. Its patients reported discovering mines
and booby-traps on roads, alongside ﬁelds, on rooftops, and
under staircases, as well as rigged in common household
items from refrigerators and air conditioners to televisions
and cooking pots.9

In Aleppo and neighbouring Idlib governorates, volunteers
similarly report mines and other explosive devices planted
in agricultural ﬁelds, next to roads, inside villages, and
around schools and hospitals. 5 Rebel forces which subjected
the towns of Foua and Kfraya to years of siege are said to
have left hundreds of mines in surrounding ﬁelds as well as
individual explosive devices in many homes. 6
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a
national programme for survey and clearance. Mine action
has been conducted by a wide range of organisations.
In areas under government control, these have included
Russian and Syrian military engineers, other parties to the
conﬂict, and civil defence organisations.
Russia deployed several hundred military deminers from the
Armed Forces Demining Centre from 2017 and conducted
clearance with manual teams supported by mine detection
dogs and Uran-6 mine detection robots. Russian troops also
provided training courses for Syrian army engineers
at Hmeimim air base and at training centres established
in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of January 2018,
Russian armed forces reported they had trained 900
Syrian engineers.10
In 2018, Russia started to withdraw troops, including
deminers, from Syria and appealed to other countries
to provide support. Armenia became the ﬁrst country to
respond to the appeal, sending an 83-man team to Syria in
February 2019, planning to focus its work on the northern
governorate of Aleppo.11 Armenia rotated a new team to
replace the ﬁrst after four months.12
National operators included Syrian Civil Defence (SCD),
which, at the start of 2018, was working in ﬁve governorates
(Dar’a, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Quneitra) with the support
of Mayday. SCD’s three teams in Dar’a and two teams in
Quneitra operated until early July 2018 when operations were
halted and the teams disbanded. SCD also had one clearance
team working in Hama governorate and another in Idlib in
2018. By mid-2019, SCD had ﬁve clearance teams working in
three provinces: Hama (1 team), Idlib (2 teams) and Aleppo
(2 teams). It also planned to deploy two non-technical survey
teams, one each in Hama and Idlib.13 AFAK, a Syrian NGO
working in partnership with The HALO Trust, conducted
clearance in the southern provinces of Dar’a and Quneitra in
the early part of 2019 until a Syrian army drive took control
of the area.14

In areas outside government control in the north east,
humanitarian demining organisations and commercial
companies, including Tetra Tech, have conducted large-scale
clearance in areas recaptured from Islamic State. A small
national organisation, Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO),
was conducting clearance in north and north-east Syria but
reportedly sustained heavy casualties among its deminers
attempting clearance of improvised devices.15
Tetra Tech, started work in northern Syria in October 2016
but since 2017, worked in the north east operating in Raqqa,
Deir Ezzour and, after its recapture in 2019, in Barguz.
Funded by the US Department of States, Tetra Tech focused
on critical infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, water
pumping stations, and electricity generating plants. By
2018, Tetra Tech had approximately 400 personnel but after
President Trump’s December 2018 announcement of the
US intention to withdraw from Syria it reduced capacity
from seven multi-task teams to two, working with two risk
education teams. Three international staff have been killed
during clearance operations in Syria.16
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian
government in July 2018 under which it deployed two staff to
Damascus. In January 2019, it started a ﬁrst risk education
training course for 26 Syrian personnel, of whom 16 were
women.17 Russia announced in March 2019 it would provide
funding of US$1 million to support UNMAS’s activities in
Syria.18 In April 2019, UNMAS announced a “Humanitarian
Mine Action Support to Syria (31 March 2019–31 March 2020)”
project, supported by a $1.4 million grant from Japan, which
is expected to deliver risk education to 43,000 people and
conduct contamination impact surveys in 85 communities,
as well as marking and fencing off explosive hazards.19

LAND RELEASE
Continuing conﬂict prevented a coordinated national
programme of mine action in 2018 and 2019. Mine action
interventions reportedly gathered signiﬁcant momentum,
albeit at levels that varied in different regions according to
the level of security. International operators have conducted
signiﬁcant amounts of clearance of land and buildings in
the north east but did not release details. No coordinated
and comprehensive information on outcomes of survey and
clearance in other areas was available.
Syrian deminers were reported to have conducted clearance
of mines and explosive devices in the Damascus suburbs of
Eastern Ghouta and Douma after government forces and their
allies retook control in April 2018. 20 As government forces
extended their control in southern governorates in 2018,
Syrian army deminers were reported clearing mines and
ERW in Dar’a. 21
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Armenia’s Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise
reported that the Armenian army engineers sent to Syria in
February 2019 had cleared around 35,000m2 by July, tackling
29 landmines and explosive devices. An Armenian deminer
was injured in the explosion of a mine or IED in March
resulting in amputation of a foot. 22 They planned to clear ﬁve
mineﬁelds near Aleppo covering a total area of about 1.3km2
in operations coordinated with Russian and Syrian military
engineers. 23 Between 8 June and 22 July 2019, the deminers
reportedly cleared 8,534m2. 24 Demolitions of cleared items
are conducted by the Syrian military. 25
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UZBEKISTAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Uzbekistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Uzbekistan has obligations under international human rights
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Uzbekistan should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance
operations.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Uzbek forces have laid mines along its international borders
at various times, including on its borders with Afghanistan
in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in
2000. While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their
1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, certain areas have not yet been delineated and
therefore the exact location of mined areas is not known.1
In 2010, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN),
Ban Ki-moon, criticised as “unacceptable” Uzbekistan’s
emplacing of mines along parts of its border that have not
been delineated. 2
Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border.
Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the mineﬁelds
along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining
operations conducted by Uzbek army deminers
in cooperation with Tajik border troops. 3

The ﬁrst ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements
were signed between the two countries, including one on
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek
border. Any demining operations will require agreement and
cooperation between the two nations; as at July 2019, the
Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) was reported to be
in negotiation with the Uzbek MoFA regarding survey of the
Tajik-Uzbek border (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the
Mines report on Tajikistan for further information). 4
In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz ofﬁcials in Batken
province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked
previously mined areas of the border around the settlements
of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared
by Uzbek deminers, and conﬁrmed that they were free of
contamination. 5 According to the most recent information
available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid
on its 150km border with Afghanistan.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of any survey or clearance occurring in 2018.

1

Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 25 April 2018.

2

“Ban calls Uzbekistan land mines ‘unacceptable’”, The Hindu, 6 April 2010, at: bit.ly/2Z3WYgN.

3

Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 16 February 2009; Tajikistan Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article 7 Report,
“General situation”, 3 February 2008, p. 3; and “Uzbekistan started demining on Tajik border”, Spy.kz, 23 October 2007.

4

Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018 and 25 July 2019.

5

IRIN, “Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed”, at: www.irinnews.org.

340 Clearing the Mines 2019

STATES NOT PARTY

CLEARING
THE MINES
2019

VIETNAM
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Vietnam has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Vietnam should prepare and publish a detailed assessment of remaining mined areas.

■

The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) should draw up a strategic plan for completing
mine clearance.

■

VNMAC should provide regular detailed reporting on the progress of demining.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Vietnam’s mine problem is certainly small compared with its
explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, though its
full extent is unknown. A survey conducted between 2010
and 2014 reported anti-personnel mines in 26 of 63 cities and
provinces but gave no further details.1 Between 2014 and
2019, Danish Demining Group (DDG) identiﬁed 13 previously
unrecorded mineﬁelds in four districts in Quang Nam
province and one district in Thua Thien Hue province. In 2018,
DDG identiﬁed three anti-personnel mined areas of 12,652m2
in A Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue province. Local residents
were aware of the presence of mines and reported to DDG
that they tended to avoid these areas. 2
Most mines were left by conﬂicts in the 1970s with
neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close
to its borders with those countries. 3 Clearance had been

reported by Vietnam along its northern border with China in
the 1990s and from 2004 onwards, but mined areas further
inland are believed to persist. 4 It was reported in 2013 by the
Engineering Command that clearance had been completed
in the Cambodia border areas. 5 Many ports and river deltas
were mined extensively during the armed conﬂict with the
United States and were not completely cleared when it
ended. A number of sea mines have been found on the coast. 6
Some mines have also been found around former United
States (US) military installations.7
Vietnam also has extensive contamination from cluster
munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants
of war (ERW) (“See Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster
Munition Remnants 2019 report on Vietnam for further
information”).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Vietnam’s mine action programme is restructuring, but
management and operations continue to depend largely
on the armed forces. According to the Decree on the
Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities,
issued in February 2019 (hereafter, the 2019 Decree), the
Ministry of National Defence (MoD) will continue to elaborate
and preside over the national mine action programme, as the
lead authority, in coordination with other relevant ministries
and sectors. 8 It also designates the MoD as the focal point for
international cooperation in mine action.9
The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) was
established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decision (No. 738 of
2013) to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide

a focal point for mine action operations. The 2019 Decree
instructed VNMAC, “under the direction of the Prime Minister
and managed by Ministry of Defense, to monitor, coordinate
and implement mine action tasks.”10 Although the VMAC is
not yet fully functional, 2019 is a crucial year as the national
programme develops its legal framework, structure, policies,
and standards.11
Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA),
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and
Golden West all provide capacity development support
in Vietnam.12
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GENDER
As at August 2019, Vietnam has not provided information on whether it has a gender policy and implementation plan for
mine action.
International operators DDG, MAG, and NPA all report having organisational gender and diversity policies and state that
they consult both women and children during community liaison activities with male and female members of community
liaison/survey teams. They say they provide equal opportunities during the recruitment process and are working towards
gender-balanced employment.13

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Data quality and accessibility continues to be a major
challenge in Vietnam. VNMAC is responsible for national
information management and uses the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). However, with
the exception of the UNDP Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project
(KV-MAP) project data, information is not shared with mine
action operators.14 The ERW impact survey report released in
2018 noted that “regulations on reporting demining activities
have not been strictly followed” and authorities had received
clearance data for only two provinces, Ha Tinh and Quang Tri,
where international donors have supported operations.15
The VNMAC information management unit intends to
consolidate mine action data from the Technology Centre
for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICEN), the UNDP KV-MAP
project, and Quang Tri province into the national information
management system. With support from NPA, VNMAC is
equipped with the necessary technical capabilities and
knowledge, but legislation governing the collection and
sharing of mine action data was lacking.16 However, the
forthcoming guiding Circular, which as at June 2019 was
being elaborated, is expected to provide clarity on the
collection and sharing of mine action data, including data
the military allow to be made public.17
Vietnam has a National Mine Action Standard, a Technical
Mine Action Regulation, and various mine action-related
procedures, each of which have their own data collection
forms. These data collection forms are not consistent, nor

are they used in a standard manner. However, this issue
is expected to be addressed by the legal framework
being developed.18
Mine action data collected by the provincial information
management system in Quang Tri, also using IMSMA, is
accessible to all mine action stakeholders. The database
holds survey and clearance results, providing a basis for
planning and tasking, as well as victim data. It has also
received some data on clearance activity undertaken by the
Provincial Military Command for 2000 to 2013.19 The data,
which are believed to be accurate, up to date, and reliable,
have been the catalyst for greater coordination across all
stakeholders within the province. 20 Live operations data
can be accessed via QTMAC’s website, while the other
Vietnamese provinces with active mine action programmes
do not have databases, and operators maintain their own. 21
Development of information management is an aim of the
KV-MAP project, the goal of which is to improve available
information for the UXO/mine action sector to support
informed policy making and task prioritisation. 22 In 2018,
Coordination Ofﬁces and Database Centres for Mine Action
were established in Quang Binh and Binh Dinh provinces with
training provided to provincial staff. As at June 2019, these
centres manage the data from the KV-MAP project which
is then fed into the VNMAC database but the aim is for the
centres to be sustainable and in the future manage the mine
action data for the province. 23

PLANNING AND TASKING
Decision 504, approved by the Prime Minister in April 2010,
set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. The plan
aimed to “mobilize domestic and international resources in
making efforts to minimize and ﬁnally create impact-free
environment for social economic development.” It called for
ERW contamination clearance of 8,000km2 between 2016
and 2025. 24
A VNMAC action plan for 2018 included three main targets25:
■

■
■

Finalise legislation, decrees, and guidelines for the mine
action sector in order to provide a uniﬁed framework for
the sector country-wide
Clarify contamination estimates through the release of the
landmine impact survey and develop risk education
Clearance of some 300km2 of ERW-affected land.

It is evident that at least partially these targets have
been achieved: legislation has been introduced; clarifying
guidelines are being developed; and the results of the ERW
impact survey were released. As at May 2019, however, no
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information had been formally provided by VNMAC on the
realisation of its 2018 goals or on its goals for 2019.
As at May 2019, there was no national prioritisation system
for mine clearance. The prioritisation processes implemented
in Quang Tri and Quang Binh are predominantly for CMR
contamination. In Quang Tri province, there is a prioritisation
plan in place and an effective system for task allocation.26
The prioritisation processes and accompanying forms were
piloted in 2018 and were rolled out in May 2019, with QTMAC
now managing the province-wide clearance task prioritization
process.27 The criteria are established based on consultation
and agreement between QTMAC and operators. In Quang
Binh province, MAG has been applying its own procedures
and process to prioritise clearance tasks based on scores of
consent, hazard assessment, and community beneﬁts.28 While
DDG uses a consultative approach at the province, district and
village level to prioritise its clearance tasks.29

STATES NOT PARTY

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

OPERATORS

Vietnam has both National Technical Regulations (QCVNs),
which are legally binding and similar in content to standing
operating procedures (SoPs), and National Mine Action
Standards (TCVN), closely aligned with the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS), but considered optional by VNMAC
and the MoD. 30

Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army
Engineering Corps and military-owned commercial
companies. Outside the central provinces its current strength
and deployment are unknown. Ofﬁcials have previously
reported that it had 250 mine clearance and battle area
clearance (BAC) teams nationally. The three Provincial
Military Command (PMC) teams in the aforementioned
provinces all conducted BAC throughout 2018. Vietnam
reportedly has more than 70 military-owned companies
undertaking clearance related to infrastructure and
commercial and development projects. 31
International operators active in 2018 included DDG, working
in Quang Nam and Thua Tien Hue provinces; MAG, working in
Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces; NPA, working in Quang
Tri and Thua Thien Hue provinces; and PeaceTrees Vietnam,
which has been working in Quang Tri province since 1995.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
VNMAC has not shared any data on mine clearance activities
in Vietnam in 2018 and operators did not report any
anti-personnel mined area reduced or cancelled through
survey or cleared in 2018.
In 2018, DDG identiﬁed 12,652m2 of anti-personnel mined area
in A Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue province. 32 During explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, ﬁve anti-personnel mines
were destroyed: one by DDG, one by MAG, and three by NPA. 33

1

VNMAC, “Report on Explosive Remnants of War Contamination in Vietnam,
Based on the Explosive Remnants of War Contamination Survey and Mapping
– Phase 1”, provided by VNMAC 19 April 2018, p. 38.

Vietnam has not set a deadline for completion of anti-personnel
mine clearance. In 2013–17, the Legacy of War Coordination
Centre (renamed the Quang Tri Mine Action Centre in 2018),
recorded clearance of 497 mines, 4% of the total number of
items cleared, but the number of mines cleared annually has
fallen steadily.34 In Quang Tri province, from 2000 to 2018, 7.5%
of the 635 incidents from explosive ordnance were due to
landmines and of the 295,671 items of ordnance found through
clearance during this time 6,866 (2.3%) were landmines.35

19

Meeting with Christopher Ramsden, Senior Technical Adviser, LWCC, Nguyen
Duc Thien, Manager, LWCC; Nguyen Van Duc, Data Processing Ofﬁcer, LWCC;
and Snr Lt. Tran Van Hai, Operations Ofﬁcer, Provincial Military Command, in
Dong Ha, Quang Tri, 19 April 2018.

2

Questionnaire from DDG.

3

Interview with Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, Deputy Commander, Military
Engineering Command, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in Geneva,
30 June 2011.

20

Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.

21

Emails from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 7 April 2017; Simon Rea, MAG, 11 April
2017 and 28 June 2019; and Clinton Smith, DDG, 23 March 2017.

Information provided by Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in email from Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Hanoi, 24 September 2012; and in
interview in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
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UNDP, “Vietnam mine action project: Project brief”, January 2019.
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Skype interview with Nils Christensen, UNDP, 13 June 2019.
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Prime Minister, “Decision on Approval of the National Mine Action Plan Period
2010–2025”, Hanoi, 21 April 2010.
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Interview with Nguyen Hang Phuc, VNMAC, Hanoi, 18 April 2018.
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Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.
Email from Simon Rea, MAG, 16 June 2019
Email from Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019.
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Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Head of Bomb and Mine
Department, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013.
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Landmine Action, Explosive Remnants of War and Mines Other than
Anti-personnel Mines, London, March 2005, p. 181.
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Ibid.
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Decree on Implementation and Management of Mine Action, No.18/2019,
1 February 2019.
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Email from Clinton Smith, DDG, 29 May 2019.

9

Email from Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019.
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Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.
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Draft Decree on the management and implementation of mine action
activities, Hanoi, April 2018.
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Emails from Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019; and Resad Junuzagic, NPA,
6 May 2019.
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For more information see Mine Action Review “Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants” 2019 report for Vietnam.

Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Engineering Command, Hanoi,
18 June 2013; email from Executive Ofﬁce of the National Steering Committee,
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2018; and email from Lee Moroney, Golden West Humanitarian Foundation,
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32

Questionnaire from DDG.
Emails from Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019; Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May
2019; and Clinton Smith, DDG, 29 May 2019.
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Emails from Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019; Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May
2019; and Clinton Smith, DDG, 29 May 2019.
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Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.
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VNMAC, “Report on Explosive Remnants of War Contamination in Vietnam”,
Hanoi, 2018, pp. 36−37.

LWCC database, accessed at: bit.ly/2KzobUH. Operators cleared 210
landmines in 2013, 108 in 2014, 94 in 2015, and 54 in 2016, mostly US-made
M-14 and M-16 anti-personnel mines.
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Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.
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Skype interview with Nils Christensen, UNDP, 13 June 2019.

QTMAC, “Facts and Figures: By Mine Action Component: Clearance”, at: bit.
ly/2Mh673I; and QTMAC, “Facts and Figures: By Mine Action Component:
Accidents and Victims”, at: bit.ly/2Z2di5L.
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KOSOVO
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

While formal accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is not currently possible for
Kosovo, as it is not yet recognised as a state by the depository to the Convention, Kosovo should submit a
letter to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis,
with the APMBC.

■

This should include the submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report on an annual basis, as Kosovo
has proposed in its Mine Action Strategy 2019–24.

■

The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should continue its efforts to ensure timely and efﬁcient clearance of
anti-personnel mines, in line with the objectives in its latest mine action strategy and complete clearance by
the end of 2024.

■

KMAC and international mine action operators should increase their collaboration to seek additional funding
and greater ﬁnancial stability for mine action.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Kosovo is contaminated by mines, cluster munition remnants
(CMR), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily
as a result of the conﬂict between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late
1990s, and between Yugoslavia and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) member states in 1999.1 At the end
of 2018, 44 conﬁrmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained,
covering almost 1.2km2 in total. 2
Both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used during
the conﬂict, in ﬁxed-pattern mineﬁelds as well as more
randomly in “nuisance” mineﬁelds. Many anti-personnel
mines had minimal metal content. 3 Although the total number
of mines emplaced during the conﬂict is not known, the UN
Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported, as at 31
May 2000, a total of 7,232 mines cleared in the preceding year
(3,448 anti-personnel mines and 3,784 anti-vehicle mines). 4
The UN reported in 2002 that “the problems associated with
landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded
ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated”, 5
but further investigation revealed that considerably more
contamination remained to be addressed. 6
Mines are found mainly on Kosovo’s borders with Albania
and the then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now
the Republic of North Macedonia), but also in the area of
Dulie Pass in south-central Kosovo.7 Kosovo has gained
an accurate assessment of remaining anti-personnel mine
contamination on its territory as a result of 20 years of mine
action operations, including surveys in 2013 and 2015. 8
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The 2013 survey of mined areas and cluster munition strikes
across Kosovo, carried out by The HALO Trust and KMAC,
conﬁrmed 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined areas covering an
estimated 2.76km2 and 51 cluster munition strikes covering
an estimated 7.63km2.9 The total of 79 mined areas was a
considerable increase on the 48 mined areas that had been
identiﬁed at the end of 2012.10 By the end of 2014, KMAC
reported the number of conﬁrmed mined areas had fallen
slightly, to 77 covering 2.75km2.11 During 2018, two areas of
previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination
were added to the database with a total size of 55,166m2.12

EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
In addition to contamination from mines, Kosovo is
contaminated with CMR (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Kosovo for further
information) as well as other ERW. Kosovo Protection
Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) explosive
ordnance disposal EOD teams regularly dispose of ERW in
response to information provided by the public and demining
organisations.13

OTHER AREAS

In January 2011, the EOD Coordination Management Section
became KMAC, responsible for managing survey and clearance
of mines and ERW. KMAC prepares an annual workplan in
cooperation with international demining NGOs and coordinates
their operations along with the national demining teams of
the KSF. It also coordinates survey, quality assurance, risk
education, public information, and victim assistance activities.14
KMAC’s role and responsibilities as head of the national mine
action programme under the auspices of the Ministry of
Defence were established and institutionalised by Kosovo’s
2012 Law on Humanitarian Demining.15
In 2018, KMAC had ﬁve permanent staff: a Director, a Senior
Quality Assurance (QA) Ofﬁcer, a QA Inspector, a Mine Risk
Education (MRE) Ofﬁcer, and a Public Information Ofﬁcer.16
Kosovo’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned,
with a strong, longstanding commitment from the national
government. The dedicated team of permanent national staff
have been employed with KMAC since its creation. This has
beneﬁtted the programme with the retention of experience
and institutional memory.17

The Kosovo government provided approximately €135,000 in
ﬁnancial support to KMAC in 2018, consistent with the amount
of funding for KMAC’s operations provided the previous year.
The KSF received €980,000 for mine and ERW clearance in
2018, also consistent with the funding it received from the
Kosovo government the previous year.18 KMAC expected to
receive similar levels of funding in 2019.19
Kosovo’s current Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 sets out the
objective of intensifying resource mobilisation efforts in order
to gain greater ﬁnancial stability. 20 While a speciﬁc strategy
did not exist in 2018, operators reported that coordinated
approaches with KMAC were made to potential donors such
as the United States and the European Union. 21
Unfortunately, the misperception that mine, CMR, and ERW
clearance in Kosovo was completed in 2001 persists, whereas
the reality is that signiﬁcant contamination remains. Kosovo
remains a poor country and needs economic assistance to
help it complete clearance in a timely manner, possibly in less
than ﬁve years if sufﬁcient support is provided. In 2019, KMAC
identiﬁed funding and logistical support as the two primary
areas where it could most beneﬁt from assistance from
international donors and mine action operators. 22

GENDER
Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 reﬂects the commitment
of the mine action programme to ensure that gender is taken into
consideration in the planning, implementation, and monitoring
of all mine action projects, with a view to promoting equality and
quality.23 The Strategy stipulates that all mine action activities and
assistance must reﬂect the needs of different ages and gender in
a targeted and non-discriminatory manner, and that mine action
and community liaison data is also to be collected systematically
disaggregated according to sex and age.24
Both KMAC and KSF had gender policies in place in 2018.
KMAC reported that the KSF’s gender policy aims to facilitate
the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW,
expressly women and children. In 2018, a total of 8% of KSF
staff employed in operational mine action roles were women,
along with 5% of staff in managerial or supervisory positions.
Within KMAC, one of its ﬁve staff was a woman. 25
Kosovo’s mine action strategy recognises the barriers that
exist against equal employment in Kosovo society, including
signiﬁcant differences in employment levels between men and
women, despite the number of men and women of working
age being broadly similar. The Strategy notes that, as at 2019,
more than four-ﬁfths of women of working age were not
employed in Kosovo’s labour market, and less than one in eight
women of working age have been employed annually over
the past ﬁve years. The primary reasons given by women for
unemployment are child and family care obligations, which
traditionally fall on women in Kosovo society. The Strategy
notes the efforts of mine action operators to overcome
these challenges and barriers to employment, such as
through child care and parental leave, and gender-sensitive
recruitment practices that encourage women to apply for
positions traditionally seen as jobs for men. It further recalls
the importance of employment of not only multi-gender,
but also multi-ethnic, survey and clearance teams and the
particular beneﬁts of recruitment in areas affected by high
unemployment and poor socio-economic conditions.26

In 2018, The HALO Trust developed a gender policy in
consultation with the Kosovo Women’s Network, an advocacy
network of more than 140 member organisations, including
women’s organisations of all ethnic backgrounds from
throughout Kosovo, which was adopted in February. The
policy aims both at increasing the recruitment of women, as
well as retention of existing female employees through the
provision of extra maternity leave and child care allowances.
Recognising the signiﬁcant deterrents to women’s
employment of affordable child care and traditional gender
roles as family caregivers, The HALO Trust’s gender policy
provides female employees and single parents of either sex
with stipends covering 75% of child care costs and increased
the paternity leave allowance from four days as stipulated by
national law, to two weeks of paternity leave. 27 By the end of
2018, the number of women working for The HALO Trust in
Kosovo increased to close to 15%, up from 3% at the start of
the year. 28
In 2018, The HALO Trust’s dedicated Community Liaison
Ofﬁcer was female and the programme deployed a genderbalanced survey team, which tried to reach male and
female respondents equally, including girls and boys
with permission of their parents. As men are most often
the primary respondents of the household, added effort
was placed on access to, and inclusion of, women and
girls in all project phases. The HALO Trust expected that
with increasing community liaison and a stronger female
presence within demining teams, further progress would
be made to overcome the challenge of reaching women and
encouraging women to take a greater interest in mine action
in their communities. Data collected post-clearance is also
disaggregated to ensure the understanding and analysis
of impact of mine action activities also takes gender into
consideration, it reported. 29
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While The HALO Trust reported that it did not have any
women in operational management positions in 2018, it
stated that it was a priority for the programme address
upward mobility for women within the organisation and was
partnering with the Gender and Mine Action Programme
(GMAP) in 2019 to this end. Additionally, in 2019, the
programme planned to train more women in the use of
Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) mine
detectors and to introduce new junior management positions
into which women will have the opportunity to be promoted. 30
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that a target of 25%
female staff was in place, and in 2018, 23% of its staff were
women, including one of four team leaders, two of six medics,

and one of four staff in the management team. Women
were especially encouraged to apply for staff positions, and
given priority over male applicants with equivalent skills
and experience. NPA conﬁrmed its survey and community
liaison teams were gender balanced and ensured that the
participation of all relevant social groups is always taken into
account when conducting activities in local communities. 31
NPA’s efforts to recruit and train multi-ethnic survey and
clearance teams was also been a critical factor in allowing
the deployment of teams in areas of particular ethnic and
political sensitivities, extending the reach of mine action
operations in north Kosovo, while also building bridges
and friendships between the individual staff members and
through their community liaison activities. 32

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine
action database. Data is disaggregated between mines, CMR,
and ERW. 33 Operators were positive in their assessments of
the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database
and of KMAC’s information management systems in general.
Notably, operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis. 34
Both NPA and The HALO Trust also emphasised the
constructive and proactive working relationship with KMAC.

Beyond weekly KMAC visits to operational sites, regular
senior management coordination meetings between KMAC
and mine action operators were held on a monthly basis
in 2018, or more frequently when required, and quarterly
meetings were also convened for operational planning. 35
According to its most recent mine action strategy, KMAC
intends, as a means to show its commitment to the APMBC,
to submit voluntary Article 7 transparency reports on an
annual basis. 36

PLANNING AND TASKING
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) supported the development of Kosovo’s new Mine
Action Strategy 2019–24, bringing together a wide range
of national and international stakeholders in a strategy
stakeholder workshop in Pristina in October 2018. The
strategy, formally approved in January 2019 and launched
by the Ministry of Kosovo Security Services on 4 April 2019,
has three goals:
■
■
■

Mine/ERW threats managed and reduced
Communication and awareness raising
Management of residual contamination.

The strategy declares that all known mined and
CMR-contaminated areas will be addressed by the end of
2024, leaving only residual contamination to be managed
accordingly. It contains annual projections for anti-personnel
mine clearance, including:
■
■
■

all high priority anti-personnel mine tasks
(8 as at October 2018) will be cleared by 2020
all medium-priority anti-personnel mine tasks
(25 as at October 2018) will be cleared by 2022; and
all low-priority anti-personnel mine tasks
(15 as at October 2018) will be completed by 2024.37

The strategy states it is based on a number of assumptions,
including that the necessary funding will be secured and that
no new mined or CMR-contaminated areas are identiﬁed. It
notes, however, that “so far each year 3–4 different affected
areas have been reported” and that should this trend
continue, capacity and progress will need to be reassessed
with regards to the 2024 deadline. 38
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As per the strategy, KMAC will develop annual operational
workplans to implement the strategy’s goals. 39 KMAC will
also request an external mid-term review of the strategy
in 2022 to evaluate progress and make any adaptations
according to contextual changes if required. 40 According to
the strategy, a separate national strategy on the management
of residual contamination will be developed by KMAC by
2023, in collaboration with other national actors, to clarify
roles and responsibilities in order to manage a long-term
residual contamination problem. 41
In 2019, KMAC conﬁrmed that it had developed annual
operational workplans to target anti-personnel mined areas,
according to impact-based criteria, including risk reduction,
development priorities, and poverty reduction, along with
the ﬁndings of a nationwide baseline socio-economic impact
assessment carried out in 2018 by KMAC, with the support
of The HALO Trust. 42 The mine action strategy for 2019–24
also is in alignment with the objectives of Kosovo’s National
Development Strategy 2016–2021. 43
The HALO Trust reported prioritising in its areas of
operations was based on impact, land use, seasonal access,
and risk and contamination levels. 44 While NPA conﬁrmed
that its operations in northern Kosovo continued to focus on
high-impacted areas, it noted that it was also important for
NPA to ensure both Serbian and Albanian-populated areas
are prioritised equally, with sensitivity towards political,
cultural, and ethnic afﬁliations. 45

OTHER AREAS

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards for land release are in place
in Kosovo, which according to KMAC are in accord with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 46
KMAC deployed two QA ofﬁcers in 2018 who visited sites at
least once a week to ensure compliance with the national
standards and standing operating procedures (SoPs). 47 NPA
reported increasing its internal QA/quality control (QC)
capacity during the year and conﬁrmed that KMAC made
frequent visits to its tasks, which it said provided highly
valued input for QA. 48 The HALO Trust conﬁrmed that KMAC
made weekly QA visits to its operations and reported it was
exploring opportunities to restructure team management
with the aim of enabling more effective QA/QC. 49

A 2014 evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme,
conducted on behalf of the International Trust Fund (ITF)
Enhancing Human Security, concluded that an increase in
capacity and improvements to land release methodology
and equipment deployed would be necessary if Kosovo were
to complete clearance operations by 2024. Since the 2014
evaluation, a number of signiﬁcant improvements have been
introduced to the mine action programme, including the use
of HSTAMID detectors by The HALO Trust and large-loop
detectors on certain tasks. 50

OPERATORS
In 2018, Kosovo’s national mine action programme’s capacity
consisted of two international operators, The HALO Trust and
NPA, and national operator, the KSF. KFOR supports the KSF
and Kosovo Police with EOD response tasks and organising
mine and ERW demolitions in Mitrovica and the north of
Kosovo, including NPA’s areas of operations. 51 The demining
season is from the end of March to the end of November, due
to weather conditions. 52
In 2018, The HALO Trust maintained a 10-team-strong
capacity to conduct both mine and CMR clearance. It reported
that operational personnel are cross-trained and can move
between activities, but generally the programme is split,

with seven teams dedicated to mine clearance and three
dedicated to cluster munition clearance. At the end of 2018,
the programme employed 97 operations personnel, of whom
14% were women. 53
KSF operated four platoons in 2018: three for demining and
one for EOD. The demining platoons are divided into ﬁve
teams with a total of 75 staff, and the EOD platoon consists
of six teams of ﬁve persons each. Of these, three teams are
on standby for EOD call-outs in Prizren and three teams
in Pomozotin. 54 In 2018, KSF units conducted demining
operations in ﬁve locations: Babaj i Bokës, Ferizaj, Ferizaj/
Urosevac Park, Harilaq, and Paldenica. 55

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Signiﬁcant advances in operational productivity have been
achieved by the use of tools such as HSTAMID detectors. NPA
sought to introduce the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs)
for a three-month pilot project to conduct targeted technical
survey in areas contaminated with CMR, but as their use
in CMR operations was not formally approved by KMAC in
2018 they were deployed for survey and clearance of mines
instead. The presence of anti-personnel mines was not found

in any of the suspected mined areas and NPA discontinued
plans to use MDDs in its areas of operations in north Kosovo. 56
In 2019, KMAC informed Mine Action Review that the use of
MDDs could, however, be considered for KSF operations in
remaining mineﬁeld tasks along the Kosovo-Albanian border.57
According to The HALO Trust, there were plans to increase
HSTAMID operator capacity and the number of HSTAMIDs in
use per team in 2019. 58

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
2

A total of 0.33km of mined area was released in 2018,
including 0.22km2 through clearance and a further 0.11km2
reduced through technical survey.

SURVEY IN 2018
Non-technical survey of suspected mined areas was not
carried out in 2018. 59A total of close to 114,000m2 was reduced
through technical survey during the year. 60 This is a slight
increase from 2017, when just under 89,000m2 was reduced
through technical survey, all by The HALO Trust. 61

Table 1: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 201862
Operator

Area reduced (m2)

HALO Trust

76,771

KSF

26,500

NPA

10,550

Total

113,821
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, a total of just over 0.22km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared, with 46 anti-personnel mines found and
destroyed. This was close to results in 2017, when the KSF and HALO Trust cleared more than 0.23km2. 63
Table 2: Mine clearance in 201864
Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO Trust

9

195,382

42

2

KSF

2

18,845

4

8

NPA

1

8,573

0

0

Total

12

220,800

46

10

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

A further six anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the
KSF in EOD response tasks during the year. 65 As Kosovo has
strict national procedures for the management of explosives,
the KSF, with support from KFOR in northern Kosovo, carries
out the destruction of mines, CMR, and other ERW found by
The HALO Trust and NPA. 66
NPA deployed two MDDs in 2018 to verify information
regarding landmines suspected to be inside cluster munition
strikes in northern Kosovo. The dogs were deployed to
Jerebinje, in Zubin Potok municipality, and Belo Brdo, in

Leposavic municipality to investigate information about
mine belts inside the strike areas. The tasks are located on
the border with Serbia, where mines were alleged to have
been laid by the Yugoslav National Army to protect military
installations from the KLA and NATO. NPA stated that since
cluster munition clearance uses less sensitive detectors
than does mine clearance, it was not possible to deploy a
BAC team in an area with mine contamination. In Jerebinje, it
was determined that the mines had likely been removed, and
in Belo Brdo, NPA found ﬁve ‘training’ mines which did not
contain explosives. 67

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the APMBC and therefore
does not have a speciﬁc clearance deadline under Article 5.
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.
As stated in Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, which
sets completion of mine and cluster munition clearance by the
end of 2024, completion will only be achievable if sustained
funding is secured. 68 Speciﬁc concerns are elaborated in the
strategy about the need to upgrade old equipment, including
vehicles to proceed without unnecessary stand-downs or
costly repairs. 69
With adequate funding, KMAC and The HALO Trust predict
that anti-personnel mine and cluster munition clearance will
be completed by the end of 2024.70 This would be 25 years
after the end of the conﬂict between the FRY forces and NATO
and more than 20 years after the UN claimed that clearance
was largely complete.

In 2019, The HALO Trust reported that it could complete
clearance of remaining mined areas within its areas of
responsibility with existing capacity by the end of 2024. It
cautioned, however, that sustaining capacity over the strategy
period will prove a challenge, and any reductions in funding
could impede progress towards meeting the 2024 target.71
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2018

0.22

2017

0.23

2016

0.15

2015

0.22

2014*

0.84

Total

1.66

* Mine and CMR clearance
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NAGORNOKARABAKH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Nagorno-Karabakh should make a commitment to respect the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
and set a deadline for the clearance all anti-personnel mines.

■

Despite not being a state party to the APMBC, Nagorno-Karabakh has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should commit to never use anti-personnel mines and provide resources
for mine survey and clearance.

■

Information management should be improved as inaccuracies in reported anti-personnel mine contamination,
survey, and clearance data continue to occur.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, anti-personnel mine contamination
throughout the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh, including
both within the Soviet-era boundaries and in the adjacent
territories, was estimated to cover just over 3.78km2 across
70 mined areas (see Table 1).1 Since 2017, the number of
conﬁrmed hazardous area (CHAs) has decreased (from 73
to 70), while total mined area has increased (from 3.56km2
to 3.78km2). 2 The difference in total mine contamination
between the end of 2017 and end of 2018 cannot be
explained or reconciled by the total area released during the
intervening 12 months. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine
contamination covered a total of 82 areas over 5.1km2 as at
the end of 2018. 3
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province
(at end 2018) 4
CHAs

Area (km2)

Askeran

7

0.33

Hadrut

20

1.90

Lachin

19

0.67

Martakert

Region

18

0.54

Martuni

2

0.17

Shaumyan

4

0.17

70

3.78

Totals
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The HALO Trust is currently conducting survey with a
view to more accurately quantifying the mined area in
Nagorno-Karabakh, covering areas that had not been
surveyed in the past. In 2019, The HALO Trust doubled its
survey capacity in order to try and complete the survey by
the end of the year. In 2018, three CHAs were added to the
database with an estimated area of 62,567m2. 5
All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by
mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the
1988–94 conﬂict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and
subsequent ﬁghting. Mines were laid by both the Azeri and
pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high
proportion of anti-vehicle mines being used in some regions. 6
The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due
to the nature of the conﬂict certain areas were mined several
times.7 In 2013, new anti-personnel mines were laid along the
Armenian-Azerbaijani “line of contact” east and north of the
disputed territory. At the time the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Nagorno-Karabakh stated that “due to the ongoing conﬂict
with Azerbaijan ... today we are not in a position to refrain
from using AP [anti-personnel] mines for defensive purposes
along the line of contact.” He noted further that, “these
mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the
extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances
and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”8
Nagorno-Karabakh is also contaminated with submunitions,
estimated at 71.62km2 at the end of 2018, and other explosive
remnants of war (ERW) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Nagorno-Karabakh
for further information).

OTHER AREAS

In 2000, The HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh
Mine Action Centre (NKMAC), which is now moribund. In
theory, its role was to consolidate all mine action-related
information and to respond to requests from the government
ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local
communities. In reality, there is no viable or tangible mine
action centre in Nagorno-Karabakh.9
A mine action coordination committee was responsible for
liaising between the local authorities and The HALO Trust.10

Regular coordination committee meetings were held between
the local authorities, The HALO Trust, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) until 2018 when the head
of the committee was moved to a new post. The position
remains vacant, with HALO Trust continuing to lobby for a
suitable candidate to ﬁll the role.11
The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities do not provide The HALO
Trust with any funding to clear mined areas.12

GENDER
The HALO Trust has an organisational gender and diversity
policy which is incorporated into HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh
programme. In addition to fully brieﬁng new recruits, HALO
also conducts regular refresher training on all its policies,
including its gender and diversity policy, for both national
and international staff.13
All groups affected by anti-personnel mines, including
women and children are said to be consulted during survey
and community liaison activities. However, the non-technical
survey teams have been predominantly male with the ﬁrst
female team member only recruited in 2019. The HALO trust
aims to recruit more female non-technical survey team
members.14

Relevant mine action data is disaggregated by sex and
age.15 Gender is not taken into account in the prioritisation,
planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.16
The HALO Trust is one of the largest civilian employers in
Nagorno-Karabakh, with 270 Karabakhi Armenian staff.17
And while there is equal access to employment for qualiﬁed
women and men in survey and clearance, the number of
women employed in operational roles is still quite low. In
2018, out of the total of 210 deminers only 15 were women of
whom 2 were team leaders. In addition, three women were
employed in managerial level/supervisory positions, and six
of the support staff were women.18

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There is no national information management system in
place. However, The HALO Trust operates its own country
mine action database and is working to better tailor
the database to its operations. For example, new ﬁelds
were added to the database in 2018 to allow for further
disaggregation of data. HALO Nagorno-Karabakh also
continues to be supported by its United Kingdom-based
specialist data management staff.19

The Nagorno-Karabakh Army Liaison Ofﬁcer shares
information with HALO Trust on items found, incidents, CHAs,
and clearance on a regular basis. HALO is not authorised to
share this data with others. 20

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy currently in place in
Nagorno-Karabakh. 21
The HALO Trust prioritised clearance of mineﬁelds in
Nagorno-Karabakh that have conﬁrmed accidents and
which will be used immediately following clearance. In 2018,
most mined areas remaining were only accessible during

the dry summer months of May to October, and HALO Trust
expanded its clearance capacity over this period. Clearance
outside of the Traditional Oblast was focused on high- and
medium-priority tasks in the Lachin corridor, with private
funding; with clearance of the remaining mineﬁelds within the
Traditional Oblast boundary conducted using USAID funding.
This approach continued into 2019. 22

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
No local mine action standards exist in Nagorno-Karabakh.
As at April 2019, however, the Nagorno-Karabakh police
were planning to lobby the government to develop standards
and The HALO Trust was planning to work closely with the
authorities to support the process. 23

The HALO Trust follows its own standing operating
procedures (SoPs) for demining and battle area clearance. 24
As at April 2019, HALO’s survey and anti-personnel
mine clearance SoPs were under review, with a view to
incorporating best practice from other HALO country
programmes. 25
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OPERATORS
Since 2000, The HALO Trust has been the main organisation
conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh. The NagornoKarabakh Rescue Service conducts explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) spot tasks and one Nagorno-Karabakh army
unit conducts limited demining. Since the April 2016 conﬂict,
The HALO Trust has collaborated with the Nagorno-Karabakh
Rescue Services when gathering information about mines
and other ERW, and part of its quality assurance (QA) process
involves participation in the ofﬁcial handover ceremony with
community representatives. 26

The HALO Trust does not ﬁeld separate teams dedicated
solely to either mine or ERW clearance. Operational staff are
trained and experienced in working in both tasks.27 HALO
is currently working to increase its non-technical survey
capacity in support of its mine clearance operations, while
decreasing its technical survey capacity. HALO recruited
30 new deminers in 2018. It had hoped to recruit more but
a demining accident in March 2018 (see below) is thought to
have deterred many potential applicants. 28

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
HALO conducts both manual and mechanical clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh. Machines are used to clear roads with
a plastic anti-vehicle mine threat and in areas with high levels of metal contamination which makes manual clearance
extremely inefﬁcient. 29

DEMINER SAFETY
In March 2018, a HALO vehicle with a technical survey team
on board detonated an anti-vehicle mine on their way to an
anti-personnel mine clearance task, killing three staff and
injuring two others.
The accident was internally investigated by The HALO Trust,
which also commissioned an external expert investigation.
A further investigation by the Nagorno-Karabakh police

was ongoing as at 1 May 2019. As a result of the internal
investigation prodding was halted as a safety precaution
until the exact causes of the accident were understood.
Mechanical clearance and clearance with detectors have
since superseded its use. Copies of HALO Trust’s internal
and external reports will be available once the police
investigation is ﬁnalised. 30

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of almost 0.26km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 0.25km2 was cleared, and 3,148m2 was reduced through
technical survey.
In addition, three CHAs were added to the database with an estimated area of 62,567m2. 31

SURVEY IN 2018
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled through
non-technical survey in 2018 but a total of 3.148m2 was
reduced through technical survey (see Table 2). 32 This is a
massive reduction from the 0.29km2 of mined area cancelled
through non-technical survey and 0.27km2 reduced through
technical survey in 2017. 33

CLEARANCE IN 2018

Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 2018 36
Province
Askeran

In 2018, a total of 253,804m was cleared across 26 areas
with 96 anti-personnel mines and 40 items of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) destroyed (see Table 3). 34 This is a drop from
the 292,176m2 cleared in 2017 and 188 anti-personnel mines
found and destroyed. 35 In 2017, The HALO Trust found one
mine for every 1,974m2 of land cleared while in 2018 it was
one mine for every 2,644m2 cleared.
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1,429

Hadrut

376

Lachin

1,136

Martuni
2

Area reduced (m2)

Total

207
3,148

OTHER AREAS

Province

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Askeran

2

8,849

3

0

4

Hadrut

9

116,306

23

0

13

Lachin

6

48,599

27

0

14

Martakert

7

69,398

43

0

8

Martuni

2

10,652

0

0

1

26

253,804

96

0

40

Totals

In addition, the HALO Trust destroyed 27 anti-personnel
mines during 13 EOD spot tasks in 2018. 38
Progress in mine clearance has ﬂuctuated over the last
ﬁve years, as shown in Table 4, but with clearance output
averaging below 0.5km2 annually. As at 2014, 95% of mine
contamination in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh had been
addressed, and this ﬁgure had risen to 97% by April 2017. 39
Following a commitment from the United States to fund the
completion of clearance of all known remaining mineﬁelds
within Soviet-era boundaries, the HALO Trust had previously
reported that this could be achieved by the end of 2019. 40
However, in April 2019, the HALO Trust stated that it does
not anticipate clearing the mineﬁelds within the Soviet-era
boundaries by the end of 2019 or in the foreseeable future.
The HALO Trust had based the original completion date
on a rate of clearance it is no longer able to achieve due
to difﬁculties in access, challenging terrain, high levels of
contamination which in some cases can only be cleared using
full excavation, and difﬁculties with staff recruitment and
retention as a result of the March 2018 accident. 41

1
2

Table 4: Five-year summary of mine clearance (2014–18)
Year

Area cleared (km2)*

2018

0.25

2017

0.29

2016

0.12

2015

0.21

2014

0.54

Total

1.41

* Figures for clearance in 2014–17 include both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel
mines.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) should reafﬁrm its written commitment to respect and
implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including clearance of all anti-personnel mines
east of the Berm, consonant with its human rights obligations.

■

Facing signiﬁcant challenges due to a decrease in operational capacity and funding for 2019, Western Sahara’s
mine action strategy targets for completing mine survey and clearance should be reassessed, and a revised
mine action strategy developed.

■

A resource mobilisation plan should be developed with the aim of attracting international donor support.

■

Greater support should be provided to the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Ofﬁce (SMACO) to enable it
to continue to coordinate mine action in Western Sahara and ensure that capacity development efforts are
not lost.

■

Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international mine action
community. Support must still be given to address remaining mine, cluster munition, and other explosive
remnants of war (ERW) contamination.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of mine contamination across Western
Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm1 are
thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination
in the world. 2 The contamination is a result of ﬁghting in
previous decades between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces.

At the end of 2018, land in Western Sahara to the east of the
Berm contained a total of 26 areas conﬁrmed and suspected
to contain mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine
contamination covering a total of nearly 216.3km2, as set out
in Table 1. 6 This is an overall decrease of one area with a size
of approximately 1.85km2 from that remaining at the end
of 2017.7

According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the
primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of the Berm,
excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from
anti-vehicle rather than anti-personnel mines; cluster
munition remnants (CMR) are also a major hazard. 3 As at
end 2018, no areas suspected or conﬁrmed to contain solely
anti-personnel mines remained to the east of the Berm, and
the majority of mine contamination identiﬁed during ongoing
and historical clearance efforts was from anti-vehicle mines. 4
However, UNMAS reported that, during the year, as a result
of non-technical survey conducted in the Agwanit Area of
Responsibility, a number of large mineﬁelds previously
thought to contain only anti-vehicle mines were found to
also contain anti-personnel mines. 5

In September 2018, UNMAS reported that following
non-technical survey efforts, 10 of the then 27 mined areas,
were reported to remain covering an estimated total of
almost 120km2, and are located within the 5km-wide buffer
strip and are inaccessible for clearance. 8 Clearance of the
buffer strip of mines and ERW is not foreseen in United
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO) mission agreements, which, according to the
UN, considerably limits the ability of MINURSO military
observers to patrol and verify developments.9

Table 1: Mined area east of the Berm (at end 2018)10
CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total CHAs and SHAs

Total area (km2)

AP mines

0

0

0

0

0

0

AV mines

2

0.11

0

0

2

0.11

Type of contamination

AP/AV mines

14

90.19

10

125.96

24

216.15

Totals

16

90.30

10

125.96

26

216.26

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle CHA = Conﬁrmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area
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contain anti-personnel mines were reported to remain with a
total size of more than 169.5km2.12
According to UNMAS, a total of six additional mined areas
with a size of just over 367,200m2 were added to the database
in 2018.13

Table 2: Mined area containing anti-personnel mines by province east of the Berm (at end 2018)14
Province
North Region

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total CHAs and SHAs

Total area (km2)

4

0.50

3

4.10

7

4.60

South Region

10

89.79

7

121.86

17

211.65

Totals

14

90.29

10

125.96

24

216.25

A survey in 2006–08 by an international non-governmental
organisation (NGO), Landmine Action, later renamed Action
on Armed Violence (AOAV), identiﬁed 37 mined areas east of
the Berm, nearly half of which were in Bir Lahlou, followed
by Tifariti, Mehaires, and Agwanit.15
Neither survey nor clearance has been conducted in the
5km-wide buffer strip to the east of the Berm. The extent
of contamination west of the Berm remains unknown,
and as of 2019, no survey had been carried out there.16

UNMAS reported in 2018 that there were areas of known
contamination in the buffer strip that remained inaccessible
for clearance due to military agreements.17 The RMA
controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been
conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the
RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component
and submits regular monthly reports, helping to build a
clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across
Western Sahara.18

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Western Sahara also has a signiﬁcant problem from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants 2019 report on Western Sahara for further information).19

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action
Coordination Centre (MACC), manages and supports mine
action activities, of which, survey and clearance activities
were implemented by commercial contractor SafeLane
Global (formerly Dynasafe MineTech Limited, DML) and
humanitarian NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2018.
On 30 April 2019, MINURSO’s mandate was extended for an
additional six months until 30 October 2019 under Security
Council Resolution 2468 (2019). UNMAS Western Sahara
serves as the UN focal point for mine action activities within
the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work
in areas east of the Berm only.
The Royal Moroccan Army operates its own demining
operations in areas west of the Berm.
In 2013–14, the Polisario Front, with UN support, established
the SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action
activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm, excluding the
buffer strip. 20

In 2018, UNMAS continued to implement an ongoing capacity
development project with SMACO, with funding from
the German Federal Foreign Ofﬁce, which concluded in
October after 28 months. 21 Emphasis was placed on building
the programme’s capacity to translate local mine action
requirements into proposals and budgets with the aim of
ensuring that SMACO can independently seek funds and
report on progress in the future. 22 UNMAS stated that efforts
were also aimed at regularly raising the proﬁle of SMACO
within the local and wider international communities. 23
NPA also reported continuing its efforts in partnership with
SMACO to develop the local staff capacity through on-the-job
trainings in the support ofﬁce as well as operationally.24 It
stated that SMACO’s ability to coordinate operations improved
signiﬁcantly in 2018, but raised serious concerns about
the cessation of funding from the German government for
capacity development activities, noting that SMACO’s running
costs and ability to pay staff salaries were at risk.25 UNMAS
informed Mine Action Review, however, that it had allocated
non-earmarked funding to cover SMACO’s operating costs for
2019, and to include the development of a communications and
resource mobilisation strategy during that year.26

GENDER
UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented
in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Ofﬁce for Project
Services (UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as
with direction from the Polisario.27 NPA reported that
gender mainstreaming considerations were included in
its Memorandum of Understanding with SMACO, in NPA’s

internal strategy documents, and taken into account during
recruitment. Additionally, during survey, efforts are made to
ensure the needs of men, women, girls, and boys are taken
into consideration for more effective and efﬁcient operations,
despite challenges presented by conducting survey activities
targeting Bedouin populations. 28
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Both the north and south of Western Sahara are known or
suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, with 24 areas
conﬁrmed or suspected areas with a total size of almost
216.3km2 remaining to be addressed at the end of 2018, as set
out in Table 2.11 This is compared to the end of the previous
year, when a total of 11 areas conﬁrmed or suspected to

In 2018, NPA reported that, during recruitment, the
programme actively selected female candidates for interviews
wherever possible. NPA has encouraged local journalists
to highlight the work of female deminers and their ability
to work equally well in a highly challenging environment,
with the aim of overcoming widely held perceptions in local

communities that demining is a job only for men. It stated
that six women were employed in operational roles in 2018,
or just over 18% of the total operational staff. Two women
held managerial roles, including Head of Finance and Head of
Human Resources, making up 40% of NPA’s management staff
in Western Sahara.29

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara improved as
a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015. 30 Routine database clean-up was conducted throughout 2018. 31 The
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has also provided ongoing support to correct database errors,
and an upgrade to the latest database software version, IMSMA Core, was scheduled to take place in August 2019. 32

PLANNING AND TASKING
In July 2019, UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that a new
mine action strategy speciﬁc to Western Sahara was under
development and would be completed in 2019, in line with the
newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. 33
The previous mine action strategy for Western Sahara
foresaw the completion of non-technical survey in 2017 or
2018 and a 50% reduction in the total number of recorded
SHAs and CHAs remaining on the territory of Western
Sahara by the end of 2022. 34 In May 2019, UNMAS informed
Mine Action Review that these targets were not met due to
“changing priorities” for mine action. It reported that the
new end state for completing the clearance of all known

hazards to the east of the Berm would be the end of 2023 in
the forthcoming revised strategy, given enough funding and
enabling political and security conditions. 35

UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both
mineﬁelds and cluster munition strikes to the east of the
Berm in conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities are identiﬁed
based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of
movement of local populations, while UNMAS ensures that
observation patrol routes are safe for military observers
and the transport of logistical supplies. 36

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Local mine action standards were in place and implemented in
2018.37 The standards were developed and ﬁnalised in 2016 by
UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with mine
action partners. NPA has reported that operators duly updated
their standing operating procedures (SoPs), and that the local
mine action standards set realistic benchmarks for efﬁcient
operations.38 A ﬁrst annual review of the standards was
completed in November 2018 with a review board consisting of
representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and all implementing
partners. No signiﬁcant changes were made, and UNMAS
reported in June 2019 that translation of the standards into
Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.39

An external quality management system was in place in 2018
and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of the
Berm. 40 NPA conﬁrmed a considerable increase in quality
assurance (QA) activities in 2018, which it said was due to
the relocation of UNMAS to Tindouf, Algeria, with easier
access to territory under Polisario control. NPA conﬁrmed
that SMACO and UNMAS QA ofﬁcers conducted many QA site
visits in 2018, conducted accreditation for new NPA staff,
monitored progress on tasks, and conducted quality control
of completed areas. 41

OPERATORS
SafeLane Global (formerly DML) and NPA were the
implementing operators conducting survey and clearance
in Western Sahara in 2018. UNMAS reported no change in
operational capacity during the year. The overall mine action
capacity in Western Sahara in 2018 consisted of nine multitask teams (MTTs) and one community liaison/survey team,
with a total of 116 operational staff in the ﬁeld. This included
six DML teams and one community liaison/survey team. The
total number of MTTs was reduced by one in July 2018. 42
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In 2018, NPA continued to deploy one team to clear mined
areas and two manual teams to address CMR in Bir
Lahlou, along with ﬁve risk education teams operating in
the Saharawi refugee camps in southern Algeria. The risk
education project, funded by Germany and supervised
by UNMAS/SMACO, ended in April 2018. 43 NPA made the
“difﬁcult decision” to close down its programme, effective on
1 January 2019, after releasing the last known contaminated
areas in Bir Lehlou province in August 2018. 44
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of nearly 3.71km2 of mixed mined area was released
in 2018: more than 2.38km2 through clearance and 1.32km2
through survey. 45

SURVEY IN 2018
According to UNMAS, of the 1.32km2 released through
survey in 2018, more than 0.87km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey (see Table 3) and 0.45km2 reduced
through technical survey. 46

Table 3: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical
survey in 201847
Region

Operator

Area cancelled (m²)

North

SLG

182,868

North

NPA

346,359

South

SLG

342,198

Total

871,425

Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey
in 201848
Area reduced (m2)

Region

Operator

North

NPA

265,492

North

SLG

185,264

Total

450,756

CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, according to UNMAS, a total of just over 2.38km2 of
areas thought to contain mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mine contamination was cleared, with the destruction of
37 anti-personnel mines, 35 anti-vehicle mines, and three
items of UXO (see Table 5). 49 This was a substantial increase
from 2017, when close to 0.28km2 of area thought to contain
anti-personnel mines contamination was cleared; however
no anti-personnel mines were found. Thirty-two anti-vehicle
mines and ten items of UXO were destroyed. 50
Western Sahara is not a state party to the APMBC. In June
2014, however, the SADR submitted a voluntary APMBC
Article 7 transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the
support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty”. 51
In July 2019, UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that a new
mine action strategy speciﬁc to Western Sahara was under
development and would be completed by the end of year, in
line with the newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy
2019–2023. 52
The previous mine action strategy for Western Sahara
foresaw the completion of non-technical survey before
the end of 2018 and a 50% reduction in the total number of
recorded SHAs and CHAs remaining in Western Sahara by
the end of 2022. 53 In May 2019, UNMAS reported that the
new end state for clearance of all known mine and ERW
contamination to the east of the Berm would be set at the
end of 2023. 54

This is almost two years earlier than UNMAS’ previous
estimate, which had sought to release all high and medium
hazardous areas in Western Sahara east of the Berm by
2025. 55 UNMAS has reported that delays to clearing mined
areas continued as a result of restrictions on accessing
certain areas of the buffer strip established by various
MINURSO mission agreements. 56 NPA has cited other
challenges to operations, including working in a remote
desert environment allied to serious difﬁculties with
the procurement of certain equipment and materials. 57
Temperatures of up to 60 degrees Celsius, strong winds,
sandstorms, and heavy rain during the wet season can also
cause mine action activities to be suspended. 58
In 2019, with the loss of NPA as a key mine action implementer,
along with the cessation of both German and Norwegian
funding for mine clearance activities, the future of Western
Sahara’s mine action programme remained uncertain.
Additional resources and capacity, along with support to
SMACO, needed to be secured urgently. In July 2019, UNMAS
informed Mine Action Review that mine action capacity had
reduced by more than 50% and there was no indication of
funding available to maintain capacity going forward.59

Table 5: Mine clearance in 201860
Region

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

North

NPA

2

1,040,387

37

5

2

North

SLG

3

508,228

0

8

0

South

DML

2

834,911

0

22

1

7

2,383,526

37

35

3

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

1

2

A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm was built during the conﬂict,
dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west and the
Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the Berlin
Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AND ACRONYMS
AIM

Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan)

AP

Anti-personnel

AV

Anti-vehicle

BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CHA

Conﬁrmed hazardous area

DDG

Danish Demining Group

ERW

Explosive remnants of war

FSD

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action

GICHD

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

GIS

Geographic information system

HI

Humanity and Inclusion

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

IP

Implementing Partner

MAG

Mines Advisory Group

MAPA

Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan

MDD

Mine detection dog

NMAS

National Mine Action Standards

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

QA

Quality assurance

QC

Quality control

SHA

Suspected hazardous area

SoP

Standing (or Standard) Operating Procedure

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

UXO

Unexploded ordnance
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